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A Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution 1985-86



The Canadian Institute for
International Peace and Security
307 Gilmour Street,
Ottawa, Ontario K2P 0P7

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A GUIDE TO
CANADIAN POLICIES ON
ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT,
DEFENCE AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
1985-86



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ISBN 0-921523-00-9



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INTRODUCTION

This guide is designed to provide Canadians with a readily accessible check list of issues in the field of peace and security. It seeks to identify the major policy issues to which Canada responded in the period beginning January 1985 and ending July 1986, to place them in context, and, where appropriate, to cite a range of Parliamentary comment on these issues.

In identifying official Canadian policies, we have relied entirely on public statements by Government leaders and responsible officials. The statements are either summarized or excerpted verbatim.

The guide is not itself designed as a commentary, and contains no interpretative opinion as such, although the choice of excerpts and statements inevitably requires editorial discretion. Our purpose, therefore, is to assemble in one collection materials which will give to the interested reader a basic reference source on Canadian policies in the field of peace and security, and, at the same time, to indicate the scope for further enquiry.

In organizing the contents, we have chosen to follow the subject order identified in the mandate of the Institute, viz: arms control and disarmament, defence, and conflict resolution. The reader may wish to note that the last category - conflict resolution - has been defined for the present purposes as Canadian responses to major regional conflict issues.

Each entry is organized under four headings - Background, Current Canadian Position, Parliamentary Comment and Current References. These headings have been defined in the following manner:

Background provides an account of the basic issue. It seeks to avoid excessive detail, but to draw on recent material as appropriate in order to set the context of current policy issues. Where Canadian policy prior to 1985 was integral to the development of the issue itself, or where it is necessary to an understanding of the current Canadian position, it is included under this heading.

Current Canadian Position is based on statements by Ministers and responsible officials, and identifies the development of Canadian policy since January 1985.

Parliamentary Comment is intended primarily to capture the formal response of the opposition parties. For the most part it relies on statements and questions in the House of Commons by designated spokespersons on foreign and defence policy. Committee hearings have been used primarily in the Background section, and, when appropriate, in describing the current Canadian position.

Current References is designed for the most part to indicate only some of the most recent materials relevant to the issue; the section is not intended to be an extensive reference list.

The Institute may consider updating and expanding this guide on an annual basis. Therefore, we welcome and invite comment on its utility, and format, and suggestions for improvement. Specifically, we envisage that a further edition would cover the period August 1st 1986-July 31st 1987. It might also extend the coverage to include editorial and other opinion on the issues identified.

The individual entries were researched and written by Steven Baranyi, Jane Boulden and Mary Goldie, research assistants at the Institute during 1985 and 1986. Professor Donald Munton contributed the section on public opinion. The volume has been edited by David Cox and Mary Taylor. All of the above owe a considerable debt to Doina Cioiu for typing, formatting and vigilance in the preparation of the manuscript.

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SECTION I - ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

1. THE ABM TREATY

Background

The SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms were signed by Soviet General-Secretary Brezhnev and US President Nixon on 26 May 1972. The SALT negotiations began in November 1969. Since they were unable to reach final agreement on strategic offensive arms limits, the parties agreed to make the ABM Treaty separate and of unlimited duration, while signing an interim agreement on offensive arms limitations.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States undertook Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programmes during the 1960s. In the United States, the BMD issue sparked a prolonged public debate. The advisability of developing BMD centred on two main concerns: the ease with which the defences could be overcome by large numbers of cheaper offensive missiles, and the possibility that BMD deployments might destabilize deterrence based on the concept of mutual assured destruction. This concept, which had become the basis of nuclear deterrence, assumes the impossibility of an adequate defence against nuclear weapons.

The ABM Treaty prohibits both sides from deploying a nation-wide BMD and limits each to two ABM deployment areas (this was amended to one area on 3 July 1974). The Treaty also puts restraints on radars and interceptor missiles and prohibits the development, testing or deployment of sea, air, space or mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. Extensive verification measures are provided for in the Treaty, which also established the Standing Consultative Committee to deal with questions of Treaty interpretation and compliance. The United States Senate ratified the Treaty by a vote of 88 to 2.

During the 1970s both the United States and the Soviet Union continued

research into ballistic missile defence. In 1975, the US dismantled the BMD system it had deployed at a missile base in Grand Forks, North Dakota.

The Soviet Union has kept its BMD deployment around Moscow. As the ICBM counterforce capability (the ability to accurately strike enemy missile silos) improved, the question of defending against ballistic missiles surfaced again, since 'hard point' defence of missile silos would be easier to achieve than population defence. From the outset, therefore, the new Reagan Administration gave more attention to BMD than had previous administrations.

In March 1983, President Reagan announced that the United States would pursue the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to provide a defence that would make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete". The ABM Treaty, therefore, entered a new and uncertain phase, since the final goal of SDI contradicts the very basis of the ABM Treaty. Although President Reagan has stated that SDI research will be conducted within the limits of the ABM Treaty, the Administration has put forward two interpretations of the terms of the Treaty: a "strict" interpretation of the Treaty which might quickly conflict with the SDI programme, and a "broad" interpretation which would allow the US much more leeway in the research programme while remaining within the Treaty. This has again sparked a debate within the United States over the benefits of the ABM Treaty and its intended limitations. In particular, there is concern that the "broad" interpretation is a first step towards complete abrogation of the Treaty.

One of the reasons cited in support of the SDI is Soviet BMD development and its alleged violation of the Treaty. In particular, the United States has expressed concern about Soviet construction of a new phased array radar. The ABM Treaty allows the construction of such radars only on the periphery of the country and only if they are oriented outwards. The US maintains that the new Soviet radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk does

not meet these criteria, and may be an element of a future nation-wide ABM system. The Soviet Union has stated that the radar is intended for space-tracking and is thus permitted under the Treaty.

Current Canadian Position

On 21 January 1985 the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, outlined the Government's position on SDI and expressed concern about its implications for the ABM Treaty.

...actual development and deployment of space-based ballistic missile defence systems by either side would transgress the limits of the ABM Treaty as currently constituted. That could have serious implications for arms control and would therefore warrant close and careful attention by all concerned. We welcome, in this regard, President Reagan's affirmation that the USA would not proceed beyond research without discussion and negotiation.¹

At the Quebec Summit in March 1985, Canada and the United States signed a declaration on international security that included a statement on the ABM Treaty. The Declaration stated:

We are agreed that [the SDI] is prudent and is in conformity with the ABM Treaty. In this regard, we agree that steps beyond research would, in view of the ABM Treaty, be matters for discussion and negotiation.²

Mr. Clark reiterated the Canadian position in the House of Commons.

...Canada intends to honour our obligations under the ABM Treaty. Not only do we intend to honour them, but we now have a document signed by the

¹ Commons Debates, 21 January 1985, p. 1502.

² Declaration by the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States of America Regarding International Security, 18 March 1985.

President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada which reaffirms the intention of both Canada and the United States to respect the ABM Treaty in so far as SDI is concerned.³

In January 1986, Mr. Clark again outlined Canada's strong support for the ABM Treaty.

Canada firmly supports the regime created by the ABM Treaty....Our stance toward SDI research is rooted in the need to conform strictly with the provisions of the ABM Treaty. We will continue to urge the parties to these treaties to do nothing to undermine their integrity but, rather, to work to reinforce their status and their authority.⁴

Parliamentary Comment

In March 1985, NDP member Pauline Jewett cautioned Mr. Clark that SDI would damage the ABM Treaty. She said:

...research inevitably leads to development and deployment....Therefore, pursuit of star wars will mean abandoning deterrence, threatening the ABM Treaty and diverting money and races to an armed race in space.⁵

Mr. Clark responded:

...the interpretation of the ABM Treaty is an interpretation which allows research. That is all that Canada has approved...we have now received an invitation to consider taking part in that research. That is consistent with the ABM Treaty.⁶

NDP member Derek Blackburn asked the Prime Minister if he agreed that "any

³ Commons Debates, 19 March 1985. p. 3166.

⁴ Commons Debates, 23 January 1986. p. 10101.

⁵ Commons Debates, 28 March 1985. p. 3459.

⁶ Ibid., p. 3460.

violation of [the ABM Treaty] would threaten world peace?" Mr. Clark responded:

...Canada supports that Treaty. We intend to remain vigilant and active in our support of that Treaty. We intend that the actions of Canada will remain consistent with our support of that treaty.⁷

In January of 1986 Ms. Jewett again pursued the question, asking the Secretary of State to make a clear statement on the issue.

I do not feel that there is an enormous amount of evidence right now which shows that the Americans, and to a lesser extent the Soviets, are distinguishing between research, testing and development. [as required by the ABM Treaty]....We need a clear statement from the Government with respect to how it interprets the question of research and the tremendous intermingling of research, testing and development.⁸

In June 1986 the Special Joint Committee submitted its report on Canada's international relations. They recommended that Canada

intensify its efforts...to win acceptance for a comprehensive set of arms control measures...[including] measures to enhance strategic stability. The latter should include, in particular, reaffirmation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, interpreted strictly as prohibiting all but basic research on defensive systems.⁹

Current References

T. Longstreth, J.E. Pike, J.B. Rhineland, The Impact of US and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defence Programs on the ABM Treaty, National Campaign to Save the Treaty, March 1985.

⁷ Commons Debates, 5 March 1985, p. 2745.

⁸ Commons Debates, 23 January 1986, p. 10104.

⁹ Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations, Independence and Internationalism, June 1986.

National Academy of Sciences "Strategic Defensive Arms Control: The SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty." Nuclear Arms Control Background and Issues Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1985, pp. 136-158.

A.B. Sherr, "The Languages of Arms Control", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November 1985, pp. 23-29.

Cross References

Canada-US Exchange of Letters on the SDI Research.

2. ARMS CONTROL TREATY COMPLIANCE: SALT II

Background

The SALT II Treaty limiting strategic nuclear forces was signed by US President Carter and Soviet leader Brezhnev in Vienna on 10 June 1979. Although the agreement was never ratified by the US Senate, both the United States and the Soviet Union have continued to abide by its terms.

The SALT II Treaty officially expired on 31 December, 1985. In 1985 President Reagan made two reports to Congress¹ outlining Soviet violations of arms control treaties. While most of these concerned the SALT II and Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaties, possible violations of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention were also listed. With respect to the SALT II Treaty, the United States is primarily concerned with a new mobile Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the SS-25. The US states that this is an illegal second new missile and that the Soviet Union has excessively encrypted the telemetry on the missile's test flights. The Soviet Union contends that the SS-25 is a modernization, within the limits of the Treaty, of an older missile, the SS-13.

On 10 June 1985 President Reagan announced that the United States would dismantle an older ballistic missile submarine when a new Trident submarine was deployed in September 1985. This kept the US within SALT limits. However, Reagan warned that future compliance decisions would be taken on a 'case-by-case' basis and that the United States reserved the right to exceed treaty limits in the future as a 'proportionate response' to Soviet treaty violations. Defence Secretary Weinberger submitted a report on possible responses to Soviet violations in January 1986.

¹ President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements, 1 February 1985 and 23 December 1985.

With the launching of another new Trident submarine in May 1986, the Reagan Administration re-evaluated the compliance situation and possible American responses. Reagan announced that the United States would dismantle two older Poseidon submarines, thus keeping the US technically within the limits of the SALT II Treaty. The President stated, however, that the submarines were being dismantled for economic reasons, (the submarines had reached the end of their useful life) and not because of SALT limits. He also indicated that because of continued Soviet violations of the Treaty, the United States would make future force structure decisions based on the nature of the Soviet threat and not on the basis of SALT limits. The next force structure decision for the United States will occur in the fall of 1986 when continued American deployment of air-launched cruise missiles on strategic bombers will take it above SALT limits unless a decision is made to compensate for these deployments.

Current Canadian Position

In a statement to the House of Commons on 23 January 1986 the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, outlined the government's position on treaty compliance:

To deviate from a policy of full compliance is to threaten the credibility, and hence the viability of arms control. Canada firmly supports the regime created by the ABM treaty and the existing SALT agreements on limiting strategic forces...We will continue to urge the parties to these treaties to do nothing to undermine their integrity, but rather work to reinforce their status and authority.²

Responding to the American decision on SALT II in his opening comments at

² Commons Debates, 23 January 1986, p. 10101.

the NATO Ministerial Meeting at Halifax, Mr. Clark said:

Regrettably, the Soviet record of compliance has raised so many questions that the United States itself now no longer feels compelled to abide by the SALT II agreement. That is a profoundly disturbing development and one we hoped could have been avoided. Let us hope the Soviet record improves and that President Reagan's May 27 announcement is not the final word on the issue.³

On 27 May 1986 Mr. Clark issued a statement on the American decision on SALT II. He said:

We welcomed the President's decision even in the absence of a satisfactory Soviet response to dismantle a Poseidon submarine last June and his plan to scrap two Poseidons when the next Trident submarine goes to sea. We are, however, very concerned about the implications of the President's stated intention to exceed SALT II limits late this year....It is our fervent hope that in the time remaining before the end of the year the USSR and the USA will reach an understanding on means to ensure continued respect for the limits of the SALT II accord....⁴

Parliamentary Comment

A Liberal member, the Honourable Warren Allmand, expressed concern over the American decision:

The unilateral decision by the United States could lead to a massive escalation in the arms race and significantly threaten the peace and existence of all nations, not just the US and the Soviet Union. In these grave circumstances I urge the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Clark), with his NATO allies, to make

³ DEA Statement 86/34, 29 May 1986.

⁴ DEA Statement 86/33, 27 May 1986.

further representations to the United States to abandon this dangerous unilateral initiative.⁵

NDP member Derek Blackburn called upon the Government to state that it would end cruise missile testing if the US exceeds SALT II limits:

Let us be just as vocal about our opposition to American threats to abandon SALT II later this year. It would be ironic if deployment of the air-launched cruise missile, which Canada helped develop, broke SALT II. Canada should make clear that we would no longer allow cruise missile testing in Canada if the US broke SALT II.⁶

Mr. Blackburn also asked:

...if Canada continues to develop the air-launched cruise, regardless of what transpires in the meantime, is it not supporting the Reagan administration policy that SALT II should not be considered in determining deployments?⁷

Mr. Clark responded:

Mr. Speaker, the short answer to that is no, because the ultimate decision on SALT II limits has yet to be taken. If I may just underline... the importance of making the case to both the Americans and the Soviet Union, there is an expectation on the part of Canadians that both of them will respect the Treaty. The Americans have, the Soviet Union has not. We should be making the case to the Soviet Union, on questions such as, for example, the way they are encrypting telemetry and on the way they have moved into a second system, that they are in violation of the SALT II limits. If they believe they are not, they should respond to the representations of Canada and other countries and make that evidence clear.⁸

⁵ Commons Debates, 5 June 1986, p. 13999.

⁶ Commons Debates, 29 May 1986, p. 13760.

⁷ Commons Debates, 2 June 1986, p. 13864.

⁸ Ibid.

NDP member Pauline Jewett asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence, Erik Nielsen to outline the Soviet violations of the SALT II Treaty which the Prime Minister had said earlier were too numerous to mention. Mr. Nielsen declined, stating that "I do not believe I have the time to go into detail on the floor of the House of Commons"⁹. Ms. Jewett pursued the issue and said that "It is incumbent upon the Department [of Defence] and the Government to tell us what these violations are. I ask the Minister to do so now."¹⁰

In response to this and further questions, Mr. Nielsen referred to the ABM Treaty, but not to SALT II.

Pauline Jewett pursued the issue with Mr. Nielsen on the 13 June, again asking him to provide examples of SALT II violations and asking that he bring cruise missile testing in Canada to an end as a protest against the American decision. Mr. Nielsen responded:

There are clear breaches in the bringing on by the Soviets of the SS-25 missile. That is a clear breach. A clear breach is the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, that is a clear breach of SALT II.¹² It is a clear breach of SALT II to encrypt telemetry, which the Soviets are doing....If those are brought onside and the Soviet Union demonstrates that it intends to honour the provisions of SALT II surely that is the desirable situation and would lead to more greatly enhanced arms limitation agreements....¹³

Liberal member the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy asked Mr. Nielsen what measures Canada would take to express disappointment with the American decision, in particular, suggesting that Canada should refuse to test the cruise missile if the US exceeded the SALT II limits. Mr. Nielsen said:

⁹ Commons Debates, 30 May 1986, p. 13872.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 13803.

¹² The radar at Krasnoyarsk is a possible violation of the ABM Treaty.

¹³ Commons Debates, 13 June 1986, p. 14365.

...the ultimate objective here is achieving an enhanced arms limitation agreement. That achievement can not be unilateral....The Geneva talks are ongoing. New proposals have been made, and no doubt will be made. I think the actions of the Government of Canada should support that far more desirable objective of an enhanced arms control agreement.¹⁴

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Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Soviet Noncompliance 1 February 1986.

Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament. Canada and the Current Crisis in Arms Control Communiqué No. 25, 5 June 1986.

A. Gliksman, "The Soviet Arms Control Compliance Record, Parts 1 and 2" National Defence, February 1986, pp. 61-70, March 1986, pp. 43-47.

L. Sartori, "Will SALT II Survive?" International Security Winter 1985-86, pp. 147-174.

J.A. Schear, "Arms Control Treaty Compliance" International Security, Fall 1985, pp. 141-182.

R. Jeffrey Smith "Administration at Odds Over Soviet Cheating" Science, May 10, 1985, pp. 695-696.

J. Voas "The Arms Control Compliance Debate" Survival, January-February 1986.

Cross References

Verification

The ABM Treaty

NATO

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 14363.

3. CANADA AS A NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONE

Background

Nuclear weapons-free zones (NWFZ) were first discussed in the 1950s. They are seen as a way of limiting the deployment and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The first proposal for a NWFZ was put forward by Poland in 1957 at the United Nations General Assembly. Known as the Rapacki Plan (named after the Polish Foreign Minister) the proposal called for a nuclear-free zone covering Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and West Germany. No nuclear weapons would be manufactured or stockpiled in this zone and the use of nuclear weapons against the area would be forbidden. The Plan proposed a broad system of air and ground surveillance, run jointly by the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations to ensure compliance. The Plan failed to gain support from the Western Powers.

The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 established the first nuclear weapons-free zone in the uninhabited Antarctic region. This was followed by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Sea-bed Treaty of 1971.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established Latin America as the only populated NWFZ in the world, was signed in 1967. Twenty five Latin American nations are party to this Treaty, under which they agree not to test, produce or acquire nuclear weapons or to allow other nations to deploy them on their territory. Protocol II of the Treaty was signed by all five nuclear weapons states and requires them to respect the nuclear-free status of Latin America, and to agree not to threaten to use weapons against the Treaty's members.

Other areas have also been proposed as nuclear weapons-free zones. These include: the Nordic states, the Balkan states, Africa, the Middle East, the Pacific and Southern Asia.

Two proposals to make Canada a NWFZ were put forward in the House of Commons in 1985. Private Member's Bill C-218, was introduced by NDP member Les Benjamin in December 1984.¹ The Bill proposed to prohibit the development, testing, manufacture, import, transport or storage of any nuclear weapon or components thereof within Canada, its coastal waters and its airspace. On 10 October 1985, Neil Young, also of the NDP presented a motion to declare Canada a nuclear arms-free zone. On 5 March 1986 Jim Fulton (NDP) introduced for first reading Bill C-264, an Act to declare Canada a nuclear weapons-free zone.

Current Canadian Position

In response to the second reading of these Bills, Gerry Weiner, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, emphasized the importance that the Canadian Government attaches to its NATO membership. Although there are no nuclear weapons stationed on Canadian soil, and overflights and port visits of nuclear armed vessels can only occur with Government permission, Canada continues to participate fully in NATO and to believe in the nuclear deterrent on which it is based. He said:

The idea of a nuclear weapons-free zone for Canada...would be realistic only if the Canadian Government were prepared to withdraw from the Alliance....The Canadian Government continues to believe that our defence partnership, co-operation and defence production sharing arrangements with our allies make a greater contribution to preserving peace and security than would our withdrawal into the uncertain isolation of a nuclear weapons-free zone.²

Mr. Weiner went on to ask whether withdrawing from NATO would enhance the prospects for peace and diminish the chance of nuclear war:

¹ Commons Debates, 13 December 1984.

² Commons Debates, 18 March 1985, p. 3133.

Would Canada's voice be listened to more seriously and would our words carry greater weight in the corridors of power around the world because we were no longer a member of the NATO Alliance? The answer to these questions remains unequivocally 'No'. Canada's possibilities for influencing these events would be greatly weakened and the stability of the East-West balance immeasurably shaken.³

In further comments, Mr. Weiner pointed out that making Canada a NWFZ would preclude the testing of the cruise missile, to which the Government is committed, and which it believes to be an important response to Soviet force modernization. This action would also mean the loss of jobs at places such as Litton Industries, which manufacture components for the cruise missile guidance system.

Finally, Mr. Weiner stated that the real answer to the nuclear problem lay in continued discussion and consultation:

Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented. They are a terrifying reality which political leadership must seek to constrain. Yet, a failure to incorporate a credible nuclear component within NATO's overall strategy would be an invitation to nuclear blackmail, with consequences too terrible to contemplate. In this sense, the real question before us is how we can best achieve policies which will reduce the recourse to nuclear weapons in Europe and elsewhere.⁴

In an outline of defence and security issues affecting Canada, the Department of National Defence stated that declaring Canada a NWFZ

...would be seen by our allies as an attempt by Canada to exploit all the benefits of alliance membership without being prepared to share the obligations....Nuclear-free zones are not nuclear-safe ones....To argue that removing nuclear weapons or declaring oneself to be nuclear-free makes one's territory safe from nuclear threat is a cruel deception.⁵

³ Ibid.

⁴ Commons Debates, 10 October 1985, p. 7575.

⁵ Department of National Defence, Defence and Security Issues, January 1985, p. 5.

On a more sympathetic note, and speaking about the idea of NWFZ in general, the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, said that one of Canada's goals at the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is

...to reiterate Canada's strong sympathy for the concept of regional nuclear weapons-free zones as specified in the NPT where these are feasible and seem likely to contribute to stability.⁶

Parliamentary Comment

NDP member Les Benjamin, sponsor of Bill C-218, stated:

There may be some who call the Bill anti-American or anti-NATO, but we have no commitment or no responsibility to NATO on nuclear weapons and there is no disloyalty in excusing ourselves from our friends' company while they are engaged in an activity which is morally wrong and not in our best interest.

.....

It is impossible for this Bill to protect immediately the people of Canada from nuclear war....However, it does protect us from the ignorance of nuclear deterrent advocates and the false sense of security that they create in the minds of Canadians when they expose their simplistic myth of maintaining nuclear balance.⁷

Mr. Benjamin emphasized Canada's role as a peacekeeper and suggested that making Canada a NWFZ was consistent with Canadian support of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Neil Young, in presenting his motion to declare Canada a nuclear arms-free zone, also emphasized that Canada's reputation as a peacekeeper gave it a role to play.

He suggested that Canada should let the United States know that it is against the cruise missile and its potential role in limited nuclear war by

⁶ Douglas Roche, An Address to the York University Conference on the Third Review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Toronto, 16 May 1985, p. 10.

⁷ Commons Debates, 18 March 1985, p. 3132.

refusing to test the missile or allow cruise-missile vessels in Canadian waters.

Pointing to the history of the discussion of NWFZs in other areas, Mr. Young said:

Discussion of the concept of a nuclear weapons-free zone has a long history in some parts of the world. In Canada the legislature of the Province of Manitoba passed a resolution declaring that province a nuclear weapons-free zone. Over 80 municipalities in Canada have declared themselves nuclear weapons-free zones. Last year nearly half a million Canadians signed a peace petition calling for, among other things, a nuclear weapons-free zone in Canada.⁸

He went on to say:

It is time for Canada to take the initiative in this area. Canada has viewed its options too narrowly and has not been willing to take an independent enough foreign policy position....Making Canada a nuclear weapons-free zone will set an example for others in the world and will be a concrete step toward making the world a safe place⁹

Liberal member Jean-Robert Gauthier stated that "we are neither for nor against the concept of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Canada"¹⁰ and asked that the issue be referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence. In October, Liberal member Charles Caccia repeated the Liberal desire that the issue go to committee to allow a full public debate. The issue "has an outlook and breadth of scope that, in consideration of the present international climate, deserves the full attention of all interested parliamentarians".¹¹

⁸ Commons Debates, 10 October 1985, p. 7573.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 18 March 1985, p. 3135.

¹¹ Commons Debates, 10 October 1985, p. 7575.

Current References

"Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones and Zones of Peace" The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1985, United Nations, 1985, pp. 89-106.

Clarkson S., "Continuity or Change: A Non-Nuclear Choice?" Canada and the Reagan Challenge: Crisis and Adjustment 1981-85 (Toronto: Lorimer and Co.), 1985, pp. 267-269.

Regehr, E., "Canada as a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone" Canada and the Arms Race, (Toronto: Lorimer and Co.), 1983, pp. 241-249.

4. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Background

In recent years there have been various allegations about the use of chemical weapons in regional conflicts. This has raised awareness of the importance of prohibition. The early conclusion of a chemical weapons ban has been designated a priority by the Canadian Government. Negotiations in this area take place primarily in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). In addition, Canada has been involved in meetings sponsored by Australia (in June and September of 1985) to discuss ways to present obstacles to the possible use of chemical weapons. Officials and chemical experts, representing the United States and the Western European and Asian countries with advanced chemical technology, participated in these meetings.¹

Although a chemical weapons ban has been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament and its various antecedents since 1968, little substantive progress had been made by 1980. Therefore, in an attempt to facilitate action, the forty-nation CD established the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. All CD participants were represented. Their first task was to define the issues that a ban on chemical weapons should cover. The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases, and many of its signatories, including Canada, retain the right to retaliate to any attack by chemical weapons. The second task of the Working Group was to draft a comprehensive treaty which would constitute an effective and verifiable ban on the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons.

In view of the limitations of the Geneva Protocol and in the hope of providing a basis for further multilateral negotiations, Canada submitted

¹ "Proliferating Poison - The Fight Against the Spread of Chemical Weapons", The Washington Post, 23 September, 1985.

two working papers to the CD in 1980, the first on ways of organizing and controlling verification, and the second on the definition and scope of a chemical weapons treaty. These papers resembled the previous eight Canadian submissions to the various prior incarnations of the CD in emphasizing verification, and the definition and promotion of a chemical weapons treaty. Two working papers submitted in 1981 dealt with (1) verification and control requirements for a chemical weapons treaty, and (2) the disposal of chemical agents.²

In 1983, Canadian Ambassador Donald McPhail chaired the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. He is credited with facilitating tangible advances in the negotiating process. Drawing from recent Soviet and American working papers that laid out their respective positions in a comprehensive fashion, the Group developed a consensus document which identified the elements of a comprehensive treaty, and outlined areas of agreement and disagreement.

Some progress was made during 1983 but resolution of the problems involving verification and compliance remained elusive. Disagreement remained over how extensive the list of banned precursors (those chemicals used as the basis for various chemical weapons) should be, especially since many have accepted industrial uses. A longstanding problem is the dispute between those who emphasize national security demands for non-intrusive means of verification, and those states insisting on more stringent means of control.

²Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Committee on Disarmament, Chemical Weapons - Working Papers, 1969-1982 Sessions, Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs, April 1983. (This reference contains all the Canadian working papers through 1982. None were submitted between 1983 and 1985, in part because of the Canadian chairmanship in 1983 and early 1984. In 1986 two papers were submitted.)

In 1984 agreement was reached that the destruction of existing stocks should be subject to systematic international inspection, but there was disagreement over the particular inspection procedures to be used. There were also significant differences regarding the right to demand and refuse on-site inspections, the need to declare the location of production facilities, and the requirements of non-intrusive but effective means to control the remaining chemical industrial base. The United States tabled a "Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons" in April 1984, but there was little progress in overcoming the disagreements between the two sides.

Current Canadian Position

In the Ad Hoc Committee, Canada has stressed the need for a comprehensive but politically acceptable regime of verification. In 1985 Ambassador J. Alan Beesley reiterated the need for procedural reform throughout the CD. He criticized the frequently repetitious deliberations and urged the recognition and expansion of common ground, with less emphasis on divergences. He called for less criticism and more positive proposals from all delegations.

Beesley expressed Canadian interest in both non-proliferation and verification in his April 1985 address to the CD, which stressed the importance of achieving a verifiable ban on chemical weapons. He noted that Canada, in agreement with many other countries, had imposed controls on the export of certain chemicals that could be used in the production of extremely toxic weaponry. However, the closing-off of production routes for these weapons required a comprehensive treaty to make the action really effective.³

³ Conference on Disarmament, Chemical Weapons-Final Records (PV) 1985 Session, Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs, February, 1986, CD/PV 306, 4 April 1985.

In June 1985, Beesley recommended widespread support for the UN Secretary-General's fact-finding mission into the allegations regarding the use of chemical weapons. He linked the consequent urgency of the negotiations with the need to uphold and strengthen the Geneva Protocol and to avoid any situation in the future where the renunciation of a modern chemical weapons treaty would also free the state in question from pre-existing obligations under the Geneva Protocol. He voiced serious concern that the confirmed reports of actual use of chemical weapons in the Iraq-Iran war did not bode well for the long-term significance of international law.⁴

In his last public address to the CD during the 1985 session, Ambassador Beesley reported on a Canadian study concerning the legality of inspecting private chemical companies at short notice.⁵ The study concluded that, in the Canadian case, existing legislation would allow for verification which includes on-site inspection at short notice.

During the 1985 session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, there were some qualified successes regarding treaty language banning civilian production of certain precursor chemicals, but not all supertoxic lethal chemicals were covered. Basic problems involving verification and compliance remained, despite efforts to overcome them.

At the 40th General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1985, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, stated that an "early conclusion of a chemical weapons treaty is now within reach in the Conference on Disarmament." He promised that Canada would "develop and make available to the UN, practical studies on chemical weapons use, along with Canadian specialists to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons."⁶ On 4 December 1985, Canadian representatives presented

⁴ CD/PV 313, 18 June 1985.

⁵ CD/PV 322, 18 July 1985.

⁶ DFA Statements and Speeches, no. 85/10.

Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar with a 174-page Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, which sets out detailed operational methods for an effective, impartial, on-site investigation into allegations of use of such weapons.⁷ An accompanying letter from Mr. Clark expressed full support for past initiatives in investigating allegations of use of chemical weapons and noted previous Canadian contributions to this field.

Chemical weapons were the main issue in three resolutions tabled at the UN General Assembly in the fall of 1985. Canada sponsored resolution 40/92B, which expressed "regret and concern" that a chemical and bacteriological (biological) prohibition had not been agreed upon and urged the CD "to intensify ...and reinforce further its efforts", and spend more time on the negotiations. Canada abstained on resolution 40/92A (sponsored by the Eastern Bloc) which urged the CD "to intensify the negotiations...and...the drafting process" in order to submit the convention to the General Assembly in 1986. The resolution also called upon all states "to refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons on the territory of other states." Of the NATO Allies, thirteen opposed this resolution, while Denmark and Greece joined Canada in abstaining. (In 1985, the American Congress had voted to fund the modernization of American chemical weapons if the NATO allies agreed to the new binary weapons.) Canada and the NATO Allies all voted in favour of resolution 40/92C, which noted with concern reports of chemical weapon use and proliferation, and condemned all contravention of existing prohibitions against chemical and biological weapons. The Soviet Union voted against this resolution.

In his first address to the CD in 1986, Ambassador Beesley spoke of "known instances of recent chemical weapons use" and urged collective action for swift success in attaining a treaty. Confirmed use in 1984 and 1985, the

⁷ DFA Press Release no. 185, 4 December 1985.

identification of Iraq as the perpetrator in 1986, and the recent disclosure by US State Department officials that Iran had the capability to use chemical weapons, lent urgency to the work in the Ad Hoc Committee. In March 1984, the Secretary-General's investigative team concluded that chemical weapons had been used "on many occasions."⁸ The Ambassador also voiced Canadian "readiness in principle to accept and apply" the verification proposals tabled in the US draft treaty of 1984. He called for "concrete, substantive alternative comprehensive proposals" from those who criticized the US suggestions. Turning to the "interim steps" involving possible multilateral agreement on the non-transfer of chemical weapons suggested by General Secretary Gorbachev, Beesley agreed with the US response. He noted that it would be of "limited utility" to have "an effective bilateral convention which is not a comprehensive convention in both senses in extending to all the main issues under negotiation and comprising a genuine non-proliferation convention."

The Ambassador stated that he was "greatly encouraged" by the recent statement by Mikhail Gorbachev (15 January 1986) which promised "strict control including international on-site inspection" for the destruction of production facilities, chemical weapons stockpiles and their industrial base, and invited the Soviet delegation to the CD to "elaborate on its precise meaning".⁹

In March 1986, a further report from the Secretary-General confirmed the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in response to Iranian offensive that carried Iranian forces into Iraqi territory. The principal agent used was mustard gas, although there was also evidence of the use of nerve gas. On 21 March 1986, the Security Council of the UN issued a strong condemnation of the continued use of chemical weapons in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and demanded that the Protocol be strictly observed.¹⁰

⁸ "Chemical Weapons-Conference on Disarmament", The Arms Control Reporter-A Chronicle of Treaties, Negotiations and Proposals, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, 1984, pp. 704.A.1-74.D.58.

⁹ Statement to CD 4 February 1986.

¹⁰ United Nations Office at Geneva, Press Release DC/1376, 25 March 1986, p.5.

On 25 March 1986, in a plenary meeting of the CD, Canada called on all signatories of the 1925 Protocol, including both Iran and Iraq, to live up to their legal obligations. The Canadian delegate commented: "We resolutely condemn any action that has been or might be taken in breach of that agreement."¹¹ Canada also submitted two papers to the CD for consideration in the context of the negotiations: one addressed the unambiguous identification of chemical substances (nomenclature); the other concerned procedures for the investigation of allegations of the use of chemical weapons.

At the end of the 1986 spring session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Western diplomats reported modest progress toward agreement on which commercial chemicals would be banned, and how verification of the destruction or dismantling of weapons plants would be handled. While the type of inspection needed to verify compliance was still in dispute, the Soviet Union indicated that they might agree to a compromise involving routine scheduled inspection, although they were more circumspect concerning inspection on demand.¹²

On 22 May 1986 the NATO Defence Planning Committee endorsed the production of new American binary chemical weapons. (see entry on NATO) A Department of External Affairs specialist on such weapons said that the modernization proposal "could actually reduce [American] chemical arsenals by as much as 50 per cent" and that storage of such weapons would be "considerably safer."¹³ The United States has said it will not go ahead with the new weapons if a treaty banning all chemical weapons can be successfully agreed upon, but, the United States argues that the production of these new

¹¹ Ibid., p.4.

¹² "Modest Progress Reported on Chemical Arms Ban" The New York Times, 27 April, 1986.

¹³ "Lethal Stocks will actually shrink, External Affairs Researcher says" The Globe and Mail, 23 May 1986.

weapons must proceed to counter continued Soviet developments in this area.

Responding to questioning in the House on the Canadian support for the NATO decision, the Associate Minister of National Defence, Harvie Andre, stated:

We fully endorse the position taken in 1970 that Canada will not have chemical weapons, will not use chemical weapons, will not produce them, and will not keep them in store....In the meantime the Soviets continued with production and have built up their chemical capabilities. In order to maintain the deterrence which is what NATO is all about - to avoid war - it is deemed prudent by all NATO countries that the US increase or modernize its chemical capability for the maintenance of that deterrence and peace.¹⁴

Canada is involved in a quadripartite agreement with the United States, Britain and Australia to share biological and chemical warfare research. The Canadian Government states that it contributes information for defensive measures against attacks from the Warsaw Pact countries.

Parliamentary Comment

On 24 February 1986, Jim Fulton from the NDP, asked the Minister of National Defence "how much is being spent right now on the production of chemical weapons and defensive chemical weapons in Canada?" The Minister, Erik Nielsen, replied that no chemical weapons were being produced in Canada.¹⁶ Later, Mr. Fulton told the House that the Department of National Defence had confirmed that some chemical weapons were produced in Canada; Soman, Sarin, Tabun and VX, described in a Government handbook as chemical warfare lethal agents, are produced in very small quantities in Canada.¹⁷

¹⁴ Commons Debates, 23 May 1986, p. 13562.

¹⁶ Commons Debates, 24 February 1986, p. 10889.

¹⁷ Commons Debates, 4 March 1986, pp. 1115-7.

On 24 March 1986, the NDP Member Derek Blackburn asked the Minister of National Defence whether he had been asked at the NATO Council Meeting earlier in March "to commit Canadian troops in any way to chemical warfare preparedness or participation within the NATO Command"? The Minister said "Of course not...the Canadian Government is not involved in any form of chemical warfare." Mr. Blackburn termed that answer "rather strange" as chemical warfare is "on the agenda of the North Atlantic Assembly and...on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament." He went on to ask the Minister for a clear statement that under no circumstances "will Canadian troops anywhere be involved in the use of chemical weapons or chemical warfare." Erik Nielsen said he was unable to give such an assurance as it is impossible to predict that Canadian troops would not be involved in "whatever kind of warfare might break out." He added: "we are certainly not planning to get involved...[as]...our every effort is directed toward the achievement of a lasting stable world peace." ¹⁸

On 23 May 1986 Pauline Jewett, the NDP critic for External Affairs, asked Mr. Clark why Canada, unlike several of the other NATO countries, did not express reservations at the recent NATO defence ministers' meeting, where the American plan for modernization of their chemical weapons was endorsed. Mr. Clark told the Commons that while Canada would prefer a ban on chemical weapons, that would first "require some reasonableness on the Soviet side with regard to verification. That has not occurred." Pauline Jewett replied that "...basically the minister is saying that the talks are momentarily stalled and let us keep them permanently stalled. That is what he is saying by his enthusiastic support for chemical weapons."¹⁹ Mr. Clark replied:

We are looking for a global ban. In order to get a global ban there has to be a system of verification which will work in the Soviet Union....That is the problem with verification.

¹⁸ Commons Debates, 24 March 1986, p. 11808.

¹⁹ Commons Debates, 23 May 1986, p. 13563.

We would be fools if we turned a blind eye to that reality.²⁰

The Liberal defence critic, Leonard Hopkins was also critical of the Government's support for the US modernization plan, and said that Mr. Nielsen should have asked for parliamentary approval prior to endorsing the binary weapons programme. Mr. Hopkins criticized the Government for its failure to bring forward a White Paper on defence policy and asked Mr. Andre to "commit himself and the Government to a debate in the House on such major international issues as this one so that Canadians may learn what is going on?" The Associate Minister said he would welcome such a debate and assured Mr. Hopkins that the Government would co-operate in arranging one.²¹ Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway are reported to have expressed serious doubts about the resumption of chemical weapons production by the United States. Mr. Hopkins said that Canadians were divided on this issue, and that the Government should not have taken an activist role in supporting the American position at the NATO meeting.²²

On 25 June 1986, NDP member Jim Fulton told the House that he had a catalogue of current Canadian Government chemical and biological warfare contracts.

These contracts amount to over \$5 million and have gone to major universities, private research laboratories and, yes, even the Ontario Ministry of Health....This is a nonsense. Biological and chemical weapons can not be used unless troops can be protected against their effects....I call upon the Government to halt work immediately in the field of chemical and biological warfare and to strike an initiative within NATO to halt development of these weapons while a global treaty is sought.²³

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., p. 13564.

²² Communiqué, Len Hopkins, Official Opposition Critic for National Defence, 23 May, 1986.

²³ Commons Debates, 25 June 1986, p. 14807.

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5. A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR FREEZE

Background

Comprehensive nuclear freeze proposals generally call for a halt to all nuclear weapons production, testing and deployment in order to arrest the nuclear arms race while significant reductions are being negotiated. In March 1980 Randall Forsberg, of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies in Boston, drafted a resolution entitled "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race". The resolution stated that "...the United States and the Soviet Union should stop the nuclear arms race" and called for "a mutual freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and of missiles and of new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons."

The idea of a nuclear freeze appealed to many people who were increasingly concerned by the nuclear arms race. Their concern had been aggravated by the policies of the new Reagan Administration which appeared unenthusiastic about arms control and was slow to develop an arms control policy. Comments from senior administration officials suggesting the possibility of a limited nuclear war, and the impending deployment of US Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe did nothing to alleviate this anxiety. Support for the freeze movement grew quickly, therefore, in the first years of the Reagan Administration, generating a movement of substantial political strength. Early in 1982 a New York Times poll stated that 72 per cent of the American public were in favour of a freeze. And in June 1982 an estimated 750,000 people, including Canadians, staged an anti-nuclear rally in New York to mark the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament.

While this degree of support for and awareness of a freeze was a relatively new phenomenon in arms control issues, the concept itself had been established earlier. In 1964 President Johnson proposed a limited freeze

on strategic weapons but it was rejected by the Soviets who argued that it would guarantee the nuclear superiority of the United States. In 1978 Prime Minister Trudeau advocated "suffocating" the arms race by imposing a ban on testing and prohibiting the production of fissionable materials.

The freeze movement generated political responses in both the US Congress and the United Nations. In the United States Senate, Senators Kennedy and Hatfield introduced a resolution proposing a mutual, verifiable freeze on the testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems as an interim step to negotiating reductions on nuclear warheads and delivery systems. Senators Jackson and Warner presented a counter resolution which effectively outlined the Reagan position on arms control as finally enunciated. The Kennedy-Hatfield resolution lost in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a vote of 9 to 6 and, in the House of Representatives a resolution endorsing the President's arms control policy passed, after a long and hard debate, by a vote of 204 to 202.

At the United Nations, resolutions on a comprehensive freeze were sponsored in the First Committee by Mexico and Sweden, India and the Soviet Union. All the resolutions passed but in each case most of the NATO countries registered a negative vote. While Congressional resolutions left the timing of the freeze up to the superpowers, and thus implied that the freeze itself was open to negotiation, the resolutions at the United Nations suggested the freeze would be accomplished by declaration.

Debate about the freeze focussed on two main issues: verifiability and force imbalance.

It was the latter problem which most concerned the European NATO members. In particular they pointed to the force imbalance in Europe which had been created by the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles. Canada was one of the

NATO members who voted against the UN resolutions. In explaining its vote at the 1983 Assembly, Canada recognized "the important symbolic value in the freeze concept as an expression of the desire of mankind to be free from the fear of nuclear war" but also noted that "[Canada] wants significant, balanced and verifiable reductions in the level of nuclear arms in the world...mere declarations are not a meaningful response to this danger....Canada wants the present levels reduced by the immediate unconditional resumption of negotiations on reductions."

Current Canadian Position

At the 40th session of the United Nations three resolutions calling for a nuclear freeze were presented in the First Committee.¹ While these resolutions varied somewhat in their content, Canada, along with most other NATO members, voted against all of them. Although Canada did not offer an explanation of its vote, it appeared to reflect three main concerns: difficulties of verification, an imbalance of forces, and difficulties with negotiation.

At the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND), the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark said:

Our view is that if we are dealing with something that is more than declaratory, particularly now that the superpowers appear to be of a mind to contemplate serious reductions which, given the percentages involved, would be bound to be more than 'nuclear junk', it is better to encourage that process than to divert it."²

¹ First Committee Resolutions 40/94H, 40/151C, 40/151E.

² SCEAND Proceedings, 4 December 1985, p. 27.

Parliamentary Comment

On 22 November 1985, NDP Foreign Affairs critic Pauline Jewett made a statement in the House concerning the Government's position on the nuclear freeze.

Despite the fine words of peace of the Prime Minister and the earlier record of Canada's Disarmament Ambassador who supported a freeze when he was a Conservative Member...Canada has failed to take even this modest action [of voting in favour of a freeze at the UN] to halt the nuclear arms race. Canada can and must do more for peace than send the Prime Minister to Brussels to be debriefed....It is time for initiative and action. At the very least Canada should support the initiatives being taken by others at the UN and elsewhere. I urge the Government to change its vote when the freeze issue comes before the General Assembly of the UN.³

Ms. Jewett pursued the issue with Mr. Clark during the SCEAND Hearings. Specifically she pointed to the examples of Australia and New Zealand, both of whom had changed their previous voting record on the freeze at the UN and were now voting in favour. She asked Mr. Clark whether the Government would consider changing its vote to an abstention. Mr. Clark responded:

We now have an agreement to look at the question of quite large-scale reductions by the two superpowers. They have both...put forward a proposal for a 50% reduction. A freeze has the world in a much more dangerous state than the 50% reduction would have. Indeed, a freeze indicates an acceptance of the status quo, rather than moving away from it.... The time taken in negotiating the application of a freeze to keep things at a dangerously high level is time taken away from negotiating reductions, in which both superpowers have now indicated they are interested.⁴

³ Commons Debates, 22 November 1985, p. 8707.

⁴ SCEAND Proceedings, 4 December 1985, p. 26.

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6. COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

Background

The Final Document of the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) specified that general and complete disarmament under effective international control "remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the field of disarmament."¹

The UNSSOD discussion envisaged that negotiations on a comprehensive programme could take place at the same time as negotiations for more partial measures, such as those addressed in the ongoing superpower dialogue on arms control. The Final Document asked the reconstituted Disarmament Commission, a deliberative body in which all Member States of the UN are represented, to consider the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament (CPD). As the Disarmament Commission operates by consensus, the Final Document also directed the Disarmament Commission to submit its recommendations to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which would then pass them on to the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament. This 40-member body, which became the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in 1984, also operates by consensus, but has a mandate to develop and promulgate specific arms control measures.

In 1979, the Disarmament Commission spent most of its first session elaborating the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The outcome was transmitted to the CD through the General Assembly later that year.

The Committee on Disarmament worked on the outline from the Disarmament Commission from 1980 to 1982 with the intention of submitting a more articulated and detailed proposal to the Second United Nations Special

¹ "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament" Report of the Conference on Disarmament, General Assembly, Official Records: Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/40/27) United Nations New York, 1985, p. 137.

Session on Disarmament in 1982 (UNSSOD II). In 1980 an Ad Hoc Working Group of the CD on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament was established, but no substantive progress was achieved. In 1981, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles of Mexico, some progress was made. Canada, like all other members of the CD, was represented in the Working Group but, unlike some of the other countries, submitted no working papers on this topic. A preliminary examination of the content of the CPD was completed, based on an outline that included chapters on objectives, principles, priorities, measures and stages of implementation, and machinery and procedures. In 1982, the Ad Hoc Working Group convened earlier than usual, since UNSSOD II was due to open in early June. Despite great efforts, however, the Committee on Disarmament was only able to submit an incomplete draft of the CPD to UNSSOD II.²

The CPD was meant to be one of the highlights of UNSSOD II. Much work was done during the Special Session on formulating a comprehensive draft. However, the problems that had polarized previous discussion on the CPD remained unsolved. These included the question of how legally binding such a programme can and should be, whether specific stages should be designated, and what constitute realistic and unrealistic expectations. An especially controversial problem was the matter of time frames, and whether the imposition of these would help or hinder the disarmament process.³ Inability to reach agreement on these issues resulted in an unfinished draft (with bracketted passages denoting areas of contention) that could only be included in an annex to the Concluding Document.

Canada expressed "disappointment" over the result, but did see merit in continuing the effort. "The process of seeking a CPD has a value of its own provided the negotiations are undertaken with openness and realism."⁴

² Homer A. Jack "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament", Disarm-or Die, The Second UN Special Session on Disarmament, World Conference on Religion and Peace, New York, 1983, pp. 60-61.

³ Ibid., pp. 65-67.

⁴ Ibid., p. 71.

After UNSSOD II, the CPD was sent back to the Committee on Disarmament, which reconsidered it and submitted a revised draft to the UN General Assembly in 1983. In turn, the General Assembly asked the CD to once again consider the CPD, noting that negotiations on much of the format and text were necessary before any agreement could be reached on a Resolution recommending action. However, during 1984 the Conference on Disarmament decided that "circumstances were not conducive to making progress."⁵ The United Nations General Assembly, in the fall of 1984, urged that "all efforts be made so that the Conference on Disarmament may resume its work" on the elaboration of the CPD early in 1985, and then "a complete draft of such a programme" could be submitted to the General Assembly at its 1986 session.⁶

The goal in the CD is to draft a Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament with which all members of the CD are in agreement. There is considerable disagreement on formulation, content and implementation, as well as on other issues. Included in the Principles, inter alia, are security assurances for non-nuclear weapons States and the establishment of nuclear weapons free zones.⁷ Included in the Measures and Stages of Implementation are "cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems", a halt to the production of nuclear weapons, and a nuclear test ban.⁸ Each of these objectives has been discussed at length in the CD and other forums, with little or no agreement on how to achieve them. Thus the attempt to include all of these issues in the CPD is beset with difficulties.

In 1985, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament was re-established. In August, the chairman, Ambassador Alfonso Garcia

⁵ "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament" in The Arms Control Reporter - A Chronicle of Treaties, Negotiations and Proposals, Institute for Defence and Disarmament Studies, 1985 p. 301 A.1.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ op. cit., (Note 1), p. 143.

⁸ Ibid., p. 146.

Robles, presented a report which showed some modest achievement. The Working Group held 25 formal meetings, and many informal discussions. A draft text was published which illustrated points of agreement and disagreement, and the suggestion of the Western countries for a first stage comprising the current negotiations was accepted. The Western countries were against the idea of time periods for each stage of disarmament, on the grounds that this was an unrealistic and artificial requirement. However, many other delegations wanted to call for universal efforts, following the guidelines of the CPD, to achieve general and complete disarmament by the year 2000.⁹ The report concluded by urging that the Committee be re-established in 1986, with "the firm intention" of discharging its mandate.

On 14 November 1985, the UNGA's First Committee agreed to urge the CD to complete work on the CPD by the next session of the UN General Assembly, in the fall of 1986. Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.19 passed without a vote and without comment.

In February 1986, the Ad Hoc Committee on the CPD was re-established with Mexican Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles again as chairman. Progress continued very slowly. Although all members remain eager to submit a draft to the General Assembly in the fall, some text may remain in brackets.

Current Canadian Position

The Canadian delegation generally supports the common positions of the Western countries. For example, the Canadian Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Alan Beesley, addressed the Canadian Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs in the fall of 1985. He described Canada's role and participation in the multilateral forums. After

⁹ op. cit. (Note 5), p. 301.B.13.

describing areas of Canada's active involvement in the CD, he turned to the CPD and noted that:

We have been involved in this, quite frankly, in a more low key fashion than on other issues, because there is always, in this case, someone who will press forward and protect our position. But obviously if anyone has any ideas on how to achieve a break-through, we would be receptive.¹⁰

Parliamentary Comment

The issue was not raised in the House of Commons.

Current References

"Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament" in Report of the Conference on Disarmament (United Nations General Assembly, Official Records, Supplement No. 27, A/40/27).

H.A. Jack, "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament", Disarm-or Die, The Second UN Special Session on Disarmament, World Conference on Religion and Peace, New York, 1983.

¹⁰ Canada and the Multilateral Forums, Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, Conference Proceedings, Ottawa, November 1, 1985, Volume II, p. 33.

7. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

Background

In the late 1950s The United States and Britain began negotiations with the Soviet Union on a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) on all forms of nuclear weapons testing. Although these efforts failed to produce a CTB, they did result in the Limited Test Ban Treaty which was signed by the three countries in 1963. The Limited Test Ban prohibits testing in the atmosphere, underwater or in outer space and has since been signed by 111 other countries, but not by France and China. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, limiting underground nuclear tests to 150 kilotons, was signed in 1974 by the Soviet Union and the United States, but has not been ratified by the United States Senate. Similarly the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, which established special provisions for peaceful nuclear explosions, has not been ratified by the US Senate. Despite the failure to ratify, the signatory states have undertaken to comply with both treaties. Trilateral negotiations on a CTB were re-opened by the Carter Administration in 1977, and substantial progress was made in developing a draft treaty. However, in the wake of strong opposition in the United States, and the political turmoil involved in the negotiation and ratification debate on the SALT II Treaty, little more of substance was accomplished in the negotiations, which ceased under the Reagan Administration.

On 6 August 1985 the Soviet Union began a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing to last the five months until the end of the year, or longer if the United States would join in. The Soviet Union has extended the moratorium three times despite continued American nuclear tests. The present extension will last until 6 August 1986 by which time the Soviet Union will have refrained from nuclear weapons testing for an entire year. The United States has said that a CTB is a long-term goal but has refused to enter

into negotiations because it feels that testing must continue to ensure weapons reliability and national security. The Reagan Administration also claims that a CTB cannot be adequately verified. During the last week of July 1986, the United States and Soviet Union met in Geneva to discuss a range of issues concerning nuclear testing.

In 1983 the United Nations Conference on Disarmament established a working group to discuss the verification and compliance issues of a CTB. This group, now called the Ad Hoc Committee, has had little success in agreeing on a programme of work. In 1983 the group continued with the same mandate on verification and compliance issues, but in 1984 and 1985 no agreement was reached on a new mandate and consequently the group has not met.

Current Canadian Position

Achievement of a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty is listed as one of the Government's six major goals in arms control and disarmament. In a speech to the 40th Session of the United Nations, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark stated that "for Canada, the achievement of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty continues to be a fundamental and abiding objective. Our aim is to stop all nuclear testing."¹ Mr. Clark continued:

to advance work on the verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, we will upgrade our analytical capability in seismic research. We will improve our large seismic facility in the Canadian North. We will expand the ability to differentiate between small earthquakes and underground nuclear tests.²

A Communiqué in February 1986 announced that the Government had approved \$3.2 million for an upgrade to the seismic array station in Yellowknife.

¹ "SSEA Address to Fortieth Session of the United Nations" Disarmament Bulletin, Autumn 1985, p. 2.

² Ibid.

Yellowknife is recognized as a unique and sensitive location to monitor global seismic events including underground nuclear tests. Updating and modernization of the Yellowknife seismic array, which consists of a series of short-period and long-period seismometers, will enable Canada to contribute to an international system which will constitute an essential monitoring element of or negotiated CTB using the best technology available.³

At the 40th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Canada voted in favour of a resolution on the "Urgent Need for a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty." (UNGA 40/81) The resolution set out a programme of work for the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a CTB, and was adopted with 116 voting in favour, 4 against (France, Grenada, United Kingdom, US) and 29 abstentions.⁴

Canada abstained from a resolution on the "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons" (UNGA 40/80A). The resolution reaffirmed the need for a treaty banning all nuclear tests by all nations for all time and called upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an Ad Hoc committee to carry out the multilateral negotiation of such a treaty.⁵ Twenty other countries abstained. France, the United Kingdom and the United States voted against while 124 countries were in favour. Canada also abstained from Resolution 40/88, the "Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests."⁶ Twenty-eight other states also abstained and 120 were in favour. France, the UK and the US voted against the resolution. The resolution welcomed the unilateral moratorium on testing by the USSR and expressed its hope that all other countries would join in the moratorium.

³ DEA Communiqué, 7 February 1986, No. 7.

⁴ UNGA Resolution 40/81, 12 December 1985.

⁵ UNGA 40/80 (A), 12 December 1985.

⁶ UNGA 40/88, 12 December 1985.

Parliamentary Comment

During the hearings of the Special Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Liberal member Lloyd Axworthy asked the Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, whether Canada would support a moratorium on nuclear tests. He said:

I thought the whole point of having a comprehensive test ban treaty is to prevent the increasing qualitative development of nuclear weapons in miniaturization and other areas. So I come back to the point: will Canada support, at this stage at least, a moratorium on test bans? Will we support a resolution in the General Assembly of the United Nations that there be a moratorium on tests until such time as the working group can start full talks?⁷

Mr. Roche responded:

First, again I have to resist any attempt at sort of drawing some sort of dichotomy between CTB and reductions as if we wanted one or the other; we want both...the chief danger to the world today lies in the existence of 50,000 nuclear weapons,...we have to find a way to reduce drastically, substantially, that number. That has to be a priority. Having said that, it does not mean that we do not want a CTB that would shut off the modernization process. Of course we want a CTB. We want both....On moratorium, it is a policy of the Government not to support a moratorium, a sort of declaration of a moratorium...the Soviet approach to this subject...very often rests on declarations, things which are unverifiable. I think what the Government of Canada would like to have is a moratorium on testing that would be the result of negotiations with verifiability built into it.⁸

⁷ SCEAND Proceedings, 1 October 1985, p. 20.

⁸ Ibid, p. 20-21.

Responding to Mr. Clark's statement on the 15 January 1986 disarmament proposal by the Soviet Union, NDP External Affairs critic Pauline Jewett stated:

If Canada truly believes in supporting a comprehensive test ban treaty, then I just cannot understand why the Minister did not say today that the unilateral proposal of the Soviets with respect to the three-month extension is admirable....It is something we would like to see the United States and other nations, in particular, France, undertake....Only in that way can we reach a comprehensive test ban sooner.⁹

Current References

R. A. Divine, "Early Record on Test Moratoriums" Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May 1986, pp. 24-26.

T.B. Cochran et al., "Unannounced US Nuclear Weapons Tests, 1980-1984" Natural Resources Defense Council Working Paper NWD 86-1.

H.E. DeWitt and G.E. Marsh, "Weapons Design Policy Impedes Test Ban", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November 1985, pp. 10-13.

D.J. Feith, "Proposal for Nuclear Test Ban: Failing the Test", Washington Quarterly, Spring 1986, pp. 15-21.

D. Sterste-Perkins, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Background and Pro/Con Arguments, CRS Report 85-1032F, 23 October 1985.

⁹ Commons Debates, 23 January 1986, p. 10104.

8. THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY - BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

Background

The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 was the culmination of two years of negotiation in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Amongst other things, it dealt with the need for measures to reduce the risk of military confrontation between the East and West. The confidence-building measures in the Final Act, however, were voluntary, and there was general recognition of the need for more substantive methods.

After three years of discussion, on 9 September 1983, the 35 nations of the CSCE established the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). Its initial goal was to discuss possible confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), which would reduce the threat of military brinkmanship in Europe. Actual implementation of disarmament methods was to be considered after a CSCE review in November 1986. The mandate directs the parties

to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations.¹

The mandate requires that the CSBMs be both militarily significant and politically binding, as well as sufficiently verifiable when applied to all of Europe. The exact nature of these measures is the greatest challenge to the CDE, since interpretations are influenced by the very different perspectives of the East and West.

¹ "Canada at the Stockholm Conference", The Disarmament Bulletin, Spring - Summer 1985, Department of External Affairs, pp. 10-11.

The talks began in Stockholm on 17 January, 1984. The 35 participating countries comprise representatives of NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and a group of neutral and non-aligned states. The differences amongst these three groupings became obvious soon after the sessions began.

The NATO countries, including Canada, presented the following six proposals in January 1984: annual exchanges on military formations; annual announcements of the upcoming military manoeuvres; notification of military activities outside of garrison; acceptance of observers at such activities; verification by challenge and on-site inspection; and the establishment of hotlines to ensure communications in time of crisis. These suggestions were criticized by the Warsaw Pact countries, who termed the proposals "legalized spying."²

The Soviet Union tabled the Warsaw Treaty Organization's (WTO) suggestions in May, 1984. While the Western approach had been aimed at "facilitating a better mutual understanding of the normal activities in the region", the East stressed the value of political steps to increase confidence and reduce the risk of war.³ Thus the WTO called for: an agreement on the non-use of force; a negotiated chemical-weapons-free zone in Europe; declarations of nuclear-free zones in the Balkans, Central Europe and the Nordic area; a freeze and reduction of military spending; and some general suggestions regarding limits on military exercises, advance warning of troop movements and mutual exchange of observers. The Soviet Union also tabled a draft treaty on the non-use of force.⁴ An American delegate criticized the proposal as "imprecise" and felt that it would only lead to "interminable negotiations."⁵

² Chalmers Hardenbergh, "The Other Negotiations" in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June/July, 1985, p. 43.

³ op. cit., Disarmament Bulletin, p. 10.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Arms Control Chronicle, Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, #6-7, February-April, 1985, p. 28.

The neutral and non-aligned group (NNA) presented confidence-building suggestions which did not specify quantities. These ideas included restrictions on offensive weapons based near borders, and vastly improved notification and observer provisions.⁶ The NNA's emphasis on geographical restrictions is seen by the West as an intermediate step between CSBMs and actual disarmament, and as such only to be considered after CSBMs have been agreed to. The East favours restrictions but is wary of concrete military changes that would impinge on their requirements for national security.

After much discussion, in December 1984 two working groups were formed. Working Group A examines all CSBMs not included in the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE. Thus it addresses such issues as the non-use of force, information exchange, compliance and verification, and ways of communication in a notification system. Working Group B studies the modest measures of observation and notification of military activities which are included in the Final Act. A third group discusses the links between the two working groups.

In January and February 1985, NATO member countries submitted six working documents which reiterated their suggestions from the year before, and, *inter alia*, recommended 45 days notification for any military manoeuvres involving 6000 troops, the mobilization of 25,000 reservists and any amphibious activity with 3,000 combat troops. The 1975 Helsinki accords call for 21 days notification of events involving 25,000 men. The WTO states tabled their CSBMs at the same time. They suggested 30 days notification of movement of more than 20,000 men and an overall limit of any manoeuvres to 40,000 men. Although this proposal brings "the Eastern CDE position into conformity with their MBFR [Mutual Balanced Force Reductions] proposals", the NATO response termed the measures "grossly inadequate."⁷ (The last proposal would be a hindrance to the large-scale

⁶ op. cit., Hardenbergh, p. 43.

⁷ Arms Control Chronicle, CCACD, #8, June 1985, p. 14.

manoeuvres NATO traditionally holds each fall.)

However, there was some movement towards agreement in 1985. For example, although the CDE's mandate called for a focus on conventional ground forces in Europe, the WTO's original proposal stipulated nuclear and chemical weapons-free zones, and no-first-use of nuclear weapons. By the end of 1985, there was agreement that reduction of the risk generated by conventional forces was the priority in the CDE.⁸

On 15 November 1985, the NNA group submitted a revised proposal that many hoped would be a bridge between the NATO and Warsaw Pact positions. It combined the Western emphasis on specific information exchange and demanding verification measures with the WTO's desire for a declaration on the non-use or threat of force.⁹

The NNA proposal also suggested that notice of a broader range of military activity would be helpful in avoiding any aggression, either by misinterpretation or accident. All CDE states should be invited to attend as observers 42 days in advance, and details of standard conditions should be provided so as to enhance the knowledge of the observers. The NNA addressed the problem of verification in a manner meant to reconcile the divergent East and West positions. The East had rejected any type of compulsory on-site inspection, while the West wanted inspection on demand. The NNA suggested "observation upon request", which would require a 12 hour notice for investigation of any suspicious activities.¹⁰

A wide variety of other issues were dealt with in the NNA proposal. Informal NATO responses have ranged from "not unhelpful" to "the ideal

⁸ John Borawski, "Progress in Stockholm Talks" in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February, 1986, p. 40.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 41.

guidelines".¹¹ At the end of 1985, there were still large areas of disagreement between East and West, including whether to include independent air and naval activities as the East wants, or to focus on ground forces, as the West and NNA group wants.

A Romanian proposal also combined elements of the NATO and WTO suggestions. In addition, it called for the creation of security zones between the borders of states. Such zones would be free of nuclear weapons and all military manoeuvres would be banned within the set areas.

Mikhail Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986 included a suggestion that the CDE impasse be broken by an agreement that would be developed over time. Thus, an initial solution would be agreement on the notification of large exercises of ground and air forces, and a decision on the question of naval activity deferred to the next stage of the conference.¹²

Although many disagreements remain, much of the last Sessions in 1986 were spent in formulating a draft treaty with a view to having a final treaty ready by 19 September 1986, the final deadline before the CSCE Preparatory Committee meeting in Vienna. Concessions have been made on both sides. The Soviet Union agreed to the principle of on-site and aerial inspections of troop formations in the area from East Germany to the Ural mountains. The United States agreed to provide notification of large movements of troops to Europe.

Current Canadian Position

Canada believes that the CDE should develop tangible results prior to the

¹¹ Ibid., p. 42.

¹² "Conference on Disarmament in Europe", The Arms Control Reporter - A Chronicle of Treaties, Negotiations and Proposals, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, 1986, p. 402. B.99.

November 1986 CSCE Follow-Up meeting. Thus the Canadian delegation will continue to be "active and innovative in exploring means" to ensure success. Early in 1985, the Canadian Ambassador to the CDE, Mr. Thomas Delworth, told the session that:

It is not a restatement or a re-working of the principle of non-use of force that is needed now. What is needed now, as confirmed in the mandate of our Conference, is to give dynamic expression and effect to this principle.¹³

In June of 1985 the Canadian delegation addressed the issue of the non-use of force once again.

...a simple reaffirmation of this principle would be pointless. That is, indeed, our position - and I believe it to be widely shared....Refraining from the threat or use of force is a political objective. It must be met through political means....a dynamic way, is to begin a process of political co-operation by adopting and implementing a set of militarily significant and politically binding measures....This is the position of the Canadian Delegation.¹⁴

With respect to the overall question of Confidence-Building, Ambassador Delworth stated:

...I am afraid that the political promise of this Conference may be fading. It is adding little to the East-West dialogue...we may be well on the way towards a non-achievement....We seek a programme of co-operative action based on informing and verifying...a coherent system, a compendium of

¹³ Statement of 29 January 1985, Disarmament Bulletin Winter 1985-Spring 1986 - Supplement, p. 13.

¹⁴ Ibid., Statement of 3 June 1985, p. 14.

information and verification on measures. We believe that only in this way can confidence be built.¹⁵

Near the close of the 1985 Session, the Canadian Delegation made a statement on the status of the negotiations.

We sense relief that the procedural agreement finally adopted at this session marks a watershed at the Conference, which has taken too long to get down to exchanging ideas in concrete form....The procedural agreement is not a panacea. It will not guarantee that we make progress....Although my Delegation, along with others, continues to doubt the value of codifying purely declaratory policies, we have agreed that in supplementing concrete CSBMs there will be a role for a reaffirmation of the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force.¹⁶

Ambassador Delworth addressed the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs in the late fall of 1985. He noted some of the progress that had been made in the most recent round of talks by outlining "the procedural agreement designed to reaffirm the principle of refraining from threatening the use of force."¹⁷ However, he noted that substantive differences still existed regarding one of the most important CSBMs, NATO and Warsaw Pact representatives cannot agree on the geographical limits of military manoeuvres that would require notification. NATO wants to limit the area to Europe, and the sea and air space directly surrounding it. The East insists that any activities affecting the security of Europe be included.

¹⁵ Ibid., Statement of 5 July 1985, pp. 16-17

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁷ The Multilateral Forums, Report on the Meeting of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, October 31-November 2, 1985, Ottawa, p. 9.

The Canadian position has generally been strongly supportive of the Western or NATO position. Thus Ambassador Delworth was critical of the Eastern proposal for a declaration on the non-use of force. He described it as an attempt by the Soviet Union to use political coercion to weaken Western defence arrangements.¹⁸ The Ambassador described Canada's position at the CDE as one aimed at countering the idea that secrecy and security go hand in hand.¹⁹

On the 30 June 1986, the Canadian Ambassador made a statement to the Conference.²⁰ He stated that:

This negotiation is still spinning its wheels on the sands of political indecision and time is passing quickly.

Speaking on behalf of NATO members, the Ambassador outlined areas in which they were now prepared to move. Ambassador Delworth supported the NNA proposal that structures, manpower and equipment all be included as part of the definition of the thresholds for ground force activities, but stressed that a solution that included "all formations of ground forces that have a military significant capability" is needed. A willingness to meet the concerns of nations whose defence capabilities rest almost exclusively on reservists and thus consider that notification of mobilization practices would affect their security interests was stated. In the area of verification, while it was preferable to have two inspections a year, "we believe it is essential that each participating state should have the option to conduct at least one inspection a year." In conclusion Ambassador Hammond stated:

The only way to reach a substantive agreement is to follow a give-and-take process. We hope that the initiative taken by us today will create a dynamism

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 10.

²⁰ Statement to Stockholm Conference, Canadian Ambassador (as Chairman of the Day of NATO Caucus), 30 June 1986.

leading to such an agreement in the eight weeks left to us before the Conference adjourns on September 19. We shall be prepared to do our part.²¹

Parliamentary Comment

In January 1986, the Secretary of State for External Affairs outlined the Canadian goals in arms control and disarmament to the House of Commons. Among those he spoke of was the "building of confidence sufficient to facilitate the reduction of military forces in Europe and elsewhere," and he noted that Canada is "playing an active part" in all the CSCE-mandated discussions.²²

Current References

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"Canada at the Stockholm Conference" The Disarmament Bulletin Supplement Winter 1985–Spring 1986.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Commons Debates, 23 January 1986.

9. DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

Background

In the last decade and a half the relationship between disarmament and development has received increased attention at the United Nations.

During the 1970s efforts were made to advance international understanding of the relationship between disarmament and development. In 1978 the Final Document of the first UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) noted the contradiction between growing military expenditures and the persistent poverty of two-thirds of the world's peoples.¹ UNSSOD I also set out the frame of reference for the Secretary-General's Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, which began its work under the Chairmanship of Mrs. Inga Thorsson of Sweden in 1978. Canada was represented on this group by Bernard Wood of the North-South Institute.

The Experts' findings and recommendations were submitted to the Secretary-General in September 1981.² Their study provided comprehensive documentation on the worldwide use of resources (labour, industrial capacity, raw materials, land, financial capital, research and development) for military purposes. It noted, for example, that over 50 million people were employed in military activities and that US\$ 500 billion (6 per cent of global output) was spent on military goods in 1980. The Group argued that this use of resources undermined development prospects in market, planned and developing economies alike. It also weakened global security by promoting the arms race and preventing the allocation of the resources needed to address the roots of instability in the developing world.

¹ UNGA, Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (UNSSOD I), 1978, para.16.

² United Nations Centre for Disarmament, "Study on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development", The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol.6, 1981, (New York: UN Publications, 1982), pp.351-361.

As a result of these findings, the Group suggested that national and intergovernmental policies which aimed at combining disarmament and development objectives could contribute to both the North-South dialogue and East-West detente. The report made nine specific recommendations including the following:

- governments should undertake studies to identify and publicize the benefits that would be derived from the reallocation of military resources;
- governments should create the necessary prerequisites... to facilitate the conversion of resources freed by disarmament measures to civilian purposes;
- consideration should be given to establishing an international disarmament fund for development.

Canada supported the report and commissioned a Canadian writer, Clyde Sanger, to write a popular version of it for wider distribution. This action was thus a positive response to the first recommendation cited above. As far as the second recommendation was concerned the Government expressed its intention to

be alert to a change in attitudes which will allow progress in the major issues under negotiation or which should be, to obtain maximum notice that reductions in military expenditures may be possible. In the meantime, it is considered that the major conclusions of the two major Canadian studies regarding the economic effects of disarmament are relevant.³

Finally, on the question of the disarmament fund, the Government noted that

[although it] agrees that the disarmament dividend approach is the most feasible of the various options examined, it considers the likelihood of a separate

³ Canadian submission contained in UNGA, Relationship between Disarmament and Development, Report of the Secretary-General, 1982, A/S-12/13, pp.8-14. The studies mentioned are Rosenbluth, Gideon, The Canadian Economy and Disarmament, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978); Bernard, J.-T. and M.Truchon, "The Impact of Disarmament on the Canadian Economy", 1980, mimeograph.

disarmament fund for development...remote (and that) any excessive stress on the idea of a deceptively simple "transfer" of financial resources from military to development purposes could serve to obscure the more significant aspects of global efficiency and economic co-operation for development which the Group's report has begun to illuminate.

The relationship between disarmament and development has continued to interest the United Nations since the release of the Thorsson report. The Second Special Session on Disarmament in 1982 considered the issue, as did the Secretary-General's Group of Consultant Experts, which produced a study on the economic and social consequences of the arms race that same year. Canada supported the 1983 General Assembly resolution which invited governments to communicate their views and proposals on the relationship between disarmament and development, and it supported resolutions calling for a conference on this topic. The Conference was originally scheduled to be held in Paris in 1986, but was postponed by the General Assembly until 1987.

Current Canadian Position

Speaking to the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, in July 1985, the Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, stated that "the Canadian Government welcomes the holding of a well-prepared international conference on the disarmament/development question."⁴ Canada would like the conference to emphasize

a practical, in-depth examination of the question with a view to establishing: what resources are tied up in armaments; how this spending has affected development; what resources might be diverted from military spending; what the problems are in doing so and what the benefits are.

⁴ Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, Statement, New York, 30 July 1985.

Ambassador Roche also stressed the importance of preserving the integrated approach to the question as presented by the Group of Governmental Experts:

Canada believes that the approach...must be a global one — encompassing developing and developed countries, nuclear and conventional disarmament — keeping security, in its broadest definition, as the touch-stone.⁵

According to him, Canada has a special role to play in the process of advancing the relationship between disarmament and development:

The world ratio of military spending to development assistance is 20:1, and the Canadian ratio is 4:1. I believe that this essential fact puts Canada in a good position to enter the discussions at the world community level.⁶

"As a developed country with a tradition of deep involvement with the developing world and as an active participant in all the multilateral arms control forums," Mr. Roche noted, "Canada will bring special expertise and sensitivities to the discussions."⁷

Parliamentary Comment

The issue was not raised in the House of Commons.

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⁵ DEA Statement, 86/17, 10 March 1986.

⁶ Special Committee on Canada's International Relations, Canada's International Relations, 28 January 1986, pp.7-8.

⁷ op.cit., Note 5

Fontanel, Jacques, "L'Intérêt d'un fonds international de désarmement pour le développement", Etudes internationales, Vol. 16, No.3, septembre 1985, pp. 561-573.

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"Disarmament and Development", special issue of Disarmament, Vol. 9, No.1, Spring 1986. See especially the article by Douglas Roche, "Spotlighting the Disarmament-Development Link", pp. 64-69.

"Points de vue canadiens sur le désarmement et le développement", Le bulletin du désarmement, Hiver 1985-Printemps 1986, pp. 18-19.

10. MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS TALKS (MBFR)

Background

Canada has participated in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks since they began in Vienna in 1973. The talks which involve nineteen nations from the NATO and Warsaw Pact Alliances have resulted in little substantive progress during the thirteen years that they have been in progress.

The issues on which NATO has concentrated in these negotiations have been the pursuit of parity in military manpower, effective methods of verification, an awareness of the problem of geographical asymmetry and the need for collectivity in reductions and limitations.

At the NATO Ministerial Meeting in December 1983, Canada called for a review of the Western negotiating position. This review led to a new Western initiative in 1984 in which the West adjusted its position on the question of data exchange. The question of agreement on troop numbers has been a major stumbling block at the negotiations since the two sides have been unable to reach initial agreement on the number of troops each side has in the region. Previously the West had required data on all ground and air manpower as a prerequisite for reductions but the revised 1984 proposal required an exchange of data on only a portion of the ground force manpower (combat and combat support units) of both sides.

On 5 December, 1985, at the close of the 37th Round of negotiations, the Western delegation submitted a new proposal which offered a formula to initiate force reductions without prior agreements on the number of troops which each side had in the region.

Current Canadian Position

Canada has not made any unilateral statement of policy on this issue. Hence its position on the December proposals may be taken to be that of the North Atlantic Council, as expressed in their Final Communiqué of 13 December, 1985¹:

the [Western] proposal embodies associated measures which open the way to the establishment of reliable force levels and which are essential to verify compliance with the agreement's provisions. It responds to an earlier Eastern proposal and represents an imaginative attempt to break a longstanding dead-lock.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, spoke to the broader issue of the conventional force balance on 23 January 1986²:

...Conventional arms, where the Soviet Union has an overwhelming superiority, will also have to find their place. The Soviet Union has the opportunity to address this imbalance in its response to the Western proposal, tabled in Vienna, last month, at the talks on Mutual Balanced Force reductions.

Ambassador Thomas Hammond, Head of the Canadian Delegation to the MBFR talks, made the following comments in a speech to the Consultative Group in November 1985:³

But the continuing value of MBFR as a forum of contact between the two alliances is not a reason to de-emphasize the basic objectives of enhancing security and stability through force reductions and limitations which underline the launching of the MBFR as a NATO initiative.

¹ North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, Final Communiqué, Brussels, 13 December, 1985.

² Commons Debates, 23 January 1986, p. 10100.

³ Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Consultative Group Conference Proceedings, vol. III, 1 November, 1985.

.....

Are our efforts doomed to be futile? The answer to this fundamental question depends, I think, on whether or not the East would be prepared to take the reduction required to reach the goal of parity of military manpower in Central Europe and to allow these reductions to be effectively monitored.

Parliamentary Comment

There has been little comment on the MBFR talks on the substantive issues involved. However, Jean Chrétien appeared to support the Minister's view on the force imbalance when he told the Commons:

...the Eastern Bloc has a great advantage in conventional arms and it should be pointed out very clearly to the USSR that this should be reduced as quickly as possible."⁴

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DeSmet, L., "Taking a Look at NATO's MBFR Reductions", Defending Europe, pp. 103-111.

Ambassador Michael Alexander (UK delegation) statement at 413th plenary session, round 37, Vienna negotiations, 5 December, 1985. United States Embassy Backgrounder, 85-130, 20 December, 1985.

⁴ Commons Debates, 23 January 1986, p. 10102.

11. THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY - THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE

Background

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed on 1 July 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970. The Treaty has a twenty-five year duration and thus comes up for renewal in 1995. Some observers regard the NPT as an agreement between states that possess nuclear weapons and states that do not. However, to date only three nuclear weapon states (NWS) - the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain - have signed the Treaty. France and China, along with some near-nuclear states such as South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan and Spain have not become signatories. The reason most often stated for not signing the Treaty is that it is discriminatory; it allows nuclear weapon states to maintain their arsenals while refusing the right of acquisition to others. Furthermore, non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) are required to open all their facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) while NWS are not. As of 1985, 130 countries have signed the NPT. Only one non-signatory, India, is known to have exploded a nuclear device. That explosion occurred in 1974 and India stated that the detonation was for peaceful purposes only.

Article 1 of the Treaty declares that each nuclear weapon state

...undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosives directly or indirectly; and not to in any way assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

In return, in Article II, non-nuclear weapon states agree

...not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices or of control over such weapons...nor to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Nuclear weapon states also agree to provide information and assistance to non-nuclear states on the peaceful use of nuclear energy through the IAEA. The non-nuclear states in turn agree to accept international safeguard measures over material and equipment. Article VI of the NPT is seen by the non-nuclear states as critical to the entire agreement. It states that all signatories will undertake

...to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The first Review Conference was held in 1975. The non-aligned and neutral states, which make up a large portion of the signatories, stressed that the nuclear weapon states had failed to bring about a halt in the arms race. Specifically they called for an end to underground nuclear testing, a substantial reduction in nuclear arsenals and a pledge by the NWS not to use or threaten to use weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. (NNWS) A Final Document was issued in which the nuclear weapon states agreed to try harder to reach these goals.

The 1980 Review Conference was less successful. By this time the total number of the signatories had grown to 115 of which 75 were in attendance at the Review Conference. Since 1975 none of the non-aligned countries' demands had been met, and, although there was some agreement on safeguards for peaceful nuclear programmes, no consensus could be reached on bringing a halt to vertical proliferation. There was therefore no final declaration nor even a formal reaffirmation of support for the Treaty.

When the NPT states came together again in 1985, there had not been an arms control measure of any kind in the previous five years. Once again the failure of the nuclear weapon states to achieve anything substantive with regard to Article VI (vertical proliferation) was the key issue. In particular, the issue of a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) was discussed, since many states see a CTB as an vital step towards bringing a halt to the arms race.

When the Conference reached the stage where it appeared that there was little chance of a Final Declaration, Mexico put forward three draft resolutions to be voted upon (two-third majority rule) after a 48-hour break, assuming that no compromise resolution could be reached in the interim. The three resolutions called for a resumption of the trilateral negotiations between the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain on a CTB, a moratorium on testing pending the conclusion of a CTB and a freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons.

In order to avoid a divisive vote, however, a compromise was reached during the final hours of the Conference, and a Final Declaration was adopted by consensus. The critical paragraph of the Final Declaration stated that:

the Conference, except for certain states,... deeply regretted that a comprehensive multilateral Nuclear Test Ban Treaty banning all nuclear tests by all states in all environments for all time had not been concluded so far and therefore called on the nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985 and called on all the nuclear-weapon states to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of such a Treaty as a matter of the highest priority in the Conference on Disarmament (Article VI, Part B, 14).

The certain states alluded to were the United States and Britain, and in the next clause of the Declaration it is noted that those 'certain States' felt that deep and verifiable reductions in existing arsenals of nuclear weapons were the highest priority.

Canada was the first Western nation to adopt comprehensive safeguards on all nuclear exports. In other words Canada will only export nuclear materials to states that are party to the NPT or will accept full IAEA safeguards on their nuclear programme. Canada, along with the Netherlands and Australia attempted to have a clause in the Final Declaration calling on all states (including nuclear weapon states) to open themselves to IAEA safeguards and inspection. In the process of compromise that led to the final consensus, the eventual statement simply reaffirmed the commitment of both nuclear and non-nuclear states to the non-proliferation regime.

Current Canadian Position

In his opening speech to the Review Conference, the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, stated that:

any weakening of the NPT will lead to the very condition - nuclear anarchy - that we are pledged to prevent. The implications of nuclear proliferation are so dangerous for all that we must find a realistic way to constrain such an unacceptable threat to common security and stability.¹

The Ambassador also pointed out that Canada was the first country to have the capability to develop nuclear weapons and to choose not to do so. Instead Canada concentrated on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Mr. Roche stated:

...Canada has a comprehensive nuclear exports policy which is based upon and fully recognizes the control value of the NPT as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. Specifically, Canada will only export nuclear materials, equipment and technology to those non-nuclear weapon states which have made a

¹ Douglas Roche, "Canadian Address to Third Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference" The Disarmament Bulletin Autumn 1985, pp. 4-5.

comprehensive binding commitment to...the NPT or by having taken an equivalent binding step, and have thereby accepted IAEA safeguards on their entire nuclear programme, current and future.²

During testimony to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Mr. Roche spoke of the success of the NPT Review Conference. He said

...the review, which occurs only every five years, shows what can be achieved in multilateral diplomacy when co-operation replaces confrontation as the basic negotiating stance.

.....

Canada's own objectives in the review conference were clearly met. Those were two; the maintenance of the NPT as a basic element of the non-proliferation regime and a reaffirmation of the purpose and provisions of the NPT. As well, a wider and enduring objective of Canadian foreign policy was also met. That is the strengthening and enhancing of the multilateral process. Multilateralism, like an effective global non-proliferation regime is a cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy.³

Mr. Roche also stated:

...the Canadian Government believes that the NPT is good for the world. Even if there have been problems with respect to stopping the arms race...we believe the NPT should not be thrown out....Canada has strong credentials to play a role in the NPT, because we were the first nation in the world having the capacity to participate in nuclear development....We were the first nation having the capacity to renounce the development of nuclear weapons....We think it is of great importance that Canada play a strong role in the protection of the NPT this year.⁴

² Ibid.

³ Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND) Proceedings, October 1985, pp. 5-6.

⁴ SCEAND Proceedings, 24 May 1985, p. 9.

Parliamentary Comment

On 11 June 1985, Conservative member Reg. Stackhouse asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark:

In light of the uncertain future of the NPT, will the Minister support its future by calling upon all nations to cease and desist from further nuclear testing as a sincere way of showing support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty?⁵

Mr. Clark responded:

Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament has been meeting with representatives of other countries, nuclear and non-nuclear powers, and through the Department of External Affairs we have been in touch with countries which are not yet signatories to the Treaty, urging that they affix their signatures to that document. We will continue to follow every means open to us to try to assure the regime of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.⁶

After the Review Conference, Mr. Stackhouse made a statement to the House:

...I believe this House should be fully conscious of the notable contribution that Canada has made to stabilizing the world through the success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference....Much of the credit goes to Ambassador Roche, the team of dedicated professional diplomats who worked with him, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs who gave his support.⁷

⁵ Commons Debates, 11 June 1985, p. 5640.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Commons Debates, 23 September, p. 6855.

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Cross References

Comprehensive Test Ban.

Uranium Exports.

Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones.

12. NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS NEGOTIATIONS

Background

On 8 January 1985, US Secretary of State George Shultz and the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, signed a joint communiqué outlining the nature and objectives of new negotiations "concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship."

When these negotiations began on 27 March 1985, the opening positions of both sides demonstrated little change from those taken in the arms control talks that had been discontinued the year before. However, on 30 September the Soviet negotiator, V. Karpov, presented a new proposal which included:

- a 50 per cent reduction in strategic launchers;
- a warhead ceiling of 6,000, with a warhead subceiling of 60 per cent in any one leg of the strategic triad;
- a ban on missile modernization;
- a ban on long-range cruise missiles (over 600 kilometers).
- a definition of "strategic" launchers as all those launchers capable of hitting the homeland of the other;
- banning of research and development of "space-strike" weapons.

The United States submitted a counter-proposal on 31 October 1985. This proposal included:

- a ballistic missile warhead ceiling of 4500, with a sub-ceiling of 3,000 on ICBMs;
- a ballistic missile launcher ceiling of 1,250 and a limit of 350 on heavy bombers;
- no limits on the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI);
- a ceiling of 140 for intermediate-range (INF) Soviet and American launchers in Europe.

When Soviet leader Gorbachev and US President Reagan met at a summit in Geneva, on 19-21 November 1985 they issued a joint communiqué reiterating the objectives of the Geneva negotiations and agreeing to hold two more summits in the following two years.

On 15 January 1986, Gorbachev made a public statement outlining a Soviet proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2,000. Reductions would occur in three stages over a fifteen-year period, culminating in a universal accord to prevent such weapons from coming into existence again; the initial reduction stage is based on the previous Soviet proposal of 50 per cent cuts. The unilateral Soviet testing moratorium was extended by three months. An important change was the inclusion of an offer to eliminate all US and Soviet intermediate-range missiles (INF) in the European zone.¹ Early in February, Soviet officials stated that an INF agreement was possible without prior agreement to limit the SDI.

In a letter to Gorbachev, dated 24 February 1986, Reagan outlined the American response to the INF element of the Soviet proposal. Reagan suggested three options for a three-year to eliminate these weapons; he rejected the Soviet demand that France and Britain agree not to build up their arsenals, and included in his proposal the intermediate-range SS-20s based in Soviet Asia.

In June, the Soviet Union put forward another proposal at Geneva. This called for reductions to a common ceiling of 8,000 strategic warheads, including sea-launched cruise missiles, and a commitment by both countries to remain within the ABM Treaty for another fifteen years. This proposal would serve as an interim step towards the deeper cuts put forward in the earlier Soviet proposal.

¹ For General-Secretary Gorbachev's full statement see USSR Embassy News Release no. 9, 15 January 1986.

Current Canadian Position

References to arms negotiations are contained in the Declaration made by Prime Minister Mulroney and US President Reagan at the Quebec Summit, 17-18 March 1985. The two leaders noted that:

our aim is...to enhance deterrence of armed aggression and bring about significant arms reduction between East and West.

.....

Dialogue and negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union at Geneva provide a historic opportunity to set East-West relations on a more secure foundation. We hope that these negotiations will lead to major steps toward the prevention of an arms race in space and to terminating it on earth, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and ultimately eliminating them everywhere.²

Referring to the US-USSR Summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985 Prime Minister Mulroney said:

The Geneva meeting has established, I think, some simple but powerful truths; that success in summitry at this level is predicated upon a number of things, including the strengths and resolve of the United States and its President and the unity and determination of our Alliance, NATO.

.....

I mean, [the Summit] to me represents a substantially changed climate and it's within an improved climate that substantial and real progress is possible. So I'm not euphoric. I don't think anyone is. But I think realism suggests that we ought to be happy with the progress that we have known.³

² Declaration by the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States of America Regarding International Security, 18 March 1985.

³ Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Statements to the Press, 21 November 1985, The Disarmament Bulletin, Winter 1985 Spring 1986, p. 1.

The resolution reaffirmed UN support for the negotiations in Geneva, noted that multilateral negotiations must also continue and expressed hope that the US-Soviet Summit would give added impetus towards early agreements.

Referring to the Soviet proposal of 15 January 1986, Mr. Clark pointed out that: "agreement on an equitable formula for the radical reduction of nuclear forces and on the appropriate relationship between offensive and defensive strategies and systems will remain the key challenges."

Specifically he stated that, "the Soviet Union does not address the issue of missiles deployed in Asia. But we take satisfaction from the fact that Mr. Gorbachev seems to be moving closer to President Reagan's 1981 zero-zero proposal on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe."

More generally, Mr. Clark noted that:

[The proposals] contain some intriguing new elements alongside well-worn positions and some disturbing preconditions that could hamper negotiation. They clearly warrant very serious consideration, but there are also many aspects that require clarification in the ongoing negotiations. The real test of the Soviet Union's commitment to radical and verifiable arms reductions will come when it moves from the stage of public diplomacy to the confidential confines of the negotiating room.

The Geneva Summit and the decision to regularize this high-level contact improve the prospects for progress in arms control. Beside bringing the leaders together, these regular meetings pave the way for annual assessments of progress made in arms control and encourage the leaders to settle matters which cannot be resolved by negotiators.

In conclusion, Mr. Clark told the House:

So, as the fourth round of Soviet-American nuclear arms talks get underway in Geneva, this Government will assist, in every way possible, the process of negotiation towards

an equitable agreement. By encouraging compliance with the fundamental arms control treaties, by developing practical solutions to verification problems and by supporting an improvement in the East-West political relationship, Canada can make a distinctive and significant contribution to realizing the critical objectives of the Geneva negotiations. That is our goal, our duty, and our Canadian tradition.⁴

Douglas Roche, Ambassador for Disarmament, addressed the question in a speech at the University of Alberta on 10 March 1986:

In this past year we have used all channels open to us to actively encourage, support and facilitate the conduct of serious and constructive negotiations.

Canada has had an ongoing series of consultations and discussions with the United States - bilaterally and along with our allies in NATO - on the progress of these negotiations. As well, Canada has engaged in an active dialogue with the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister has written to General Secretary Gorbachev outlining Canada's views and priorities on arms control questions and Canada has conducted bilateral arms control and disarmament discussions with Soviet officials in Ottawa and in Moscow.⁵

Parliamentary Comment

Liberal members Jean Chrétien and Lloyd Axworthy pursued the question of whether or not the Government would apply pressure on the United States to put the SDI on the table at the Geneva negotiations.⁶

During the course of the hearings on NORAD held by the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Axworthy asked Ambassador Roche:

⁴ Commons Debates, 23 January 1986, pp. 10100-10102.

⁵ DEA Statement, 86/17. 10 March 1986. The text of the Prime Minister's letter to General-Secretary Gorbachev has not been made public.

⁶ Commons Debates, 2 October 1985, 23-24 January 1986.
SCEAND Proceedings, 1 October, 1985 pp. 20-21.

Have we taken a position? Will we take a position that in fact Star Wars should be discussed in order to bring about all the other kinds of possible benefits of the resumption of the negotiations that the Star Wars question seems to hold the key to unlock?

Mr. Roche replied:

Yes, Canada has taken the position that the SDI should be put on the table. That has been a consistent position, so there would be nothing new in bringing that up again.⁷

Chrétien pursued the question with the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the House of Commons the next day and Mr. Clark answered that "the position of the Canadian Government is that the space issue must be on the negotiating table."⁸

Both opposition External Affairs critics made statements in January regarding the arms control negotiations and the newest Soviet proposal (15 January 1986).

Liberal critic Jean Chrétien commented:

The Gorbachev proposal must be carefully examined and it will call for a reasonable reply. However, preliminary analysis already shows that the plan submitted by the Soviet leader contains new and encouraging elements...the willingness of the Russians...to permit site inspection - and they have affirmed that they will accept that - is very important....I see the new disposition of the Soviets to put in the second phase or have later discussions with the British and French Governments as a positive sign that there will be more flexibility and early progress in the negotiations....Now that the Soviets have returned to the negotiating table and are willing to put forward some new propositions, I think that the

⁷ SCEAND Proceedings, 1 October 1985. p. 21.

⁸ Commons Debates, 2 October 1985, p. 7245.

NATO nations should talk to the Americans and try to do something positive regarding SDI....I believe that is the main obstacle to progress.⁹

A similar desire to respond positively to the Soviet proposals was expressed by Pauline Jewett who said:

...there were some very significant elements in the Gorbachev proposals,...a genuine reaching out for on-site verification and a willingness to put off until Phase II the inclusion of discussions of French, British, Chinese and other nuclear weapons. I also agree that it was disappointing that we did not see the question of SS-20s in Soviet Asia raised by Gorbachev...what I found to be the most exciting aspect of [the proposals, is] that there is a timetable...of all the Gorbachev proposals. I found this one to be the most innovative.¹⁰

In its final report the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations recommended that:

...Canada intensify its efforts, multilaterally within NATO, the United Nations and in disarmament forums and bilaterally with the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries, to win acceptance for a comprehensive set of arms control measures....the Government's capacity for formulating policy on arms control and disarmament needs improvement....one essential requirement would be a new policy development mechanism designed to reconcile the views received from the Department of External Affairs and National Defence.¹¹

Current References

The Soviet Proposal on Strategic Arms Reductions, CIIPS Communiqué, 28 October, 1985.

⁹ Commons Debates, 23 January 1986, pp. 10102-3.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 10103.

¹¹ Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations, Independence and Internationalism, June 1986, p. 145.

The American Proposals at Geneva, CIIPS Communiqué, 13 January, 1986.

Joe Clark Address to the Fortieth Session of the United Nations
The Disarmament Bulletin, Autumn 1985, pp. 1-2.

Joel Sokolsky, "Arms Control Negotiations: Confronting the Paradoxes" in
M. Molot and B. Tomlin (eds) Canada Among Nations 1985, (Toronto: James
Lorimer and Company, 1986), pp. 49-68.

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Cross References

NATO
Comprehensive Test Ban
SDI
The ABM Treaty

13. NUCLEAR WINTER

Background

The theory of nuclear winter holds that an exchange of nuclear weapons could produce enough smoke and dust to cut off sunlight to the earth for months, or even years, thus causing a severe drop in temperature to somewhere below the freezing mark. The result would be an end to plant life and agriculture and the starvation of those animals and humans that had survived the nuclear exchange. The effects would be felt in the Southern as well as the Northern Hemisphere, since the complete collapse of ecosystems and thus food supplies would mean mass starvation. The thesis was first put forward by the American scientist Carl Sagan in 1983, and has since been the subject of several scientific studies, as well as of debate concerning its potential effect on nuclear strategic thinking.

On 27 November 1984 the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution on nuclear winter, sponsored by Mexico and the Neutral and Non-aligned Nations. Canada also put forward a resolution on nuclear winter but withdrew it when it was unable to obtain a consensus on the text of the resolution or on proposed amendments. The primary difference between the Canadian resolution and the Mexican one was that the Canadian resolution treated nuclear winter as a worst-case scenario while the Mexican resolution treated it as a certain outcome. After withdrawing its resolution Canada voted in favour of the Mexican resolution.

In the spring of 1984 the Government of Canada asked the Royal Society of Canada to carry out a study and submit a report on the issue of nuclear winter. The study was chaired by Kenneth Hare, the Scientific Director was Andrew Foster, both from the University of Toronto. The Royal Society presented its report entitled "Nuclear Winter and Associated Effects" to the Government on 31 January 1985.

The Report stated that:

Although the results must be interpreted with care, a prima facie case has been made that a nuclear winter will follow from nuclear explosions of a wide range of severity, including those that are considered quite small in present strategic scenarios.¹

The Report further concluded that an aggressor delivering a first strike could not win, even if the opposing side did not retaliate, since such a strike would trigger nuclear winter for the aggressor and victim alike. The impact for Canada would be severe, whether or not it was a direct target in such an exchange. The Royal Society stated that "we are convinced that the Canadian Government should include [the effects of nuclear winter] in its strategic reckoning"² and recommended that the question be examined in greater detail by a qualified group of scientists. Specifically, Canada should participate in the larger US research programme which will last for 3-5 years. Funding of \$5 million would allow Canada to make an effective contribution.³

In mid-July a group of international scientists were invited by the Head of the Canadian Forestry Service to observe the controlled burning of about 800 hectares of crushed fir trees in Northern Ontario. The fir trees had been killed by spruce budworm and it was thought that the controlled burning might provide a chance for scientific observation of smoke effects which would shed some light on the nuclear winter theory.

¹ Nuclear Winter and Associated Effects, Royal Society of Canada, January 1985, p. 53.

² Ibid., p. 52.

³ Ibid., p. 57.

Current Canadian Position

After receiving the Royal Society Report in January, an interdepartmental committee from the Departments of External Affairs, National Defence, Agriculture, the Environment, Health and Welfare and Fisheries studied the findings of the Report. On 27 June 1985, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, made a statement in the House of Commons outlining the Government's position on the issue.

Mr. Clark stated the Government's agreement with the Royal Society's recommendation that further Canadian studies should be carried out in co-ordination with other countries and said that copies of the Report would be forwarded to the United Nations. He added that:

There is general agreement within the Government that the nuclear winter hypothesis is scientifically credible even though the details regarding its magnitude and duration are subject to great uncertainties.

.....

It is clear that a nuclear conflict would be catastrophic. This reinforces our basic conviction that any nuclear war must be prevented. Consequently, the Government continues to support NATO and its deterrence policy which has ensured our security for over 35 years. Our adversaries must appreciate that no nuclear war can be won in the traditional understanding of victory. The Royal Society Report reinforces this basic conviction. It follows, therefore, that we must continue to do all that is within our power to deter the initiation of all war.³

Parliamentary Comment

The issue was not raised in the House of Commons.

³ DFA Statement 85/36, 27 June 1985.

Current References

Bertin L., Nuclear Winter, CIIPS Background Paper No. 3, March 1986.

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14. PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

Background

Although the prevention of an arms race in outer space has been considered by the United Nations since the beginning of the space age in the late 1950's, it has only recently been taken up by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in a serious and comprehensive manner.

The 1959 report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space led its parent organization, the UN, to establish a permanent committee on the subject. In 1961, a consensus resolution was passed in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) which identified the principles by which states should be guided in their exploration and use of outer space. It was established that international law, including the UN Charter, applied to outer space, and that outer space and all celestial bodies were free for all states to explore.¹

Throughout the 1960's, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (COPUOS) continued its efforts and in December, 1966, the UN General Assembly unanimously approved the Treaty on Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies. Canada ratified this treaty in 1967. The Outer Space Treaty, as it is known, states that the exploration and use of outer space shall be for the benefit of all, and bans all weapons of mass destruction in space.

The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union limits the number of anti-ballistic missile sites, interceptor missiles and associated radar, and tests of defensive weapons. The parties undertake "not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems

¹ The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1985, United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, (United Nations, New York, 1985), p. 119.

or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based."² The ABM Treaty, therefore, acts as a barrier to the extension of the arms race into outer space.

The Final Document of the First UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) urged that further agreements be developed to keep outer space for solely peaceful purposes. In 1979, the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies was opened for signature. It prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons on the moon or in its orbit, and specifies how the resources of the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used as the common heritage of all mankind. It has not yet obtained the necessary ratification to enter into force. Canada has not signed this treaty.

In June 1979, bilateral superpower talks on anti-satellite (ASAT) activities were suspended after a year of inconclusive discussions. There was disagreement concerning the capabilities of each side in this area, and the possible defensive or offensive nature of ASAT weapons.

Canada was involved in the 1982 UN Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE). The final report of this conference urged all states, particularly those with active space programmes or interests, to realize the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space, which was seen as a serious and dangerous prospect.

In 1982, at the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II), Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau outlined Canada's official stand on the increasing militarization of outer space. He pointed out the "highly destabilizing" loopholes in the Outer Space Treaty, particularly those regarding "anti-satellite weapons or anti-missile laser systems."

² Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space, Canada, Working Paper, Conference on Disarmament Document 618, CD/OS/WP.6, 23 July, 1985, p. 17.

I believe that we cannot wait much longer if we are to be successful in foreclosing the prospect of space wars. I propose, therefore, that an early start be made on a treaty to prohibit the development, testing and deployment of all weapons for use in space.³

In 1981, at the request of the Soviet Union, the item "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of stationing weapons of any kind in outer space" was placed on the agenda of the UN General Assembly for a vote in 1982. The Soviet Union also presented a draft treaty. There was no mention of ASAT weapons. At the same time, Italy, representing a group of Western nations, introduced a resolution entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space and prohibition of anti-satellite systems." Both resolutions asked the General Assembly to request the Conference on Disarmament to consider the question of the militarization of outer space. The major difference was that the Soviet resolution called on the CD to begin negotiations on a treaty which would ban the stationing of any weapons in outer space whereas the West asserted that it was necessary to identify all relevant issues prior to actual negotiations.

Both resolutions were adopted. In 1982, a similar approach resulted in two further resolutions. All four were supported by large majorities. Canada, like most Western states, abstained on the Soviet resolution and voted in favour of the Western resolution. In 1983 and 1984, Canada voted for the two resolutions that called for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and the examination of this issue by an Ad Hoc Working Group in the Conference on Disarmament.

Since 1982, the issue of preventing an arms race in outer space has been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, but the 40 nations represented

³ The Prime Minister's Address to the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, New York, 18 June, 1982, DEA, p. 10.

were unable to reach a consensus on the mandate for an Ad Hoc working group. Canada was very active in trying to promote agreement on an agenda, arguing that the General Assembly had placed basic responsibility on the Conference.⁴ As a contribution to the necessary preparation for substantive negotiations, Canada tabled a working paper which outlined the factors of stable and unstable deterrence, desirable objectives for arms control, the increasing importance of space for military purposes and the present state of arms control in space. The paper also illustrated the relationship of anti-satellite systems to ballistic missile defence.⁵ The Canadian delegate pointed to the paradoxical nature of space systems, since, depending on the situation, certain characteristics could be either stabilizing or destabilizing.⁶ An example of this is that a reconnaissance satellite can offer information on compliance with an arms control treaty, while at the same time providing crucial military information for warfare.

Early in 1983, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Alan MacEachen, promised the CD that "the expanding programme of verification research in Canada...[would]...seek to identify possible solutions" to the problem of prohibiting all weapons in outer space. He advised the CD to define the legal requirements of such a ban, thereby allowing expansion of the already existing outer space legal regime.⁷

The Ambassador to the CD, Donald McPhail, continued Canadian pressure and support for the creation of an Ad Hoc Working Group on arms control and outer space. In April, 1983, he promised full Canadian co-operation with the contact group that had been established to clarify the objectives and

⁴ Conference on Disarmament, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space-Final Records (PV) 1979-1984, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, DEA, June, 1985. CD/PV 183, 31 August, 1982, p. 23.

⁵ CD 320, 26 August, 1982.

⁶ CD/PV. 183, 31 August, 1982, p. 24.

⁷ CD/PV. 189, 1 February, 1983, p. 22.

tasks of an eventual working group in this area. He wanted to foreclose the option of armament in outer space, and proposed defining the substance of a future treaty. Since verification would be a problem due to the possible dual nature of many space systems, Canada also undertook a national research programme.⁸

In 1984, his successor, Alan Beesley, voiced Canada's "considerable apprehension and regret" regarding the CD's apparent inability "to come to grips with the very real and pressing problems of arms control and outer space, an issue with a potential for seriously destabilizing effects, not to mention the possible financial outlays of almost unimaginable dimensions." Referring to the 1982 Canadian working paper, Beesley repeated its contention that consideration must be given to "the over-all net effects on a system-by-system basis." He urged that a mandate for an Ad Hoc committee should call for basic research on such issues, as well as a survey of existing treaties and international law pertaining to outer space.⁹

Ambassador Beesley also cited Prime Minister Trudeau's intention to promote in the CD a ban on high altitude anti-satellite systems. To further promote this goal, the Canadian Government initiated "a number of long-range studies on certain aspects of the outer space issue." Beesley promised to contribute the results of these studies to the proposed ad hoc committee, as well as to use the resultant research for working papers on the specific distinctions between low and high altitude satellites.¹⁰

⁸ CD/PV. 216, 28 April, 1983, p. 10.

⁹ CD/PV. 262, 26 April, 1984. p. 54.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 55.

Current Canadian Position

In 1985, agreement was finally reached on the mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. The mandate directed the Committee to examine all issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space as a preliminary step in the initial stage of its work. Substantive consideration should be given to all existing agreements, proposals, and future initiatives, as well as to the current legal regime and any activities that pertain to outer space.

In March 1985, Ambassador Beesley described the mandate as "realistic...[and]...exploratory...but, nonetheless, one that permits concrete work." He noted that it took into account and "both compliments and accurately affects the realities concerning the bilateral negotiations...[and]...does not undermine or undercut or prejudice or in any way interfere with those negotiations, and that we consider to be absolutely essential."¹¹ (The bilateral negotiations referred to are those between the superpowers at Geneva). The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, expressed the Canadian Government's pleasure regarding the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee and promised effective Canadian participation aimed at fostering consensus and understanding of the requirements for a treaty banning the militarization of outer space.¹²

In April 1985, Beesley told the CD that preventing an arms race in outer space was one of Canada's "major priorities." He praised all members of the CD for the breakthrough on the procedural problem regarding the mandate, and urged that the conscious attempt to determine the area of existing common ground be an example for other issues.¹³

¹¹ Conference on Disarmament, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space-Final Records (PV) 1985, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, DEA, February 1986, CD/PV 306, 29 March, 1985, p. 9.

¹² DEA Communiqué, 85/46, 9 April 1985.

¹³ CD/PV. 306, 4 April 1985, p. 24.

In July 1985, the Canadian Ambassador tabled a "modest" yet "practical contribution to our deliberative efforts, particularly to the widespread desire for concrete documentation."¹⁴ The comprehensive, two-volume compendium of the CD's working papers and final records which relate to the area of outer space illustrates both "the extent of past work...[and]...certain achievements", as well as the "daunting range of issues and problems."¹⁵

Later in July, the Canadian delegation deposited a working paper entitled "Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space." This review of existing relevant agreements was considered essential to ensure that the CD worked in conformity with existing treaties and international law. Over twenty international agreements, including the UN Charter, were examined, and a variety of issues were identified that were deemed fundamental to the successful development of a treaty preventing an arms race in outer space.

At the 40th Session of the General Assembly, Canada, with most other members, voted for the Resolution 40/87 which called for the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on this issue in the CD. The resolution also called on all states to refrain from any actions involving outer space that were contrary to existing treaties. The United States and Grenada abstained. Resolution 40/162, which called for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, passed without a vote. The Secretary of State for External Affairs told the 40th Session that preventing an arms race in outer space was a Canadian priority, and "now on the world agenda."

Ambassador Beesley urged the CD, in February 1986, to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. He said that the Canadian Government hoped that the 1985 mandate would also be

¹⁴ CD/PV. 317, 2 July 1985. p. 29.

¹⁵ Ibid.

renewed, as it had been "attained only with great difficulty, skill and perseverance." He reiterated the Canadian view that the multilateral discussions must be "complementary to, and not disruptive of" the superpower bilateral talks on the same issue. He said that while the 1985 discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee has been "substantive" and "for the most part objective", they remained incomplete and thus the 1985 mandate had to be discharged with "determination and dispatch" prior to any new approach. The Canadian delegation would continue to make "concrete contributions."¹⁶

In March 1986, the Canadian delegation presented a compendium of documentation resulting from the 1985 CD discussions on outer space. This was followed in July 1986 by the tabling of an official Canadian paper on terminology relevant to Arms Control in Outer Space. At the termination of the 1986 summer session, it was apparent that the Outer Space mandate was by no means exhausted and that its prompt renewal in 1987 would permit significant work to be undertaken.

Parliamentary Comment

The Secretary of State for External Affairs told the House of Commons, on 23 January 1986, that the prevention of an arms race in outer space was one of the six Canadian goals in arms control and disarmament. He noted the tabling in 1985, at the CD, of the working paper "on the nature of the legal regime governing outer space."

¹⁶ Address to the CD, 4 February 1986, p. 14.

Current References

Conference on Disarmament, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space-Working Papers (WP) 1962-1984, Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs, June 1985.

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Hardenbergh, Chalmers ed. "Outer Space II - Conference on Disarmament" The Arms Control Reporter , Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, p. 574.A.1.

Matte, Nicolas M. ed. Arms Control and Disarmament in Outer Space, McGill University, Centre for Research of Air and Space Law, Montreal, 1985.

Samson, Hélène. Briefing Paper, Outer Space in the 1980's, United Nations Association in Canada, Ottawa, September 1983.

15. RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Background

Radiological weapons are defined as any device, other than a nuclear weapon, designed to kill or destroy by disseminating radioactive material. While these weapons have not yet been developed, they have been the subject of study by an Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) since 1980. In 1979 the superpowers submitted a joint proposal aimed at prohibiting the development, production, stock piling and use of radiological weapons; the major obstacles in the way of such an agreement are the questions of whether attacks on nuclear facilities should be included, and verification.

Sweden and the Neutral and Non-aligned Nations have argued that the convention should include such attacks in order to make the treaty comprehensive. They suggest that otherwise there is little value to a ban on weapons which do not exist and show no likelihood of being developed. Large quantities of radioactivity would be released in the event of an attack on storage facilities for radioactive waste, and Sweden and other states see these attacks as the most likely possible form of radiological warfare. The United States and many of its allies, including Canada, want attacks on nuclear facilities to be dealt with under a separate arrangement. They believe that such attacks should be dealt with in a legal agreement, such as the Geneva Convention of 1949 on "methods of warfare and humanitarian law."¹

Some delegations have argued that the the issue is adequately covered by the protection of victims of international war in the 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Convention. Inter alia, the Protocol bans attacks on nuclear power

¹ Hélène Samson, Briefing Paper-Radiological Weapons, United Nations Association in Canada, Ottawa, December 1985, p.1.

stations unless such stations are directly and significantly supporting adversarial military operations.

Sweden has pointed to alleged deficiencies in the Protocol. Specifically, the wording of the Protocol restricts its implications to attacks that have "consequent severe losses among the civilian population."² Since radiation has delayed effects, such losses might not actually occur until long after the attack.

The joint US-Soviet proposal of 1979 stipulated that verification of compliance with the convention would be assisted by a Consultative Committee of Experts, which would investigate any alleged violations. Parties to the treaty would also be able to lodge complaints with the Security Council. However, in July 1985, the United States decided that these verification procedures were inadequate and proposed additional procedures.

The issue has taken on new importance in light of two Iraqi attacks on a partially constructed Iranian nuclear facility in the spring of 1985. These caused no severe damage but they were the fifth and sixth military attacks on nuclear reactors since 1967.³

Current Canadian Position

Canada submitted a compendium of verbatim records and working papers to the 1985 session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. These were part of results of Ottawa's "review and assessment of the radiological weapons negotiating process", which took place in the fall of 1984.⁴

² Ibid., p. 2.

³ Bennett Ramberg, Nuclear Plants-Military Hostages? in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists March 1986, pp. 17-21.

⁴ DEA Conference on Disarmament, Radiological Weapons - Final Records (PV) 1977-1984 : Conference on Disarmament, Radiological Weapons - Working

In his April address to the CD, Canadian Ambassador J. Alan Beesley urged the superpowers to reach agreement on a treaty. He stated that the Canadian delegation "would support an early consensus on the draft treaty on which United States/USSR agreement has already been reached." Referring to the Swedish-led group, the Ambassador promised active support for "parallel attempts to develop a formula to meet the serious apprehensions that have been expressed regarding attacks" on nuclear power stations. He also pointed to the value to the CD of an agreement, in that it would be a rare and thus edifying experience, and would "help to reinvigorate the institution."⁵

In July 1985, a Canadian official said Canada would immediately sign a radiological weapons treaty based on the 1979 joint US/USSR proposal. Noting that the issue had been re-examined in Ottawa, the official stipulated that attacks on nuclear facilities were best addressed in another forum, perhaps preceded by a legal examination. The official termed the recent American demands for further verification regrettable. Despite the June announcement by the Warsaw Treaty States that they were in agreement with the Swedish view on the need to include attacks on nuclear facilities, the Canadian official said there was nothing significantly new in their position.⁶ He reiterated the Western position that the banning of radiological weapons be dealt with separately from the question of such attacks.

In his address to the 40th General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1985, the Secretary of State for External Affairs called on the superpowers "to conclude an effectively verifiable treaty banning radiological weapons." He said "Canada is ready to sign a treaty

Papers (WP) 1970-1984, January, 1985. The two-volume set covers all working papers.

⁵ Conference on Disarmament - Working Papers (note 4) CD/PV 306, pp. 24-31.

⁶ The Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, ed. Chalmers Hardenberg, The Arms Control Reporter 1985, pp. 703 A1 - 703 B14.

immediately."⁷

In the General Assembly, a resolution was passed by consensus to call on the CD to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee so that it might continue negotiations in 1986. Canada, along with many of its Western allies, abstained on Resolution 40/90, which called for a ban on new types of weapons of mass destruction. The United States cast the sole negative vote.

Parliamentary Comment

During the hearings of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Conservative member Allan McKinnon asked the Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, what was meant by radiological weapons. Mr. Roche responded:

Radiological weapons are not in the common lexicon today because they do not exist. They are, in essence, weapons with an explosive capacity that would disseminate radiation in the atmosphere....Some people would ask why we are worried about that. I think that, to the extent you can shut off the development of futuristic weapons, it is a contribution to world security....Progress on achieving a treaty on radiological weapons has been deterred in the Conference on Disarmament by ancillary matters that have been tacked onto it.⁸

⁷ UNGA 40, p.4.

⁸ SCFAND Proceedings, 1 October 1985, p. 23.

Current References

Beesley, J. Allan, Statement by the Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, CD/PV 306, April 4, 1985.

Clark, Joe, The Right Honourable Secretary of State for External Affairs, Plea for World Peace as UN Celebrates Fortieth Birthday, Statements and Speeches No. 85/10, to the Fortieth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, September 25, 1985.

16. URANIUM EXPORTS

Background

Canada is one of the world's largest suppliers of uranium. It was involved in the research and development of the atomic bomb during World War II, and supplied uranium for atomic weapons from Port Radium in the Northwest Territories. In 1945 Canada renounced any intention of developing atomic weapons of its own but it continued to supply Britain and the United States with uranium and plutonium for their weapons programmes for the next twenty years. In 1965 Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson changed this policy and announced that from that point on Canadian exports of uranium would be used for peaceful purposes only. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970, requiring non-nuclear weapon states to submit to the full safeguard measures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to agree not to develop nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapon states are required to co-operate fully with non-nuclear states in the development of peaceful nuclear energy uses and have agreed to work to end vertical proliferation. Canada signed the NPT but continued to sell uranium to countries that had not signed this Treaty.

In 1974 India, which had participated in a nuclear co-operation programme with Canada, exploded an atomic bomb, claiming that it was a peaceful nuclear explosion. It initially stated that no agreement with Canada had been breached but later admitted that the plutonium used in the bomb had been produced in the Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor. In response, Canada suspended all nuclear co-operation with India and later that year announced more stringent safeguards on Canadian exports of nuclear material and equipment.

Natural uranium is a blend of Uranium²³⁵ and Uranium²³⁸. Uranium²³⁵ which can be used directly as a nuclear explosive constitutes less than 1 per cent of natural Uranium and this is too low to generate a nuclear

explosion. Natural uranium, therefore, is not classified as a strategic material. Approximately 85 per cent of Canadian uranium exported goes to the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France for enrichment and then for use in light water nuclear reactors. These reactors require uranium with a 3 per cent concentration of Uranium²³⁵ and natural uranium must be enriched to this concentration. This is done by increasing the percentage of the Uranium²³⁵ isotope. The enrichment procedure is elaborate and expensive and until recently only countries with nuclear weapons programmes could afford the cost of such large operations. These plants have both military and civilian uses, and therefore the separation of materials for civilian and military application occurs only as a bookkeeping procedure. Essentially, this is the basis of the principle of fungibility. Imported uranium effectively goes into a large pot and is not kept separate according to country of origin or intended use.

In a letter to Ed Broadbent, leader of the NDP, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark, outlined the principle of fungibility:

It is impossible to trace precisely each and every molecule of Canadian uranium through these complex enrichment plants....However, for each ounce of Canadian uranium fed into the enrichment plant the same amount, in both enriched and depleted forms as appropriate, is subject to the Canada-USA nuclear co-operation agreement and to the non-explosive use and non-military use commitments contained therein. This is an example of the application of the internationally-accepted principle of fungibility.¹

When the uranium is enriched to the required 3 per cent concentration, the commensurate amount is taken off and the "depleted uranium" (which still contains small amounts of ²³⁵) is stored. Depleted Uranium²³⁸ can be used

¹ Secretary of State for External Affairs, Letter to the Hon. Edward Broadbent, 3 October 1985.

in military reactors to breed plutonium which can be used to produce nuclear weapons. Uranium₂₃₈ is also an important element of hydrogen bombs, providing 50 per cent of their explosive power.

After the Indian explosion in 1974, Canada announced that no uranium of Canadian origin could be enriched or reprocessed without prior consent from Canada. After two years of negotiations concerning this requirement, the European Economic Community (EEC) and Japan continued to refuse to agree to the stipulation, and in January 1977 Canada halted uranium shipments to both. Japan soon afterwards agreed to abide by the clause but the Community continued to balk and eventually, in September 1980, Canada signed an agreement with the EEC allowing sales to occur with consultation on a case-by-case basis. When Canadian uranium is enriched by the Soviet Union for use by Spain, East Germany, Sweden and Finland in their reactors, Canada requires that the depleted uranium be shipped to those countries along with the enriched. This requirement does not apply to Canadian uranium enriched in Britain, France and the United States, since these countries have bilateral agreements with Canada.

In 1965 Canada signed an agreement with the United States entitled the Canada-United States Nuclear Co-operation Agreement. This agreement stipulates that uranium from Canada can not be used for military purposes, and was most recently renewed in 1980. It requires that the amount of Canadian uranium entering an American plant must at least equal the amount of uranium enriched by that plant for non-military use (primarily light-water reactors).

² The resolution was cosponsored with Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Cameroons, Chad, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Sweden and Uruguay.

Current Canadian Position

At the 40th Session of the United Nations General Assembly Canada co-sponsored a resolution entitled "prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes" (Resolution 40/94G).² The resolution called upon the Conference on Disarmament to "pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices." The resolution passed with 145 voting in favour (including Pakistan), one against (France) and seven abstentions (including Argentina, Brazil, Britain, China, India, the United States).

Responding to questions concerning the agreement with the United States the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, stated in the House:

I have looked at the provisions of the treaty.
I have looked at the degree to which they are
being honoured. The treaty obligations and the
treaty assurances with respect to Canada in
relation to the US and other countries are being
honoured.³

Parliamentary Comment

On 26 September 1985, NDP leader Ed Broadbent asked Mr. Clark why depleted uranium from Canada was being used as part of the encasement surrounding US nuclear warheads. He also asked "what corrective steps are being taken by the Government of Canada to enforce this agreement (that Canadian uranium be used for peaceful purposes only)?"⁴

³ Commons Debates, 30 September 1985, p. 7147.

⁴ Commons Debates, 26 September 1985, p. 7054.

Mr. Clark responded:

...our treaty provisions with the United States are similar to those which we have with Sweden and other countries. They are based upon the principle of fungibility. Over the last 20 years there has been no evidence of any breach of the language or obligations of that treaty.⁵

On 29 September 1985, a segment of the CTV programme W5 suggested that Canadian uranium exports to the US were being used for military purposes, and this sparked further questions in the House. Mr. Clark reiterated his earlier position that the treaty with the United States was being upheld and said that even after watching the CTV programme, "I have neither seen nor received any evidence to suggest that the treaty is not being respected."⁶

Liberal member Lloyd Axworthy pursued the issue:

These reports also include the fact that Canadian uranium is now being used by the French nuclear agency which could have a potential for use in weapons. Has the Canadian Government investigated that possibility and are we also looking into what safeguards are in place to make sure that the French Government, in light of its production of nuclear weaponry, is not also using Canadian uranium for those purposes?⁷

Mr. Clark responded that Canadian standards with regard to France are ensured through arrangements with Euratom. Reacting to Mr. Clark's statement that he had watched the W5 programme, NDP member Ian Waddell asked Mr. Clark:

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Commons Debates, 30 September 1985, p. 7147.

⁷ Ibid.

Did he not see the pictures of the barrels of depleted uranium? Did he not hear the American official say that Canadian uranium was being mixed in and was in fact being used to make nuclear bombs?⁸

Mr. Clark responded:

...I heard those statements by Mr. Arkin. I have heard the allegation that the Canadian treaty assurances are not being respected. That allegation is false.⁹

NDP External Affairs critic Pauline Jewett asked Mr. Clark to outline the reasons he had for his certainty that depleted Canadian uranium was not being used for military purposes. Mr. Clark stated:

I have informed myself on the principle of fungibility and other arcane matters that are involved in this question. I have learned that there is, in the treaty, a requirement for administrative arrangements to be put into place that deal with the residue as well as the original uranium. I have learned that those administrative arrangements are in fact in place. I am satisfied on the basis of the information I now have available, that the treaty is being respected....The proof is that I have looked for any weakness in the treaty and I have found none. If Honourable Members have any information that the treaty is not being respected, I ask them for the fourth time not to be so secretive. Come forward with your allegations so that we can find out whether they are true or false.¹⁰

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 7149.

Current References

For a good overview of what happens to Canadian uranium in the United States, see the testimony of Mark Moher, Director of the Nuclear Energy Division at External Affairs, SCEAND Proceedings, 1 October 1985, pp. 24-27.

E. Regehr and S. Rosenblum (eds.), Canada and the Nuclear Arms Race, (Toronto: James Lorimer and Co., 1983).

A.S. Krass, P., B. Boskma, B. Elzen, W.A. Smit, Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation, SIPRI, 1983.

D. Fischer and P. Szasz Safeguarding the Atom, SIPRI, 1985.

Cross References

Non-Proliferation Treaty

17. VERIFICATION

Background

Canada has been an active participant in multilateral arms control and disarmament processes since the 1950s. In 1979 Canada undertook a review of the previous twenty-five years of the arms control and disarmament process in an effort to see if there was a specific area in which Canada could profitably make a greater contribution.

The review concluded that the issue of verification was one which spanned all areas of arms control and disarmament, in which discussion occurred primarily on an Ad Hoc basis, and towards which little research was directed. As a result, verification was seen as an area in which Canada could make a modest but significant contribution, and a programme to broaden Canadian specialist and public understanding of the issue was created.

The Arms Control Verification Research Programme of the Department of External Affairs is a cooperative process between Government, the academic community and the commercial sector in support of Canada's participation in international negotiations. When the programme began in October 1983 its budget was \$500,000 and this has since grown to \$1 million.

Its objective is to improve the verification process which is seen as indispensable to the success of efforts to reduce and eliminate arms. It is based on the conviction that useful work on verification problems can be done in advance of negotiations towards specific agreements.¹

Projects undertaken in the verification programme include:

- research concerning problems in international negotiations

¹ The Government of Canada, Verification in All Its Aspects: A Comprehensive Study on Arms Control and Disarmament Verification Pursuant to UNGA Resolution 40/152(0), Government of Canada Publication, April 1986, p. 35.

- specialized technical training programmes
- hosting of international symposia of experts on specific subjects
- liaison with national and international bodies outside of Canada
- public presentation of verification issues

The verification research programme focusses on six priority issue areas:

1. the achievement of a comprehensive convention to ban chemical weapons;
2. the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty;
3. the development of a treaty to ban weapons for use in outer space;
4. the pursuit of arms control and military confidence-building in Europe through the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna and the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE);²
5. The conclusion of a ban on radiological weapons;
6. The conduct of other research as may be required from time to time.²

Specifically, programme activities include: a \$3.2 million upgrade of the seismic array station at Yellowknife, a study given to the UN Secretary General on operational procedures for investigating alleged chemical weapons abuses, and the ongoing PAXSAT programme which is studying the feasibility of techniques for monitoring an arms control agreement on space weapons or conventional forces in Europe.

Current Canadian Position

During the 1985 Fall Session of the United Nations General Assembly,

² "The Verification Research Programme", The Disarmament Bulletin, Spring-Summer 1985, p. 12.

the Canadian delegation to the UN promoted a Canadian-formulated resolution entitled "Verification in All Its Aspects." Resolution 40/152 (0) was co-sponsored by ten³ other states and passed by consensus on 22 November, 1985. The resolution was called "a historic breakthrough", since previous resolutions on this issue had failed to proceed beyond the negotiating stage.⁴

The Resolution called upon member states "to increase their efforts towards achieving agreements on balanced, mutually acceptable, verifiable and effective arms limitation and disarmament measures." It also invited all members of the UN "to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than 15 April 1986, their views and suggestions on verification principles, procedures and techniques...and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification." The Secretary-General was asked to compile a report on these submissions for the 1986 Session of the General Assembly. Since verification is often one of the causes of disagreement in arms control negotiations, this resolution was held to be valuable in that it focussed multilateral attention on the need to make this issue a central concern for all states.

In his speech to the 40th Session of the United Nations, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, promised that Canada would step up its work in improving the verification process.⁵

The Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament at the United Nations, Douglas Roche stated:

Verification is not, of course, an end in itself,
but it does enhance the effectiveness of treaties

³ The ten other states were: Australia, Belgium, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Turkey, the United Kingdom.

⁴ Canadian Delegation to the UN, Press Release no. 62, 22 November 1985.

⁵ SSEA Address to the 40th Session of the United Nations, Disarmament Bulletin, Autumn 1985, pp. 1-2.

by promoting confidence and compliance in negotiated texts. A solid body of verifiable arms control treaties in which nations reposed a degree of confidence would go a long way toward easing tensions and mistrust.

.....

This body of knowledge and expertise on verification issues [being developed by Canada] is shared widely with the international community. In this way Canada is furthering, in a very practical way, the global arms control process. Canada's credentials in this sort of serious background work on verification have been well-established and are now widely recognized in the multilateral forums.⁶

Carrying out the requirements of Resolution 40/152 (0), in April 1986, the Canadian Government submitted to the Secretary-General and subsequently published "A Comprehensive Study on Arms Control and Disarmament Verification Pursuant to UNGA Resolution 40/152 (0)". This publication provides a comprehensive survey of the historical background to verification efforts, and outlines the relevant principles, procedures and techniques used in verification. It addresses some of the questions related to verification in three areas of arms control under consideration in the Conference on Disarmament: a comprehensive test ban, the prohibition of chemical weapons, and the peaceful uses of outer space. All of these regimes depend on adequate verification for their success. By listing the verification requirements in each case, the publication identifies the areas where future verification efforts should be concentrated.

In reply to the Secretary-General's call for new ideas on verification, Canada listed six possible innovations.⁷ It suggested that the UN has an important role to play in the application and interpretation of arms control agreements, despite the fact that the bilateral negotiating process

⁶ Signals of Hope, DEA Statement, 10 March 1986, pp. 8-9.

⁷ Verification In All Its Aspects: A Comprehensive Study on Arms Control and Disarmament Verification Pursuant to UNGA Resolution 40/152(0), Government of Canada Publication, April 1986, p. 35.

between the superpowers may continue to be of paramount importance in the global arms control forum. Nevertheless, it is suggested that "new ways and new approaches" for UN diplomacy would be a worthwhile endeavour. Among the Canadian suggestions are:

...a further strengthening of the United Nation's capacity to investigate allegations of non-compliance. For example, fact-finding initiatives by the Secretary-General can help to bridge the gap between prohibition and verification, between the legislative and enforcement roles of the United Nations,...considerations of means of improving the adequacy of the Security Council as a means of resolving verification and compliance difficulties,...research and examination of the utility of establishing an International Verification Organization (IVO) or IVO-type organization for use in future agreements, utilizing the rich body of documentation generated over the years in the Conference on Disarmament and elsewhere, ...greater assistance, advice, technical expertise offered to negotiators in the regional arms control and disarmament process with a view to combining international mechanisms with regional measures of verification.⁸

Parliamentary Comment

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, in a statement to the House of Commons on 23 January 1986, emphasized that the area of verification is "where Canadian expertise and diplomacy come together."⁹ He noted the success of the Canadian-initiated resolution on verification, and asserted that Canada is "second to none in our activity to develop verification procedures and technology that meet the practical requirements of arms control agreements actually under negotiation or envisaged."¹⁰

⁸ Ibid., p. 41.

⁹ Commons Debates, 23 January 1986, p. 10101.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Current Readings

Cleminson F.R., Gilman E., A Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs, January 1986.

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Hafemeister, David, Ronn Joseph J. and Tsipis, Kosta, "The Verification of Compliance with Arms-Control Agreements", Scientific American, Volume 252, Number 3, March 1985.

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Roche, Douglas, Ambassador for Disarmament, Signals of Hope: Canada and the International Year of Peace, Secretary of State for External Affairs Statement 86/17, Edmonton, March 10, 1986.

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18. WORLD DISARMAMENT CAMPAIGN - THE INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF PEACE

Background

The first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament was held in 1978. It resulted in a Final Document which, amongst other points, noted the need for global education on the dangers of the arms race, so "that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence."¹ The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the UN Centre for Disarmament Affairs (which became the Department for Disarmament Affairs on 1 January 1983) were encouraged to accelerate their educational efforts in this area. As a result, the UN system increased the production and promotion of information on the arms race and disarmament. Member states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were urged to facilitate a wider dissemination of knowledge and materials on various aspects of disarmament.

In 1980, Alfonso Garcia Robles, Mexican Ambassador to the UN, proposed a study on the feasibility of a World Disarmament Campaign. This led to a request from the General Assembly that the Secretary-General study possible structures of organization and financial support for such an undertaking. This report was submitted to the General Assembly in 1981. After member states commented on the study and added their own suggestions, the resulting report was submitted to the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II) in 1982. The concept was popular and the World Disarmament Campaign was launched by consensus on 7 June 1982, the opening day of UNSSOD II. The Secretary-General submitted an outline of a programme for the World Disarmament Campaign, which was discussed during the Special Session.²

¹ World Disarmament Campaign, Fact Sheet No. 36, Department of Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, New York, June 1984, p. 2.

² "The World Disarmament Campaign and the Role of Public Opinion" The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1985, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, New York, pp. 156-157.

UNSSOD I had proclaimed Disarmament Week as an annual event, to coincide with 24 October, the day the UN was founded. UNSSOD II stressed the educational value of the Week, and made it an integral part of the World Disarmament Campaign (WDC).

The World Disarmament Campaign (WDC) has three major goals: (1) to inform, (2) to educate and (3) to generate public support and understanding of the aims of the UN in the field of arms control and disarmament. These objectives are to be carried out on a global basis in a non-partisan, factual manner with the active participation and co-operation of all UN member states. The UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, in conjunction with the UN Information Centres, NGOs, various Foreign Ministries, UN Associations and the media around the world, has tried to provide information for the non-specialized reader. The demand for non-polemical, comprehensive information about arms control and disarmament has rapidly increased over the past few years.

The UN Department of Disarmament Affairs is the overall organizer of the WDC and maintains close contact with a wide range of UN agencies and departments which are involved. A variety of regional seminars, conferences, internship programmes, fellowships and speakers have been organized to ensure that many people can benefit from the Campaign. The UN also publishes The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, the periodical Disarmament, a World Disarmament Campaign Newsletter and educational kits and booklets.

The Campaign is financed with existing UN funds, and by pledging conferences held each year during Disarmament Week. Canada contributed to the pledging conferences in 1984 and 1985.

In 1982, the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, a recommendation from the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) that an International Year of

Peace (IYP) should be proclaimed on 24 October 1985, the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations. Resolution 37/16 declared 1986 the International Year of Peace and invited all Member States, UN organizations and interested NGOs to help in the preparation and fulfilment of the IYP. In 1983 the Secretary-General was asked to propose a draft programme for the General Assembly. That year, Resolution 38/56 called for the establishment of a voluntary fund for the IYP programme. In 1984, Resolution 39/10 called for more funding in order to promote international peace and security. All of these resolutions were adopted without a vote.³

According to the Secretary-General's draft programme, the main goals of the IYP are: (1) to motivate widespread effective action promoting peace on the basis of the UN Charter; (2) to reinforce and reinvigorate the UN system and the Security Council, so that they are able to maintain and promote international peace and security; and (3) provoke thought on, and encourage efforts for, the basic requirements of peace in the modern world.

Regional seminars were held in 1985 that focused on "Peace and Development", "Peace and Disarmament", and "Preparation for Life in Peace." A wide variety of events on these themes and many others were planned around the world for 1986. The Secretariat's Department of Political and Security Council Affairs is responsible for co-ordinating activities within the UN system, as well as maintaining liaisons with IYP activities involving NGOs and other non-UN organizations. Many of the specialized UN agencies will sponsor events that will relate peace to their particular field.

³ Hélène Samson, Briefing Paper - International Year of Peace, United Nations Association in Canada, Ottawa, December 1985, p. 1.

Current Canadian Position

In the General Assembly, Resolution 40/151 B in 1985 was one part of a broader resolution on a Review and Implementation of the concluding Document of UNSSOD II. In particular, it referred specifically to the World Disarmament Campaign. Canada, with 138 other nations, voted for it in December 1985. By supporting it, Canada, inter alia, accepted the inclusion of the WDC on the provisional agenda of the forty-first session of the UN General Assembly and called for more financial pledges, noting with regret "that most of the states that have the largest military expenditures have not so far made any financial contribution to the World Disarmament Campaign."⁴ With regard to Resolution 40/151D, entitled "World Disarmament Campaign: actions and activities", Canada, all the NATO allies, and several other nations abstained. This abstention was attributed to the wording of part of the Resolution, which invited all Member States to co-operate with the UN "to ensure a better flow of accurate information" as well as "to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information."⁵ Canada seeks to avoid supporting resolutions with wording such as this, on the grounds that it is open to a variety of interpretations.⁶

In October, 1985, Canada pledged a donation of \$100,000.00 to the WDC. Of this amount, \$10,000.00 was specified for use for the International Year of Peace, and will be used to support activities undertaken by the IYP Secretariat.

Canada was one of three Western sponsors of Resolution 40/3 on the International Year of Peace which was adopted without a vote on 24 October, 1985. The Resolution proclaimed the IYP, and invited all states, all

⁴ Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly During the First Part of Its Fortieth Session, from 17 September to 18 December 1985, Department of Public Information, Press Section, UN Press Release GA/7272, 13 January 1986, p. 161.

⁵ Ibid., p. 164.

⁶ Arms Control and Disarmament Division, DEA, 29 May 1986.

organizations in the UN system, all interested NGOs, educational, scientific, cultural and research organizations, as well as the communications media, to aid and co-operate with the Secretary-General to ensure that the objectives of the Year were met.

On 6 March 1986, the Canadian Government announced the details of Canada's International Year of Peace programme of activities.⁷ As noted above, a major donation was made to the IYP Voluntary Trust Fund. Other Government-sponsored activities included a cross-Canada tour from 14 April to 2 May by the Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche. He discussed the IYP and the relationship between disarmament and development with members of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs and with interested Canadians. A selection of essays by distinguished Canadians on the broad themes of the IYP is to be published in the fall of 1986 and presented to the UN. It will also be widely distributed in Canada. The United Nations Association in Canada, with funding from the Disarmament Fund of the Department of External Affairs, is holding an essay and poster competition for Canadians on the topic "What is peace and what can I do to achieve it ?" A commemorative stamp will be issued in the fall of 1986 to mark the International Year of Peace. The Disarmament Fund, which totalled over \$500,000.00 in the 1985-86 fiscal year, will give priorities to projects directly linked to the goals of the IYP. In the Communiqué which announced the above activities, the Secretary of State for External Affairs said that various Government Departments will be taking the themes of the IYP into account in their activities during 1986.⁸

Parliamentary Comment

The issue was not raised in the House of Commons.

⁷ DEA Communiqué 86/59, 6 March, 1986, pp. 1-2.

⁸ Ibid., p.3.

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19. ARMS TRANSFERS

Background

The global trade in conventional arms has expanded considerably during the past decade, from a worldwide total of US\$ 56.9 billion during 1973-76 to US\$ 147.3 billion during the 1981-84 period.¹ Although the share of the supplier market held by the superpowers has decreased since the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union still accounted for 53 per cent of total arms deliveries in the years 1981-84. Britain, France, Italy and West Germany together held 23 per cent of the market during that period, and a third tier of producers (Belgium, Brazil, China, Czechoslovakia, Israel, the two Koreas, Pakistan, Poland, Spain) were rapidly increasing their share.²

NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) states remained the largest consumers of armaments, including nuclear weapons. But between 1981-84, 81 per cent of global exports of conventional arms were purchased by developing countries. Over half of these went to the Middle East, followed by 17 per cent to Africa, 12 per cent to East Asia, 9 per cent to Latin America and 6 per cent to South Asia.³

There have been important attempts to regulate both the supply and demand side of the global arms trade. In 1974 eight Latin American countries released the Declaration of Ayacucho, in which they pledged to work towards arms acquisition limitation agreements in their region. No concrete agreements were reached, but the initiative was revived by the Peruvian Government in 1985.⁴ The Contadora draft treaty, debated in 1985, contains

¹ Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, (Washington: ACDA, 1985), pp.43-45.

² Ibid., p.43, pp. 89-130.

³ Ibid., p.43.

⁴ Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, The Arms Control Reporter, (Brookline MA: IDDS, 1986), p. 502.A.1.

provisions for the comprehensive limitation of arms transfers to Central America.

In 1977 the Carter Administration committed the United States to unilateral arms exports limitations and to negotiating multilateral restraints with the other major exporters. This initiative led to the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) talks with the Soviet Union. Four sets of discussions were held on this issue without result, and the process was abandoned in 1979.⁵

There has since been a decline in the priority attached to this issue by the main exporters. The idea of increasing the international availability of arms trade statistics, as an interim step towards arms trade regulation, was revived by the UN Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, in their 1981 report. The Canadian Government responded to this recommendation, in 1982, by noting that it could not increase the availability of information on its arms exports until "there is some sign of reciprocity from the States of the Warsaw Pact".⁶

Canada is not a major player in the global conventional arms trade: it ranks twenty-fifth in the world's suppliers, far behind the superpowers, the secondary exporters and the new tier of exporters. Indeed, Canada's arms exports account for less than 0.5 per cent of the global conventional arms trade.⁷

The volume of Canada's military exports has nevertheless grown over the years, from \$ 336.2 million in 1970 to \$ 721.7 million in 1980 and

⁵ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1980, (London: Taylor and Francis, 1980), pp. 121-126.

⁶ UNGA, Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, Report of the Secretary-General, A/S-12/13, 14 May 1982.

⁷ Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, (Washington: United States ACDA, 1985), pp. 89-99.

\$ 1,902.7 million in 1985.⁸ Over 70 per cent of these exports were sold to US purchasers, a pattern reflecting both the overall continental orientation of Canadian trade and the impact of the Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA) between Canada and the United States.

Questions have been raised in the past about Canada's arms exports practices. Alleged violations of the Canadian policy, particularly the granting of export permits for the sale of strategic goods to governments involved in conflicts or known to systematically violate human rights, have been the subject of public debate. The need to enforce end-use provisions in arms sales contracts, as exemplified by the existence of Canadian military supplies in Vietnam and the resale of Canadian F-86 fighters to Pakistan in 1965, have also attracted public attention.⁹

Current Canadian Position

According to the Notice to Exporters as amended in 1985, "Canadian policy with respect to the export of such goods [military-related and strategic equipment] is a restrictive one." It is

based on the principles that such equipment should not be supplied to countries considered as representing a military threat to Canada; to countries involved in hostilities or where there is an imminent threat of hostilities; or to those countries to which United Nations resolutions forbid the export of arms.¹⁰

⁸ DEA, Statistics on Canada's Defence Exports: April 1986, unpublished.

⁹ Regehr, Ernie, Making a Killing: Canada's Arms Industry, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), pp.5-8, 51-52; Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility, Annual Report 1983-84, (Toronto: TCCR, 1984), p.10, 53-54.

¹⁰ DEA, Canadian Export Control Law and Policy: Requirements for Obtaining Export Permits, Ottawa, 1 March 1985, paragraph 7.

Originally the Notice contained a clause prohibiting the supply of military equipment to "regimes considered wholly repugnant to Canadian values...especially when such equipment could be used against civilians" but this was omitted from the amended version which came into effect on 1 March 1985.

AS a member of NATO, Canada is a participant in the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) which regulates strategic goods exports to communist countries. Under COCOM procedures, Canada cannot export arms and strategic goods to countries on the Area Control List (ACL), namely all WTO member states, Albania, Mongolia, North Korea and Vietnam.¹¹ On 10 January 1986 the Government announced that Libya would be added to the Area Control List.¹² Although the People's Republic of China is not on the ACL, exports to this country are also regulated by the COCOM. On 14 February 1986 the Government announced that "Canada has joined with its NATO Allies and Japan in relaxing export controls on certain strategic goods to the People's Republic of China."¹³

This policy also restricts arms exports to regions in which there is actual or potential conflict: "permits would therefore not be issued in the present circumstances for the export of such goods to destinations such as Guatemala, Honduras or Nicaragua."¹⁴ When questions were raised in the House about the Government's decision to provide Turkey with 20 CF-104 Starfighters in December 1984, Associate Defence Minister Harvie Andre answered that the Government was in fact "honouring a commitment in which all NATO partners are involved." Mr. Andre also noted that Canada "acknowledged that...it is necessary to be even-handed" and was

¹¹ DEA, Area Control List, Export and Import Permit Act, effective 3 July 1981; External Affairs Canada, Canadian Export Control Law and Policy: Requirements for Obtaining Export Permits, Ottawa, 1 March 1985, paragraph 30.

¹² PMO, Communiqué, 10 January 1986.

¹³ DEA, Communiqué, No. 37, 14 February 1986.

¹⁴ DEA, Communiqué, No. 86, 19 June 1985.

consequently "engaged in discussions with Greece to provide it with spare parts and engines for its aircraft...in order to strengthen its capabilities."¹⁵ The Government again defended its decision in the House on 5 May 1986.¹⁶

Since the UN Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa in 1977, Canadian policy also restricts arms exports to that country.

After the amendment of the Export and Import Permits Act and the disclosure by the opposition that the Government had issued permits to export certain goods to Chile in 1985, questions were raised in the House about the Government's policy on exporting arms to countries which violated human rights. Responding to the Opposition's concerns, the Secretary of State for External Affairs explained that:

When permit applications for military exports to countries with poor human rights records are being reviewed, the principal issue is whether there is a risk that the goods will be used against the civilian population. The permits of which you have copies were issued following an interdepartmental review in which it was determined that there was not a significant risk that the goods would be used against civilians...In the last six months, I have exercised my authority...to refuse the issuance of permits for military exports to destinations including Chile, Guatemala and Iran.¹⁷

In the same communiqué, Mr. Clark indicated that the Government is currently reviewing Canada's arms export policy.

Parliamentary Comment

The question of the sale of fighter aircraft to Turkey was first raised in

¹⁵ Commons Debates, 11 December 1985, p.9376.

¹⁶ Commons Debates, 5 May 1986, p. 12965.

¹⁷ op.cit., (note 13).

the House by Liberal MP Sheila Copps, who suggested that the decision was "contrary to the representations now being made across Canada by Greek Canadians."¹⁸ The issue was also taken up by New Democrat MP Derek Blackburn, who noted his concern "that the Government realizes that what it is doing may very well be heating up an already very volatile political situation..."¹⁹ Alan Redway of the NDP subsequently raised the issue in the House on 5 May 1986.²⁰

The question of strategic exports to Chile was first raised by New Democrat MP Nelson Riis, who asked:

Why had External Affairs granted an export permit to Med-Eng systems Incorporated of Ottawa, on November 5 last year, to export para-military equipment to the Chilean National Police who, according to Amnesty International, participated in the murder and torture of hundreds of Chilean civilians last year?²¹

Mr. Riis elaborated on this issue in the House two days later:

Why did the Minister approve \$11 million in exports of military equipment to Chile, including parts for tanks, and from Standard Aero of Winnipeg the overhaul of engines for the Chilean Air Force? Why did he allow de Havilland, a Crown Corporation, to export spare parts for the Chilean Armed Forces aircraft?²²

Mr. Riis also raised questions about the Government's decision to remove the clause about human rights from the Export and Import Permits Act. In November, Mr. Riis asked whether the Minister had amended "this policy to legitimize selling military equipment to countries such as Chile?"²³

¹⁸ Commons Debates, 12 March 1985, p.2927.
¹⁹ Commons Debates, 11 December 1985, 9376.
²⁰ Commons Debates, 5 May 1986, p. 12964.
²¹ Commons Debates, 18 June 1985, p.5915.
²² Commons Debates, 20 June 1985, p.6045.
²³ Commons Debates, 4 November 1985, p.8320.

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20. CANADA-US - AGREEMENT ON THE NORTH WARNING SYSTEM

Background

Discussions between Canada and the United States on the development of the North Warning System (NWS) began in 1976, with a view to planning a replacement for the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line. Negotiations on the actual system chosen began in early 1984. The approach chosen was the result of a co-operative study, the Joint US-Canadian Air Defence Study (JUSCADS), jointly funded by the two countries, that was completed in 1979.

A Memorandum of Understanding was signed by Prime Minister Mulroney and President Reagan at the Quebec Summit on 18 March 1985, and tabled in the House of Commons on 19 March 1985.

The modernized system outlined in the Agreement consists of:

- a system of Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radars to be deployed in the United States to monitor the eastern, western and southern approaches to the continent;
- the North Warning System (NWS), which will replace the obsolescent Distant Early Warning System in Alaska and the Canadian North;
- USAF Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) to supplement the NWS at times of alert;
- forward operating locations and dispersed operating bases to be developed at existing Canadian airfields in order to accommodate AWACS and fighter aircraft;
- communications equipment to facilitate the command and control of interceptors.

Canada has agreed to meet all the communications needs of the system. In particular this involves designing and implementing a system of communication between the radar stations, and integrating the radars with the Regional Operational Control Centres (ROCCs) in North Bay. Any new

facilities required by the NWS in Canada will be designed and built by Canadians. After 1989 Canada will become the programme manager and will oversee the final development and construction stages. Once the NWS has been completed (1992) Canada will assume complete operational control of that portion of the NWS that is within Canada. Canadians will also be involved in the manning of the OTH-B radars in the United States and (to an as yet undetermined extent) in the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).

The modernization will occur in two phases. The United States will be the manager of Phase I which will involve the acquisition of 13 long-range L-band planar array radars (AN/FPS-117s) and the installation of 10 of these at existing DEW line sites (8 in Canada, 2 in Alaska). The remaining 3 radars will be deployed at new sites in Labrador. Short-range "gap-filler" radars will be developed, and two prototypes will be tested. This phase will also see the creation of an Alaskan logistics station and the testing of communications links for the system. Canada will be the manager of Phase 2, which is scheduled to begin in 1989. At this point 37 short-range radars will be procured; 2 will be deployed in Alaska and 35 in Canada. Five logistic stations will be built in Canada and all radar stations and communication links should be completed by 1992. If necessary a Joint Senior Review Council will be formed to oversee the development of the system.

The entire modernization programme will cost approximately \$7 billion. The estimated cost of the NWS is \$1.29 billion. Canada will assume 40 per cent of the cost (\$511 million) and the United States 60 per cent (\$777 million). This 60/40 cost sharing relationship will also apply to the operation and maintenance costs of the system.

In August 1984, the Sperry Co. of New York received a \$79.6 million research and development contract for the short-range radars. In February

1985, a \$58.8 million contract was awarded to General Electric in Syracuse for the first of the long-range radars.

Current Canadian Position

In a statement in the House of Commons on 13 March 1985, the Minister of National Defence, Erik Neilsen, said:

Under the new arrangements, Canada will, for the first time, fully exercise its national defence responsibilities on its own sovereign territory and within its own airspace....The North Warning System will be a Canadian-controlled system - operated, maintained and manned by Canadians. Canadian sovereignty in our North will be strengthened and assured for the future. ...I would like to make it clear that these radars are neither designed nor sited for the detection of ballistic missiles or other events in space.... There is no responsible alternative to modernization. Major components of the existing system are technically obsolete and increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain. Most important, the present system is no longer adequate to meet the modern bomber and cruise missile threat....Throughout the negotiations this Government has sought to reinvigorate the Canada-United States defence partnership while at the same time enhancing Canadian sovereignty. This agreement on North American air defence modernization is tangible evidence of this Government's commitment to strengthen Canadian defence capacity and to assure Canadian control of its defences."¹

Parliamentary Comment

Debate in the House of Commons on the NWS Agreement centred on two aspects of the Agreement: its potential connection to the American Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) programme and the decision to upgrade existing

¹ Commons Debates, 13 March 1985, p. 2976-2977.

airstrips in the North to accommodate fighter and radar aircraft. The possibility of a connection between the NWS and SDI became an issue as a result of remarks by American officials that seemed to contradict government assurances that no such tie existed. Paul Nitze, Special Adviser to the President on Arms Control, stated on 6 March that "since SDI had not yet 'resulted in the development of specific systems, it remained to be seen' whether NWS was a possible component of the space initiative."² Both Mr. Nielsen and Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark quoted a US Embassy news release which stated:

With regard to the upgrading of the DFW line and its replacement with the North Warning radars, the Department can state clearly and categorically that the North Warning System being planned by Canada and the United States is not part of the Strategic Defence Initiative Program.³

Debate in the House continued and was fuelled by remarks from other American officials, including Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who suggested the NWS was a necessary back up to a strategic defence system.⁴ Opposition members called for a review process to be built in to the Agreement and asked that a clause be attached to prevent Canada from being tied in to further technological developments. After the Memorandum had been signed by the two countries and tabled in the House of Commons, the Honourable Jean Chrétien asked about the effects of expanding airstrips in the North. He suggested that if all the conditions listed in the Agreement were carried out (airfield upgrades to accommodate CF-18s and AWACS, missile and ammunition storage, and the creation of alert hangars) the Canadian North would become home to "a sophisticated series of military air bases."⁵ Mr. Clark replied that only two types of airstrips will be developed.

² Globe and Mail, 7 and 8 March 1985.

³ Commons Debates, 8 March 1985, p. 2813.

⁴ Mr. Weinberger appeared on Canada AM, 18 March 1985, and was quoted in Commons Debates, 18 March 1985. p. 3109.

⁵ Commons Debates, 20 March 1985. p. 3200.

The first has to do with modification which will allow aircraft carrying radar to be stationed. The second has to do with the possibility of upgrading airstrips in the far North to allow interceptor aircraft - NORAD aircraft, aircraft not armed with nuclear weapons, aircraft carrying only conventional weapons - to go into the North in the event of an alert so that if we detect something flying over our territory we can send up aircraft to find out exactly what it is."⁶

The question of the NWS being connected to SDI came up again during the hearings of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND). Responding to a question from Benno Friesen, Admiral Nigel Brodeur, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff stated:

...to say that because you have a surveillance system capable of detecting cruise missiles, or capable of dealing with the more immediate problem, which is the Blackjack bomber, that you are involved in SDI is totally incorrect. It is wrong to establish a linkage there, because a linkage there has no technological basis, and no military operational basis either.⁷

Conservative member Don Ravis asked about the advance of technology and the future of the NWS.

...I am wondering if the Russian technology in the launch platforms...is going to advance so quickly that the launch will take place from much farther out. Do we need to think about having our detection system further north or do we need some type of satellite surveillance? I am trying to project this 15 and 20 years down the road.⁸

Major General Larry Ashley, Chief of Air Doctrine and Operations replied:

⁶ Ibid., p. 3201.

⁷ SCEAND Proceedings, 3 October 1985, p. 46.

⁸ SCEAND Proceedings, 6 December 1985, p. 27.

...no doubt as the threat evolves there will have to be some changes to that in terms of refinement, in terms of orientation, or as the studies in phase 2 [of SDA 2000] are planned to do, to have a look at whether or not we have to move to some other kind of approach.⁹

John Anderson, Assistant Deputy Minister of Defence for Policy told the Committee:

The calculations that have gone into the present system have indicated that we would get from the system as it is now configured at least as much and probably more warning of a bomber or cruise missile attack than of a ballistic missile. If that set of equations were to change...then one might want to extend the range of warning outwards. I think the probability is that by the time we get there, space-based systems will be available....¹⁰

Mr. Ravis later asked Mr. Nielsen for assurances that Canadian technology would be involved in the construction of the NWS.

Are we absolutely satisfied that this is going to be a Canadian technology...and not a transfer of technology from the United States?

Mr. Nielsen replied:

It is technology in our possession....we may have some technology in delivering the communications end of things that really did not originate in Canada, was not developed in Canada, and has not been refined in Canada, but that we have, and we would be using along with our other Canadian expertise; but generally speaking, it is Canadian.¹²

⁹ Ibid., p. 28.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ SCEAND Proceedings, 13 December 1985, p. 9.

¹² Ibid.

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21. CANADA-US - ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY AND SURVEILLANCE

Background

In 1880, when Britain first gave the Arctic islands to Canada, a colonial bureaucrat noted:

The object in annexing these unexplored territories to Canada is to prevent the United States from claiming them, and not from the likelihood of their proving of any value to Canada.

Notwithstanding this view, successive Canadian Governments have attributed great political and economic value to the Arctic and its resources. Active involvement in the High Arctic began in the 1890s in the form of exploration and patrol expeditions. During World War II, the Canadian Arctic took on a new strategic significance when Canada gave permission to the United States to build a chain of airfields and weather stations in the Arctic in order to deliver military aircraft to the Soviet Union.

In 1955 Canada and the United States signed an agreement to build the Distant Early Warning System, a line of early warning radar stations stretched across the Canadian North. The main purpose of the system was to provide warning of a Soviet bomber attack across the North Pole against the continental United States.

While this increased activity in the Arctic was primarily initiated by the United States, co-operative agreements satisfied Canadian Government concern about the protection of sovereignty. This situation changed in 1969 when a privately owned American oil tanker, the Manhattan, attempted to cross the Northwest Passage without seeking the permission of the Canadian Government. Concerned both with the threat to sovereignty and possible increases in commercial shipping, the Canadian Government passed the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 1970, which established

Canadian environmental jurisdiction for up to 100 miles off the Arctic coasts. Following further multilateral efforts to codify the law of the sea this claim to regulation was acknowledged in Section 234 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (The United States does not recognize the authority of this Convention.)

During the 1970s the resource potential of the Arctic grew substantially as reserves of oil and natural gas were discovered. Foreign and Canadian oil companies estimate that there are 8.5 billion barrels of oil beneath the Beaufort Sea and 65 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the High Arctic.

At the Quebec Summit in March 1985, Canada and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on developing the North Warning System (NWS), a line of modern long- and short-range radars to replace the DEW line. (see separate entry) The NWS will be completely manned and controlled by Canadians, a change from the DEW line which was largely manned and operated by Americans. Minister of National Defence Erik Neilsen stated that the NWS would ensure that "Canadian sovereignty in our North will be strengthened and assured for the future."¹

Although the first nuclear submarine operated under the Arctic ice cap for an extended period of time as early as 1958, it is only recently that both superpowers have developed the technology needed to operate ballistic missile submarines under the ice. This capability has increased the potential for the Arctic to become a region of strategic importance to the superpowers, and has created new dilemmas for the Canadian Government. The presence of nuclear submarines is particularly difficult to detect and monitor effectively, thus posing a new challenge to the assertion of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.

¹ Commons Debates, 13 March 1985, p.2976.

In August 1985 a more visual threat to Canadian sovereignty presented itself in the form of the voyage of an US coast guard vessel, the Polar Sea, through the North West Passage. The declared purpose of this voyage was to shorten the sailing time to Alaska, but the US Government did not request permission from the Canadian Government to make the voyage. Although the US Government made it clear that it did not agree with Canada's position on the status of the Arctic waters, it did propose that the voyage be on a co-operative basis. It also stated that the voyage did not prejudice the legal position of either government with regard to the waters. A spokesman for the State Department, Daniel Lawlor, commented:

We look at the Northwest Passage as a strait linking two parts of the High seas, and it is of extreme importance to us to have free transit through straits in normal modes of passage.²

The American Ambassador to Canada, Paul Robinson, was quoted as saying: "We're saying its international waters. We have other security concerns that would naturally involve the Soviet Union."³

John Anderson, Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy at the Department of National Defence explained the American view more fully:

...the Law of the Sea convention provided that international straits that would be closed by the extension of coastal jurisdiction under the other provisions of the Law of the Sea convention would become subject to a right of transit. That right of transit is without restriction....It covers operation of ships on the surface, submarines under the surface and aircraft above the surface [and] applies to straits that are considered to connect high seas to high seas....The Americans...contend

² "Canada to Launch Sovereignty Review", Globe and Mail, 2 August 1985, p.1.

³ "Northwest Passage Not For the Soviets, US Envoy Feels", Globe and Mail, 2 August 1985, p.1.

that the Northwest Passage is such an international strait, connecting high seas to high seas. Canada contends that it is internal waters of Canada. Under the American interpretation of the status of those straits, even though we have closed them and made them internal waters, even though parts of that strait were closed as territorial sea when we extended the territorial sea to the 12-mile limit, under the 1983 convention a pre-existing right of transit would continue to exist.⁴

Current Canadian Position

When the proposed voyage of the Polar Sea was first announced, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, commented in the House of Commons:

The action that is being taken by the Government of the United States does not compromise in any way the sovereignty of Canada over our northern waters, or affect the quite legitimate differences of views that exist between Canada and the United States on that question.⁵

A Government Release on 31 July 1985 announced that Canada had authorized the voyage of the Polar Sea and that the voyage would take place with Canadian support and participation. It stated:

The Government of Canada has made clear that the waters of the Arctic archipelago, including the Northwest passage, are internal waters of Canada and fall within Canadian sovereignty. At the same time, the Government has reaffirmed Canada's longstanding commitment to facilitating safe navigation in the Arctic, subject to necessary conditions for the preservation of its environment and the welfare of its inhabitants. These conditions have been met.

⁴ Standing Committee on National Defence Proceedings, 5 May 1986. p. 34.

⁵ Commons Debates, 20 June 1985, p. 6043.

The Press Release also noted:

While the United States has made known that it does not share Canada's view regarding the status of these waters, it has assured the Government of Canada that the purpose of the voyage is solely operational, to reduce the Polar Sea's sailing time to Alaska. The United States has also formally advised the Government of Canada that the transit, and the preparations for it, are without prejudice to the position of either country regarding the Northwest Passage.⁶

In a major statement to the House of Commons on 10 September 1985, Joe Clark outlined Canada's policy on the Arctic and announced new steps to be taken to strengthen and protect Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic in the future. With reference to the voyage of the Polar Sea in August, Mr. Clark said:

The voyage of the Polar Sea has left no trace on Canada's Arctic waters and no mark on Canada's Arctic sovereignty. It is behind us and our concern is for what lies ahead.

Mr. Clark stated that "the policy of the Government is to maintain the natural unity of the Canadian Arctic archipelago and to preserve Canada's sovereignty over land, sea and ice undiminished and undivided."⁷

At the end of his statement Mr. Clark gave an outline of the new measures he had announced:

...first, immediate adoption of an Order in Council establishing straight baselines around the Arctic

⁶ Government of Canada, News Release, 85/114.

⁷ Commons Debates, 10 September 1985, p.6463.

⁸ The baselines are established by an Order in Council and define the outer limit of Canada's historic internal waters.

archipelago to be effective January 1, 1986;⁸ second, immediate adoption of a Canadian Laws Offshore Application Act; third, immediate talks with the United States on co-operation in Arctic waters on the basis of full respect for Canadian sovereignty; fourth an immediate increase of surveillance overflights of our Arctic waters by aircraft of the Canadian Forces, and immediate planning for Canadian naval activity in the Eastern Arctic in 1986; fifth, the immediate withdrawal of the 1970 reservation to Canada's acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice; and sixth, construction of a polar class 8 ice-breaker and urgent consideration of other means of exercising more effective control over our Arctic waters.⁹

On 11 April 1986, as promised in Clark's September statement, the Canadian Law Offshore Application Act, extending Canadian civil and criminal law to offshore zones in the Arctic, received its first reading in the House of Commons. Mr. Clark stated that "The exercise of functional jurisdiction in the Arctic waters is essential to Canadian interests, ... But it can never serve as a substitute for the exercise of Canada's full sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago."¹⁰

Parliamentary Comment

Since the voyage of the Polar Sea occurred in August, when the House of Commons was not in session, opposition leaders commented initially through the press. At a press conference, Liberal leader John Turner called the voyage "an affront to Canada" and said that:

The United States knows the views of the Canadian public but is blatantly encouraged to ignore those views by the inaction of the Prime Minister - which

⁹ Commons Debates, 10 September 1985, p.6464.

¹⁰ "Bill to Assert Sovereignty Over High Arctic, Offshore" Globe and Mail, 12 April, 1986. p. 1.

¹¹ Statement by the Right Honourable John N. Turner, 9 August 1985.

is unacceptable....The American Government has acted without jurisdiction. The Prime Minister has permitted this to happen. The Canadian Government should in unequivocal terms state that the American attitude with respect to the Polar Sea voyage is intolerable.¹¹

In the House of Commons, in September, Liberal External Affairs critic, Jean Chrétien, said that the voyage "humiliated the whole nation" and asked why the Government had not acted sooner on the issue, especially in view of their "great friendship" with the United States. Mr. Chretien also expressed concern about the decision to remove Canada's reservation to acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. He said:

Today, the Minister is taking a gamble and making a bold move which might cause the court to look into this case. Now we will either win or lose....I hope we will win but I believe that 50 or 100 more years of sovereignty exercised by the Government, with no challenge from anyone, would have been better. If it is true that there is a policy of friendship with the Government of the United States, it is a shame that President Reagan sent a quasi military ship in our water this summer despite the requests and pleas of the Secretary of State for External Affairs.¹²

Mr. Jim Fulton, the NDP spokesman, applauded the Government for some of its actions but expressed similar concerns, especially warning the Minister to "set our house in order first" before moving too quickly towards a decision in the International Court. In particular he cited the example of the MV Arctic, a vessel that was

...exempted...by Order in Council from the strict requirements of the Arctic Waters Marine Prevention Control Act to carry crude oil south from Cameron Island, as part of Pan Arctic's Bent Horn project.¹³

¹² Commons Debates, 10 September 1985, p. 6464.

¹³ Commons Debates, 10 September 1985, p. 6466.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Mr. Fulton also encouraged the Minister to deal with other sovereignty problems. He stated that there was a

...crying need to move on the 141st meridian with Alaska in the Western Arctic, Dixon Entrance and our rights in the Gulf of Alaska as well as the straits of Juan de Fuca off Vancouver.

.....

Let us not forget that as recently as last summer during the election, the United States Secretary of the Interior had a piece of Canada for sale off the Queen Charlotte Islands for gas and oil development.¹⁴

Both NDP and Liberal members stated their concern that native people participate in developing stronger Arctic sovereignty and that native land claims be settled as quickly as possible. Liberal Member Charles Caccia said that:

...our native people have proven over the centuries their ability to live in the Arctic and they should be active participants in reinforcing Canadian sovereignty. In the long term, we will be better served by developing sovereignty with the help of native people rather than relying on the technology and values prevailing in southern Canada.¹⁵

Late in March, NDP Member Jim Fulton asked Mr. Clark about an article in Macleans magazine ¹⁶ suggesting that Clark had made a deal with US Secretary of State Shultz concerning the Polar Sea far in advance of the voyage. He went on to ask:

...how can British Columbians find any reason to trust that the Government has not already cut a deal on the AB Line, the Beaufort Sea and the Strait of Juan de Fuca, in the interests of the United States?

¹⁵ Common Debates, 19 September 1985, p. 6777.

¹⁶ See "Straight Talk at the Summit", Macleans, 24 March 1986, p. 13.

¹⁷ Common Debates, 21 March 1986, p. 11747.

Mr. Clark responded:

The report in Macleans magazine was totally false.¹⁷

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND) presented its report Canada-US Defence Cooperation and the 1986 Renewal of the NORAD Agreement on 14 February 1986. The Committee recommended that:

...the Government consider negotiating with the United States a joint arrangement for the defence of the Arctic Ocean committing both nations to maintain underwater and other systems for the detection of submarines; the United States would concentrate on the outer periphery and Canada on the waters of the Canadian Archipelago.¹⁸

In the Minority Report, presented by the Liberal members of SCEAND, this idea was flatly rejected since "such an arrangement might prejudice Canada's case on any reference to the World Court".¹⁹

During the hearings of the Standing Committee on National Defence (SCND) Liberal member Len Hopkins asked about the SCEAND recommendation, stating:

...how can we as Canadians make any agreement with them for the protection of the archipelago...when there is no common agreement as to what in fact is the internal part of the archipelago?²⁰

General G. Thériault, Chief of the Defence Staff, responded:

It would seem to me that irrespective of the US view pertaining to the legal status of the Northwest Passage specifically, there might very much be room for extensive co-operation between the two countries in terms of pooling defence efforts for the security of the north or of the arctic basin as a whole....²¹

¹⁸ SCEAND, Canada-US Defence Cooperation and the 1986 Renewal of the NORAD Agreement, 14 February 1986, p. 82.

¹⁹ Liberal Members of SCEAND Minority Report, 14 February 1986, p. 3.

²⁰ SCNS Proceedings, 5 May 1986, p. 23.

²¹ Ibid.

On 9 June 1986, Progressive Conservative member Alan Redway asked Mr. Clark if it was true that the Polar Sea would make a return voyage through the Northwest Passage this year. Mr. Clark stated that this was not the case.²²

The Special Joint Committee on International Relations recommended that "the Government of Canada renew its efforts to secure the agreement of the United States to Canada's claim to the Northwest Passage," and stated that "the committee's preferred course of action at this time is a deliberate decision to allow time to pass rather than pressing for a decision by the International Court of Justice."²³

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²² Commons Debates, 9 June 1986, p. 14114.

²³ Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations, Independence and Internationalism, June 1986, p. 134.

22. CANADA-US - CRUISE MISSILE TESTING

Background

On 10 February 1983 Canada signed an agreement with the United States entitled the "Canada/US (CANUS) Test and Evaluation Program" which established a procedure for the testing of US defence systems in Canada. The agreement is valid for five years, will be renewed automatically for another five years, and can be ended on twelve-month notice. The agreement is not reciprocal since it only covers the testing of US systems in Canada. Under the agreement the United States could ask to test the following systems: artillery equipment; helicopters; surveillance and identification systems; advanced non-nuclear munitions; aircraft navigation systems; and the guidance system for unarmed cruise missiles. Canada may refuse any project and no biological, chemical or nuclear weapons may be brought into the country.

On 15 July 1983, the Canadian Government announced that it had agreed to allow the testing of the AGM-86B Air-launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) in Canada. The Government stated that the testing of the cruise missile guidance system was "linked intimately to Canada's security as a member of NATO and NORAD and to Canada's policy on arms control and disarmament." The cruise missile is an unmanned vehicle propelled by a jet engine that can carry conventional or nuclear warheads and be sea-, ground- or air-launched. The use of Canadian territory was explained on the ground that it offers extensive stretches of uninhabited cold weather terrain similar to the attack routes into the Soviet Union. Four to six tests per year of the unarmed ALCM are allowed; hitherto the tests have occurred in the first three months of every year to ensure the proper weather conditions. The Government stressed that "this is no way changed Canada's own renunciation of nuclear weapons for our national forces."

The agreement to test the cruise missile generated considerable public

debate from Canadians who felt it compromised Canada's position on nuclear weapons and contributed to the arms race. There was also concern about the potential harm to Canadian citizens and the Canadian environment should anything go wrong during a test. In announcing individual tests the Government has assured Canadians that the flight of the cruise will never be closer than eight kilometres "to any built-up area."

The Government also stated that the Canadian approach:

...is grounded in several elements: our founding membership in NATO, our dedication to the global dimension of peace and stability, our active pursuit of verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements, and our longstanding decision not to develop our own national nuclear force.

Only one test of the cruise missile was carried out in 1984. In 1985, three tests occurred. On 15 January, there was a "captive carry" test of the electronic guidance system in which four ALCMs were carried on a B-52; this was followed by a free flight test on 19 February, and another one on 25 February. All three tests were successful.

In 1986, two tests occurred. On 22 January, there was a free flight test which included a practice interception by two Canadian CF-18 fighters. The missile crashed in a wooded area, near the end of its flight; on 25 February, there was another free flight test in which the engine failed to ignite and the missile fell into the Beaufort Sea.

Two groups were formed within the Department of National Defence (DND) to oversee the process. A steering group exercises authority over the programme itself and makes recommendations concerning projects which are acceptable to Canada. A co-ordinating group reviews the feasibility of the projects and administers the programme. Every year on 1 January the United States submits a 30-month forecast to DND outlining the projects they wish

to implement in Canada. After review and Ministerial approval the Government informs the US of its approval in principle. US sponsors then submit a project proposal to DND. This is again reviewed and the proper authority granted, at which point a project arrangement is jointly developed which, when signed, allows testing to begin. Cabinet approval may be required for specific projects.

Current Canadian Position

A Department of National Defence publication of January 1985 stated:

The ALCM is an important retaliatory element of the USA central strategic forces which provide the ultimate deterrent in NATO's strategic triad.... USA central strategic systems are the principal deterrent to a Soviet nuclear strike on North America, including Canada, and the ultimate deterrent to Soviet aggression anywhere in the NATO area....By testing vital elements of the technology of these systems, Canada will be assisting in the maintenance of its own defence as well as NATO's deterrence posture.¹

Parliamentary Comment

Comment in the House of Commons focussed primarily on the two cruise missile tests early in 1986 and the problems they involved. Opposition members called upon the Government to end the testing of the cruise missile in protest against the American decision to abandon the SALT II limits. (See Compliance entry). The Government provides 48-hour notice of each cruise missile test. In a statement to the House, NDP member Derek Blackburn objected to this policy:

¹ Defence and Security Issues, Department of National Defence, January 1985, p. 9.

...the Government continues to show contempt for Parliament and the people of Canada by withholding information....The Government obviously knows the schedule of these tests, but it refuses to tell Canadians in order to prevent demonstrations against an unwise and unpopular policy.²

After the test of 22 January 1986, in which the cruise missile crash landed, opposition members called upon the Government to provide details of the mission, and asked why the missile had been so close to populated areas. Liberal member Len Hopkins said:

Can the Minister tell us what malfunction occurred? Will he be giving a full report to the House, and hence to Canadians, when investigations are completed?³

Mr. Andre responded:

The cruise completed its mission perfectly and it was...during the recovery phase when the cruise was flying a figure eight in preparation for parachuting down...[that the missile crashed].⁴

Mr. Hopkins then questioned Mr. Andre as to "why the missile is reported to have passed within three kilometres of Wandering River, Alberta"⁵ despite Government assurances that the missile would remain at least eight kilometres away, Mr. Andre stated:

...I am informed that in fact the cruise flew within the test corridor as defined and published....It did not wander outside the corridor and it did not crash outside the corridor.⁶

² Commons Debates, 20 January 1986, p. 9934.

³ Commons Debates, 23 January 1986, p. 10090.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., p. 10091.

⁶ Ibid.

NDP member Pauline Jewett asked the Government to end cruise missile testing. This call was echoed by other opposition members after the second test also failed. Liberal member Jean Chrétien said:

Does the Government intend to stop the cruise testing program, since these tests have clearly shown that the safety guarantees provided by the American authorities are worthless with failures like these?⁷

Mr. Andre said:

The corridor in question was designed to avoid population concentrations. It is carefully monitored every step of the way. There are all kinds of safety mechanisms in place.⁸

During a press conference Mr. Andre stated: "There will be no further tests until we determine the cause of this crash."⁹

The US Ambassador to Canada, Thomas Niles, stated that "there was no danger in the tests to anybody. Sometimes they don't work, that's why you test them."¹⁰ NDP member Derek Blackburn asked the Minister of National Defence:

Does the Minister support the impropriety of an American official announcing a resumption of testing over Canadian territory before we have even had a report on why the last missile crashed?¹¹

The Associate Minister of National Defence, Harvie Andre replied:

⁷ Commons Debates, 25 February 1986, p. 10928.

⁸ Ibid., p. 10929.

⁹ As quoted in "Cruise Missile Flights Will Continue in North Despite Second Crash", Globe and Mail, 26 February 1986.

¹⁰ As quoted in Commons Debates, 3 March 1986, p. 11124.

¹¹ Commons Debates, 3 March 1986, p. 11124.

...the Canadian Government has to be satisfied as to the reasons for that crash. Once it is satisfied, the terms and conditions of the agreement entered into by the previous Government will be honoured.¹²

On 8 April 1986 Mr. Blackburn announced that the Yukon legislature had voted to oppose the testing of the cruise missile.

This was a free vote on a private Member's motion, and the Government Leader clearly urged all Members to follow their consciences....The Government should note that people who have to live with the cruise missile hanging over their heads are not too happy about it. They frankly do not like Canada's contribution to the nuclear arms race.¹³

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¹² Ibid.

¹³ Commons Debates, 8 April 1986, p. 11993.

23. CANADA-US: EXCHANGE OF LETTERS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

Background

In his speech of 23 March 1983, President Reagan asked: "What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant US retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could interrupt and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?" President Reagan then called upon the American scientific community "who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete."

This vision of a leak-proof defence that could shield the entire population from nuclear weapons called into question previous assumptions about strategic doctrine. Nuclear deterrence rests on the assumption of mutual vulnerability - both sides accept that an attack on the other is certain to result in an unacceptably punitive response. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972, reinforced the logic of mutual deterrence by prohibiting the development of a nationwide ballistic missile defence. While President Reagan insisted that this new research would remain within the limits set down by the ABM Treaty, critics have expressed concern that the SDI may mark the beginning of the end of the ABM Treaty. (See the ABM Treaty).

President Reagan's request led to National Security Study Directive 6-83 which established two study groups to examine the issue and outline how such a research programme could be shaped.

Both panels rejected the idea of a leak-proof population defence but supported limited defences, which, they claimed, would enhance deterrence by increasing the uncertainties of attack for the Soviet Union. On 6

January 1984 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 119 established a research programme called the Strategic Defense Initiative. In March 1984 Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson was appointed to head the project and in April the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was formed. The cost of the programme was estimated to be \$26 billion over a five-year period.

In February of 1985, almost a year after the SDI began, Paul Nitze, special advisor to the President on arms control, stated that the United States would not go ahead with the SDI on the basis of technological feasibility alone. A decision to continue the programme would be subject to other stringent criteria. He stated that technologies must be survivable and be cost-effective at the margin, "that is, it must be cheap enough to add additional defensive capability so that the other side has no incentive to add additional offensive capability to overcome the defence."

Within NATO, reaction to the SDI was mixed. European allies feared the SDI would lead to US withdrawal or a weakening US commitment to the defence of Europe. Allies also feared that the SDI would spark the Soviet Union into greatly increasing its offensive forces, and generate a new, more dangerous arms race.

On 26 March 1985 Canada with all other NATO allies, as well as Australia, Japan and Israel, received a letter from US Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger. Weinberger reassured US allies that they were to be included in the benefits of the SDI programme and the decision-making process, and invited them to become participants in the research stage, insofar as they were allowed under the limits of the ABM Treaty. He stated:

As you know, the purpose of the SDI is to determine whether there are cost-effective defensive technologies that could enhance deterrence and increase stability. Because our security is inextricably linked to that of our friends and Allies, we will work closely over the next several years with our Allies to ensure that

in the event of any future decision to deploy defensive systems (a decision in which consultation with our Allies would play an important part), Allied as well as US security against aggression would be enhanced. ... The US will, consistent with our international obligations including the ABM Treaty, proceed with co-operative research with the Allies in areas of technology that could contribute to the SDI research program. Pursuant to this policy, the US is permitted - and is prepared - to undertake such co-operative programs on data and technology short of ABM component levels as may be mutually agreed with Allied countries. If your nation is interested in exploring possible co-operative efforts...I would ask...that you send me, within 60 days an indication of your interest...

Current Canadian Position

Secretary of State Joe Clark outlined the Government's position on the SDI, for the first time, in January 1985. He said:

To date, the full extent of the program has not been explored and it would be premature to draw definitive conclusions about it...research on SDI does not in and of itself contravene the provisions of either the 1967 Outer Space Treaty or of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, both of which Canada strongly supports. In light of significant Soviet advances in ballistic defence research in recent years and deployment of an actual ballistic missile defence system, it is only prudent that the West keep abreast of the feasibility of such projects.[†]

After the invitation from the United States had been received, Prime Minister Mulroney expressed reservations about the programme:

...my enthusiasm for this is restrained, obviously in a perfect world these types of systems would not be required....The world isn't perfect and we have to recognize that reality and play our full

[†] Commons Debates, 21 January 1985, p. 1502.

role and assume our responsibilities in trying to protect it. I'm not enthusiastic about anything that might even be construed as making negotiations more difficult....There is a big difference in the leader of the western alliance sitting down with the Soviets in Geneva having asked its allies for support of the research concept of SDI, to that we said yes....That is one thing, it is another, quite another, to be invited to participate actively in project where you are not the big player where you don't see the thrust and where you have no control over the parameters.²

In response to questioning in the House as to when the Government would make a decision on the invitation to participate in the SDI, Prime Minister Mulroney announced that the Government had asked senior civil servant Arthur Kroeger to look into the issue and report to Cabinet.

What we are going to do is ask a very distinguished, principled and impartial public servant to make necessary inquiries on our behalf, and to report to Cabinet. We will consider these matters within our own time frame and not with regard to any limitations of time imposed by anyone else. We will consider them and, pursuant to that, we will report to the House.³

Mr. Clark released the Green Paper on Canadian foreign policy early in May 1985, and stated that an all-party committee would be set up to examine foreign policy and submit a final report on 31 May 1986. On 16 May 1985 Clark stated that the Government would be willing to delay a response to the American invitation in order that the views of Canadians could be heard through the Committee process. This decision was, at least in part, a response to threats from the opposition parties that they would boycott the Committee unless it was allowed to deal with the SDI issue and present an interim report before a decision was made by the Government. Mr. Clark stated:

² Prime Minister Mulroney, Press Conference, 28 March 1985.

³ Commons Debates, 18 April 1985, p. 3859.

...the position of the Government of Canada is... that we expect to take a decision on the limited question of the American invitation....sometime in the next three to four months. We would greatly value the advice of individual Canadians and interested Canadians on the Strategic Defence Initiative question prior to that time.

.....

What I have given is the period of time within which the Government expects to be called upon to make a decision, in the Canadian interest and on the Canadian timetable....⁴

After extensive hearings across Canada, on 23 August 1985, the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations submitted an interim report on the SDI and free trade issues. On SDI, the Committee concluded that they were unable to obtain crucial information necessary to a final decision. The Committee then recommended that:

...the Government not take a final decision on participation in the research phase of the SDI until it has been able to acquire the required additional information related to the strategic, financial and economic implications of the invitation.⁵

After receiving the Report and consulting with the Cabinet, Prime Minister Mulroney announced that the Government had reached a decision on the American SDI invitation.

After careful and detailed consideration the Government of Canada has concluded that Canada's own policies and priorities do not warrant a government-to-government effort in support of SDI research. Although Canada does not intend to participate on a government-to-government basis on the SDI research program, private companies and institutions interested in participating in the program will continue to be

⁴ Commons Debates, 17 May 1985, p. 4855.

⁵ Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations, Interim Report, 23 August 1985, p. 118.

free to do so.... This Government believes that SDI research by the United States is both consistent with the ABM Treaty and prudent in light of significant advances in Soviet research and deployment of the world's only existing ballistic missile defence system....And I have instructed the Minister of Defence today to advise Secretary Weinberger that is not in our national interest and that we will not be accepting the invitation to participate... ⁶

In his letter to Secretary Weinberger Mr. Nielsen said:

Upon reflection, the Government of Canada has concluded that Canada's own policies and priorities do not warrant a government-to-government effort in support of SDI research.... We believe that the extensive existing co-operation in defence research between our two countries is mutually beneficial and should be encouraged to grow. The Government is committed to further development of this co-operation and will continue to welcome further research arrangements with the United States....Although Canada does not intend to participate on a government-to-government basis in the SDI research program, private companies and institutions interested in participating in the program will continue to be free to do so.⁷

Parliamentary Comment

After Mr. Clark's statement in the House giving support to SDI research, opposition concern centered around the potentially destabilizing aspects of the programme and its potential effect on superpower relations. Liberal member Lloyd Axworthy asked:

First, I would like to know why [Mr. Clark] is now reversing the position he took when he spoke before the United Nations by allowing the introduction of a new military force in outer space? Second, ...When any one power indicates that it is about to make a new

⁶ Prime Minister Mulroney, Transcript of Remarks, 7 September 1985.

⁷ Office of the Prime Minister, Communiqué, 7 September 1985.

technological breakthrough, the other power responds in like kind. If we support the United States in its \$25 billion research program, are we also to tell the Soviets to go ahead with their \$25 billion research program....how does the Secretary of State...reconcile the incredible instability that the SDI program represents with the entire area of superpower relationships?⁸

On 18 March 1985 at the Quebec Summit, the Canadian Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States which, in addition to setting the framework for the construction and operation of the North Warning System, contained an invitation for a possible future exchange of strategic technology. These developments sparked opposition concerns that this might link Canada to the SDI, inadvertently or otherwise. There was similar opposition concern that NORAD might eventually lead Canada to SDI involvement. (See entries on the North Warning System and NORAD Renewal).

During this time, prior to the commencement of Committee hearings on the possibility of SDI participation, opposition members sought assurances that the Government would not become involved in SDI. NDP member Pauline Jewett stated:

...my question is also for the Prime Minister who talked earlier about aspects of Canada's history as a promoter of peace...and his wish to have his Government continue on this path. This is very commendable, and it would be even more commendable if the Prime Minister would say now, today, clearly, that Canada...[is] opposed to the militarization of outer space and will not take any part whatsoever in research or otherwise in any development of an anti-ballistic missile system.⁹

On 31 May 1985 Liberal member Lloyd Axworthy asked about a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs which indicated that the US Department of Defense was now able to offer contracts to Canadian companies

⁸ Commons Debates, 21 January 1985, p. 1504.

⁹ Commons Debates, 27 March 1985, p. 3412.

under the SDI. He stated that this

...makes a total sham and mockery of statements made in this House that there would be no such involvement until a direct policy decision has been made by the Government and reviewed by this Parliament and by the Canadian people. Is the Deputy Prime Minister prepared to repudiate that stand and clearly indicate to the US Department of Defense that no contract should be offered to Canadian companies until there has been a very clear policy decision on the part of the Government on whether Canadian companies should be involved in any way, shape, or form?¹⁰

Mr. Nielsen responded:

What he is asking the Government to do...is put a total ban on any trading relationships, particularly in the research and high tech area, between Canadian companies and the United States in connection with its SDI program....There never has been any impediment or barrier to Canadian companies entering into contractual relationships with firms in the US, the UK, Japan, or anywhere else...the Hon. Member knows we have set up a process whereby we expect to obtain the hard facts upon which to base a value judgement on whether or not the Canadian Government is going to become involved in any way with the United States SDI program.¹¹

On 23 August 1985, after hearing from Canadians across the country, the Special Joint Committee on International Relations tabled its Interim Report, which contained a number of conclusions and recommendations with respect to potential Government involvement in the SDI.¹³ The Committee recommended that the Government continue "to support pragmatic defence-oriented research and development programs", including joint defence research programs, which help contribute to the fulfilment of Canadian military roles and responsibilities. The majority of the Committee also agreed with the Government's position supporting the research stage of SDI. The Report stated:

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 31 May 1985, p. 5273.

¹¹ Ibid.

In view of the absence of negotiated limitations on research into ballistic missile defence and concerns about Soviet research programs, the majority of the Committee is of the opinion that it is prudent and logical that the United States continue to do basic research into this area until such time as it is limited by treaty or other agreement.

The Committee noted the instability of the transition from mutual assured destruction to mutual assured defence, as well as the tremendous costs of a new arms race. They concluded that the only way to mitigate these problems was through "active promotion" of the arms control process. To this end technological and economic factors should play a secondary role to arms control factors in the Government's decision.

The issue of possible job creation was addressed briefly by the Committee concluded that it had "not received evidence that Government participation would result in significant job creation in Canada".

The Summary Resolution of the Committee stated:

The Majority of the Committee...agreed, however, that the Committee was not able to obtain crucial information at this time....This might influence a final decision, and...the Committee feels that the Government is best equipped to gather the additional information required. Therefore... recommends the Government not take a final decision on participation in the research phase of the SDI until it has been able to acquire the required additional information related to the strategic, financial and economic implications of the invitation.

After the Prime Minister's decision of 7 September that Canada would turn down the invitation to participate in the SDI, opposition members expressed

¹² Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations, Interim Report, 23 August 1985, (Recommendations and Conclusions pp. 110-119).

concern about the fact that private companies could still seek contracts with the United States Department of Defence concerning SDI research. Pauline Jewett and Jean Chretien asked for assurances that the Government would not be giving financial support to those companies wishing to bid on defence contracts related to the SDI. Mr. Nielsen responded:

We intend to co-operate with the United States, as we have in the past and we hope that that research activity will increase. All these projects are subject to a decision-making process which is in place and will be utilized when any new project comes up for consideration. ¹³

Opposition members continued to press the Government on the issue of whether Canada would be participating in SDI through the "back door" and asked whether Government sponsored agencies such as the National Research Council would be allowed to bid on contracts.

Mr. Nielsen responded:

...as research projects come up involving the continued co-operation that we enjoy with the United States in this field...we will determine whether or not to proceed on any individual project on the basis of Canadian priorities and Canadian objectives.¹⁴

As the SCEAND Hearings on the renewal of NORAD began in the Fall, opposition members voiced their concerns that NORAD could lead Canada into involvement in the Strategic Defence Initiative and called for the reinsertion in the NORAD agreement of a clause stating that Canada would not be involved in active anti-ballistic missile defences. (See entry on NORAD Renewal) In the House of Commons the Opposition sought assurances that Canadian territory would not be used for the SDI. Liberal member Jean

¹³ Commons Debates, 9 September 1985, p. 6396.

¹⁴ Commons Debates, 19 September 1985, p. 6786.

Chretien asked Mr. Nielsen to

...give the House the assurance that, at a time when we are negotiating renewal of the NORAD agreement with the United States, it is imperative that no activity should be deployed in Canada that would make us clear participants in Star Wars.¹⁵

Mr. Nielsen responded that Mr. Chrétien

...is searching for a linkage which is simply not there....it is not the intention of the Government of Canada to participate on a government-to-government basis in the Strategic Defence Initiative.¹⁶

Mr. Axworthy pursued the question of a possible memorandum of understanding (MOU) on an exchange of strategic technology with the United States with Mr. Clark during the SCEAND Hearings. Mr. Axworthy said:

It is my further understanding... that this... will be agreed to in a very short period of time. The reason why I think it is important,...is that under this agreement...the United States Department of Defence would thereby have access to a number of research projects presently sponsored or funded...by our own Government which would have application to SDI related research. ...Obviously this would be a full contradiction of the position taken by the Government in September...It seems to me that the memorandum of understanding that is being negotiated would in fact lead towards that very end result.¹⁷

Mr. Axworthy went on to describe technological research going on in Canada that could have potential applications to SDI research. He stated:

What we are objecting to is that this research would

¹⁵ Commons Debates, 22 November 1985, p. 8708, (see also Commons Debates, 24 February 1986, p. 10880).

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ SCEAND Proceedings, 4 December 1985, p. 5.

be applied to SDI programs, which would be the effect of signing an MOU which would give them access and availability to that research. That is the question because it would run contrary to the Government policy. 20

Mr. Clark responded:

What I can answer now is that a memorandum of understanding that the Government of Canada signs will flow from, and not conflict with, the policy of the Government of Canada. The policy of the Government of Canada is that there will be no government-to-government participation in SDI research. Nothing, I think, could be clearer.¹⁹

On 21 March 1986 Ms. Jewett again asked for Government assurances that Canada would not become involved in SDI. She asked: "Does [the Prime Minister's] statement ...clearly mean that Canada will not become involved through NORAD, or in any other way, in an active ballistic missile defence?"²⁰ In an apparent change of position, Mr. Mulroney responded "...that has always been clear."²¹

In June NDP member Derek Blackburn and Liberal member the Hon. William Rompkey raised the question of Canadian involvement in the Teal Ruby project and its connection to the SDI. Mr. Rompkey pointed out that the Teal Ruby project is listed in the United States as a SDI project and asked Associate Defence Minister Harvie Andre to call a halt to Canadian involvement in the project. Mr. Andre responded:

We think it is in Canada's interest....We think there is enormous potential for good use of this technology in Canada in keeping our North under observation, tracking down airplanes, both civilian and, in the event of a war situation, military. In our view it would be rather foolish to take the move the Hon. Member is suggesting.²²

¹⁸ SCEAND Proceedings, 4 December 1985, p. 7.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Commons Debates, 21 March 1986, p. 11746.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Commons Debates, 16 June 1986, p. 14447.

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Cross References

North Warning System
NORAD Renewal
ABM Treaty

24. CANADA-US - NORAD RENEWAL

Background

The North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) was formed on an interim basis by Canada and the United States on 7 August 1957, and was formally established on 12 May 1958. The initial NORAD Agreement was of ten years duration. It established an integrated command framework to control the active and passive defence systems required to protect North American airspace. These included a joint fighter-interceptor force and a number of radar sites across the continent. By 1957 the Soviet Union had developed both an atomic weapon capability and a large long range bomber force. NORAD was a response to both these developments and to the resulting concern among American and Canadian strategic planners, who feared a surprise Soviet bomber attack against US military bases and population centres.

Canada had previously undertaken three joint efforts with the United States in radar surveillance. The Pinetree Line stretched across 50° North latitude began as a United States project, but in 1951 Canada and the United States agreed to share the costs of its extension to cover areas of Canada. This system will be phased out as the new North Warning System (NWS) begins operations. The Distant Early Warning (DEW) line was completed in 1957. The DEW Line consists of a series of short-range radars extending across the Canadian north (the 70th parallel). The Mid-Canada line, which began operations in 1954, consisted of a string of 98 detection sites across the 55th Parallel and was completely designed, built and financed by Canada. This system was completely deactivated by 1965.

The NORAD Agreement was renewed in 1968 for a period of five years. At that time, a clause stating that the NORAD Agreement would "not involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defence" was inserted as part of the Agreement. In 1973 the Agreement was

only renewed for a further two years to allow a re-evaluation of the strategic situation. The Soviet Union had by now developed an arsenal of intercontinental nuclear weapons of its own and the threat of a Soviet attack coming by way of the long-range bomber had faded. This change coincided with the commencement of negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The 1975 renewal reflected the changed strategic situation. Although defence against air attack remained a basic tenet of the Agreement, new emphasis was placed on the need to deal with the possibility of ballistic missile attack. NORAD functions now included:

- warning and assessment of ballistic missile attack and ensuring an effective response should deterrence fail;
- space surveillance;
- maintenance of peacetime surveillance to warn of bomber attack and limited defence against bombers.

This also involved the development and maintenance of new surveillance systems such as the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) and the Satellite Early Warning System (SEWS) which did not directly involve Canada. Although the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty had been signed by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1972, the clause precluding Canada from any involvement in a ballistic missile defence system remained.

In 1980 the Agreement was renewed for a one-year term because of an upcoming election in Canada. The 1981 renewal was for five years, and changed the name of NORAD to North American Aerospace Defence Command, (replacing 'air' with 'aerospace'). This recognition of the changing nature of the threat to North American airspace led to a further redefinition of NORAD's roles which now involved aerospace surveillance and warning and characterization of aerospace attack. The 1981 Agreement also removed the ABM clause.

In 1985 Canada's contribution to NORAD in terms of the assets maintained in Canada included:

- the Distant Early Warning (DEW) System built in 1958;
- the Pinetree Line;
- 2 Regional Operational Control Centres (ROCCs) in North Bay;
- a network of communication facilities linking the North Bay ROCCs with radars and NORAD headquarters in Colorado;
- a squadron of CF-18s;
- a Baker-Nunn space surveillance camera at St. Margaret's Bay New Brunswick.

On March 18 1985, Canada signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States establishing a framework for the upgrading of NORAD's surveillance assets. Most importantly, the Memorandum set out the terms for the construction of the North Warning System (NWS) which is slated to replace the DEW line system. (See entry on the North Warning System).

Current Canadian Position

On 14 June 1985, the House of Commons ordered:

That the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence be empowered to hear evidence and consider Canadian policy with respect to future defence co-operation with the United States in the North American region with particular reference to air defence and related agreements embodied in and flowing from the North American Aerospace Defence Agreement.¹

The House received the SCEAND report on 14 February 1986, and on 19 March 1986, while visiting Washington, Prime Minister Mulroney renewed an the NORAD Agreement without substantive alteration. The Government stated:

¹ Commons Debates, 14 June 1985, p. 5782.

The Prime Minister and the President agreed to extend the NORAD Agreement for a further five year period. They noted that the extension of the NORAD Agreement is fully consistent with the provisions of the ABM Treaty and is in full accordance with other US and Canadian treaty obligations. ²

Parliamentary Comment

The Special Committee of the Senate released a report in January 1985 titled Canada's Territorial Air Defence. The Committee stressed the need for long-term planning and recommended that:

...when the review of the NORAD Agreement...takes place, Canada should explore the possibility of renewing the Agreement for a period of 15 years, to the turn of the century, with provision for review every five years.³

Opposition members in the House of Commons called upon the Government to reinsert the "ABM" clause in the renewed NORAD Agreement and asked for Government assurances that Canada would not become involved in SDI through the NORAD Agreement. NDP member Derek Blackburn asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, to

...assure the House today that, in the negotiations taking place now and in the weeks to come, his Government will make it abundantly clear to the Americans that we want that clause put back in, and thereby prevent us from getting involved in an offensive star wars program.⁴

Mr. Clark responded:

...that particular clause was deleted precisely to avoid

² PMO Release, 19 March 1986.

³ Special Committee of the Senate on Defence, Canada's Territorial Air Defence, January 1985, p. 56.

⁴ Commons Debates, 4 February 1985, p. 1961.

any suggestion that either Canada or the United States might take actions which would breach the ABM Treaty....Consequently I would be surprised if Members of the House who are anxious to have the ABM Treaty respected would want to reinsert a clause which might contain the suggestion that it would open the way for the United States to depart from the obligations of that treaty.⁵

NDP member Pauline Jewett asked Mr. Clark to have the clause included in the North Warning System Agreement with the United States. Mr. Clark stated that "that paragraph was deleted at the time because it was not relevant at the time. Nothing has happened to make it relevant." Ms. Jewett then posed a supplementary question: "...is he saying to the whole Canadian public that the door is open to Canadian participation in an active ballistic missile defence?" Mr. Clark responded: "Canada supports the provisions of the ABM Treaty and intends to continue to do that. There is no need to add redundant language..."⁶

Early in 1985 a new command structure known as Space Command was created in the United States and based at the NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs. While Space Command is a completely American integrated command, the Commander-in-Chief of Space Command is also the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD. Opposition members expressed concern that Canada might become involved in SDI through connections with Space Command. NDP member Derek Blackburn said:

The Government insists there is no connection between the Strategic Defence Initiative and the North Warning System. Why then are the US Air Force and NORAD merging their missile, air, and space warning systems, under a new NORAD Space Command at Cheyenne, Colorado?⁷

Mr. Clark responded: "... the Hon. Member would know that those

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Commons Debates, 13 March 1985, p. 2972.

⁷ Commons Debates, 12 March 1985, p. 2931.

arrangements have been in place for some long time, well before there was discussion of the Strategic Defense Initiative."⁸ Ms. Jewett raised the issue again in the House, referring to an article in the New York Times.

...the United States has finalized its plans to establish an integrated command centre at Colorado Springs which will include ballistic missile defences, that is, the SDI, as well as offensive nuclear forces. Can the Minister confirm this decision? Will he not agree that, unless we oppose it, Canada will be inexorably drawn into star wars through NORAD?⁹

Mr. Nielsen responded:

...I will confirm no such thing. I read the article to which the Hon. Member refers...[it] garbled totally fictitious events with some actual developments, which creates the very false impression of relevance to star wars, SDI or whatever.¹⁰

The SCFAND Committee which examined the issue of NORAD renewal, held its hearings over the Fall of 1985. The major issues that were of concern during the Hearings included the reinsertion of the ABM clause excluding Canada from ballistic missile defence and the question of potential Canadian involvement in the American SDI programme through NORAD and its associated programmes and structures. The Committee submitted its final report on 14 February 1986.¹¹ The Committee recommended that the Government "renew the NORAD agreement for a period of five years with no substantial modifications in the thrust of the document." Rather than reinserting the ABM clause, the Committee recommended that:

...the Government consider inviting the United States to issue at the time of the renewal of the NORAD agreement

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Commons Debates, 29 May 1985, p. 5188.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ SCFAND, Fourth Report, Canada-US Defence Cooperation and the 1986 Renewal of the NORAD Agreement, 14 February 1986.

a joint declaration reaffirming both countries' commitment to deterrence and strategic stability, as well as their support for the integrity of the ABM Treaty....

Reflecting the continuing concern for Canadian sovereignty in the North, the Committee suggested that the Government pursue "various options available for the performance of airborne surveillance and control missions" and consider acquiring such assets and technology to use in "support of Canadian sovereignty, and in support of NORAD if required...."

The Liberal members of the SCEAND Committee issued a minority report on the same day as the SCEAND Report was released. The Liberal members stated:

The Liberal members of the Committee strongly support the renewal of the NORAD Agreement for a period of five years. ...[and] call for the reinsertion of the ABM clause...¹²

The minority report also said that:

The tone of the [SCEAND] report is biased against those witnesses who chose to disagree with the majority's opinion regarding the nature of the threat Canada faces, the best response to this threat and the most appropriate military relationship Canada should have with the United States.¹³

When the NORAD Agreement was renewed by Canada and the United States in March of 1986, a joint statement was issued reaffirming their commitment to the ABM Treaty. Mr. Hopkins asked: "Why would Washington and Ottawa not simply reinstate the ABM clause in the signed NORAD Agreement itself in order to allay the concerns of Canadians?"¹⁴ Mr. Clark responded:

There was ...a concern in Canada about the integrity of the ABM Treaty. It was precisely for that reason

¹² Len Hopkins, Official Opposition Critic for National Defence, Communiqué, 14 February 1986.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Commons Debates, 19 March 1986, p. 11660.

that, at the summit meeting in Washington, the Prime Minister of Canada secured from the President of the United States an explicit underlining to the United States of the importance of full compliance with the ABM Treaty and other existing arms control obligations.¹⁵

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Cross References

The ABM Treaty

Canada-US: Agreement on the North Warning System

Canada-US: Exchange of Letters on the Strategic Defense Initiative

¹⁵ Ibid.

25. THE DEFENCE BUDGET AND THE WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE

Background

The 1986-87 Overall Expenditure Plan of the Federal Government projects total expenditures of \$108,571 million of which \$9,938 million or 9.2 per cent will go to the Department of National Defence (DND). In 1985-86 \$9,367 (9.0 per cent) of a total \$103,944 million went to DND. The new budget thus provides 2.75 per cent real growth for the Department, with 2 per cent real growth planned for the following two years. Of the \$9,938 million allocated to DND, \$2,584 million or 26 per cent will be devoted to Capital Expenditures.

Ongoing projects that fall under Capital Expenditures include:

- construction of new Canadian patrol frigates
- purchase of military operational and support trucks
- the ongoing CF18 procurement programme
- the Destroyer Life Extension programme
- procurement of a Tactical Towed Array Sonar System
- procurement of six De Havilland Dash 8 aircraft
- acquisition of Challenger aircraft
- construction of the North Warning System
- procurement of short-range air-to-air missiles for the CF18

The remainder of the budget will be spent on operating expenses, salaries, pensions and benefits.

Despite election promises of an increase of 6 per cent in the defence budget, the Conservative Government announced in November 1984 that the 1985 projection was being reduced. The 1985 and 1986 budgets are therefore not markedly different from the defence budgets of previous governments. The Government has also planned a comprehensive review of initiatives and expenditures in the area of defence in order to assess Canadian commitments

and clarify the mandate of the military. The date of publication of this White Paper has not yet been announced.

Current Canadian Position

In response to questioning in the House of Commons, the Minister of National Defence, Erik Nielsen, stated that:

...unlike the last 16 years during which time the Armed Forces underwent erosion of a substantial nature, we will, under the leadership of the Prime Minister and the Conservative Government ensure that we live up to our commitments to our allies and to NATO, to make Canadian men and women who serve in our Armed Forces proud once again to serve their country.¹

The Minister of Finance, Michael Wilson, said:

While defence remains a high priority, even here it has been necessary to reduce the rate of real growth for the defence budget by one per cent in both fiscal years 1986-1987 and 1987-1988." and "That is consistent with the Government's firm commitment to playing a meaningful and effective role in NATO and NORAD."²

In his statement before the Standing Committee on National Defence, the Associate Minister of Defence, Harvie Andre stated:

The Government, since it took office, has given high priority to defence and it will continue to do so. The Budget demonstrates this. Because of the importance which this Government attaches to defence and to remedying the neglect of the past, expenditure for the Defence Programme will rise substantially in 1986/87 and will continue to increase in real terms over the next five years, a period

¹ Commons Debates, 1 March 1985, p. 2641.

² DND News Release 7/86, pp. 2-3.

of extremely tight restraint for government expenditures generally.

.....

...these budgetary allocations will not allow us to do everything that this Government considers to be appropriate for defence.³

Parliamentary Comment

Referring to a Conservative campaign pamphlet entitled "Honour the Commitment" in which the Conservatives promised 6 per cent real growth in defence, Liberal Defence Critic Len Hopkins asked Mr. Nielsen why this commitment was not being fulfilled.

...Having been a member of the Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet for several months now, how can the Minister sit idly by while his Party's commitment to 6 per cent real growth in defence spending is ignored?

Mr. Nielsen responded by saying that he would look into the matter. Faced with the same question the next day Mr. Nielsen stated that details were forthcoming from the Department and that:

I can assure him, with respect to the Estimates, that they will provide sufficient to enable us, unlike the previous Government, to live up to those commitments to our allies in NATO.⁵

Questions at the Standing Committee on National Defence centred on how the Department calculated the figure of 2.75 per cent real growth⁶, and how expenses for new equipment fitted in to budget estimates.

³ Standing Committee on National Defence (SCND) Proceedings, 15 April 1986.

⁴ Commons Debates, 28 February 1985, p. 2601.

⁵ Commons Debates, 1 March 1985, p. 2641.

⁶ For a description of how DND calculates real growth see SCND Proceedings, 15 April 1986, p. 24.

Questions about the promised Government White Paper on defence centred on when the Paper would be published. Pursued by Liberal defence critic Len Hopkins on the issue, in early May 1986, Mr. Nielsen and Mr. Andre refused to give a date and pointed to the lack of a White Paper from the previous Liberal Government. Mr. Andre said:

While in opposition we did not realize how much repair work was necessary and how long it was going to take to straighten out the mess. However we are working on it and the promise of a White Paper will be kept.⁷

When questioned on the issue at the Standing Committee on National Defence, Mr. Andre passed the question to Mr. Anderson, Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy. Mr. Anderson said:

I think there is a problem that has arisen as a result of the budget decisions as to whether, under the present constraints the Government finds necessary to impose on defence, this is a good time to be producing a white paper that would try to look well ahead as to where we should be going. I think Mr. Nielsen is probably still considering that question of whether this is a good time to go ahead or not.⁸

Mr. Andre stated:

The Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence has before it a reference, if you will, on this question, and every time it comes to a point of are we going to resolve it and proceed, events seem to conspire to cause it to be postponed. I do not have a better excuse than that, other than that the whole question is very much before the Cabinet Committee right now.⁹

⁷ Commons Debates, 1 May 1986, p. 12841.

⁸ SCND Proceedings, 15 April 1986, p. 25.

⁹ Ibid.

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations submitted its final report in June 1986. It stated:

In our opinion, the government must confront the commitment-capability gap....We therefore propose an immediate study of long-term defence requirements designed specifically to ascertain how much additional expenditure would be necessary to complete the task of re-equipping the armed forces over the next 10 years. If this level of spending is not considered attainable, then the government should attempt, in consultation with its allies, to renegotiate or restructure some of Canada's commitments so as to close the gap between commitments and capabilities and ensure that Canada's armed forces can carry out properly the roles they are assigned.¹⁰

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Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations, Independence and Internationalism, June 1986.

¹⁰ Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations, Independence and Internationalism, June 1986, p. 50.

Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Canada-US Defence Cooperation and the 1986 Renewal of the NORAD Agreement, 14 February 1986.

Cross References

Defence-Major Acquisitions.
NATO.
North Warning System.

26. DEFENCE - MAJOR EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS

Background

The Department of National Defence initiated three major projects in 1985 and early 1986 : the North Warning System, the new Low Level Air Defence (LLAD) programme, and the Tribal Update and Modernization Programme (TRUMP). The North Warning System will be funded jointly by Canada and the United States and is dealt with in a separate entry.

In May 1985 three finalists were chosen from among 7 groups of firms competing for the LLAD contract. The finalists were: AB Bofors (Sweden) and Marconi Co. (Canada); Contraves AG (Switzerland) and Raytheon (Canada); Oerlikon-Buhrle (Switzerland) and Litton Systems (Canada). On 16 April 1986 the Associate Minister of National Defence, Harvie Andre, announced that the contract had been awarded to the Oerlikon-Buhrle Litton consortium, and on 13 June 1986 Mr. Andre announced that final Government approval had been given to the project.

The LLAD system will consist of 10 anti-aircraft guns, 30 low-level surface to air missile and 10 radar systems. It will be used to protect Canadian land and air forces in Europe. Specifically the system will protect Canadian troops and the airfields at the Baden-Soellingen and Lahr bases in Germany and the CAST Brigade, if deployed in northern Norway. The total programme cost is estimated at \$1.025 billion (1986 dollars) of which \$650 million will be spent on the system itself and \$350 million on spare parts, training, ammunition and other costs. The LLAD system should be complete by 1991.

Mr. Andre announced that the TRUMP programme had been approved on 9 May 1986. This programme involves four DDH 280 Tribal class destroyers which entered service in 1972 and 1973. The destroyers will receive a new command, control and communications system, and a supportive air defence

missile system. The new air defence system is perhaps the most important improvement since the destroyers currently have no way of fending off the increasing threat from the air which consists of attacking aircraft and anti-ship missiles.

The total cost of the TRUMP project will be \$1.2 billion (in 1986 dollars). The first vessel will enter the Lauzon shipyards in November 1987, and work on all four destroyers should be completed by early 1992. The Canadian Patrol Frigate construction programme is an ongoing project. Six new frigates will be built by the Saint John shipbuilding and Drydock Company Limited at a total cost of \$5.255 billion. The final frigate is expected to be delivered by early 1993.

On 16 July 1986 the Government gave the Department of National Defence approval to begin soliciting bids on new conventional diesel-powered submarines. The Department will receive bids from consortia that include both Canadian and European companies for a minimum of four and a maximum of twelve submarines. Two consortia will eventually compete for the contract and construction should begin in 1990.

Current Canadian Position

With regard to the LLAD project, the Department of National Defence stated that "This procurement will substantially improve Canada's defence posture in Europe and further demonstrate Canada's commitment to NATO."¹

Announcing the Government's approval of the implementation phase of the TRUMP programme, Mr. André stated:

The significant feature of TRUMP is that it will greatly improve the fighting capability of these

¹ DND News Release, 12/86.

ships; it will permit a welcome and long overdue improvement in our contribution to our NATO allies.

.....

I would like to make sure that the importance of this development is fully appreciated. The majority of Canada's Navy today has little or no protection against air attack; no ship in our fleet is capable today of protecting other ships from air attack, and this includes merchant ships as well as other naval vessels. This is not satisfactory. This is going to be changed.²

Parliamentary Comment

On 3 April 1985 while the competition among companies for LLAD was still going on, Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy asked the Minister of National Defence Erik Nielsen, about the use of Nielsen's name along with Litton Systems in an advertisement concerning the connection between increased defence expenditures and job creation.

Mr. Nielsen responded by reading a telegram from the President of Litton Systems. The telegram said:

This is to confirm that the advertisement placed by Litton in today's Globe and Mail and Ottawa Citizen was done without the permission or consent of the Prime Minister's Office or any of his staff.³

Almost a year later the LLAD issue was raised again in the House. In this case, however, questions centred on rumours that the Government was planning to eliminate the project since the project did not appear separately in the Main Estimates. Progressive Conservative member Bud Jardine and Liberal member Len Hopkins both asked for assurances that the Government would go ahead with the project and award a contract.⁴

² The Honourable Harvie Andre, Authorization for Implementation Tribal Class Update and Modernization Project, 9 May 1986.

³ Commons Debates, 3 April 1985, p. 3661.

⁴ Commons Debates, 4 March 1986, p. 11166, 21 March 1986, p. 11749.

Mr. Andre responded that:

The reports are speculative and decisions on that are currently before the Government. They will be made in due course.⁵

At the Standing Committee on National Defence (SCND) NDP member Derek Blackburn questioned Department of National Defence (DND) representatives about the contract selection process, and the factors taken into account.⁶ The Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance), Lawrence Davies, responded:

There were three items,...there are cost considerations, industrial benefits and technology, and they [Oerlikon] were judged to be the winner on all three counts.⁷

Later that week General Theriault, Chief of Defence Staff, outlined the approach in more detail:

Basically, the approach was to put the operational problem to the respondents and seek from them a proposal that would embody how best they could see solving that operational problem. Their responses, of course, were the subject of extensive evaluation, the finalist having been judged the most responsive not only from an operational standpoint, but also from a cost standpoint and, in fact, from a manpower standpoint.⁸

Conservative member the Honourable Alan McKinnon sought assurances that future sales of the ADATS missile system would result in its manufacture in Canada. Eldon Healy, the Assistant Deputy Minister for Material (DND) responded.

⁵ Commons Debates, 21 March 1986, p. 11749.

⁶ For a good description of the overall contract selection process, see SCND Proceedings, 17 April 1986, p. 7.

⁷ Ibid., p. 5.

⁸ SCND Proceedings, 21 April 1986, pp. 19-20.

As part of the proposal put forward by Oerlikon and Litton, they do include in the industrial benefits package offshore sales potential for the ADATS missile. They include that in the guaranteed portion of the contract....

.....

That would lead to making some of the systems and doing some of the systems integration in Canada. The system would become a Canadian system, but not necessarily every part would be produced in Canada.⁹

Mr. McKinnon also inquired about the reported test results of the LLAD system which gave it a success rate of 83 per cent. Dave Hampson, the Project Manager of the LLAD system, replied:

For each of these systems, when they fire they test a certain thing on the system and not necessarily the whole system gets tested. In the first 36 missiles they had a high rate of success in all the different systems....Something might have gone awry in some specific component, but not necessarily on the whole missile.¹⁰

Liberal member Len Hopkins asked how the cost of the LLAD system would fit into the defence budget and whether or not any other programmes would be changed or cancelled as a result. Mr. Davies, the Assistant Deputy Minister for Finance, replied:

I believe I said we were going to transfer certain funds that we were going to find within the budget into the capital account. We are doing that by reducing somewhat the operational activity rules in 1986-87 by reducing certain expenditures on research and development and on construction, which would supplement the equipment budget.¹¹

After the TRUMP authorization was announced, Liberal member Len Hopkins

⁹ SCND Proceedings, 5 May 1986, p. 11.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 13.

¹¹ SCND Proceedings, 21 April 1986, p. 7.

made a statement in the House of Commons, criticizing the Conservative Government for taking credit for previous Liberal initiatives.

The former Liberal Government gave this programme preliminary approval in 1980 and final approval in principle in 1984. We see again the Conservative Government's failure and inability to put forward anything new. How long will the Government continue to piggyback on former Liberal programs?¹²

Questions on the TRUMP programme at the SCND centred on the role the upgraded destroyers would play. Mr. Healey stated:

The TRUMP ships are intended to have an air defence capability. Area air defence means they have the capability not only of protecting themselves, but more importantly, of protecting other ships in convoy...

.....

The concept of utilization of the Tribal class destroyer is that it will be a destroyer leader and will have several of the CPFs [Canadian Patrol Frigates] in company and it will be an all-Canadian group.¹³

Questions were raised about the timing of the Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) programme and possible delays as a result of management changes at the Saint John shipyard and problems with the corrosion of the steel used for the ships. Eldon Healey, the Assistant Deputy Minister (Material), assured questioners that delays would be minimal and that the costs incurred as a result of the corroding steel problem would be absorbed by the contractor, not the government.¹⁴ Mr. Andre stated that the first two frigates would be six and five months late and the remaining vessels would be delivered on schedule.¹⁵

¹² Commons Debates, 12 May 1986, p. 13166.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 36-37.

¹⁴ SCND Proceedings, 15 April 1986, p. 29.

¹⁵ SCND Proceedings, 21 April 1986, p. 29.

Responding to a question from Liberal member Len Hopkins, Mr. Healey outlined the relative capabilities of the frigates.

...in the towed array with the electronics that we are putting aboard, we may have a slight edge. We may be slightly more capable than many of our NATO allies. In the area of air defence in the frigates, we believe that it may be more capable because we have a vertical launch system which will be the first within the alliance....In terms of surface-to-surface capability, our frigates will be fitted with the harpoon missile, which is an American missile, also capable of being launched from aircraft and submarines.

.....
That missile will be the standard missile and it will grow throughout its life, as will some of the other systems....The frigates we are producing look like they will be as capable into the mid-1990s and late 1990s as anything currently on the planning boards.¹⁶

The report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations recommended that the Government examine the possibility of equipping the Canadian navy with diesel-powered submarines, within the context of Canadian defence policy and as a way of enhancing Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.¹⁷

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Details on Major Projects, National Defence 1986-87 Estimates Part III, Expenditure Plan, pp. 73-76.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations, Independence and Internationalism, June 1986, p. 134.

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27. NATO

Background

Canada is a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO's declared aim is the prevention of war:

It works to achieve this by striving to improve understanding between East and West and by possessing sufficient strength to deter an attack on any member of the Alliance. The Treaty provides that Alliance members will come to each others assistance in the event of an armed attack upon any one of them.¹

After the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the initial concerns of the signatories were primarily military. By the mid-fifties, however, there was a growing sense that NATO needed to address larger security concerns than could be dealt with in strictly military terms, and to generate a greater sense of cohesion in order to combat Soviet efforts to create disunity in the Alliance.

In 1956 a NATO report proposed guidelines for institutionalizing alliance consultations, and suggested a number of non-military areas in which the allies could work together. (For example, resource development, science and public information). The report set the parameters for a consultation process that remains an important part of alliance decision-making. It also outlined a code of conduct for consultations that requires allies to keep each other adequately informed of actions and activities of common interest, to take the opinions of other allies into consideration in the formation of national policy and to ensure that any member which fails to adhere to alliance consensus decisions in its national policy provides an adequate explanation of this behaviour.

¹ NATO and Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons, NATO Information Service, Brussels, 1984, p.1.

In 1967, faced with a new strategic situation, NATO issued another report entitled "Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance" (the Harmel Report). This report outlined two objectives for the Alliance: continued maintenance of adequate military strength and political cohesion, and new efforts to achieve a more stable and durable relationship with the East. To ensure these goals, the report argued, the consultative process must be enhanced and continued. This commitment to close consultation and co-operation was renewed in the Ottawa Declaration in 1974.

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the central consultative body of NATO and was established by the Treaty in 1949. The Council is composed of permanent representatives who meet on a weekly basis. Ministerial consultation occurs in three forums: NATO Foreign ministers meet twice each year at the Council level; NATO Defence ministers meet twice each year in the Defence Planning Committee, and in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG); Special Council meetings involving heads of government and ministers are sometimes convened, as was the case when President Reagan met with NATO ministers after the US-USSR Summit in November 1985.

Canada's force commitments to NATO at present consist of:

- a Mechanized Brigade Group of about 6,000 men based in Lahr, West Germany;
- 3 squadrons of the Canadian Air Group, based in Baden-Soellingen, West Germany;
- the Canadian Air/Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group based in Canada and committed to reinforcing Northern Norway when required. This consists of 1 Brigade Group and 2 squadrons of fighters.
- a destroyer in the Standing Naval Force Atlantic.

The primary objective of operations and training for 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and 1 Canadian Air Group is to maintain their formations and their

respective units and squadrons at a high state of operational readiness to conduct high intensity operations in the Central Region in a conventional or nuclear biological or chemical environment."²

In addition to these force commitments, Canada provides training facilities for NATO troops on Canadian territory. There is a West German facility for tank training in Shilo, Manitoba and the British Army uses facilities at Suffield and Wainwright, Alberta. Both the German and British forces use the Goose Bay, Newfoundland facilities for training in low-level flying.

The Canadian Air Group in West Germany is being refitted with CF-18 aircraft to replace older CF-104 aircraft. The deployment of these CF-18s will be completed in 1986.

Current Canadian Position

On 11 March 1985 the Canadian Government announced that it was increasing the strength of Canadian forces stationed in Europe by adding 1,220 military personnel to the Mechanized Brigade Group in Lahr, West Germany and that an infantry battalion group based in Canada would be specifically designated to the Allied Command Mobile Force, Land. This is multi-national force which will reinforce NATO during times of crisis. These measures will cost \$50 million in the first year and \$100 million per year thereafter.

The Minister of National Defence, Erik Nielsen, told the House of Commons that:

...with these initial measures, we hope to increase the effectiveness and contribution of our Canadian forces in Europe. The objective,

² DND 1986-87 Estimates, Part III, p. 43.

of course, is to meet fully our commitments to NATO, as we have often said we would do."³

Participation in the consultative process has been perceived, particularly by officials, as one of the major advantages that Canada derives from membership in NATO.

As an active participant in the consultative and planning processes of NATO, Canada influences the development of Western security policy and of efforts to ensure an enduring peace. We thereby gain a greater measure of control over our own destiny, and our influence is incomparably greater than the influence we could exert internationally on the basis of our power alone."⁴

Before the Geneva Summit between the United States and the Soviet Union, which took place on 19-21 November 1985, President Reagan consulted with the NATO allies at a special meeting in New York. Reporting on the meeting to the House of Commons, Prime Minister Mulroney stated:

...I take particular satisfaction from the strength, unity and vitality of the Western Alliance. When the leaders of the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, West Germany and Canada met with President Reagan to discuss the forthcoming summit, the strength of cohesion of our common purpose was strongly evident. We are all deeply committed to the Alliance and the principles it represents."⁵

Communiqués are issued by the Alliance at the conclusion of each consultative meeting stating the major issues raised and NATO's position on them. From time to time, Communiqués note the reservations of member states. Since none of the Communiqués contained reservations made by Canada, they can be construed as statements of Government policy.

³ Commons Debates, 11 March 1985, p. 2882.

⁴ Facts About Canada and NATO.

⁵ Commons Debates, 28 October 1985, p. 8070.

The Communiqués issued during 1985 and the first half of 1986 addressed several issues. The Allies have stated their support for American research into the technology of strategic defence conducted within the limits of the ABM Treaty. They see this as a "prudent" effort in light of Soviet developments in the defence area. The Communiqués have expressed strong support for the US negotiating positions in the Geneva Negotiations. In particular the Allies expressed concern about the Intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) issue and stated their determination to continue deployment of INF (the Pershing II and cruise missiles) in the absence of an agreement with the Soviet Union. However, the Allies continue to reiterate their willingness to "modify, halt, reverse, or dispense with Longer-Range INF (LRINF) deployment as part of an equitable and verifiable arms control agreement." The idea of an interim agreement on this issue was given support at the 13 December 1985 meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

The Allies also supported the American negotiating position in the other areas of the Geneva Negotiations and stressed the need for effective verification. Addressing the compliance issue, the NPG stated that "a double standard of compliance with arms control agreements would be unacceptable....In this context we reaffirmed the essential requirement for full compliance with all arms control agreements." (NATO Nuclear Planning Group, 21 March 1986).

At the meeting of the Defence Planning Committee on 22 May 1986, the American decision to resume production of chemical weapons was the primary issue. In light of Soviet chemical warfare capabilities, the US Department of Defence asked Congress to approve production of a new binary chemical weapon. Congress approved the request provided it was also accepted by NATO. The Defence Planning Committee adopted the request as part of NATO Force Goals for 1987-92. The Netherlands, Denmark and Norway stated they would not accept the weapons on their territory even during a crisis.

Germany agreed to accept them in a crisis but on the condition that it was not the only Alliance member to do so. The Norwegian Minister stated his country's opposition to the project as a whole. Although Alliance members agreed that the United States would begin production of new binary weapon shells, the Communiqué issued after the meeting confirmed NATO resolve to continue to seek a worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

In terms of NATO doctrine, the Allies emphasized that NATO does not seek military superiority and that none of NATO's weapons will be used except in response to an attack. However NATO has stated its resolve "to sustain the credibility of NATO's strategy of flexible response and forward defence". In order to strengthen this strategy, NATO Defence Ministers have stressed the need to avoid "an undue reliance on the early use of nuclear weapons".

Parliamentary Comment

On 12 March 1985, Liberal MP Len Hopkins asked the Minister of National Defence what part of the Budget would provide the funds for the increase in Canada's contribution to the NATO forces. "I asked him if this is new money or whether it is in the existing Estimates....Can the Minister assure this House and all Canadians that no purchase of new equipment to which we have already committed ourselves will be adversely affected."⁶

Mr. Nielsen responded that, "...with respect to the equipment, I believe that the answer is in the affirmative."⁷

⁶ Commons Debates, 12 March 1985, p. 2932.

⁷ Ibid, p. 2932.

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28. PEACEKEEPING AND OBSERVATION

Background

In the late 1940s four international observer missions were established under UN Security Council auspices to facilitate the containment of conflict in the Balkans, Indonesia, the Middle East and Kashmir. The role of these missions was limited to observation, investigation and reporting by unarmed military officers.

Since the establishment of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1956, ten peacekeeping and observation missions have been conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. The most prominent peacekeeping missions outside the UN have been those in Indochina, Chad, Lebanon and Egypt.

Canada has been active in the creation and operation of multilateral peacekeeping forces, playing a key role in the establishment of UNEF and participating in all UN operations since that time. Canada has also participated in several non-UN operations: the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC), created in 1954 to supervise the ceasefire in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam and its successor, the International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS), created in 1973; the Observer Team to Nigeria (OTN) created in 1968 to supervise the election after the Nigerian civil war; and the Commonwealth Monitoring Force established in 1979 to monitor the elections in Zimbabwe.

Canada has consistently supported multilateral peacekeeping, although the priority accorded peacekeeping has varied with different governments. Peacekeeping operations have not received unanimous support in the United Nations. Three particular issues have caused concern: the question of the effectiveness of peacekeeping, support for non-UN operations, and the financing of UN operations.

Controversy has arisen over whether peacekeeping helps resolve conflicts or actually prolongs them by removing the primary incentive for opponents to negotiate. There has also been disagreement over the desirability of establishing peacekeeping missions outside the UN.

The problem of financing is related to the authorization of peacekeeping forces by the General Assembly. The Soviet Union and France have traditionally opposed the General Assembly's claims on this issue, and have refused to pay for peacekeeping operations not established by the Security Council. Many countries which agree with UNGA-sponsored peacekeeping operations in principle have nevertheless failed to make payments on time. As a result, UN peacekeeping operations have incurred a large deficit since the 1964 mission in the Congo. According to one source, "68 percent of the overall deficit of the Organization is due to peacekeeping operations."¹ Consequently, troop-contributing countries have generally borne most of the burden of financing UN peacekeeping operations.

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations reviewed Canada's peacekeeping operations and recommended, inter alia that

the best approach to invitations to become involved in peacekeeping operations is for Canada to apply its criteria on a case-by-case basis, while maintaining its preference for operations under United Nations auspices.²

Current Canadian Position

Shortly after the Conservative Government took office, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, noted in the UN General Assembly that:

¹ United Nations Association, "Peacekeeping", Briefing Paper, Ottawa: UNA, October 1984, p.5.

² SJCIR, Independence and Internationalism, June 1986, p. 61.

UN peacekeeping forces and observer missions continue to be essential in a number of troubled areas of the world. All member states have a responsibility to contribute to the support of these operations. In particular, we ask member states to respond positively to the appeal by the Secretary-General for additional voluntary contributions for the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus.³

Mr. Clark went on to note that peacekeeping is only the beginning of conflict resolution: "While peacekeeping forces can help reduce the risk of open conflict, lasting peace can be achieved only through reasonable political compromise."⁴

The Government's Green Paper reiterated Canada's commitment to peacekeeping. It also raised the issue of Canada's participation in non-UN operations:

there has been a tendency in recent years to bypass the UN in favour of other multinational arrangements. Do Canadians agree that we should encourage a return to the practice of UN sponsorship of peacekeeping operations...despite the frustrations involved?⁵

In June of 1985 the Government released a joint statement with the governments of Argentina, Austria, Jordan, Malaysia, Senegal, Sweden and Tanzania calling for a strengthening of UN peacekeeping capabilities:

We consider UN peace-keeping operations as an important instrument to improve international security. In order to be effective, such operations need a clear mandate, adequate means to fulfill their missions and a sound financial basis.⁶

In keeping with its concern for the effective multilateral financing of UN

³ DEA, Statements and Speeches, 84/6.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ DEA, Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations, Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1985, p.41.

⁶ DEA, Communiqué 97, 27 June 1985.

peacekeeping operations, in December 1985 Canada voted in favour of UNGA resolution 40/247 reviewing the rates of reimbursement to the governments of troop contributing states. This resolution called for the maintenance of existing reimbursement rates but acknowledged that "in consequence of the shortfall of financial contributions, troop-contributing states are...bearing considerably larger portions of the costs for their troops..."⁷

Canada currently participates in three UN peacekeeping missions as well as one non-UN mission. In the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) operation, Canadian troops are responsible for maintaining surveillance of the ceasefire, observing and reporting on activities and resolving local inter-community disputes in Sector Four, which roughly corresponds to the old city of Nicosia. These tasks are carried out by one infantry battalion and by a small unit at UNFICYP Headquarters; a total of 515 Canadians are currently posted in this mission. The operation's mandate is renewed every six months by the UN Security Council, at which time troop contributors, such as Canada, signal their intention to maintain or modify their commitment to the operation. This mission is financed by troop contributing countries, although the UN is required to reimburse their expenses and currently pays a portion of the cost through voluntary contributions by its members.

In the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) mission, Canada contributes to the maintenance of the peace between Israel and Syria in the Golan. The Canadian contingent of 220 personnel share the responsibility with Poland for logistics and communications, that is, for the mechanical maintenance of equipment, as well as the supply and transportation of the troops actually observing the ceasefire. This mission is financed by an assessment of UN members, and its mandate is renewed by the UN Security

⁷ Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly During the First Part of Its Fortieth Session (New York: UN Department of Public Information), 1986, pp. 582-583.

Council every six months.

Canada also contributes 20 officers to the UN Truce Supervision Organization, a mission established in 1948 to oversee the truce between Israel and its neighbours in Palestine. Its mandate is to observe the maintenance of the ceasefire ordered by the Security Council and supervise the observance of the General Armistice Agreements between Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Israel. Canada still posts an attaché to the UN Command Military Armistice Commission in Korea. Finally, while Canada no longer has a field presence in the UN Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), it still supplies air transport to move the headquarters from one country to the other every six months.

In the spring of 1985 Canada agreed to participate in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai. The MFO was established by Israel, Egypt and the United States in 1981 when the UN Security Council was unable to agree on the establishment of a UN mission to supervise the border. The function of the 140 Canadian personnel, committed to this task since 31 March 1986, is to provide transportation for the troops and civilian observers actually monitoring the border. The current commitment expires on 31 March 1988, at which time Canada will have the option of renewing or terminating its participation in the mission.

When questioned by a member of the Special Committee on Canada's International Relations, about the decision to participate in this non-UN force, the Canadian Ambassador to the UN, Stephen Lewis, stated that while

it should be a fact of Canadian foreign policy to push for the use of the UN...where there is no alternative (to a non-UN mission) and where regional peace is at stake and where the countries who receive the forces will welcome them under a different banner, I do not resist. The logic compels me to accept it.⁸

⁸ Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations, Proceedings, 27 November 1985, p.18.

Similarly, the Government has indicated its willingness to consider a contribution to a peacekeeping or observation mission in Central America in the context of a Contadora agreement.⁹

Parliamentary Comment

The Government's decision to participate in the MFO drew some questions from the opposition. Former Liberal External Affairs critic Jean Chretien noted that:

We had a principle that we support the UN...that there should be no force sent to bring peace in different conflicts...that are not under the umbrella of the UN. And suddenly last fall, unanimously, because there was a consensus between Israel and Egypt, we decided to replace the Australians in the Sinai!¹⁰

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⁹ External Affairs Transcript, 2 February 1985. See also Edmonton Journal, 4 February 1985.

¹⁰ SJCCIR Proceedings, 27 November 1985, p.19.

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Cross References

Cyprus

The Israeli-Arab Dispute

Central America: The Contadora Process

SECTION III - CONFLICT RESOLUTION

29. AFGHANISTAN

Background

Following the coup by General Mohammed Daud in 1973, Afghanistan underwent rapid changes. These involved the imposition of a secular civil-military regime, the implementation of an ambitious development strategy, and the broadening of relations with both East and West. In 1978 the Daud regime was overthrown by the Khalq faction of the pro-Moscow Peoples Democratic Party. The newly formed Revolutionary Military Council attempted to implement a land redistribution programme and other reforms. These policies and the regime's tilt towards the Soviet Union gave rise to an anti-government insurgency. Thereafter, the country's political, economic and military situation deteriorated rapidly.

In September 1979 the regime was toppled by the backers of Hafizolla Amin, who in turn was replaced in December by Babrak Karmal of the PDP's Parcham wing. The Soviet Union, which had been assisting the Amin Government's counter-insurgency efforts through the provision of equipment and troops, engineered Karmal's takeover and supported it through direct intervention. By 1980 there were over 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

With at least 300,000 deaths, 2 million internally displaced persons and 2.5 million refugees in Pakistan alone, the war has been very costly in human terms. The United States, China and Pakistan provide support for the insurgents who fight on despite the scale of Soviet support. The Soviet Union increased its troop presence to 115,000 in 1985, and has reportedly stationed 50,000 troops on the northern border to reinforce those already in the country.

Since 1982 the United Nations Secretary-General has made attempts to mediate between the parties to the dispute. Seven rounds of proximity talks have taken place between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan

and these talks were scheduled to resume on 30 July 1986. These talks have produced draft agreements on the mutual cessation of interference in each other's affairs, on Soviet and American guarantees for Afghanistan's independence, and the return of refugees to Afghanistan, but no concrete agreement has been reached on a timetable for the withdrawal of troops.

Canada has consistently supported United Nations General Assembly resolutions calling for a withdrawal of foreign troops, a political solution and the creation of the conditions necessary for the return of refugees to Afghanistan. The Government has also maintained a substantial aid programme for Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations recommended that the Government continue to support refugee relief programmes for Afghan refugees. "In its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union", the Committee continued, "Canada should take every opportunity to raise the issue of Afghanistan and make clear that Soviet occupation and devastation of that country constitute a serious obstacle to improved relations."¹

Current Canadian Position

During the 40th session of the General Assembly, Canada voted in favour of the resolution on human rights in Afghanistan. The resolution

expresses its deep concern that the Afghan authorities, with heavy support from foreign troops, are acting with great severity against their opponents and suspected opponents without any respect for the international human rights obligations which they have assumed;

expresses also its deep concern at the severe consequences for the civilian population of

¹ SJCCIR, Independence and Internationalism, June 1986, p. 108.

indiscriminate bombardments and military operations primarily targeted on the villages and the agricultural structure;

calls upon the parties to the conflict to apply fully the principles and rules of international humanitarian law and to admit international humanitarian organizations.²

One month earlier Canada had voted in favour of an Assembly resolution on the situation in Afghanistan, which called for a withdrawal of foreign troops and a political solution, expressed support for the Secretary General's mediation efforts and requested that those efforts continue.³

In a statement to the General Assembly on this resolution, Canada's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Stephen Lewis, expressed the Government's position in the following terms:

Karmal remains in power purely by force of Soviet arms. Hostility grows internally. The government is at war with its own people...The Soviet Union, however, will not win...the Soviet Union cannot impose a military solution...The only answer is a negotiated settlement which embraces the principles in the resolution before us...⁴

Ambassador Lewis suggested that the Soviet Union wanted to discourage international discussion of the Afghanistan question. It is "up to this General Assembly to keep the Afghan cause alive", he stated, and to "somehow persuade the Soviet Union that negotiation is the only route to world approval."⁵

As a member of NATO, Canada has also endorsed the condemnations of the

² Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly During the First Part of its Fortieth Session, (New York, UN Department of Public Information, 1986), pp.495-497.

³ Ibid., pp.16-17.

⁴ DEA, Statements and Speeches, 85/24.

⁵ Ibid.

Soviet occupation of Afghanistan which have issued from North Atlantic Council meetings. At the conclusion of the December meeting, the Council urged:

the Soviet Union to end the unacceptable military occupation of Afghanistan, to withdraw its troops, and agree to a political solution restoring Afghanistan's independence and non-aligned status.⁶

Canada continues to provide funding for Afghan refugee relief programmes in Pakistan. In addition to over \$5 million disbursed through multilateral channels, the Government provided over \$14.1 million in bilateral funding to Pakistan for food aid to Afghan refugees in 1984-85.⁷ When the Secretary of State for External Affairs travelled to Pakistan in December 1985, he visited a refugee camp to which Canada had provided food aid and humanitarian assistance.⁸ In response to a question in the House, Mr. Clark indicated that he would discuss the Soviet Union's military presence in Afghanistan with Soviet officials when he visited the Soviet Union in April 1985.⁹

Shortly after the UN-mediated talks resumed in April, Mr. Clark responded to a question in the House by stating that

we have supported those talks and those United Nations efforts throughout. We intend to continue to support them. Naturally, we intend to look for any other ways, if they can be found, whereby Canada might supplement the excellent initiatives taken by the Secretary General.¹⁰

⁶ NATO, North Atlantic Council Communiqué, 13 December 1985. See also Ibid., 7 June 1985.

⁷ CIDA, Annual Report 1984-1985, 1985.

⁸ DEA, Communiqué, 85/180, 29 November 1985.

⁹ Commons Debates, 4 February 1985, p.1965.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 22 April 1986, p. 12533.

Parliamentary Comment

Before the Secretary of State for External Affairs visited the Soviet Union in April 1985, Alex Kindy of the Conservative Party asked the Minister if he would raise the issue of the continuing Soviet military presence in Afghanistan with Soviet authorities.¹¹ Shortly before the resumption of the Geneva talks in 1986, another member of the Conservative Party, William Lesick, reminded the House that:

While some people focus on the war between Iran and Iraq, or the conflict in Central America, the war in Afghanistan is clearly the more tragic in terms of humanity and human cost. We should not let this issue fade in our consciousness. It is a continuing tragedy of Soviet interference and aggression. When we talk of a durable peace between the superpowers, we should not weaken our resolve that basic human rights should be defended. This means telling the Soviets to get out of Afghanistan.¹²

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¹¹ Commons Debates, 4 February 1985, p. 1965.

¹² Commons Debates, 16 January 1986, p.9833.

30. CENTRAL AMERICA

THE CONTADORA PROCESS

Background

On 9 January 1983 the foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela met on the island of Contadora, off Panama, to discuss the deteriorating situation in Central America. Local conflicts in El Salvador and Nicaragua had spilled over their borders, creating tensions between the countries of the region and attracting increasing superpower involvement. The Contadora countries, as the Latin American group came to be known, initially sought to encourage dialogue which would help to de-escalate conflicts in the region. This initiative soon became a formal vehicle for conflict resolution in Central America.

On 7 September 1984, the Contadora Group presented the five Central American governments (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) with the Contadora Act for Peace and Co-operation in Central America. This treaty would have committed the parties to halt the arms race in all its forms, to launch a process of negotiated arms reductions, to cease supporting irregular forces, to promote national reconciliation and to establish representative and pluralistic political systems. It provided for the elimination of all foreign military facilities and prohibited all international military manoeuvres in the region.

Although the Act was accepted without revision by Nicaragua, it was rejected by Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras. On 12 September 1985, a new treaty was presented by the Contadora Group, which included improved guidelines for national reconciliation as well as for control and verification. It did not, however, prohibit US military exercises in the region or explicitly commit the United States to cease supporting the forces fighting to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. For these and other reasons, the 1985 treaty was rejected by Nicaragua, and the Contadora negotiations were suspended until May 1986.

On 12 January 1986, the foreign ministers of the Contadora Group and the Lima Group (the support group formed by Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay on July 28, 1985) released the Caraballeda Message. This document advocated the suspension of all external support to irregular forces, the suspension of international military manoeuvres in the region and the resumption of talks between the United States and Nicaragua. Four days later the governments of Central America endorsed this message in the Guatemala Declaration. Representatives of the Contadora and Lima Groups met with US officials in February to underline how important it was for the peace process that there should be no further outside support for irregular forces and insurrectionist movements in Central America.

Since then representatives from the five Central American countries have met on several occasions alone and with their Contadora and Lima Group counterparts in an attempt to sign the treaty by 6 June. On 7 June the Contadora countries presented the five Central American governments with a third draft treaty. This draft strengthened provisions prohibiting international military manoeuvres in the region and offered new guidelines for arms reductions. On 21 June Nicaragua announced its support for the revised draft. Cost Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras rejected the Act and the Salvadorean Government called for the restructuring or the dismantling of the Contadora Group.

On 25 June the House of Representatives of the US Congress voted in favour of extending \$100 million in aid (including \$70 million in military assistance) to the contra forces fighting against the Nicaraguan Government. The next day the International Court of Justice ruled that US military support for the contras breached international law and that Washington was under an obligation to cease these acts.

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations noted in its report that it had "received more submissions on Central America than

on any other single subject". The Committee concluded that although "Canadian influence over the security policies of other countries is limited, Canada has a special opportunity to offer direct, practical and desperately needed help to the hundreds of thousands of refugees in the region." The report also noted that a minority of the Committee urged "Canada to join the initiative of the foreign ministers of the Contadora Group and the Lima Support Group to impress upon Washington the need to try to bring the conflict to an end and to change its policy towards Central America."¹

Current Canadian Position

The Canadian Government has supported the Contadora initiative and Canada agrees with the Contadora countries that the conflicts in Central America stem mainly from local conditions. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, has stated that, "social and economic disparities lie at the root of the current instability, tension and violence in Central America. Unfortunately, these have been heightened by the introduction of East/West tensions, and militarization in the area."²

The Government has also addressed the question of self-determination: "Canada believes strongly that the countries of Central America must be free to seek their own solutions without interference from any source."³ The Government views the Contadora initiative as the best existing vehicle for a regional peace agreement. "We believe that the Contadora process", argued Mr. Clark in the green paper, "offers the best hope for a peaceful

¹ SJCCIR, Independence and Internationalism, 1986, pp. 111-114.

² Letter to the Inter-Church Committee for World Development Education, 10 January 1985.

³ DEA, "Outline of Canadian Policy in the Light of USA Embargo on Nicaragua", 5 June 1985.

end to the conflict in Central America."⁴ The Government has nevertheless expressed its concern that an enforceable agreement be reached: Canada's peacekeeping experience, notes the paper, "warns us that the political problems and financial costs can be considerable."

After the 1984 treaty failed to obtain unanimous support in Central America, Canada presented the Contadora Group with its views on ways to improve the agreement. Canadian officials suggested that the framework for financing verification operations be clarified and that Central American states be included in the Control and Verification Commission which would oversee the implementation of the agreement. Officials also recommended that the Commission's freedom of movement and access to communications media be guaranteed, that a sponsoring political authority be designated and that a time limit be established for the Commission's mandate.⁵

Several of these suggestions were incorporated into the 1985 treaty. In February the Secretary of State for External Affairs also indicated that Canada might play a role in control and verification operations, if it were invited to do so.⁶ The Canadian Government sent a message of support to the first meeting of the Lima Support Group and the Contadora countries in August 1985.⁷

Canada continued to support the process after the second draft treaty was rejected and the Contadora Group recessed in the fall of 1985. "There are those who diminish the Contadora peace process — those who say it has achieved too little", noted Canada's representative to the UN General Assembly in November. But "the question for detractors", she continued,

⁴ DEA, Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations, 1985.

⁵ op.cit., Note 3.

⁶ DEA transcript, 2 February 1985. See also Edmonton Journal, 4 February 1985.

⁷ DEA, Communiqué, 85/120, 23 August 1985.

is where might we be without it? Contadora has helped to keep the lid on an increasingly explosive situation; it has created a framework for peace. It will require even more patience and, moreover, the indispensable political will of the parties involved. Continued regional dialogue is the only possible means to find a solution to this most complex crisis. The task is enormous but it is patently obvious that the stakes are even greater.⁸

Canada's support for the initiative was reiterated in response to the Caraballeda Message and the Guatemala Declaration of January 1986.⁹ When a Peruvian delegation visited Canada in February, the Government indicated that it "continues to regard the Contadora initiative as the best avenue for achieving reconciliation in (Central America) and thus deserving of strong international support."¹⁰

Canada has complemented its support for the Contadora process by maintaining diplomatic and commercial relations with all countries in the region. Ottawa did not follow Washington's embargo on trade with Nicaragua. Several days after the embargo was declared, Mr. Clark met with US Secretary of State Shultz and expressed Canada's view that this action could undermine the Contadora initiative. Soon thereafter the Government announced that it would allow Nicaragua to open a trade office in Toronto and that, while it would not establish a special assistance programme to encourage Canada-Nicaraguan trade, "normal government facilities will apply."¹¹

The Government has followed a cautious approach to US policy in Central America. When a member of the Opposition asked the Government if it would

⁸ DEA, Statements and Speeches, 85/27, 25 November 1985.

⁹ DEA, Communiqué, 86/18, 29 January 1986.

¹⁰ DEA, Communiqué, 86/28, 11 February 1986.

¹¹ DEA, "Outline of Canadian Policy in the Light of USA Embargo on Nicaragua", 5 June 1985.

publicly denounce the June 1986 Congressional vote in favour of military assistance to the force seeking to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government, the Minister for External Relations, Monique Vezina, replied that:

Canada's policy differs from that of the United States. We are radically opposed to anyone interfering in any country whatsoever, and this applies to helping the Contras as well as to helping the guerilleros in El Salvador....We think that the solution lies in dealing with these economic and social problems and not in giving military aid.¹²

Mr. Clark defended the general approach of Canada's quiet diplomacy in the following terms:

I am far from convinced that Canada's expressing views critical of American policy is going to change that policy. What it may well do is limit fairly significantly our ability to work in the region to achieve some kind of progress and some kind of stability. So rather than contenting ourselves with comment on what the Americans are doing, we intend to follow the path of encouraging development, encouraging aid, and refining the one process (Contadora) we think will bring stability to the region.¹³

This does not mean that the issue of Central America is not on the bilateral agenda. As Mr. Clark reported after a series of meetings between the Canadian and US heads of state in March 1986,

the Prime Minister raised with the President, as I, the week before, had raised with Secretary of State Shultz, the difference in view between Canada and the United States of the nature of the problem in Central America and, consequently, the nature of the solution.¹⁴

¹² Commons Debates, 26 June 1986, p. 14902-14903.

¹³ Standing-Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Proceedings, 3 December 1984, p. 27.

¹⁴ Commons Debates, 20 March 1985, p.11709.

On other related issues, the Government decided not to send official observers to the 1984 Nicaraguan national elections, although it did send observers to the 1985 Guatemalan elections. Ottawa has maintained an active Official Development Assistance (ODA) programme for the region. This programme has included substantial amounts of aid to Nicaragua; aid to El Salvador was renewed in 1985.

Parliamentary Comment

When the Government decided not to send observers to the Nicaraguan elections in 1984, the Liberal External Affairs critic, Jean Chretien, charged that this reflected the new Government's "deference" to US policy in Central America.¹⁵

The new Liberal External Affairs critic, the Honourable Donald Johnston, put the following question to the Government after the 1986 Canada-US summit meetings:

Did the Prime Minister raise Canada's concerns with respect to the President's policy on Nicaragua, that is, more military aid for the Contras?"¹⁶

Members of the New Democratic Party have frequently raised questions in the House about Canadian policy on Central America. They have suggested that Canada urge the Reagan Administration to support the Contadora process, speak out against the Administration's embargo on Nicaraguan trade and encourage trade between Canada and the latter, urge the Administration to resume talks with the Nicaraguan Government, and formulate a coherent policy towards Guatemala in the light of ongoing human rights violations in

¹⁵ "International Canada", October-November 1984:12, in International Perspectives, January/February 1985.

¹⁶ Commons Debates, 20 March 1985, p.11709.

that country.¹⁷ Furthermore, NDP External Affairs critic Pauline Jewett stated that "the Conservative Government continues to practice the old Liberal policy of "quiet acquiescence" in U.S. Central America policies". She suggested that the Government should "move beyond silly and contradictory rhetoric...and instead take concrete steps — opposing military aid to the Contras, opening a Canadian embassy in Managua, pressing human rights issues, invigorating Contadora, ending aid to El Salvador — to secure peace and justice in Central America."¹⁸ In June 1986, Ms. Jewett put the following question to the Government:

In view of the fact that the \$100 million the US Congress just voted will mostly go to military aid to the Contras, who, as we all know, are seeking to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua, will the Government, knowing that this is a violation of Article II of the UN charter, publicly denounce it? ¹⁹

The Minister for External Relations, replied that Canada was opposed to anyone giving military aid to the Contras.

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¹⁷ Commons Debates, 4 February, 2 May, and 8 May, 1985; Commons Debates, 31 October 1985, p. 8215.

¹⁸ Pauline Jewett, Letter to Friends, 29 January 1986.

¹⁹ Commons Debates, 26 June 1986, p. 14902.

31. CYPRUS

Background

Cyprus became an independent country in 1960 after having been a Crown Colony of the United Kingdom since 1925. Under the 1960 agreements Cyprus became a sovereign state in which power was to be shared between the Greek majority (78 per cent of the population) and the Turkish minority (18 per cent). Britain retained two military bases on the island.

Fighting between the two communities broke out in 1963 when the Greek president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios III, called for constitutional changes that would have replaced power sharing between the two communities with majority rule. There was also a renewal of the campaign to achieve union with Greece (or enosis), accompanied by an eruption of terrorist activity. A United Nations force (UNFICYP) was created in 1964 to help restore and maintain peace on the island. It remains in Cyprus today.

In July 1974, with the support of the military regime in Athens, Greek Cypriot nationalists overthrew President Makarios in a bid to force enosis. Civil strife erupted among Greek Cypriots followed by fighting with Turkish Cypriots. Five days later Turkish forces landed in Cyprus and occupied the northern part of the island. Some 170,000 Greeks fled to the south while 40,000 Turks took refuge in the north. UNFICYP forces were redeployed from their positions on the island to form a buffer zone between the two communities along the ceasefire line. The Turkish Federated State of Kibris was established shortly thereafter.

Numerous UN-sponsored talks have taken place since 1974 in an attempt to resolve the Cyprus dispute. Although at times both comprehensive and specific accords have almost been reached, major disagreements remain. The Greek Cypriots want to regain full control of the island with freedom to move, own property and settle: they want the 20,000 Turkish troops withdrawn. The other side wants equal say in the running of a future

federal state, as well as iron-clad guarantees for its safety.

In November 1983 Turkish Cypriot authorities unilaterally declared their zone independent and the sector was renamed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The UN Security Council rejected this declaration of independence, reaffirmed resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975) calling for an independent and unified Cyprus, and restated its support for UNFICYP and the Secretary-General's good offices in mediating the dispute. Only Turkey recognizes the TRNC.

Proximity talks between the two communities resumed in 1984 under the guidance of UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, but these ended in January 1985 without any agreement having been reached. The Secretary-General attempted, without success, to revive the talks in 1985 and 1986. In April 1986 the Secretary-General presented the parties to the conflict with a draft framework agreement for the creation of a bizonal federation on the island. The TRNC indicated that it was prepared to accept the plan, but President Kyprianou, speaking for the Greek community, virtually rejected the draft on the grounds that it did not provide sufficient guarantees for his community's rights or a timetable for the withdrawal of Turkish troops.

Canada, which has maintained a contingent of troops in UNFICYP since 1964, has continually supported UN efforts to mediate the dispute.

Current Canadian Position

Shortly after the resumption of talks between the two communities in 1984, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, stated in the United Nations General Assembly that:

While peacekeeping forces can help reduce the risk of open conflict, lasting peace can be achieved only through reasonable political compromise. In this spirit, we applaud the constructive participation of the leaders of the two Cypriot communities in the proximity talks held during the past two weeks under the auspices of the Secretary-General... (we) urge the parties to seize this opportunity for progress towards a just and lasting settlement.¹

The Government's commitment to peacekeeping and peacemaking was reiterated by Canada's Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, P.D. Lee, later that year. Mr. Lee applauded the Secretary-General's mediation efforts and called on Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives to continue to show flexibility in their negotiations.²

That week External Affairs also released a communique in which Mr. Clark noted that:

Canada has always shown a keen interest in reconciliation on the island and its own role has been to try and facilitate the renewal of confidence building by preventing a recurrence of hostilities.³

Mr. Clark stated that the Government "applauds the readiness of the two parties to renew...difficult but necessary high-level talks...(and) encourages the participants to persevere despite the obvious difficulties ahead." He also noted that a failure to engage in dialogue "could well consecrate partition, a result which is desired by no one."⁴

When the talks ended without producing any concrete agreements, the Department released a communique in which Mr. Clark expressed his regret

¹ DEA, Statements and Speeches, no.84/6, 25 September 1984.

² Canadian Delegation to the UN, Communiqué, 84/33, 14 December 1984.

³ DEA, Communiqué, 84/183, 17 December 1984.

⁴ Ibid.

over the outcome of the talks but stressed that "the present setback must not be allowed to impede progress." The Secretary of State also called on the parties to the dispute to resume talks with the goal of reaching a negotiated settlement to their dispute.⁵

Parliamentary Comment

Shortly after the round of talks which ended in January 1985, Conservative MP Alan Redway, made the following statement in the House:

Unfortunately, those talks failed. Now there is a new Turkish-Cypriot constitution that makes no mention of the possibility of a unified Cyprus. In the light of this new development I call upon our Government and the United Nations to renew their efforts without further delay to bring about an end to the stalemate, the removal of all foreign troops, and a united Cyprus.⁶

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⁵ DEA, Communiqué, 85/9, 29 January 1985.

⁶ Commons Debates, 6 May 1985, p.4429.

32. HUMAN RIGHTS

Background

Since the mid-1970s, four international instruments have addressed human rights issues: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, and for the countries of Europe and North America, the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights covers labour, social security, education, and cultural rights. The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocol covers the right to life, freedom from torture and arbitrary arrest, equality before the law, and freedom of movement and expression. Both Covenants entered into force in 1976. This was also the year that the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination came into force. The Helsinki Final Act, which contains provisions for the protection and promotion of human rights, (economic, social, cultural, civil and political) entered into force in 1975.

Adherence to the International Covenants and to the Convention is monitored by UN agencies, particularly by the General Assembly (Third Committee), the Human Rights Commission, the Human Rights Committee and the International Labour Office. Adherence to the Helsinki Final Act is monitored through the periodic meetings of the CSCE.

Since the ratification of international legal instruments in the human rights field has both domestic and foreign policy implications, and since human rights come under provincial jurisdiction, the Federal Government has worked with the provinces to formulate Canadian policies in this field. Several features have characterized Canadian policy since the mid-1970s.

After itself ratifying the international instruments including the Optional Protocol, Canada has encouraged other governments to follow suit. Canada has made efforts to improve UN machinery for human rights work, and has been active on committees such as the Working Group for the Disappeared. The Government has also promoted the development of new instruments such as the International Convention against Torture, which came into force in August 1985. Finally, although it has emphasized themes rather than cases in its human rights advocacy, Canada has spoken out bilaterally against certain governments' violations of human rights.

From 7 May to 17 June 1985 Canada hosted the first Human Rights Experts Meeting of the CSCE. The sessions focussed on the implementation of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Fundamental differences between East Bloc representatives and their NATO counterparts soon produced a deadlock and the Meeting ended without a concluding document and without agreement on the holding of another such meeting.

On 26 June 1986 the report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations was tabled in the House. It noted that "many witnesses called for a more significant human rights component in Canadian foreign policy."¹ The report recommended, inter alia, that the Government pay special attention to strengthening the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) and the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, express its opposition to human rights violations through bilateral diplomatic channels, reduce or terminate official development assistance to governments guilty of systematic, gross and continuous violations of basic human rights, and use its voice in international financial institutions to protest the actions of such governments.²

¹ SJCCIR, Independence and Internationalism, 1986, p.15.

² Ibid., pp.99-114.

Current Canadian Position

When Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark visited the Soviet Union in April 1985, he brought Canada's concerns about human rights violations in that country to the attention of Soviet officials. As reported by Mr. Clark's Parliamentary Secretary, Gerry Weiner:

The Secretary of State for External Affairs raised the issue of Soviet Jewry during his meetings with Soviet leaders. He informed them of the importance Canadians attach to the respect of human rights. He urged the Soviet authorities to allow the emigration of Soviet Jews. He stressed, in particular, Canada's hope for the release of Anatoly Shcharansky, and he raised the case of Mr. Sakharov as well.³

Canada played a prominent role in the deliberations of the Human Rights Experts Meetings in 1985. While pursuing a thematic approach and avoiding confrontation, Canadian representatives criticized those member governments which continued to deny their citizens such rights as the right to emigrate, to form free trade unions, to practice their religious faith, and to form human rights monitoring groups. Canada defended the principle that human rights were not a matter solely of domestic jurisdiction. Many of these points were reiterated by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, at the commemorative conference of the Helsinki Final Act in August 1985.⁴

On 23 August 1985 Canada signed the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.⁵

Speaking to the 40th Session of the UN General Assembly on 25 September

³ Commons Debates, 30 April 1985, p.4282.

⁴ "International Canada", in International Perspectives, August-September 1985, p.8.

⁵ DEA, Communiqué, 85/119, 23 August 1985.

1985, Mr. Clark suggested that human rights activities in the UN system could be expanded by

completing the work on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, ensuring that the new Convention against Torture is properly implemented, extending the Commission's programme of advisory services...assisting the Working Group on the Disappeared...the UN must continue to focus attention on the fate of prisoners of conscience, ensure that the disabled are not deprived of their basic rights, protect the interests of indigenous populations around the world, and take steps to protect the rights of those who themselves promote human rights.⁶

On 5 March 1986 the Chairman of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, Gordon Fairweather, made a statement to the UNHRC on behalf of the Canadian Government. He reiterated Canada's support for the establishment of the position of High Commissioner for Human Rights. He registered Canada's "strong support for the ongoing efforts of the Secretary-General to develop administrative measures which may assist in averting...mass displacements of populations." Mr. Fairweather also suggested that the mandates of the Special Rapporteurs for Guatemala and El Salvador be renewed, that the Commission "continue to press for a decisive and early move to democracy, an end to the cycle of violence, and the full restoration of human rights in Chile", and that it "continue to insist that its Special Representative be admitted to provide an independent assessment of the situation" in Afghanistan. He noted with "profound regret that the Government of Iran has not yet felt able to receive the Special Rapporteur of this Commission." Mr. Fairweather also raised the issues of "bombings by the Air Force in the densely populated Jaffna Peninsula" in Sri Lanka, the plight of the Kampuchean people under Vietnamese occupation and of the Vietnamese people themselves, some of whom "are consigned to so-called 're-education camps'..." as well as of "restrictions on civil liberties, __

⁶ DEFA Statements and Speeches, 85/10, 25 September 1985.

and the violence of insurrection" in Nicaragua.⁷

Several weeks later, in an address to the Canadian Human Rights Foundation, Mr. Clark added South Africa and the Soviet Bloc countries to the list of those countries where violations of human rights arouse Canada's concern.

He suggested that the Government is striving to develop "a universal policy of support for human rights, with special attention focussed on those human rights situations where our standing is strongest and the impact of our involvement is likely to be the greatest." Mr. Clark sounded a note of caution, however, on the use of sanctions to project Canada's human rights policy:

Very often the response is not compliance but defiance. In some instances retaliation can follow against the very people whose welfare is at stake. Usually the relationship with the regime in question is damaged, reducing influence in the future....It is not enough just to be heard. Our voice must also count.

Finally, Mr. Clark suggested that NGOs concerned about human rights

help focus the public debate rather less on human rights violations themselves and rather more on what we can actually do to improve particular situations...our real purpose is to find practical solutions.⁸

On his visit to South Korea in May, Prime Minister Mulroney raised Canada's "very deep concerns about civil rights abuses and civil rights situations in that country."⁹

On 26 May 1986, at the closing session of the Experts Meeting on Human Contacts of the CSCE in Berne, the Canadian delegation expressed its

⁷ DEA Statement, 86/19, 20 March 1986.

⁸ DEA Statement, 86/20, 26 March 1986.

⁹ Commons Debates, 12 May 1986, p.13176.

disappointment with adherence to certain human rights provisions in the Helsinki Final Act:

We do not really lack documents of standards of performance...what we lack is compliance by certain signatory States. Our more profound disappointment stems from the fact that our bilateral talks, our formal discussions in our meetings, and, finally, our negotiations, have failed to reveal any new willingness by some States to make real, substantial headway in facilitating freer movement and contacts and the resolution of humanitarian cases.¹⁰

Parliamentary Comment

Debate in the House on human rights issues in Canadian foreign policy has tended to focus on specific cases of violations and on calls for Government action concerning those violations. The treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union has been condemned by members of all parties, who have also called on the Government to raise specific cases with the Soviet Government.¹¹ Human rights violations in Chile and in El Salvador have been brought to the Government's attention by members of the NDP. The latter have also called upon the Government to take diplomatic actions to protect threatened human rights workers in El Salvador.¹² Pauline Jewett of the NDP raised the issue of human rights violations in Korea shortly before the Prime Minister was scheduled to visit that country.¹³

¹⁰ DEA, Statement and Speeches, 26 May 1986.

¹¹ Commons Debates, 26 March 1985, p.3369; 27 March 1985, p.3405; 15 April 1985, p.3709; 29 April 1985, p.4201; 30 April 1985, p.4280; 6 May 1985, p.4428; 7 May 1985, p.4471; 14 May 1985, p.4718; 13 June 1985, p.5723; 4 June 1986, p.13947; 13 June 1986, p.13949.

¹² Commons Debates, 1 April 1985, p.3563; 18 June 1985, p.5915; 5 June 1986, p.13999; 11 June 1986, p. 14235.

¹³ Commons Debates, 12 May 1986, p.13176.

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33. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Background

In 1985-86 international terrorism became a major policy concern for Western governments, particularly for the United States. This was due in part to a general increase in terrorist attacks, and in part to the US-Libyan confrontation in the spring of 1986.

The year began with a series of attacks in Western Europe by local groups. On 15 January 1985 the Belgian Fighting Communist Cells declared war on NATO after attacking a US military recreation centre. On the same day Action Directe of France and the German Red Army Faction announced the formation of a "politico-military front", while on 28 January the Portuguese FP-25 group launched attacks on NATO vessels in Lisbon harbour.

In March Libya, Syria and Iran formed the Pan-Arab Command to fight "US and Western imperialism" in the Middle East. On 13 April a restaurant in Madrid frequented by US servicemen, was bombed and the following day Paris was the scene of bomb attacks on an Israeli bank, a National Immigration Office and the offices of a rightist newspaper. On 14 June members of the Shi'ite Amal militia of Lebanon highjacked TWA flight 847, while en route from Athens to Cairo. Four days later a bomb exploded at Frankfurt airport, for which the Arab Revolutionary Organization claimed responsibility.

On 22 June, Air India flight 182 exploded in midair off the coast of Ireland, while a suitcase taken off a CP Air flight exploded at Narita airport in Tokyo; both flights had originated in Canada. On 8 August a car bomb exploded at a US base near Frankfurt. In September four Soviet diplomats were kidnapped in Lebanon and on 7 October the Achille Lauro cruise ship was seized by PLO fighters.

On 23 November an Egyptian jetliner was highjacked by members of the dissident Palestinian group led by Abu Nidal. The jet was forced to land in Malta, where it was stormed by Egyptian commandos. On 24 November a car bomb exploded at a US military shopping centre in Frankfurt. Finally, on 27 December gunmen attacked the counters of the Israeli airline El Al at Rome and Vienna airports, killing numerous bystanders. The PLO immediately dissociated itself from the attacks, which were alleged to have been carried out by the Abu Nidal group.

In response to this wave of attacks, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a landmark resolution on terrorism on 8 December 1985. The resolution "unequivocally condemns, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed".¹ After repeated US entreaties for concerted action on terrorism, the European Economic Community agreed, on 28 January 1986, to ban all arms sales to states clearly implicated in supporting terrorism.

In early 1986 Libya became the focus of Western and particularly of US concern over terrorism. US-Libyan hostilities peaked with the bombing of a discotheque in West Berlin on 5 April and the US retaliatory attacks on two Libyan cities on 14 April. At the conclusion of the Tokyo Economic Summit on 5 May the heads of government of the seven leading Western economies (Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, West Germany and the United States) released a joint statement strongly condemning international terrorism, urging determined national and international action to combat terrorism and pledging to take strong measures against states supporting these practices. These commitments supplemented those entered into by Western governments in the Bonn Summit Declaration of 1978.

At meetings of the North Atlantic Council, the foreign ministers have repeatedly condemned terrorism and expressed their resolve to combat it

¹ UNGA, Fortieth Session Resolutions, pp.607-609.

jointly. At the May 1986 meeting of the Defence Planning Committee the ministers "resolved to work together to eradicate this scourge and urge(d) closer international co-operation in this effort."²

Canada has not been immune to terrorist attacks. On 12 March 1985 a guard was killed during the siege of the Turkish Embassy by members of the Armenian Revolutionary Army. The bomb which exploded at Narita airport and the bomb which may have destroyed the Air India jetliner on 23 June are believed to have been planted in Canada. In January 1986 special security measures were implemented at the Toronto, Montreal and Ottawa international airports in response to bomb threats. Finally, on 25 May 1986 an attempt was made to assassinate Punjabi Minister Malkiad Singh Sidhu on Vancouver Island, allegedly by four members of the Sikh community.

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations recommended, in its final report, that airport security and border control be improved to deal with terrorism in Canada. It also recommended that the Government "work through the United Nations" by, for example, striving "to engage the support for a UN Security Council resolution to deny countries harbouring terrorists the right to invoke their sovereignty to prevent international action."³

Current Canadian Position

The hostage-taking at the Turkish Embassy on 12 March 1985 underlined the fact that Canada was not immune to international terrorism. On the same day the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Erik Nielsen, announced in the House that "the question of the security arrangements of our embassies here...will be under intensive review at a very early time." Mr Nielsen

² NATO Press Service, "Final Communique", No.M-DPC-1(86)15, 22 May 1986.

³ SJCCIR, Independence and Internationalism, 1986, pp.63-64.

did not provide details on the grounds that this information could further jeopardize the embassies' security.⁴

The Air India tragedy on 22 June prompted a renewal of debate on necessary Canadian responses to terrorism. On 24 June Prime Minister Mulroney expressed the Government's resolve to investigate the causes of the explosion and to combat terrorism with all the means at its disposal. He ordered a full review of airport security in Canada.⁵

On the following day, Transport Minister Don Mazankowski gave the House a detailed report on the Air India and Narita airport explosions, on existing security arrangements at Canadian airports, on new security measures adopted in response to these incidents and on Canada's obligations under international conventions governing civil air transportation. He noted that "we are probably entering a new era....Canadians once thought we were immune to the horrors of terrorism and sabotage, but now that it appears to have struck very close to home, it is a rude awakening for us all and we are trying to address the reality of the situation."⁶

Speaking to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) two days later on 27 June, Mr. Mazankowski elaborated on new security measures ordered by the Government in response to the Air India tragedy and made several proposals to the ICAO for the enhancement of aviation security.⁷

In his address to the UN General assembly on 25 September 1985, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark suggested that "terrorism must be dealt with in more detail by the UN" and noted that Canada would "actively seek, through new international instruments if necessary, to deal effectively with this scourge."⁸

⁴ Commons Debates, 12 March 1985, p.2929.

⁵ Commons Debates, 25 June 1985, p. 6146.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 6146-6158.

⁷ Statements and Speeches, 27 June 1985.

⁸ Statements and Speeches, 25 September 1985.

Following the hijacking of the Achille Lauro, the Government stated that it "strongly condemns the hijacking." It noted that "Terrorism, wherever it occurs and whatever its alleged motivations, is to be deeply deplored" and urged "all concerned to act with restraint and responsibility to bring about rapidly the release of these innocent victims of a conflict which in the end can only be resolved by peaceful means."⁹ In his statement to the UN General Assembly on October 23, Prime Minister Mulroney suggested that terrorism

demands concerted international action. We must exchange information, there must be nation-to-nation understandings, and we must have international conventions. Those who murder and maim innocent people, those who bring anarchy to civilized society can have no sanctuary, no comfort, no indulgence.¹⁰

Mr. Mulroney also urged "all states to support such practical measures as counter-terrorist conventions and the ICAO's drive to strengthen the security of international travel." Two weeks later, on 4 December 1985, Canada ratified the UN Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.¹¹

On 10 January 1986 the Government announced new measures it was taking against the Government of Libya in response to the bombings at the Rome and Vienna airports.¹² Several days later the Government ordered the implementation of special security measures at the international airports in Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal, following a threat by an alleged Libyan source to bomb a plane destined for the United States. The Government gave qualified support to the US attacks on Libyan targets which took place on 14 April.¹³

⁹ DEA, Communiqué, No.148, 8 October 1985.

¹⁰ PMO, "Notes for an address by the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, United Nations General Assembly", 23 October 1985.

¹¹ DEA, Communiqué, 85/184, 4 December 1985.

¹² PMO, Release, 10 January 1986.

¹³ PMO, Release, 14 April 1986; PMO, Release, 15 April 1986.

Parliamentary Comment

On the day of the hostage-taking at the Turkish Embassy, Liberal Party leader John Turner asked the Deputy Prime Minister to report on the situation at the embassy. He also asked for details on the involvement of various security services in the rescue operations. Ian Deans of the NDP asked the Government if, given

the recent trials, convictions and sentencing in France, that Armenians had made threats against Turkish communities around the world, did we contact the Turkish Embassy here to discuss with them the possible necessity of additional security being provided for them...?¹⁴

Mr. Turner suggested that the Government had not implemented the recommendations of an RCMP report that security measures at embassies be improved, while Mr. Broadbent accused the Government of not living up to its obligations under international agreements to provide adequate security for embassy personnel. The Government's handling of the incident and of embassy security was taken up in the House on the following days.

The debate in the House following the Air India crash focussed on airport security measures and on the proposed inquiry into airport security. Andre Ouellet of the Liberal Party asked the Government whether it intended to follow the request of the Canadian Airline Pilots Association to retain RCMP security personnel at the airports. He also asked why Air-India flight 182 was

not on the alert system after all those representations ...by Indian authorities?
...after it was brought to the attention of Canadian authorities that the three pieces of luggage were retained because they did not pass the appropriate tests, why was no action

¹⁴ Commons Debates, 12 March 1985, p. 2930.

taken then in Mirabel to call back the flight...?¹⁵

Les Benjamin of the NDP suggested that the Government "seize the opportunity to keep in place, enlarge and replace everything with respect to cut-backs (in airport security expenditures) under the previous and the present administrations."¹⁶ Lloyd Axworthy of the Liberal party asked the Minister of Transport whether he did not

agree that it would be more appropriate to have the Canadian Aviation Safety Board, which is an independent agency not tied into the Government, undertake the investigation into the security system at Canadian airports...?¹⁷

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¹⁵ Commons Debates, 25 June 1985, pp.6138-6149.

¹⁶ Commons Debates, 23 June 1985, p. 6152.

¹⁷ Ibid., p.6140.

34. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Background

The offensive which Iraq launched against Iran on 23 September 1980, appears to have been motivated by a desire to forestall the spread of Islamic fundamentalism to Iraq's own large Shi'ite population, and to regain territory lost to Iran in the 1975 Algiers Agreement.

Iraq occupied territory in southwestern Iran until June 1982, when it withdrew its forces to the border and announced that it was prepared to negotiate a ceasefire. By that time, however, the Iranians believed that they had the upper hand militarily, and they therefore escalated their demands and continued the offensive. Teheran demanded a restructuring of the Iraqi Government and the political neutralization of President Saddam Husayn, as well as US\$ 150 billion in reparations and the repatriation of 100,000 Shi'ites who had been expelled from Iraq. In the autumn of 1982 Iran launched its first mass offensive on Iraqi positions. Iraq repelled the attacks at the border and retaliated with strikes on economic targets inside Iran.

In February 1984 Iran launched its "final offensive" with an estimated 250,000 troops. Iraq was reported to have used chemical weapons to stop this offensive, and it increased attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf, often against ships registered in countries other than Iran. Fearing a possible Iranian victory, support for Iraq increased on the part of the Gulf states and outside powers such as France and the Soviet Union. Both sides launched major offensives in the spring of 1985, and chemical weapons were again reportedly employed by Iraqi forces. In the fall Iraq bombed the Iranian oil complex on Kharg Island. Iran retaliated by striking at some Iraqi population centres but during the entire 1983-85 period the war was essentially in a state of stalemate. In February 1986, Iran launched another major land offensive on Iraqi positions.

The war has been costly in human and in economic terms. Although confirmed figures are unavailable, one journalist estimated on the basis of interviews in NATO capitals that by the fall of 1985 the war had caused approximately 500,000 Iranian and 300,000 Iraqi deaths.¹

Several attempts have been made by third parties to facilitate conflict resolution. India sent an emissary on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, but the latter was regarded with suspicion by Iran for its failure to condemn the Iraqi attack. The initiative taken by the Islamic Conference Organization failed for the same reason.

The most successful initiative so far has been that of the UN Secretary-General. Although Iran resents the failure of both the UN Security Council and the General Assembly to condemn Iraq's invasion and its use of chemical weapons, it has accepted the Secretary-General's mediation efforts. These efforts led to a moratorium on attacks against civilian targets (which held for nine months in 1984) and an agreement on the treatment of prisoners of war. But Iraq has not responded to the Secretary-General's attempt to secure a moratorium on the use of chemical weapons. Neither has the Secretary-General been able to bring the belligerents to the negotiating table. As a result, the war continues with no end in sight.

Canada has urged Iran and Iraq to use the offices of the Secretary-General to end the conflict, and has indicated support for the latter's mediation efforts. The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs concluded, in its 1985 report, that "beyond this, there was little that Canada could do."²

¹ New York Times, 23 September 1985.

² Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on Canada's Relations with the Countries of the Middle East and North Africa,

Current Canadian Position

In his address to the UN General Assembly on 25 September 1984, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark noted that

We need a negotiated settlement to end the suffering and destruction of the war between Iran and Iraq. We support the Secretary-General in building upon his recent success in obtaining the agreement of the belligerents to cease attacks on civilian population centres. His sending a team to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons was also a useful action.³

After the UN body of experts reported on the treatment of prisoners of war by both belligerents, Mr. Clark issued a statement calling upon both Iran and Iraq to implement the recommendations of the report. He stressed the importance for both parties of providing the International Committee of the Red Cross with unrestricted access to prisoners of war and of implementing a prisoner exchange programme. Mr. Clark "also reiterated Canada's longstanding appeal for an end to the conflict" and urged "both parties to make use of the good offices of the U.N. Secretary-General."⁴

Speaking about the Gulf War on his visit to Saudi Arabia in April 1986, Mr. Clark stated that Canada "share(s) the view that Iran should take up Iran's offer to seek a negotiated settlement, so as to avoid further misery and destruction."⁵

Parliamentary Comment

The issue was not discussed in the House of Commons.

³ DEA, Statements and Speeches, No.84/6, 25 September 1984.

⁴ DEA, Communiqué, 85/22, 6 March 1985.

⁵ DEA, Statement, 86/22, 7 April 1986.

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35. THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT

Background

The Accord between Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) of 1985 raised some hopes that progress towards resolving the conflict between Israel and its neighbours might be possible. But by February 1986 the initiative, like the Reagan Plan in 1982 and the Fez Charter in 1983, had failed to produce constructive dialogue between Israel, the PLO and the surrounding Arab states.

The Accord reached between King Hussein of Jordan and PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat, on 11 February 1985, called for the establishment of an international framework for negotiations, including a joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation, leading to Palestinian self-determination in the context of a confederation with Jordan. The Accord did not, however, mention UN Security Council Resolution 242 which, inter alia, recognized the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Israel. One week later the PLO Executive Committee issued a communique rejecting Resolution 242, reiterating its demand for an independent Palestinian state and its claim to be the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people".

When US Secretary of State Shultz visited the Middle East in May 1985, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres indicated that his Government was willing to meet with a joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation that did not include members of the PLO. For its part the United States welcomed the Accord and announced its readiness to meet with a joint delegation if this led to direct negotiations with Israel.

When King Hussein visited Washington later in May 1985 to discuss the sale of US arms to Jordan, he announced a five-stage plan which included a meeting between the United States and a Jordanian/Palestinian delegation,

US endorsement of Palestinian self-determination, PLO acceptance of resolution 242 and US dialogue with the PLO followed by multilateral negotiations. Two weeks later Israel announced its own peace plan, which called for negotiations between Israel, the US, Egypt, Jordan and non-PLO Palestinians. Lists of potential Palestinian representatives were exchanged in July, but agreement could not be reached on the presence of PLO members in the delegation.

Already frustrated by disagreements over the composition of a Jordanian/Palestinian delegation, the peace process was further set back when a PLO unit killed three Israelis in Cyprus on 25 September. Israel responded by bombing PLO headquarters in Tunis and, two weeks later, a dissident faction of the PLO highjacked the Italian liner Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean.

The Middle East was discussed at the US-Soviet Geneva summit in October, but no fresh proposals were advanced. In November King Hussein travelled to Damascus where he met with Syrian President Hafez Assad. Syria's consistent opposition to Jordanian-Israeli discussions which might leave the problem of the Golan Heights unresolved was reflected in the communique issued after the Damascus meeting, which rejected direct negotiations and partial solutions to the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Attempts to bring Israel and the Palestinians to the negotiating table were pursued nevertheless. In January 1986 the US Government agreed to invite the PLO to an international forum, if the PLO would renounce terror and accept Resolution 242. When King Hussein brought this offer to Yassir Arafat, the PLO Chairman indicated that he could only accept resolution 242 after Washington had stated its support for Palestinian self-determination. Discussions continued until 19 February 1986 when King Hussein publicly blamed the PLO for the breakdown of the peace process and announced the suspension of Jordanian mediation efforts.

The Canadian Government has consistently supported Resolution 242 and has stated Canada's support for Palestinian rights and self-determination on the West Bank and the Gaza strip.¹ The Government has also expressed its opposition to the Israeli annexation of the occupied territories.

In June 1985 the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs released its report on Canada's relations with the Middle East and North Africa. The report concluded that "there can be no resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute until there has been agreement on how to accomodate the Palestinian people while at the same time ensuring the security and legitimacy of Israel."² It recommended, inter alia, that the Government "continue to urge Israel to end, not just freeze, settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza"³ and maintain its policy on Jerusalem by "not recognizing Israel's unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem and opposing actions by Israel to alter the status of the city."⁴ The Committee also recommended that Government "contacts with the PLO continue at their present level and frequency" while noting that it was "not persuaded on balance that Canada should proceed to recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."⁵

Current Canadian Position

Speaking to the UN General Assembly on 25 September 1984, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, stated that:

We strongly support a just and comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute based on Security Council

¹ For an historical account of Canada's relations with the Middle East, see The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on Canada's Relations with the Countries of the Middle East and North Africa, 1985, pp. 49-53.

² Ibid., p. v.

³ Ibid., p.55.

⁴ Ibid., p.58.

⁵ Ibid., p.66-67.

Resolution 242....We also support the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their right to a homeland within a clearly defined territory, the West Bank and Gaza strip.⁶

In March 1985, the Israeli Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yitzak Shamir, paid an official visit to Ottawa. After the Senate Committee had released its report, Prime Minister Mulroney was quoted as saying that although he had not yet read the report, he had been concerned with "the possibility of unfairness to Israel developing" in the Committee. He noted, however, that "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people must form a part of any over-all peace settlement between Israel and her Arab neighbours."⁷ Several weeks later, in response to questions in the House, Mr. Mulroney stated that "Canada's policy toward the Middle East is based on an unshakable commitment to the integrity and independence of the State of Israel."⁸

In response to the Israeli attack on PLO headquarters in Tunisia, Mr. Clark stated that:

Canada deplores the Israeli attack near Tunis which led to the killing and wounding of many civilians.... Such actions, whatever their motivation, can only exacerbate the cycle of violence in the Middle East.⁹

Several days later, following PLO attacks on Israeli citizens, Mr. Clark stated that "Canada deplores the recent killing of Israeli citizens" and noted that these "tragic events underline once more the importance of working earnestly and in good faith for real negotiations to achieve a political solution to the conflict in the Middle East."¹⁰

⁶ DEA, Statements and Speeches, No.84/6, 25 September 1984.

⁷ Globe and Mail, 6 June 1985.

⁸ Commons Debates, 28 June 1985, p.6362.

⁹ DEA, Communique, No.140, 1 October 1985.

¹⁰ DEA, Communique, No.147, 7 October 1985.

In April 1986 the Secretary of State for External Affairs visited Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel. In Jordan Mr. Clark told King Hussein that

[he] found the Jordanian government as committed as ever today to a fair-minded peace. Few countries have pursued this essential cause with more commitment and energy than you and your countrymen...your commitment to moderation, in a world of increased stridency, must be applauded and supported."¹¹

In Saudi Arabia Mr. Clark noted that the

Kingdom's leaders have done much to move the peace process forward through such initiatives as the Fez Plan. Canada strongly supports the concept of peace with justice which it embodies, including a homeland for Palestinian people.¹²

Several days later in Israel, Mr. Clark reiterated Canada's commitment to Israel's right to secure and recognized boundaries as well as to the right of Palestinians to a homeland on the West Bank and Gaza strip. He noted that although solutions to the disputes of the Middle East must be found in the region itself, "countries outside the region, like Canada, can help create conditions and provide encouragement to move the process forward."¹³

According to press reports, Mr. Clark also reiterated Canada's position vis-a-vis the PLO in the capitals of the Middle East. He emphasized that the Government intended to maintain contact with the organization on the less-than-ambassadorial level, but would not recognize the PLO diplomatically until it renounced terrorism and recognized Israel's right to exist under the terms of resolution 242.¹⁴

¹¹ DEA, Statement, No.86/74, 7 April 1986.

¹² DEA, Statement, No.86/22, 8 April 1986.

¹³ DEA, Statement, No.86/25, 14 April 1986.

¹⁴ Globe and Mail, 14 April 1986.

In the UN General Assembly, Canada voted against resolution 40/168/A which, inter alia, called on all states "to put an end to the flow to Israel of Israel of any military, economic, financial and technological aid,,,aimed at encouraging it to pursue its aggressive policies against the Arab countries and the Palestinian people." It also voted against resolution 40/168/B which called for a total embargo of Israel. Finally, Canada voted in favour of resolution 40/168/C determining "that Israel's decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the Holy City of Jerusalem is illegal and therefore null and void...."¹⁵

Canada's voting record on UN resolutions dealing with Palestinian refugee issues is varied. For example, Canada voted in favour of resolution 40/165/A calling for increased international support for the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. It voted in favour of resolution 40/165/D calling on member states to increase their support for UN educational projects for Palestinian refugees. It voted against resolution 40/165/F on the resumption of the ration distribution to Palestinian refugees and abstained from voting on resolution 40/165/I on the protection of Palestinian refugees.¹⁶

Parliamentary Comment

Following the Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis, Marcel Prud'homme of the Liberal Party stated: "I do appreciate the condemnation issued by the Secretary of State for External Affairs who stated unequivocally the illegality of that aggression."¹⁷ The following day Mr. Roland de Corneille, also of the Liberal Party, stated that

¹⁵ UNGA, 1985 session. pp.95-101.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp.250-262.

¹⁷ Commons Debates, 2 October 1985, p.7242.

Israel should not have been condemned by Canada... for taking steps to destroy PLO terrorism by bombing the PLO headquarters in Tunisia. Indeed, Tunisia should have been condemned by Canada for giving the PLO a base from which to operate.¹⁸

With regard to the same event, Jim Manly of the NDP stated that:

Neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians can achieve their goals by the use of terror...We believe in the right of Israel to exist in security. We also believe in the right of Palestinians to a homeland. Let Canada and world opinion say very clearly that neither of these worthy goals can be achieved through the use of terrorism.¹⁹

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¹⁸ Commons Debates, 3 October 1985, p.7295.

¹⁹ Commons Debates, 9 October 1985, p.7488.

36. KAMPUCHEA

Background

The roots of the current war in Kampuchea may be traced back to the the collapse of French colonial order in Indochina in the 1950s, the subsequent instability of Cambodia as it was then called, and more recently to the genocidal policies of the Khmer Rouge regime during the 1975-78 period. The immediate cause of the war was the invasion and subsequent occupation of Kampuchea by Vietnam in December 1978.

The United Nations General Assembly condemned the Vietnamese occupation in 1979 and the exiled Government of Khieu Samphan continued to occupy Kampuchea's seat in the Assembly. The newly formed Government in Phnom Penh implemented policies designed to revive an economy shattered by a decade of war, while the Vietnamese army launched a counterinsurgency campaign to eradicate opposition forces. These opposition forces formed a loose alliance in 1982, creating the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) under the formal leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The CGDK still occupies the Kampuchean seat in the General Assembly.

The Coalition is composed of three groups: the largest force is the remnant of the Pol Pot regime, the Khmer Rouge, which receives military support from China; the other two, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and the Sihanoukist National Army (ANS), are non-communist organizations supported by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and by China. In July 1985 the United States extended military assistance to these two non-communist resistance organizations.

Several proposals to resolve the conflict have been put forward by ASEAN and the Indochinese countries. The Kampuchean Government submitted its own proposal in 1985: it included the holding of elections in 1987 and the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops by 1990. In August 1985 the

Indochinese Foreign Ministers' Conference endorsed the Malay concept of indirect talks between the Kampuchean Government and the CGDK. In March 1986, however, the Kampuchean Government decided to postpone elections until 1991 in order to accomodate resistance groups willing to work within the political system.

The cornerstone of the Indochinese Foreign Ministers' position is the elimination of the Khmer Rouge as a political and military force but although the CGDK has itself made concessions on a number of issues, its March 1986 proposal indicates that it does not accept this condition. This proposal called for a phased withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, the formation of a coalition government including both the current Government and all three CGDK partners, and the holding of UN-supervised elections.

The timing of the Kampuchean Government's 1985 proposal coincided with the success of Vietnamese campaigns against resistance forces. In the dry season of 1984-1985 Vietnam launched major offensives against CGDK bases along the Thai border some of which spilled over into Thai territory. Virtually all the opposition bases inside Kampuchea were eliminated during these strikes. During the 1985-1986 dry season Government and Vietnamese troops reinforced defenses on the border while the resistance forces continued to strike deep inside the country. Vietnam currently maintains an estimated 160,000 troops inside Kampuchea.

Canada has consistently supported the UN General Assembly's call for a withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. Since 1983 Canada has co-sponsored the annual ASEAN resolution in the General Assembly outlining a framework for peace in the region. Through CIDA, the Government has maintained an active programme of humanitarian assistance to refugees on the Thai border.

Current Canadian Position

Speaking before the UN General Assembly on 25 September 1984, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, noted that "We support the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in their efforts to bring peace to the unfortunate country of Kampuchea, which continues to be occupied unlawfully."¹ The Government's position was reiterated in the same forum later that year by Canada's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations. He stated that Canada applauded ASEAN efforts to resolve the conflict but noted that these and other parties' efforts had been unsuccessful in getting "a regionally powerful and recalcitrant nation to change its course." He also noted that Canada was opposed to the "attempted resuscitation" of the Khmer Rouge regime.²

The Government expressed its opposition to the Vietnamese offensives against the CGDK in 1984:

Canada condemns these Vietnamese attacks which are in violation of the principles of international conduct and resolutions of the United Nations that have repeatedly called for the immediate withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops from Cambodia....

The Government of Canada, therefore, calls on the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to cease at once all hostile activities in Cambodia, to refrain from initiating attacks on any other camps of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea and to respond constructively to proposals for the settlement of the conflict in Cambodia.³

When the Vietnamese offensives spilled over into Thai territory in 1985, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs stated that:

¹ DEA, Statements and Speeches, no.84/6, 25 September 1984.

² Canadian Delegation to the UN, Press Release No. 19, 30 October 1984.

³ DEA, Communique, 84/189, 28 December 1984.

This ongoing violation of Thailand's sovereignty...is without justification and renders even more serious Vietnam's disregard for the many United Nations resolutions calling for the prompt withdrawal of its forces from Cambodia. The Government of Canada deplores Vietnam's disregard for the norms of international behaviour evident in the hostilities its forces are conducting on both sides of the Thai-Cambodia border.⁴

Canada voted in favour of the 1985 UNGA resolution on Kampuchea. The resolution, inter alia, deplored "that foreign armed intervention and occupation continue", noted its concern "about reported demographic changes being imposed in Kampuchea by foreign occupation forces" and expressed its conviction that

there is an urgent need for the international community to find a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean problem that will provide for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and ensure the respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and neutral and non-aligned status of Kampuchea.⁵

The Canadian International Development Agency continues to provide relief assistance to Kampuchean refugees in Thailand. In 1984-85 CIDA allocated \$900,000 to the Kampuchean refugee programme.⁶

Parliamentary Comment

The issue was not discussed in the House of Commons.

⁴ DEA, Communique, 85/20, 15 March 1985.

⁵ UNGA, Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly During the First Part of Its Fortieth Session, pp.9-10.

⁶ CIDA, Annual Report 1984-85, 1985.

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37. LEBANON

Background

In February 1984, Lebanese President Gemayel abrogated the May 1983 agreement with Israel which had sanctioned an Israeli security presence in Southern Lebanon. Later in the spring, all US, British and Italian contingents of the Multinational Force withdrew from Beirut. The unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in early 1985 clearly established a shift in power towards Syria and the Shia community within Lebanon. By mid-1986, however, this had not produced agreement on the reforms necessary to end the war, which has dragged on, at different levels of intensity and with different players, since 1975.

The last phase of the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon was completed in June 1985. Israeli involvement continued, however, for in response to Israel's transfer of 1,000 Shi'ite prisoners to an Israeli jail in March, members of the Shi'ite al-Jihad al-Islami highjacked a TWA Boeing 727 in June. The highjacking ended on 30 June, and although the Government of Israel denied any connection between the two events, all Shi'ite prisoners were returned to Lebanon by the end of September. With the continuation of Israeli air patrols over Lebanon and allegedly over Syrian territory, and the deployment by Syria of anti-aircraft defences close to the Lebanese border, tensions between Israel and Syria remained acute.

Several attempts to promote inter-communal dialogue leading to political reform were initiated during the year. During a conference of Christian leaders in April, agreement was reached on a commitment to Lebanese unity, the recognition of its Arab identity and its special relationship with Syria. In May an offer for dialogue by the chairman of the Lebanese forces (the Maronite militia) was rejected by the Shi'ite Amal and the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). In July, Druze and Muslim leaders presented the Christians with a programme which included the establishment

of a new constitution instituting equal rights, a one-man one-vote electoral system, the elimination of existing communal privileges, the restructuring of the army, and the disarming of the militias. This plan was rejected by some Maronite factions, but talks between all the main parties to the conflict were initiated in early November.

On 28 December leaders of the Lebanese Forces, the PSP and Amal signed an accord in Damascus. The agreement included major political reforms and reiterated the position that Lebanon had an Arab character and a special relationship with Syria. Within days of the signing of the agreement, however, fighting had broken out within the Maronite community between factions favouring and factions opposing the accord. The leader of the Lebanese Forces was defeated and, with his departure from Lebanon, the prospects for national reconciliation decreased once again.

At the end of March 1986 the last contingent of French troops was withdrawn from the country. On 19 April, the Soviet Union for the first time voted in favour of renewing the mandate of the UN Interim force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). This force had been established in 1978 to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore peace and security, and assist the Government of Lebanon in re-establishing its authority in southern Lebanon.

In Canada, the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, released in June 1985, contained some observations on Canadian-Lebanese relations. It noted that the previous Government had opposed the 1982 Israeli invasion of the country and had called for a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon. The Committee suggested that "a continued Syrian presence might, in fact, assist temporarily in maintaining internal security in Lebanon. In some respects Syria may be the only power left in Lebanon capable of restoring some order and unity to the country." Finally, the Committee expressed its support for "any efforts the Canadian Government is able to

make to promote Lebanon's territorial integrity."¹

Current Canadian Position

The Canadian Government's position on the conflict in Lebanon was outlined by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, at the UN General Assembly on 25 September 1984. Mr. Clark stated that:

Canada hopes that the Lebanese government's current efforts to restore peace and stability in that tragic country will be rewarded. We support Lebanon's territorial integrity and maintain that all foreign troops should withdraw unless present at the request of the Lebanese Government.²

On 14 June 1985 the Government decided to withdraw all Canadian staff from the Embassy in Beirut, citing the risks to which they were exposed. Mr. Clark emphasized that "this measure in no way affects Canada's continuing strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon" and for efforts to bring to a conclusion the recurrent violence in Lebanon."³

Parliamentary Comment

At the height of Amal attacks on Palestinian camps in May 1985, Bob Corbett of the Progressive Conservative Party made the following statement:

I urge the Government of Canada...to call upon the Governments involved to halt the horror. I also call upon the Government of Canada to make immediate

¹ The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on Canada's Relations with the Countries of the Middle East and North Africa, 1985, pp. 71-73.

² DEA, Statements and Speeches, 84/6, 25 September 1984.

³ DEA, Communique, 81, 14 June 1985.

representations urging provision be made to allow the admittance of medical and food supplies into the camps, to permit the evacuation of the wounded and burial for the dead, to provide safety for those in medical centres who are presently injured, and to arrange for the safe return of the abducted Palestinians. We cannot turn away from this cruelty.⁴

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⁴ Commons Debates, 29 May 1985, pp.5179-5180.

38. LIBYA

Background

Although the extent to which the Government of Libya is responsible for Middle Eastern terrorism is unclear, there is little doubt that since 1969 Libya has given material support and sanctuary to certain groups using terrorist tactics in Europe, in the Middle East and in North Africa. Such support for terrorism, in addition to Libya's military incursions into Chad, has increased tensions between Tripoli and governments in the West.

Tensions with the United States have been particularly acute since the Reagan Administration took office and challenged the unilateral Libyan claim to the Gulf of Sidra as territorial waters. On 19 August 1981 Libyan fighters fired on US interceptors in the Gulf and US forces shot down two Libyan planes in response. When Libyan troops moved into Chad in 1983, the United States and France jointly provided military support to Chad Government forces. The shooting of a policewoman by a Libyan diplomat outside the Libyan Mission in London, on 8 May 1984, led Britain to break off diplomatic relations with Tripoli. The wave of terrorist activities following the formation of the Pan-Arab Command in March 1985 (composed of Libya, Iran and Syria), particularly the 23 November 1985 highjacking of an Egyptair jetliner and the attacks on El Al counters at the Rome and Vienna airports on 27 December 1985, further exacerbated tense relations between Libya and the West.

On 24 March 1986, the United States reported that Libyan forces had fired six surface-to-air missiles on US forces carrying out exercises in the Gulf of Sidra. US forces responded by disabling two Libyan naval vessels and by attacking ground missile facilities on the coast.

On 5 April a bomb exploded in a West Berlin discotheque frequented by US servicemen. American officials claimed to have conclusive evidence showing

Libyan sponsorship of the attack. That day France expelled two Libyan diplomats allegedly planning attacks on US targets in the country and two days later West Germany also expelled two Libyan diplomats.

On 12 April US naval ships in the Mediterranean were put on alert and, on the following day, the United States Ambassador to the UN, Vernon Walters, travelled to Europe to organize concerted action against Libya. After a special meeting in The Hague on 13 April, European Community foreign ministers announced new measures against Libya and urged all parties to the confrontation to exercise restraint. Several hours later, US fighter-bombers flying from bases in Britain attacked targets in Tripoli and Benghazi. Britain, Canada, Israel and South Africa expressed varying degrees of support for the US action.

The following week the European Community agreed to impose further sanctions on Libya, again urged all belligerents to exercise restraint, and called for international action to combat terrorism. At the Tokyo Summit on 5 May, the leaders of Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, West Germany and the United States announced a package of measures against terrorism, noting that these applied to "any state which is clearly involved in sponsoring or supporting international terrorism, and in particular of Libya..."¹

The Government of Canada has curtailed Canada's relations with Libya since the 1970s. The Government has not opened an embassy in Tripoli, has not accepted Libyan ambassadorial representation in Ottawa, and restricts the entry of Libyan students into Canada.

¹ Original statement cited in the New York Times, 6 May 1986.

Current Canadian Position

Noting that "Canada is deeply concerned about the support that the Libyan regime has given to extremists", the Government introduced new measures against Libya on 10 January 1986. These measures included the termination of Government financial assistance and insurance coverage for Canadian business ventures in Libya, as well as the addition of Libya to the Area Control List of the Export and Import Permits Act. The Government also stated that it was calling on Canadian firms dealing with Libya not to take advantage of commercial openings created by the US embargo. Noting that it had no legal powers to force Canadians working in Libya to leave the country and that these Canadians appeared to be under no immediate threat, the Government suggested that "Canadians working there would do well to look to their particular circumstances in the context of current developments and assess whether they have grounds for anxiety about their security." Finally, the Government stated that "any further steps must be broadly based and co-ordinated", noting that "Canada is prepared to work vigorously toward the achievement of a meaningful consensus among our friends and allies."²

In response to a question in the House soon after the Berlin discotheque bombing, Prime Minister Mulroney stated:

The American Government and others are growing progressively concerned about the irresponsible and criminal misconduct of some agents of countries which appear to be giving succour to terrorism... which is completely unacceptable to Canada...³

When the possibility of US retaliation increased, Mr. Mulroney stated that:

² PMO, Release, 10 January 1986.

³ Commons Debates, 9 April 1986, p.12047.

We have advised our allies to ascertain at all times that retribution is justified and to act with great caution in this area, especially in connection with the Canadian presence, we emphasized and re-emphasized this aspect as recently as yesterday....⁴

Several hours after the US attacks on 14 April, the Prime Minister's Office made the following statement:

The Government of Canada has been fully consulted by the United States all along and was notified in advance of its intentions with respect to Libya.

We accepted President Reagan's statement that Libya was involved in the perpetration of terrorist attacks....

The U.S. response to a very serious provocation appears to have been limited and aimed at terrorist installations.⁵

On 15 April the PMO released another statement in which the Government's concern over the safety of Canadians in Libya was reiterated. The statement also noted that while "the United States' intention was scrupulously to avoid civilian targets, we profoundly regret the loss of innocent life." "As the government has made clear", it continued,

terrorism is...an evil which all members of the international community must work to eliminate. The United States was seeking to do precisely that and Canada supports that objective.

We are concerned, however, lest the cycle of violence continue...We urge, therefore, a renewal of effort by all concerned to reach negotiated settlements to the tensions that have long plagued the Middle East.⁶

On the same day, Prime Minister Mulroney noted in the House that the Government had worked to ensure that the issue of terrorism be on the

⁴ Commons Debates, 11 April 1986, p.12124; see also p.12131.

⁵ PMO, Release, 14 April 1986.

⁶ PMO, Release, 15 April 1986.

⁷ Commons Debates, 15 April 1986, p.12242.

agenda at the Tokyo summit and that Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark would discuss the issue at the upcoming meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris.⁷ On 16 April Deputy Prime Minister Erik Nielsen noted that the "United States Government...vigorously pursued a variety of diplomatic and economic options but found it was left with no alternative but to attack military installations in Libya."⁸ This view was reiterated by the Prime Minister in the House on the following day.⁹ With regards to the safety of Canadians in Libya, the Government stated several times that they were under no immediate danger, that the Government would not forcibly remove them from that country but that it had contingency plans in case of an emergency.¹⁰ On April 22 the Secretary of State for External Affairs noted nonetheless that:

there is no guarantee that that calm will continue. Even with all our contingency plans, we cannot guarantee that we will be able to come to the aid of each Canadian in that very large country. For this reason I extended the advice of the Government of Canada that Canadians now in Libya should leave.¹⁰

Parliamentary Comment

In the days preceding the US attacks on Libya, several questions were raised in the House about Canada's position. On 9 April Don Johnston of the Liberal party asked if the Government would "express its concerns to the US Administration about the dangers inherent in escalating any military action in the Mediterranean at this time?"¹¹ On 11 April John

⁸ Commons Debates, 16 April 1986, p.12304.

⁹ Commons Debates, 17 April 1986, p.12365.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 22 April 1986, p.12530.

¹¹ Commons Debates, 9 April 1986, p.12047.

Turner of the Liberal Party raised the same issue. He also asked whether Canadians in Libya were at risk and whether the Government, upon consulting with US officials, had been "given the assurance that, in the event of the United States engaging in military operations, Canadians in Libya would be evacuated."¹²

On the same day Jim Manly of the NDP noted, in response to the Prime Minister's statement on terrorism, that "it is one thing to say no sanctuary, no comfort, no indulgence; it is another to engage in a retaliatory strike." Mr. Manly also asked if the Prime Minister thought "that military action is an appropriate response to terrorism. Will he agree that such action will lead to a further escalation of international tension and, in fact, to an increase in terrorism...?"¹³

On the day of the attack Ed Broadbent of the NDP raised the issue of the safety of Canadians in Libya and put the following question to the Government: "Did the Americans discuss the plan with the Canadian Government before the weekend, and if so, what did the Canadian Government have to say?"¹⁴

On April 15 John Turner asked the Government why it had not advised Canadians to leave Libya and whether it had contingency plans for these Canadians in case of an emergency. He also asked the Prime Minister why "does he not propose international economic measures which could act as a better substitute for future military action?" Herb Gray of the Liberal Party asked if the Government would press for concerted action at the OECD meeting and at the Tokyo summit. Mr. Broadbent asked the Government if it had been in contact with Libyan authorities regarding the safety of Canadians working in Libya.¹⁵

¹² Commons Debates, 11 April 1986, p.12124.

¹³ Commons Debates, 11 April 1986, p.12131.

¹⁴ Commons Debates, 14 April 1986, p.12186.

¹⁵ Commons Debates, 15 April 1986, pp.12241-12245.

On April 16 Mr. Turner put the following questions to the Government:

Did the Prime Minister speak directly to the President of the United States on the subject of Libya? Did he ask for evidence to justify the action taken by the U.S.? What kind of answer did he get? Did he suggest any alternatives for other options?¹⁶

Mr. Turner also asked the Deputy Prime Minister if he did not

consider it hypocritical on the part of the Canadian Government to condemn terrorism at one of its sources in Libya, yet allow Canadians to work in that country as technical experts to help the economy which funds that terrorism?

On the same day Mr. Broadbent asked if the Government would "urge the two superpowers to use their influence, given their strong agreement in the Middle East, to deal with the root of tension in that area?" Finally, Warren Allmand of the Liberal Party questioned the coherence of the Government's position. "Last night", he noted,

the Deputy Prime Minister said that the United States had no alternative but to take the action it took the day before, whereas the Prime Minister, in a statement he made yesterday morning, urged negotiated settlements. Would the Deputy Prime Minister tell us which is the official position of the Canadian Government...?¹⁷

On 17 April Mr. Johnston asked the Government if it would impose full economic sanctions against Libya, while William Rompkey of the Liberal Party queried the Government on its contingency plans for the evacuation of Canadians from Libya.¹⁸ The call for sanctions was repeated by Mr. Gray in the House on the next day.¹⁹ During the following days further questions were raised about the safety of Canadians in Libya.²⁰

¹⁶ Commons Debates, 16 April 1986, pp.12302-12303.

¹⁷ Commons Debates, 16 April 1986, pp.12304-12305.

¹⁸ Commons Debates, 17 April 1986, p.12365.

¹⁹ Commons Debates, 18 April 1986, p.12409.

²⁰ Commons Debates, 22 April 1986, p.12350, 24 April 1986, p.12607.

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Cross References

International Terrorism

39. NAMIBIA

Background

Following the defeat of Germany in World War I, the League of Nations granted South Africa a mandate to administer the territory known as South West Africa. In 1966 the United Nations General Assembly terminated this mandate and declared that the territory would henceforth come under the authority of the United Nations. In 1967 the General Assembly established the UN Council for South West Africa to administer the territory until it became independent.

In 1968 the UN Security Council condemned the Republic of South Africa's refusal to comply with the General Assembly's 1967 decision. That year the General Assembly, acting at the behest of representatives of the Namibian people, proclaimed that the territory would henceforth be known as Namibia. In 1971 the International Court of Justice ruled that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal. The ICJ ruling also obliged member states to refrain from fostering relations (diplomatic, consular or commercial) that might imply recognition of South Africa's rule in Namibia. In 1974 the UN Council for Namibia enacted a Decree for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, making the exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory without the Council's authorization an act for which entities could be held liable by future Namibian governments.

The presence of the South African Government in Namibia has been resisted by the South West African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO), which was recognized by the General Assembly as the authentic representative of the Namibian people in 1973. While the international community endeavoured to create a framework for Namibian independence, South Africa proceeded to establish "bantustans" and other structures to strengthen its control over Namibia. In 1975 it sponsored the Turnhalle Conference, a process

attempting to create a Namibian government acceptable to Pretoria but excluding SWAPO.

In January 1976 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 385 which, inter alia, condemned the continued illegal occupation of Namibia and the system of racially discriminatory laws implemented by the South African authorities in that country; the Security Council also declared that free elections under UN supervision must be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity.

During the following year the Turnhalle Conference produced an interim constitution and set a date in 1978 for elections leading to independence. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), a coalition of ethnic parties excluding SWAPO, was formed to contest the elections. Shortly thereafter Pretoria unilaterally annexed Walvis Bay, Namibia's only deep-water port. In response, the Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa. In January 1978, South African troops attacked SWAPO camps in southern Angola.

Guided by the spirit of Resolution 385, five Western members of the Security Council (Britain, Canada, France, West Germany and the United States) formed the Namibian Contact Group in 1977. This Group submitted a proposal for Namibian independence to the Security Council in April 1978. Both Pretoria and SWAPO accepted the proposal. In September the Security Council passed resolution 435 outlining a comprehensive framework for Namibian independence and establishing a United Nations Transition Assistance Group to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under UN supervision and control.

The Contact Group's initiative was backed up by pressure from Western governments. Although Canada had not prohibited Canadian companies operating in Namibia from paying taxes to the Government of South Africa

(thereby implying de facto recognition of South Africa's rule, contrary to the 1971 ICJ ruling), the Government had imposed limited economic sanctions and it did draw up a voluntary code of conduct for Canadian companies operating in South Africa and Namibia.

Canada also played an active role in the Contact Group's initial efforts. But when the negotiations failed to yield concrete agreements with Pretoria, the process began to lose strength. South Africa pressed ahead with the 1978 elections despite the fact that these undermined the UN plan. No new Western sanctions were imposed. With the announcement of Washington's policy of "constructive engagement" in 1981, the role of the Contact Group decreased in importance. In 1982 the withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia was made conditional by Washington and Pretoria on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. In 1983 the Security Council rejected this linkage, while France suspended its membership in the Group.

Pretoria has meanwhile been proceeding with its own plan to modify its presence in Namibia. In 1980 it began creating the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF), a local force designed to assume the burden of directly fighting SWAPO. From November 1983 to February 1984 it conducted Operation Askari, an invasion of southern Angola which destroyed numerous SWAPO bases and refugee camps. In April 1985 it installed a transitional government to replace direct rule which was re-established when the DTA Government collapsed in 1982. In March 1986 Pretoria announced that it would begin implementing UN Resolution 435 on 1 August 1986 on condition that Cuban troops were withdrawn from Angola.

Current Canadian Position

When the Government of South Africa announced the establishment of an interim government in Namibia, Canada's Secretary of State for External

Affairs, Joe Clark, issued a statement condemning the action. "We regard unilateral measures taken by the South African Government in relation to the establishment of constitutional bodies and the transfer of power in Namibia", stated Mr. Clark, "to be null and void".¹ The Secretary of State pointed out that:

The only agreed basis for internationally recognized independence for Namibia is UN Security Council Resolution 435, to which Canada is firmly committed. Under Resolution 435 the constitution for an independent Namibia is to be drafted by representatives of the Namibian people chosen in a free and fair election. The Government of Canada considers that any action taken by a so-called interim government for Namibia to be without effect.

Mr. Clark also noted that the South African action sent a negative message to the international community: "Canada deplores this step as it suggests that South Africa does not intend to proceed promptly with the implementation of Resolution 435."

In a speech to the UN Security Council on 13 June 1985, Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN, Stephen Lewis, echoed Mr. Clark's concerns and reiterated the previous Government's rejection of the linkage between a withdrawal of South African authorities from Namibia and Cuban troops from Angola. This condition, "which has no warrant in international law, which is incompatible with Resolution 435, and which has been rejected by this Council" is, Mr. Lewis argued, "a deliberate obstacle...To hold Namibia hostage to what this Council has previously described as 'irrelevant and extraneous issues' is palpably outrageous."²

Ambassador Lewis also noted that the Contact Group had been less than successful in its endeavour to bring independence to Namibia. Despite its

¹ DEA, Communique, No.51, 19 April 1985.

² DEA, Statements and Speeches, No.85/3, 13 June 1985.

failure to secure agreement thus far, Mr. Lewis stated, "the Contact Group should not disband, because it still has a role to play, one day, under Resolution 435."

Mr. Lewis also urged member states to consider stronger measures of pressure on South Africa to comply with Resolution 435. He noted that "Canada admits that it's very difficult to know how to proceed. We shall have to look to other steps that member states might take — steps which demonstrate that patience is long gone, and that the time to move strongly is now." Ambassador Lewis reiterated these points in his statement to the Security Council on 15 November 1985.³

One month later the Government of Canada imposed new economic sanctions on South Africa. Secretary of State Joe Clark noted that Eldorado Nuclear, a crown corporation, was currently processing Namibian uranium imported from South Africa. Mr. Clark stated that in order to comply with voluntary measures in Security Council Resolution 283, the Government would not renew the processing contract: "Existing contracts will be honoured but no new contracts for the processing of Namibian uranium imported from South Africa will be entered into. Should South Africa set a date for the implementation of the UN Plan for Namibian independence", noted Mr. Clark, "we shall consider rescinding this measure."⁴ In the same speech Mr. Clark listed the independence of Namibia under UN resolution 435 as one of the seven conditions Canada wanted to see fulfilled in South Africa in the near future.

At the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau on 16-22 October 1985, Prime Minister Mulroney strongly supported the Accord which, inter alia, condemned Pretoria's illegal occupation of Namibia and called

³ DEA, Statements and Speeches, 85/25, 15 November 1985.

⁴ DEA, Statement, 85/37, 6 July 1985.

⁵ "The Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa", Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Nassau, The Bahamas, 16-22 October 1985.

upon member states to impose limited economic sanctions on South Africa.⁵ Canada also endorsed the final Communiqué which declared the Transitional Government "null and void", rejected the "linkage" argument, "stressed that the policy of 'constructive engagement' had failed to end South Africa's intransigence over Namibia" and reaffirmed the Commonwealth's call for the immediate implementation of Resolution 435.⁶

In keeping with its condemnation of specific South African policies towards Namibia, the Government of Canada also stated, in the green paper released in the spring of 1985, that "Apartheid and South Africa's reluctance to cede its control over Namibia have been the principal causes of strife in the southern half of the continent."⁷

Parliamentary Comment

The issue of the mining of uranium by Canadian companies in Namibia was raised in the House by Mr. Dan Heap of the New Democratic Party, who noted that:

The United Nations Council for Namibia in 1974 passed decree No. 1 calling for a halt to further foreign exploitation of Namibia's natural resources. Yet Rio Algom, a Canadian company with tax benefits from the Canadian Government, has, with Rio Tinto Zinc, for nine years been mining uranium at Rossing in Namibia. After the ore is imported into Canada a Crown corporation, Eldorado, in Port Hope, processes it to uranium hexafluoride for delivery to Japan.⁸

After outlining the stated desire of the UN Council for Namibia to prosecute Rio Algom, as it has prosecuted a Dutch company engaged in

⁶ "Communiqué", Ibid.

⁷ DEA, Competitiveness and Security, 1985.

⁸ Commons Debates, 28 May 1985, p.5135.

similar activities, Mr. Heap called "on the Government of Canada to honour the UN boycott of South Africa and the decree of the Council for Namibia, and halt this greedy and illegal practice by Canadian companies." As the debate over Canadian policy toward South Africa intensified in the summer of 1986, New Democrat Howard McCurdy suggested that:

There is one area in which Canada has failed to get plaudits. That concerns the complicity of this country with respect to the American alliance with South Africa vis-à-vis Namibia....

Mr. McCurdy asked:

why has the Government not resigned from the Contact Group as a clear signal that we will not be a handmaiden of American complicity in South African oppression?⁹

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⁹ Commons Debates, 16 June 1986, p. 14448.

40. SOUTH AFRICA

Background

In November 1983 the white community in south Africa voted in favour of a new constitution which extended limited political representation to those classified under apartheid as Indians and coloureds. The new constitution established a tricameral parliament with one chamber each for the Indian and coloured peoples, but gave the white chamber the power to override its counterparts and denied any political representation to blacks, who constitute almost three quarters of South Africa's population. Elections were held under the new system in 1984, but the voter turnout was exceptionally low. Protests against the new constitution, school boycotts, and protests against local Government structures and economic hardships spread through non-white residential areas.

Unrest continued through 1985. On 21 July the Government imposed a state of emergency throughout most of the country. A week later it banned outdoor funerals. In August the Congress of South African Students was banned and President Botha announced that he was opposed to the implementation of a one-man one-vote political system. In November the Government prohibited foreign news agencies from reporting on township violence.

Protest inside South Africa was accompanied by an increase in South African pressure against the Front Line States (Neighbouring States). In March 1984 Mozambique and South Africa signed the Nkomati Accord, whereby Pretoria agreed to stop supporting the Mozambiquan National Resistance while Maputo pledged to close African National Congress (ANC) facilities on his territory. In September 1985, however, Pretoria admitted to technical violations of the Accord. Similarly, the non-aggression agreement reached with Angola in January 1984 was violated by Pretoria in May, June and September 1985.

Other Front Line States also felt the weight of South African pressure. In June 1985 South African commandos attacked ANC offices in Gaborone, the capital of neighbouring Botswana. In July a bomb planted by South African agents devastated ANC headquarters in Zambia. In January 1986, the Government of Lesotho was toppled after intense economic pressure from South Africa.

Responding to those developments, in the summer of 1985 all EEC members recalled their ambassadors from Pretoria and France and the United States imposed limited economic sanctions. At the October 1985 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau the Eminent Persons Group was formed to promote dialogue and to seek a peaceful solution to the increasingly volatile situation in South Africa.

Initially it was hoped that this Commonwealth initiative might lead to constructive dialogue between the Government and black opposition organizations. The Eminent Persons Group presented the Government with proposals for the release of Nelson Mandela and the legalization of the ANC, the suspension of ANC paramilitary activities and the initiation of dialogue leading to the establishment of a non-racial democratic government. But, on 19 May 1986, as the Group was finishing its discussions in the country, South African commandos carried out attacks on alleged ANC centres in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The Group left South Africa immediately. In its report to the Commonwealth Heads of State on 12 June, the Group concluded that:

while the Government claims to be ready to negotiate, it is in truth not yet prepared to negotiate fundamental change, nor to countenance the creation of genuine democratic structures, nor to face the prospect of the end of white domination....Its programme of reform does not end apartheid, but seeks to give it a less inhuman face.

After noting that, in the view of the black leadership in South Africa,

diplomatic persuasion has proven to be ineffective, the Group put the following question to its sponsors:

Is the Commonwealth to stand by and allow the cycle of violence to spiral? Or will it take concerted action of an effective kind? Such action may offer the last opportunity to avert what could be the worst bloodbath since the Second World War."¹

The Heads of Government who sponsored the EPG met on 3-5 August to consider the Report and what action the Commonwealth might take in the light of its conclusions. In Canada, the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations recommended, in its report released several days after the EPG report, that given the EPG's conclusions, "Canada should move immediately to impose full economic sanctions, seek their adoption by the greatest possible number of Commonwealth members, and promote similar action by non-Commonwealth countries."²

On 23 May 1986, the Non-Aligned Movement introduced a resolution in the UN Security Council to impose selective economic and other sanctions on South Africa in response to the raids. Twelve of the fifteen Council members voted in favour of the resolution, but it was defeated on a double veto by Britain and the United States. On 12 June Pretoria declared a new state of emergency.

Canada has opposed apartheid since Prime Minister Diefenbaker participated in the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth in 1961. Government support for bilateral trade was curtailed in 1977 and 1978, and an active aid programme to the Front Line States has been developed through the Canadian International Development Agency. A voluntary Code of Conduct for Canadian companies operating in South Africa was established in 1978.

¹ Mission to South Africa: The Commonwealth Report, (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1986), p. 68.

² SJCCIR, Independence and Internationalism, 1986, p. 110.

Current Canadian Position

On 15 February 1985 the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, stated in the House that the Government was undertaking a complete review of Canadian policy towards South Africa. Two weeks later, in response to questions about the implementation of the Code of Conduct, Parliamentary Secretary Gerry Weiner agreed that "In the absence of an official monitoring mechanism, the code has not operated as effectively as had been hoped." With respect to the Government's meeting of 26 February with Zulu Chief Buthelezi, who was working with the South African Government, Mr. Weiner pointed out that "while Chief Buthelezi is not a guest of the Canadian Government, we are happy to take advantage of his presence in Ottawa to review the situation in his country with him." Mr. Weiner also noted that like Mr. Buthelezi "We, too, have reservations about the effectiveness of economic sanctions in fostering peaceful change and we are concerned about the effects they would have on the poorest segments of the South African population."³

On 21 March 1985 the House debated a motion introduced by an opposition MP calling on the Government to stop further Canadian investment in and further bank loans to South Africa, as well as the importation of Krugerrand coins into Canada. Speaking on behalf of the Secretary of State for External affairs, Mr. Weiner pointed out that "the Government is not convinced that the banning of new investment to South Africa by Canadian companies is the proper way to register our objection to apartheid."⁴ With regards to regulating the management practices and new investments of Canadian firms already operating in South Africa, Mr. Weiner commented:

Canada rejects the extraterritorial assertion of the laws of other countries that inter alia seek to direct

³ Commons Debates, 15 February 1985, p.2398; Commons Debates, 26 February 1985, p.2536.

⁴ Commons Debates, 21 March 1985, p.3271.

the activities of foreign companies operating in Canada in a way that displaces Canadian law and policy. Such practice would be contrary to international law and an infringement on Canadian sovereignty. Canada as a home country, therefore, cannot purport to extend its own law to South African activities of South African companies controlled by Canadian nationals or residents in a way that directly displaces South African law and policy, no matter how objectionable the latter may be. Therefore, we could not enforce any ban on new investments in South Africa based on retained earnings or local borrowing by South African affiliates of Canadian companies. Neither can we, as a country, compel Canadian-controlled companies operating in South Africa to break South African law.

As for the proposed ban of Kruggerand coins, Mr. Weiner pointed out that in the absence of a multilateral agreement with other signatories of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) on a ban, "such a unilateral action might also be considered to be contrary to Canada's obligation under the...Agreement." On the issue of Canadian private lending to South African firms, Mr. Weiner suggested that:

the rules of international law limit the authority of a state to control or direct conduct in the territory of another state. They make it illegitimate to attempt to prohibit lending to South African borrowers in South Africa. The difficulties of enforcing such action are obvious.

When pressed in the House one month later to announce measures against South Africa as soon as possible, given the escalation of violence in that country, Mr. Clark stated that "what we most need is to take action that would be effective, and that means a co-ordination of action with other countries."⁵

In response to the June 1985 attack by South Africa on ANC offices in Botswana, the Secretary of State for External Affairs stated that

Canada deplores the violence from any quarter and

⁵ Commons Debates, 15 April 1985, p. 3717.

supports peaceful change in South Africa. It condemns this further act of cross-border violence and urges South Africa to respect the sovereignty and independence of its neighbours.⁶

On 6 July 1985, the Government announced a series of new measures in response to the situation in South Africa. These measures included strengthening the administration of the Code of Conduct, tightening the implementation of the 1977 UN Arms Exports Embargo, accepting the 1984 UN Security Council Voluntary Embargo on arms imports from South Africa, terminating the remaining governmental programmes which supported trade with and investment in South Africa and discouraging, through consultation, the sale of Kruggerand coins by Canadian financial institutions. Mr. Clark also announced an increase in funding support to education and training programmes for blacks in South Africa and Canada. He noted that the policy review announced earlier in the year would continue. Finally, Mr. Clark pointed out that:

If the Government of South Africa continues to proceed timidly and grudgingly at each step, and continues to put down non-violent opposition, even the most moderate may reach the end of their patience, and be driven to violence. Far better to admit all South Africans to full participation in the affairs of their country now. Far better to rebuild your ties with other countries.⁷

Two days later Mr. Clark and the Minister of State for Fitness and Sport, Otto Jelinek, jointly reaffirmed Canada's support for the Commonwealth policy of limiting sport contacts with South Africa and reissued established guidelines to assist sporting associations in interpreting this policy.⁸

In response to the imposition by Pretoria of the State of Emergency on 21 July 1985, the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, James

⁶ DEA, Communique, 85/82, 14 June 1985.

⁷ DEA, Statement, 85/37, 6 July 1985.

⁸ Government of Canada, News Release, 85/103, 8 July 1985.

Kelleher, stated that the "Canadian Government cannot but vigorously condemn the use of repressive measures to counter protests against injustice and inequality." He called "again upon the Government of South Africa to break this cycle of violence, to abandon repression and to enter into an equal and sincere partnership with all South Africans."⁹

In a speech to the Royal Commonwealth Society, delivered shortly thereafter, Mr. Clark stated that "Canada urges South Africa to stop the arrests and end the detention without trial of those who have called for, and participated in, non-violent protests. Imprisoning hundreds is no way to start a dialogue...Serious dialogue," suggested Mr. Clark, "must begin with leaders who have the trust of the black community. The release of Nelson Mandela, and his involvement in such a serious dialogue, would be a significant step towards peaceful reform."¹⁰

On 14 August 1985 the Government announced that it was recalling its Ambassador to Pretoria for consultations with Government officials and for the discussions with business representatives planned for the month of September. Mr. Clark also explained the Government's earlier decision to receive the credentials of the South African Ambassador-designate and stressed that "Receiving his credentials does not suggest in any way that Canada condones the apartheid policies of the South African Government." The Secretary of State noted furthermore that:

the dismantling of apartheid cannot end other than with the participation of blacks in the government of their country, with their full participation in the exercise of political power...it is not only the details of the apartheid system but its essential core — the exclusion of blacks from the decision-making process in their own country — which must be addressed.¹¹

⁹ DEA, Communique, No.112, 23 July 1985.

¹⁰ DEA, Statements and Speeches, No.85/6, 29 July 1985.

¹¹ DEA, Statement, 85/47, 14 August 1985.

Following President Botha's statement of 15 August against one-man one-vote in South Africa, Mr. Clark announced, apparently after considerable debate within Cabinet, that the Government would not impose economic sanctions in the immediate future. "Our preference at this moment", stated Mr. Clark, "is to pursue routes other than sanctions because sanctions have very broad implications."¹²

On 9 September 1985, the same day that he met with representatives of Canadian chartered banks regarding South Africa, Mr. Clark told the Commons that "if we have to resort to the full disruption of economic and diplomatic relations, we are prepared to do so if other measures do not work. "However", noted the Secretary of State for External Affairs,

most of us in this House believe that it is important to keep a door open and to use the influence that we now have, rather than to spend it immediately in a gesture that may be more effective in terms of public relations at home than it would be in ending apartheid in South Africa.¹³

On 13 September 1985, Mr. Clark announced new measures against South Africa. These measures included an ongoing series of meetings with Canadian businesses with interests in the country, a voluntary ban on loans to South African Government agencies, a voluntary ban on the sale of crude oil and refined products to South Africa and an embargo on air transport between the two countries. He also announced a \$1 million increase in Canadian assistance to the families of political prisoners and detainees in the country, and the appointment of a special administrator for the Code of Conduct.¹⁴

Mr. Clark outlined the reforms that the Canadian Government would accept as an indication of Pretoria's willingness to abandon apartheid. These

¹² Ottawa Citizen, 24 August 1985.

¹³ Commons Debates, 9 September 1985, p.6397.

¹⁴ DEA, Statements and Speeches, No.85/8, 13 September 1985.

included the introduction of common citizenship and "common political rights including the right to vote", the repeal of race classification laws, of pass laws and the Group Areas Act, independence for Namibia under UN resolution 435, the release of ANC and United Democratic Front (UDF) leaders and "the initiation of a process of consultation and negotiation with the genuine leaders of those who are called Indian, blacks, and coloureds." Finally, Mr. Clark stressed that the "Government of South Africa should have no doubt that we will invoke full sanctions unless there is tangible movement away from apartheid."

On 24 September 1985 Canadian officials met with President Nyerere of Tanzania, the chairman of the Front Line States. That day the Government also condemned the South African raid into Angola which had taken place several days earlier.¹⁵ The next day Mr. Clark forcefully raised the issue of South Africa in the UN General Assembly.¹⁶ On 26 September, Prime Minister Mulroney appointed Bernard Wood of the North-South Institute to undertake a fact-finding tour of Southern Africa. Mr. Wood met with leaders of the front line Commonwealth states to discuss possible further measures against South Africa.¹⁷

On 16-22 October Prime Minister Mulroney attended the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau. He was prominent in forging the consensus on a common approach towards South Africa which emerged from this Meeting.¹⁸ In a speech to the 40th session of the General Assembly, the Prime Minister reiterated Canada's commitment to invoke total sanctions against South Africa and to sever diplomatic relations if there was no visible progress in the dismantling of apartheid in the near future.¹⁹ On his return Mr. Mulroney told the House that the heads of government sponsoring the Eminent Persons Group would be meeting in six months to review the situation in

¹⁵ DEA, Communique, 85/133, 24 September 1985.

¹⁶ DEA, Statements and Speeches, 85/10, 25 September 1985.

¹⁷ Globe and Mail, 26 September 1985.

¹⁸ "Transcript of a press conference given by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney", 20 October 1985.

South Africa and to decide what further action, if any, should be taken by the Commonwealth.²⁰

In late November the Government named Archbishop Edward Scott of the Anglican Church of Canada as Canada's representative on the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group. The Group held its first meeting in London on 12-13 December, and began meeting with leaders in Southern Africa in January 1986.

On 30 January 1986 Mr. Clark released a statement which

expressed deep concern about recent developments affecting Lesotho and Botswana. These two Commonwealth partners, which have given shelter to refugees from South Africa, have in the past few weeks been subject to military action, border restrictions, and continuing threats by South Africa.

Canada joins in the international condemnation of these acts of intimidation...South Africa cannot hope to sustain apartheid by actions outside its borders.²¹

Responding to reforms announced by President Botha in the first week of February 1986, Mr. Clark stated in the House on 4 February that "the recent speech by the President of South Africa touched upon some of the points raised in the Nassau Accord..." but it "has a long way to go before it meets other fundamental elements of the Nassau Accord."²²

Secretary of State Clark "strongly condemned" South Africa's 19 May 1986 attacks on alleged ANC targets in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. He "called upon the South African Government to refrain from further acts of aggression against its neighbours" and "expressed deep regret that the South African Government had chosen to take violent action at the very time that the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons was in the region to promote

¹⁹ DEA, Statements and Speeches, No.85/14, 23 October 1985.

²⁰ Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for a Statement to the House of Commons by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney", 28 October 1985.

²¹ DEA, Communique, 86/19, 30 January 1986.

²² Commons Debates, 4 February 1986, p.10433.

peaceful change through a process of political dialogue." These actions would "have to be taken into account when Canada and other Commonwealth countries meet later this year to assess the progress made in dismantling apartheid and to consider the report of the Group of Eminent Persons."²³

When the opposition parties called for tougher immediate action against South Africa in response to the raids of 19 May, Mr. Clark stated in the House that he was working to identify "intermediate steps to be considered first in consultation with our ambassador and our friends in the Commonwealth and elsewhere," and he suggested that it was in the interests of all those opposed to apartheid to find ways of working together". On 21 May Mr. Clark asserted that, nevertheless, Canada had "not moved from the position...with regard to the ultimate action that Canada might have to take if we are incapable of persuading South Africa to rid itself or rid the world of the evil of apartheid."²⁴

As Opposition calls for unilateral measures increased, Mr. Mulroney announced in the House on 11 June that "if we cannot...secure a unanimous thrust of support from the Commonwealth...we shall not hesitate to act either alone or in concert with like-minded nations."²⁵

On 12 June Secretary of State Joe Clark announced new unilateral measures Canada was taking in the light of the Eminent Persons report and the new state of emergency declared by Pretoria. The measures included ending Canadian Government procurement of South African products and encouraging provincial governments to follow suit, banning the promotion in Canada of tourism to South Africa, allocating \$2 million more to existing programmes for the training and education of blacks in that country and ceasing to accept the non-resident accreditation of four South African attachés to Canada. The Government also appointed Bernard Wood to visit leaders of certain Commonwealth African countries before the August Commonwealth

²³ DEA, Communique, 86/95, 19 May 1986.

²⁴ Commons Debates, 21 May 1986, p.13481.

²⁵ Commons Debates, 11 June 1986, p. 14237.

meeting, and announced that it was closing its Embassy for the day and sending diplomats to the commemorative service for the Soweto uprising on 16 June.²⁶

The Government report on the compliance of Canadian companies with the voluntary Code of Conduct which was released on 18 June, indicated that five firms were not meeting the Code's standards. Mr. Clark stated in the House on 19 July that he did "not approve of those practices by Canadian companies" and that he hoped "that those practices will change." With regards to the gap between Canadian and South African law on corporate behaviour, Mr. Clark noted that "we want to see Canadian practice conform to our standards, not to South African standards."²⁷ On 27 June Mr. Mulroney defended in the House the Government's decision not to impose further unilateral measures before having reached agreement with other Commonwealth countries.²⁸ On 13 July Mr. Mulroney met with Prime Minister Thatcher of Britain to discuss the question of South Africa and its implication for Commonwealth unity.

Parliamentary Comment

On 15 February 1985 New Democratic Party MP Jim Manly raised questions in the Commons about the enforcement by the Government of the Code of Conduct. After noting that 29 out of 30 Canadian companies with operations in South Africa did not report regularly under the Code, Mr. Manly asked whether

the Government (would) at least take the small step of bringing in anti-discrimination contract compliance provisions for all government contracts, including a provision disqualifying any Canadian company operating in South Africa that does not comply with the guidelines?²⁹

²⁶ Commons Debates, 12 June 1986, p. 14269. See also Ibid., p. 14296.

²⁷ Commons Debates, 19 July 1986, p. 14693.

²⁸ Commons Debates, 27 June 1986, pp. 14964-5.

²⁹ Commons Debates, 15 February 1985, p.2398.

Mr. Manly reiterated this question in the House on 26 February asking, in addition, why the Government was "rolling out the red carpet for Mr. Buthelezi who is trying to drum financial support for the South African economy".³⁰

On 21 March 1985 New Democratic party MP John Rodriguez introduced a private member's motion in the House calling on the Government to "disallow further Canadian investment in South Africa, outlaw the importation of Kruggerand gold coins into Canada and outlaw Canadian bank loans to South Africa."³¹ The next day fellow New Democrat Jim Manly noted that South African police had opened fire on a demonstration the day before, killing at least eighteen blacks as a result. "What concrete steps is the Government of Canada prepared to take", asked Mr. Manly, "to put pressure on the Government of South Africa to end this tragic situation, instead of just waiting for a long-term solution?"³²

This call for action was echoed by Liberal MP Warren Allmand one month later in the House. "Considering the serious escalation in South Africa", asked Mr. Allmand, "is the Government now ready to re-examine its policy, to implement economic sanctions against South Africa, and to implement a mandatory program with respect to Canadians doing business in South Africa?"³³

Several days later NDP Member Steven Langdon presented statistics on the non-compliance of Canadian firms with the Code of Conduct. He called on the Government to strengthen the Code and to encourage Canadian companies more strongly to comply with its guidelines.³⁴

On 18 June 1985, after the South African raid on alleged ANC offices in

³⁰ Commons Debates, 26 February 1985, p.2536.

³¹ Commons Debates, 21 March 1985, p.3267.

³² Commons Debates, 22 March 1985, p.3289.

³³ Commons Debates, 15 April 1985, p.3715.

³⁴ Commons Debates, 19 April 1985, p.3897.

Botswana, New Democratic Party MP Howard McCurdy called on the Government to "immediately recall its ambassador...and act immediately to implement economic sanctions against South Africa."³⁵

Shortly before the Government announced its new measures in September, Mr. McCurdy asked the Prime Minister whether he would not "accept the judgement of oppressed South Africans that tough sanctions are necessary...impose mandatory sanctions and go to the Commonwealth Conference to exert the kind of leadership that black South Africa expects?"³⁶

That same day Mr. Allmand of the Liberal Party outlined, in the House, the position he had taken during an all-party consultation on South Africa. He noted that while the Government's statement of 6 July was "a step in the right direction...it was not enough. The Code of Conduct is still a voluntary code. It is not mandatory and, strictly speaking, there were no economic sanctions imposed against South Africa." Given the deterioration of the situation in that country over the past months and the failure of the past policy of combining pressure with dialogue, noted Mr. Allmand, "It is time for something new."³⁷

Both opposition parties welcomed the Government's announcement on 13 September 1985 of tougher measures against South Africa, although each party had reservations about the measures. Jean Chretien of the Liberal Party commented that a deadline for action was needed and that he was "disappointed that the Minister could not impose sanctions or give orders to certain people in Canada, many of whom we can give orders to, not to do business with South Africa."³⁸ Pauline Jewett of the NDP suggested that

³⁵ Commons Debates, 18 June 1985, p.5905.

³⁶ Commons Debates, 10 September 1985, p.6489.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 6483.

³⁸ Commons Debates, 13 September 1985, p. 6590.

the Government "initiate a program of staged economic sanctions to be implemented within specific time limits in the absence of the dismantling of apartheid and concrete moves toward majority rule." She also suggested that the Code of Conduct be made mandatory, that financial assistance be extended to political prisoners and detainees through Canadian non-governmental organizations and that matching funds be provided by CIDA for monies raised by the Canadian Aid for South African Refugees Organization.³⁹ After the Commonwealth Accord had been announced, Mr. McCurdy criticized the Government for giving in to the British position. "We must do more", argued Mr. McCurdy,

than participate in merely symbolic measures or in another contact group destined to increase even more the level of frustration and resentment felt toward the western democracies.

Without the support of mandatory sanctions, the lip service of the West may well be replaced by the weapons of the East and the future hostility of black Africa toward the West would then be assured.⁴⁰

Two days later Mr. McCurdy praised the Prime Minister's condemnation of apartheid in the UN General Assembly. He noted, however, that "We have promised a tough stand, and we must take that stand. If in six months South Africa has not responded as demanded...We must respond with action...."⁴¹

Seven months later, following South Africa's attacks on three of its neighbours, Donald Johnston of the Liberal party suggested that the Government's response was inadequate: "Why does the Prime Minister not do what he committed himself to do before the United Nations last October, and immediately sever diplomatic relations with South Africa?"⁴² The leader of

³⁹ Ibid., p. 6591.

⁴⁰ Commons Debates, 22 October 1985, p.7868.

⁴¹ Commons Debates, 24 October 1985, p.7957.

⁴² Commons Debates, 20 May 1986, p.13408.

the NDP, Ed Broadbent, cautioned that "the abolition of diplomatic relations with South Africa might simply lead to a continuation of massive levels of trade as it did, for example, in the case of Canada's relations with Taiwan." "Will the Government undertake now", asked Mr. Broadbent, "to change its voluntary controls over Canadian investment in South Africa and to issue instructions to Canadian companies that there should be no more investment in South Africa...?" Agreeing with Mr. Clark that collective action by the Commonwealth is preferable to unilateral action by Canada, Mr. Broadbent went on to ask the Minister if he would propose to that organization a multilateral ban on agricultural imports from, and further investment in South Africa.⁴³

The opposition parties increased their calls for limited unilateral action towards South Africa.⁴⁴ In response to the measures announced on 12 June, Warren Allmand of the Liberal Party commented that "what the Government has proposed today is good" but that "Canada must be prepared to do more and to do it more quickly." He cited the banning of further investment, divestment, the severing of diplomatic relations and making voluntary measures mandatory as examples of actions the Government could take.⁴⁵ The

leader of the Liberal Party, Mr. Turner, noted that
the value of Canadian Government purchases from
South Africa is less than \$1 million. The banned
South African attaches already live in the United
States, and obviously the ban on promotion of
South African tourism is economically meaningless.
The measures do not touch our \$230 million in
imports from South Africa, nor do they touch our
\$150 million in exports to South Africa, nor do
they touch Canadian investment in that country.

Given today's state of emergency in South Africa,
why has the Canadian Government failed to

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 13408-13409.

⁴⁴ Commons Debates, 2 June 1986, pp. 13858-9; Commons Debates, 11 June 1986, pp. 14233, 14237.

⁴⁵ Commons Debates, 12 June 1986, p. 14270.

announce any measures of substance and just engaged in what we might term hollow gestures?⁴⁶

Several of these concerns had been voiced earlier by New Democrat Pauline Jewett, who noted that while her Party welcomed "the fact that this Government, unlike Governments before it, is prepared to take some strong initiatives,...we feel that the Canadian Government is not moving with the sense of urgency that the situation demands." Ms. Jewett urged the Government to convene a Commonwealth meeting before the scheduled meeting in August.⁴⁷

The opposition continued to call for stronger measures and on the following day the House held a special debate on the deteriorating situation in South Africa at the request of Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy.⁴⁸ During the debate Mr. Axworthy suggested that Canada could act as a catalyst for international action by unilaterally imposing a total embargo on South Africa.⁴⁹

Several MPs called for stronger specific measures by the Government. Brian Tobin of the Liberal Party suggested that "a Commonwealth which cannot respond to what is happening today in South Africa is a Commonwealth not worth saving."⁵⁰ Liberal MP, Marcel Prud'homme suggested that Canada should help the Front Line States develop alternate trade routes and markets, as well as "assist the liberation movement with the supply of humanitarian aid, medical supplies, food and the like."⁵¹

Opposition calls for stronger measures continued after the special debate.⁵² Noting that the Special Joint Committee recommended full economic

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 14295.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 14271.

⁴⁸ Commons Debates, 13 June 1986, pp. 14362-14366.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 14394.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 14405.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 14421.

⁵² Commons Debates, 16 June 1986, p. 14447; Commons Debates, 19 June 1986, p. 14694.

sanctions, New Democrat Howard McCurdy asked the Government one week later in the House if it was not "about time the Government acted to impose those sanctions, now?"⁵³

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⁵³ Commons Debates, 27 June 1986, p. 14964; see also Commons Debates, 20 June 1986, p. 14756.

APPENDIX

A SURVEY OF CANADIAN PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

INTRODUCTION

The material from which these comments are derived consists entirely of national public opinion surveys conducted across Canada. All the polls cited below meet contemporary standards of scientific sampling for surveys. While most of the polls are of recent origin, some attempt has been made to provide an historical perspective where relevant and possible given availability of materials.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Asked by Decima in 1985 to name "one issue or problem which you feel is the most important one facing the world, that is, the one which concerns you personally the most", more than twice as many Canadians identified nuclear war, wars and peace in general, or the arms race and disarmament (33%) than did all conventional economic issues, such as unemployment and inflation, combined (13%). Indeed, more expressed concern about world hunger, famine and food supply (17%) than conventional economic matters, reflecting perhaps then current reports of starvation in Ethiopia. When provided with a list of five issues the proportion saying "poverty and hunger" was the most "serious" issue (40%) was greater than that for "the arms race" (28%) but the latter issue exceeded "economic problems" (20%).

The 1985-86 polls also showed continued public concern over the threat of a nuclear confrontation. The degree of public worry about nuclear weapons and war has generally increased in recent years. Table I portrays Canadian expectations from 1972-1985 on whether the chances of nuclear war are greater or less than they had been 10 years earlier. The proportion answering "greater" doubled between 1971 and 1975, and then doubled again between 1975 and 1982. There is a decline after 1982 but in 1985 a majority of Canadians still said that war is closer than a decade ago.

Table IChances of a Nuclear War Compared to Ten Years Ago (in %)

	<u>1971*</u>	<u>1975*</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1985</u>
Greater	17	33	52	62	65	53
Less great	54	42	23	19	17	21
Same	19	17	16	14	14	17
DK/Undecided	<u>10</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
	100	100	100	100	100	100

*For these surveys the question referred to "atomic war".

Source : CIPO

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

In a 1984 survey by Goldfarb consultants, about four in ten Canadians expressed the view that east-west relations had deteriorated in the past ten years or so. An equal proportion said they had remained the same, while one in six believed there had been improvement. Those who expressed more interest in world affairs tended to see more deterioration. In the same study over 80% said they were very or somewhat concerned with the current state of east-west affairs. Only 13% said they were not concerned at all. Of those who perceived deterioration, most (66%) believed the responsibility lay with both superpowers. Just less than two in ten (18%), blamed the USSR, while slightly fewer (11%) blamed the United States.

The November 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev Geneva Summit, the first such US-Soviet meeting since 1979, was the subject of a major survey for the CBC. Prior to the summit, Canadians appeared hopeful but not optimistic about concrete progress. Most thought it would improve US-Soviet relations and that it would slow the arms race, but less than a majority thought it would ease international tensions. One out of four, in fact, predicted it would increase tensions. Most expected the meeting to achieve "only little progress". One in six expected no progress at all while only half as many looked at a "great deal" of progress. Perceptions of the two superpowers reveal some parallels. Most (45%) said President Reagan was "somewhat interested" in working towards peace, while a smaller group (38%) found him very interested. By comparison, the same proportion as for Reagan said Gorbachev was somewhat interested (45%) while fewer found him very interested (22% as compared to 38%). More respondents found Reagan personally trustworthy than they did Gorbachev. More also expected the US President to be willing to compromise at Geneva. Interestingly, more rated Gorbachev as better at "influencing people in the west" than so rated Reagan.

CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY

Over the past decade there is some evidence of an increase in the number of Canadian favouring increased defence spending. A 1977 CROP survey, for example, found a near majority of Canadians (47%) expressing the view that federal government spending on national defence was "just right". Half as many said it was too much and slightly fewer that it was not enough. In 1980, however, CROP found less than one in three satisfied with spending levels and only one in ten still saying too much was being spent. Fully four out of every ten felt not enough was being spent, double the proportions three years earlier. It seems likely that this trend has continued through the 1980s. A number of recent surveys, including Gallup

and the CBC, show very few Canadians in favour of decreased defence spending. Attitudes appear roughly evenly divided between favouring increased and maintaining current spending levels. However, fewer Canadians express support for increased military spending if that means either reduced social spending or increased personal income taxes.

NATO

Canadians are, and have long been, firm supporters of the NATO alliance and Canada's participation in it. Approval of the alliance has typically been substantial since the NATO treaty was signed in 1949, and there is no evident current trend toward a decline. A recent Goldfarb survey found 85% supporting continued Canadian participation in NATO, and those more interested in and more knowledgeable about international affairs tended to be most supportive. It also found three in four Canadians believe that a military balance in Western Europe is necessary to offset Soviet power. Perhaps paradoxically, these levels of support in principle are not matched by a broad awareness or understanding about NATO. About four in ten Canadians consistently deny "having heard or read anything" about it. And a significant proportion—albeit a minority—of those who claim some knowledge of NATO are usually unable to explain the organization's purpose.

CRUISE MISSILE TESTING

One of the most controversial defence issues in the last several years has concerned the testing of the US cruise missile over northern Canada. A series of questions asked by various survey organizations suggests that Canadians overall remain roughly evenly divided for and against this testing. The only trend or change has been a very slight shift toward fewer voicing objections. A May 1985 Gallup poll found 45% in favour of Canada permitting the cruise tests and 45% in opposition. The proportion

who claimed to be aware of the issue rose from about one in every two Canadians, in late 1982 when the question was first asked, to almost nine out of ten, in 1985. Cruise testing was also one of the most divisive of recent issues amongst social groups. Anglophone Canadians, older age groups, males, the university educated and upper income earners were more in favour than opposed. Francophones, British Columbians and Quebeckers, younger age groups, females, public school educated persons and lower income earners were more opposed than in favour.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

The second highly controversial defence issue was that of the US Strategic Defense Initiative and possible Canadian involvement. Again the level of awareness was relatively high; over eight in ten of those interviewed during the summer of 1985 - during the Special Parliamentary Committee's hearings on this subject - said they were aware of the Reagan Administration's plan. Perhaps the only aspect of the SDI on which Canadians reveal a consensus is its feasibility. Eight out of every ten thought it likely that such a space-based defence system could in fact be built. No consensus exists on its consequences, however. When asked what the effect of such a system would be on the arms race, 60% thought it would speed it up, 15% that it would slow it down, and 24% that it would have no effect. When asked whether a space-based defence system will make the world safer or less safe from nuclear destruction, about four in ten replied safer. The same proportion replied less safe. In this case the remainder had no guess. On the key policy question of Canadian involvement in SDI research, a bare majority approved. Forty percent were opposed. When the Decima organization asked a similar question distinguishing between research and deployment, slightly less than one-third believed Canada should only participate in the SDI research phase, and slightly more than a third believed this country should be involved in both research and deployment. Approximately one-third were against any involvement.

Those who are most favourable towards SDI tend to regard it as technologically feasible, tend more than opponents to believe development of the system will either have no effect on the nuclear arms race or will actually slow down that race, and support Canadian involvement on both the research and deployment phases of the project. Notably, those who are favourable to SDI but less strongly so tend more to support Canadian participation in the research phase only. Consistent with these views, proponents tend to explain their support of SDI development in terms of the need to provide "defence", "protection" or "security" against nuclear missiles. Those who are unfavourable toward SDI in general tend more than its proponents to believe it unlikely such a system could be built and be effective, tend strongly to expect its development to speed up the nuclear arms race, and reject any Canadian involvement. Most opponents explain their negative position on the grounds that the US attempt to develop a strategic defence system will "escalate the threat of nuclear war" and lead to an increase rather than a reduction in nuclear weapons. Other opponents point to the system's high costs and its likely ineffectiveness.

The intensity of interest group opposition to Canadian involvement in SDI was evident at the summer 1985 hearings of the Special Parliamentary committee. The intensity of public opposition may be reflected in the pattern of responses in the July 1985 Decima survey to two questions - the one concerning the preferred nature, if any, of Canadian involvement in the SDI project (participation in research and deployment, in research but not building, or no participation) and another, follow-up question in which respondents were asked a more complex variant: "Some people say that if the Star Wars system is going to be built anyway we may as well participate so that we at least get some economic and technological benefits out of it." As might be expected, virtually all supporters of Canadian participation in both SDI research and deployment agreed with this view. Most (75%) of those opposed to any Canadian participation disagreed.

A more recent question on SDI from the November 1985 CBC survey found Canadians more or less evenly divided in approving (41%) and disapproving (44%) of the "star wars defense system". A solid majority (61%), however, approved the Mulroney Government's decision to allow Canadian business to participate in star wars research. Most also opposed direct government participation and were against government help to these companies.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

Regional conflicts around the world are not generally priority issues for the Canadian public in comparison, say, to the nuclear arms race. For example, around two in every ten Canadians generally regard conflicts in the Middle East or Central America as "very important" for this country. As many or more attribute no importance or very little importance to these situations. In Canada's overall relationship with different regions, Central America, South America, the Caribbean and Africa (in that order) trail Western Europe, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Asia.

Concerning situations in these regions, Canadians tend to take, in principle, a middle-of-the-road position. When Decima asked about the causes of the "unrest in Central America" in 1985, a minority (28%) singled out the Soviet Union and Cuba. A smaller minority (12%) blamed American policies. A solid majority (56%) of the Canadian public said the root cause of the unrest is poverty and injustice. An earlier survey considered three alternative policies Ottawa might adopt to deal with the conflict. Military assistance to "local governments" to combat insurgency found the least favour with only one in ten saying it would be most appropriate. Increased economic assistance was regarded as preferable by around two in ten while 70% opted for supporting the peacekeeping efforts of other Central American countries as the most appropriate. However, in the 1985 CBC poll, more Canadians disapproved of US policy in Central America (40%) than approved of it (32%).

A series of Canadian Gallup polls show that the percentage who have heard of South Africa's racial policies increased from less than a majority to more than 60% in the twelve-month period between mid 1985 and mid 1986, presumably as a result of the intense media coverage received by recent events there. Perhaps also as a result of this preferences regarding Canadian policy have measurably hardened. While around two in every ten continue to believe Canada should not interfere, significantly fewer now are satisfied with Canada maintaining relations with South Africa and merely urging abandonment of apartheid. Supported by a majority in 1985, this words-only stance is now backed by about 40%. A growing group, albeit still a minority, advocate condemnation of apartheid coupled with cutting relations. The group has increased from around one in every six a year ago to more than one in three in mid 1986.

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A Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution 1986-87



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International Peace and Security
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A GUIDE TO
CANADIAN POLICIES ON
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DEFENCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
1986-87

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ISBN 0-662-15623-4

PREFACE

The purpose of this Guide is to bring together in one place the major developments affecting peace and security, and Canadian policies related thereto, over the course of a year. It can serve a useful purpose as a record of such developments and policies from a Canadian perspective, but the reader will have to draw his own conclusions if he wishes to pass judgement on Canadian responses to the many challenges briefly surveyed here. A few guidelines may perhaps be offered however to those who wish to make such a critical assessment.

First, definitions and priorities: "Arms Control" and "Disarmament" are considered together because both have to do with weapons, either by reducing their numbers or by limiting their use, although the objective of disarmament strictly considered is to abolish weapons. But unless either or both contribute to the avoidance of war they have done little to strengthen peace and security, which is the goal of efforts to limit and reduce arms. "Defence" is interpreted mainly to mean the military means Canada employs to deter war or to protect her sovereignty, although NATO is as much a political as a military alliance and "peace keeping" goes beyond the use of armed force. Finally, "Conflict Resolution" is a diplomatic concept, although the conflicts under review have mostly been characterized by the use of armed force. It may be thought that this subject should have priority, for if there were to be no conflicts there would be little use for weapons or for defence. However, the most serious potential conflict is that between the United States and the Soviet Union, and this is mostly treated under "arms control and disarmament". It is a matter of preference or prejudice whether one assigns greater or less priority to these headings. What is clear is that the greatest threat to the security of Canadians, and no doubt of everyone else, is the potential use of strategic nuclear weapons. In that sense, relations between the USSR and the West are the key determinant of Canadian security.

A second guideline is that distinctions may therefore be made between various categories of threats to Canadian security, both in terms of the nature of the threat and of its urgency, which may well be different. Apart from global nuclear war, however, it is not easy to categorise direct threats to Canadian security which involve the use of force. Canada is a fortunate country compared to most, but we are nonetheless vulnerable to disruption and conflict elsewhere, whether it be in terms of imports of particular commodities such as oil, or of illegal refugees, or of grain markets. "Security" in this wider sense is not covered comprehensively in these pages, but it is nevertheless possible to conclude from the issues discussed that Canadian interests are world-wide and that an active diplomacy may have more to do with their defence than conventional military means. In any event, no government can or should pay equal attention to all the possible contingencies which could threaten its security. Tacitly or otherwise, governments establish some order of priorities based on their assessment of national interests.

Thirdly, the user of this guide may wish to know what in fact are such priorities from the government's point of view. Readers may recall that in 1970 the government of the day attempted to set out foreign policy priorities, although it would be difficult in the light of subsequent events to claim that they always governed the policy agenda. The present government has been less ambitious. But the Defence White Paper clearly attaches greatest importance to two contingencies--an attack on North America by ballistic or cruise missiles, and crisis leading to war in Europe. Moreover, certain priorities have been established for arms control and disarmament policy (see pp. 91-92). In general, these are traditional Canadian objectives and priorities, although there is a perceptible shift towards greater concentration on the North as a defence priority, and more emphasis on issues of verification of arms control and disarmament agreements. In regard to the resolution of regional conflict, the record points to increasing Canadian involvement in efforts to assist

the front-line states of Southern Africa deal with the multiple challenges confronting them, as well as to a slow but steady rise in official reaction to public anxieties about the course of United States policies in Central America.

These comments suggest that the concepts of peace and security, treated here as two sides of the same coin, are taking on larger meanings in the public mind, combining political, economic, ecological, and psychological dimensions as well as those of defence in the traditional sense. Nuclear weapons have now for over forty years called into question the "great war" scenario which so dominated the Western experience and imagination up to that point. Yet governments have had little choice but to assume that armed force will continue to be the final arbiter in disputes between nations, including the use of nuclear weapons. This dichotomy between popular perspectives and traditional planning assumptions has affected Canada less than many countries, but the twin issues of northern sovereignty and cruise missile technology seem likely to bring it into major focus in the years ahead.

Geoffrey Pearson
Executive Director

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INTRODUCTION

This guide is designed to provide Canadians with a readily accessible check list of issues in the field of peace and security. It seeks to identify the major policy issues to which Canada responded in the period between August 1986 and July 1987, to place them in context, and, where appropriate, to identify a range of Parliamentary comment on these issues.

In identifying official Canadian policies, we have relied entirely on public statements by Government leaders and responsible officials. The statements are either summarized or excerpted verbatim.

The guide is not itself designed as a commentary, and contains no interpretative opinion, although the choice of excerpts and statements inevitably requires editorial discretion. Our purpose, therefore, is to assemble in one collection materials which will give to the interested reader a basic reference source on Canadian policies in the field of peace and security, and, at the same time, to indicate the scope for further enquiry.

In organizing the contents, we have chosen to follow the subject order identified in the mandate of the Institute, viz: arms control and disarmament, defence, and conflict resolution. The reader may wish to note that the last category - conflict resolution - has been defined for the present purposes as Canadian responses to major regional conflict issues.

Each entry is organized under five headings - Background, Current Canadian Position, Parliamentary Comment, Current References and Further Reading. These headings have been defined in the following manner:

Background provides an account of the basic issue. It seeks to avoid excessive detail, but to draw on recent material as appropriate in order to set the context of current policy issues. Where Canadian policy prior to 1986 was integral to the development of the issue itself, or where it is necessary to an understanding of the current Canadian position, it is included under this heading.

Current Canadian Position is based on statements by Ministers and responsible officials, and identifies recent developments in Canadian policy.

Parliamentary Comment is intended primarily to capture the formal response of the opposition parties. For the most part it relies on statements and questions in the House of Commons by designated spokespersons on foreign and defence policy. Committee hearings have been used primarily in the Background section, and, when appropriate, in describing the current Canadian position.

Current References is designed for the most part to indicate only some of the most recent materials relevant to the issue; the section is not intended to be an extensive reference list.

Further Reading contains a limited number of more general, background references which the reader may wish to consult for more detailed background.

The Institute welcomes comments on the Guide's utility, and format, and suggestions for improvement.

The individual entries were researched and written by Jane Boulden,

Francine Lecours, and Jim Moore, research assistants at the Institute during 1986 and 1987. The volume has been edited by David Cox and Mary Taylor. All of the above owe a considerable debt to Doina Cioiu for typing, formatting and vigilance in the preparation of the manuscript.

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SECTION I - ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

1. THE ABM TREATY

Background

The SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms were signed by Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev and US President Nixon on 26 May 1972. The SALT negotiations began in November 1969. Since they were unable to reach final agreement on strategic offensive arms limits, the parties agreed to make the ABM Treaty separate and of unlimited duration, while signing an interim agreement on offensive arms limitations.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States undertook ballistic missile defence (BMD) programmes during the 1960s. In the United States, the BMD issue sparked a prolonged public debate. The advisability of developing BMD centred on two main concerns: the ease with which the defences could be overcome by large numbers of cheaper offensive missiles, and the possibility that BMD deployments might destabilize deterrence based on the concept of mutual assured destruction. This concept, which had become the basis of nuclear deterrence, assumes the impossibility of an adequate defence against nuclear weapons.

The ABM Treaty prohibits both sides from deploying a nation-wide BMD and limits each to two ABM deployment areas (this was amended to one area on 3 July 1974). The intent of the Treaty is outlined in Article I (2):

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defence of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defence, and not to deploy ABM systems for defence of an individual region except as provided for in Article III [establishing two specific deployment areas] of this Treaty.

Extensive verification measures are provided for in the Treaty, which also established the Standing Consultative Committee (SCC) to deal with

questions of Treaty interpretation and compliance. The United States Senate ratified the Treaty by a vote of 88 to 2.

During the 1970s both the United States and the Soviet Union continued research into ballistic missile defence. In 1975, the US dismantled the BMD system it had deployed at a missile base in Grand Forks, North Dakota.

The Soviet Union has kept its BMD deployment around Moscow. As the counterforce capability (the ability to accurately strike enemy missile silos) of ballistic missiles improved in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the question of defending against ballistic missiles surfaced again, since defence of missile silos would be easier to achieve than population defence. From the outset, therefore, the new Reagan Administration paid more attention to BMD than had previous administrations.

In March 1983, President Reagan announced that the United States would pursue the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to provide a defence that would make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete". The ABM Treaty, therefore, entered a new and uncertain phase, since the final goal of a defensive shield, impenetrable by ballistic missiles, contradicts the very basis of the ABM Treaty. Although President Reagan initially stated that SDI was only a research programme and would be conducted within the limits of the ABM Treaty, the Administration has put forward and moved towards acceptance of a second "new" interpretation of the ABM Treaty which would allow the US to carry out tests and development of systems previously considered forbidden by the Treaty.

This new interpretation, also known as the "broad" interpretation, would allow the testing and development of ABM systems based on new physical principles and would only prohibit their actual deployment. The Reagan Administration has stated that it believes this broad interpretation is legally valid.

3.

The interpretation of the ABM Treaty has therefore become an issue of considerable debate, centering on how ABM systems based on new technologies are dealt with by the Treaty. The key to the debate lies in Article V of the Treaty. Article V states that:

Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

Proponents of the broad interpretation maintain that the systems and components referred to in Article V are defined by Article II. The use of the phrase "currently consisting of" as part of the definition of a system in Article II means that only systems based on 1972 technology (current at the time the Treaty was signed) are banned. This means that systems based on new technology in the basing modes listed are not affected.

The narrow interpretation holds that Article V clearly bans all sea-based, space-based or mobile land-based systems and components, whether they are based on 1972 technology or not. The phrase "currently consisting of" was used in Article II only to demonstrate the functional nature of the definition, not to exclude future technologies.

The Soviet Union has stated that it believes the narrow interpretation to be the only valid interpretation of the Treaty and until 1985 this was the only interpretation held by the United States.

Current Canadian Position

The Government of Canada has stated that it is in favour of the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. In June 1986, the Special Joint Committee Report, Independence and Internationalism recommended that the Government reaffirm support for a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty,

and the Government responded that they "would continue to press both the United States and the Soviet Union to maintain the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty until an updated treaty is in place".¹ In a statement to the House of Commons, Secretary of State, Joe Clark outlined this position further. He said:

Our interest in Canada is to ensure strict adherence to that Treaty, and continued respect by both sides for the integrity of this fundamental arms control document.²

Addressing the question of what limits the Treaty places on research into ABM systems Mr. Clark stated:

Its text [the ABM Treaty] does not refer directly to research, although the private negotiating record of either side may mention research. The agreement on what precisely is intended in that Treaty is for these two Governments which are the parties to the agreement to work out.³

In response to questioning in the House of Commons as to the Canadian position on how the ABM Treaty limits research, Mr. Clark reiterated the idea that it was up to the two parties to that Treaty to come to an agreement:

...that is an issue, a disagreement between the two parties signatory to the ABM Treaty. ...there is a written treaty that makes no reference to research, and...there might be private documents in the hands of both the Soviet Union and the United States which might elaborate on other agreements that they made with respect to research. Only they can know that. All that we can ask is that the integrity of the ABM Treaty be respected and that there be a strict adherence to it. That is the position of the Government of Canada.⁴

¹ DEA Canada's International Relations, Dec. 1986, p. 47.

² Commons Debates, 21 Oct. 1986, pp. 553-4.

³ Ibid., p. 553.

⁴ Ibid., p. 581.

Mr. Paul Nitze, Special Advisor to President Reagan on Arms Control issues, came to Ottawa on 5 March 1987 as part of US consultations with the allies about the question of reinterpreting the Treaty. After the meeting, Mr. Clark issued a statement that said the United States had reassured Canada that no move had yet been taken to move to a broad interpretation. The statement also said:

The Canadian Government has consistently supported the USA in its adherence to the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Any move to a broader interpretation could have significant political and strategic ramifications for international stability and security,....Any unilateral action by either party to the Treaty that could have a negative impact on the current strategic balance would be regarded by Canada with profound concern....⁵

Parliamentary Comment

NDP member Derek Blackburn asked what steps the Government would take since "President Reagan has made clear his intention to test and deploy ABM systems outside the laboratory within 10 years?"⁶ Prime Minister Brian Mulroney replied:

I would not want to try to anticipate what may or may not happen in the next 10 years but our treaty is clear and the position of the Government of Canada with regard to ABM is clear. We have conveyed that to all Parties. There has been no change in our positions.⁷

Mr. Blackburn then further suggested that the American position on the ABM Treaty at the Reykjavik Summit demonstrated their intention of abrogating the Treaty and that the United States had misled NATO allies as to their intentions with respect to the Treaty.

⁵ DEA Statement, 87/14, 5 Mar. 1987.

⁶ Commons Debates, 14 Oct. 1986, p. 333.

⁷ Ibid.

Liberal member Don Johnston expressed disappointment that the post-Reykjavik statement made by the Secretary of State did not adopt a position on how the US Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) programme met the requirements of the Treaty. Referring to Mr. Clark's statement that it was up to the two parties to the Treaty to determine its specific limitations, Mr. Johnston stated:

That sounds as though this were some sort of private contractual relationship between two individuals or two corporations....this treaty goes to the very heart of world security, yet he refuses to offer the Government's view as to how the star wars initiative can be rationalized with the terms of that treaty.⁸

NDP leader Ed Broadbent believed that the events at the Reykjavik Summit demonstrated the US intention to break the existing treaty and that this represented a reversal of the previous US position favouring the restrictive interpretation which had been elucidated by US Secretary of State George Shultz. Mr. Broadbent went on to say that he felt that Mr. Clark was avoiding the central issue by refusing to take a position on the question of research.

Surely such a narrow discussion as 'the limits on permissible research' is now described as the issue only because the United States Administration has refused to back away from insisting on its right to test and deploy the star wars system. Instead of forthrightly criticizing the Reagan Administration for this, [he] is now helping them get the focus away from their desire to violate the ABM Treaty. I say to the Minister that this is unacceptable to the people of Canada....⁹

On 27 October 1986 Liberal member Lloyd Axworthy called upon the Prime Minister to join the opposition parties in a joint resolution indicating

⁸ Commons Debates, 21 Oct. 1986, p. 555.

⁹ Ibid., p. 557.

support for the disarmament proposals discussed at Reykjavik

Such a resolution would incorporate the very strong and unmistakable commitment to honour the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty requirements of 1972 that there be no testing and development of space-related weapons other than those that are in laboratories or on fixed-ground sites.¹⁰

Mr. Axworthy went on to say that the stumbling block at Reykjavik had been President Reagan's failure to agree to limit research and development on SDI for 10 years.

That is what the ABM Treaty requires. It is not such a big concession. It is not such a major threat to security. Research would continue in the laboratories but it would not get to the point where there would be a series of prototypes in outer space....I rise...to express my deep regret...that the Government has withdrawn from its previous position.¹¹

Mrs. Pauline Browes, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Environment, responded:

We have been assured by the USA that SDI research is being conducted within the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty....We are satisfied with the assurances we have received from the administration.¹²

At hearings before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, Liberal member Don Johnston asked Mr. Clark whether he believed Article V of the ABM Treaty ruled out the pursuit of SDI. Mr. Clark responded that "It is our view that it would not rule out research on the Strategic Defence Initiative."¹³

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 27 Oct. 1986, p. 792.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., p. 793.

¹³ Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade Proceedings, 21 Jan. 1987, p. 10.

NDP member Pauline Jewett pursued the question of research, suggesting that "...very frequently the President [of the United States] refers to research as if it included testing and development - indeed, everything short of deployment of SDI."¹⁴ Mr. Clark replied:

If what you are asking me to do,...is suggest it is our view that the United States Administration is now in breach, or is contemplating a breach, of its obligations under the ABM Treaty, no, I do not think that is the case.¹⁵

In the House of Commons, Mr. Johnston asked Mr. Clark about reports that Secretary of State Shultz said the allies should not be criticizing the broad interpretation and asked Mr. Clark to confirm that he had sent a letter to Mr. Shultz on this issue. Mr. Clark responded:

I can confirm that I have written to the US Secretary of State indicating the very grave importance Canada places on the US continuing to adhere to a restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty.¹⁶

Liberal member Donald Johnston called upon the Government to make it clear to Mr. Nitze that Canada supported the restrictive interpretation of the Treaty. He stated:

There is no need for a reinterpretation of that treaty. Although it was signed only by the two superpowers, it is not a private contract to be nit-picked by lawyers in the Kremlin and the White House simply to provide new interpretations which would permit the extensive testing of this new defensive system.¹⁷

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 16.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Commons Debates, 13 Feb. 1987, p. 3409.

¹⁷ Commons Debates, 4 Mar. 1987, p. 3799.

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2. ARMS CONTROL TREATY COMPLIANCE: SALT II

Background

The SALT II Treaty limiting strategic nuclear forces was signed by US President Carter and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev in Vienna, on 10 June 1979. Although the agreement was never ratified by the US Senate, both the United States and the Soviet Union have continued to abide by its terms.

The SALT II Treaty officially expired on 31 December 1985. In 1985 President Reagan made two reports to Congress¹ outlining Soviet violations of arms control treaties. In 1987 a report was sent to Congress in March.² While most of the violations concerned the SALT II and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaties, possible violations of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention were also listed. With respect to the SALT II Treaty, the United States is primarily concerned with a new mobile Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the SS-25. The US states that this is an illegal second new missile and that the Soviet Union has excessively coded the telemetry on the missile's test flights. The Soviet Union contends that the SS-25 is a modernization, within the limits of the Treaty, of an older missile, the SS-13.

On 10 June 1985 President Reagan announced that the United States would dismantle an older ballistic missile submarine when a new Trident submarine was deployed in September 1985. This kept the US within SALT limits. However, Reagan warned that future compliance decisions would be taken on a 'case-by-case' basis and that the United States reserved the right to exceed treaty limits in the future as a 'proportionate response' to Soviet treaty violations. Defence Secretary Weinberger submitted a classified report on possible responses to Soviet violations in January 1986.

¹ President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements, 1 Feb. 1985 and 23 Dec. 1985.

² President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, Mar. 1987.

With the launching of another new Trident submarine in May 1986, the Reagan Administration re-evaluated the compliance situation and possible American responses. Reagan announced that the United States would dismantle two older Poseidon submarines, thus keeping the US technically within the limits of the SALT II Treaty. The President stated, however, that the submarines were being dismantled for economic reasons, (the submarines had reached the end of their useful life) and not because of SALT limits. He also indicated that because of continued Soviet violations of the Treaty, the United States would make future force structure decisions based on the nature of the Soviet threat and not on the basis of SALT limits.

In September 1986 the United States decided to overhaul rather than dismantle two Poseidon submarines coming to the end of their useful lives. As a result, the United States exceeded the SALT limits on 28 November 1986 with the deployment of a 131st cruise missile carrying B-52 bomber. This put the United States over the SALT limit of 1,320 MIRVed ballistic missiles and cruise missile carrying bombers. In response, the Soviet Union stated it would remain within SALT limits "for the time being".

Current Canadian Position

Responding to questioning in the House of Commons, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark stated:

...we have made clear our views about the importance of respecting the SALT II limits from the very beginning of the rumours that there might be an intention on the part of the United States to breach those limits. Within the last week both myself personally to Secretary Shultz and the Prime Minister to President Reagan reaffirmed our position that it would be better for the world if the United States would respect the SALT II obligations.³

³ Commons Debates, 27 Nov. 1986, p. 1590.

In a statement released by Mr. Clark on 28 November 1986, he said:

The Government viewed with serious concern the [Reagan] Administration's announced intention in the spring and deplores the implementation of that decision today. Our views have repeatedly been conveyed to the US Administration....The Government recognizes that SALT II is not a perfect agreement and acknowledges that the USSR has not satisfactorily responded to charges of its own non-compliance with provisions of SALT II. At the same time, we believe that even an imperfect regime of restraint on the strategic arms race is better than no restraint at all.... Until [a new arms control] accord is attained, however, we consider the interests of nuclear arms control and strategic stability are best served by both the USA and USSR continuing to abide by the provisions of the SALT II agreement.⁴

Parliamentary Comment

Some members of the House called upon Mr. Clark to suspend cruise missile testing as a way of protesting against the United States action with respect to the SALT II Treaty. Mr. Clark responded:

We regret the decision that has been taken by the United States with regard to the SALT II limits. We have made that clear. We have a commitment to NATO to test the airlaunch Cruise missiles. We intend to keep our word.⁵

Liberal member Donald Johnston pursued the question, citing paragraph 23c of the Canada-US umbrella testing agreement:

Either Government shall reserve the right to cancel, suspend, postpone or terminate any

⁴ As quoted in "Canada views USA Decision on SALT II with Serious Concern" The Disarmament Bulletin, Winter 1986 - Spring 1987, p. 3.

⁵ Commons Debates, 27 Nov. 1986, p. 1597.

specific test and evaluation project, if in its opinion, any unforeseen imperative circumstances should so warrant.

Surely the breach by the Americans of their obligations under SALT II would constitute such an eventuality if the Government so elected to stop testing the Cruise missile.⁶

Mr. Clark responded:

I also regret the action of the Liberal Party now in suggesting that we have no obligation to contribute to the collective defence of NATO, an obligation which we have accepted. Unhappily the nuclear deterrent remains a reality in the world. This country cannot opt out of our obligations.⁷

NDP member Pauline Jewett pursued the same line of questioning:

Does the Government yet recognize that there is a link between the breaching of the SALT II limits and air-launched Cruise missile?....why does it not do the honourable thing and dissociate us from the breach of the SALT II limits and cancel air-launched Cruise missile testing?⁸

Mr. Clark responded:

I know there is a great deal of concern in Canada about the inherent danger of living in a nuclear world. That is why Canada is doing everything we can to encourage arms control agreements which would move toward a reduction of that nuclear danger. One way to stop arms control agreements would be for a prominent member of the Western Alliance to turn its back on Europe, and to turn its back on the United States.⁹

⁶ Commons Debates, 1 Dec. 1986, p. 1643.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., p. 1644.

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Cross References

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks
Canada-US - Cruise Missile Testing

3. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Background

Biological weapons have been used on several occasions in the past. Their use during the First World War led the international community to redouble its efforts to deal with this problem and in 1925 the Geneva Protocol was signed. The Protocol prohibits the use of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and of bacteriological processes.

After the Second World War several United Nations organisations recognised the limits of the Protocol and the importance of making it more effective. In 1969 the United States renounced both the production and stockpiling of biological weapons. Negotiations at the UN Conference of the Committee on Disarmament succeeded in producing a Convention on biological weapons in 1972, which came into force three years later. The Convention forbids the use, production, stockpiling or transfer of bacteriological or poisonous weapons and calls for the destruction of existing stocks. The Convention, which 102 states had ratified by 1 January 1986, is seen as the first agreement requiring actual disarmament to be agreed upon at the international level.

The Convention was the subject of two review conferences, in 1980 and 1986. The Second Review Conference, in September 1986, stressed its determination to rule out any possibility of biological agents being used in weapons and repeated its commitment to reach agreement on a ban on chemical weapons. A final declaration was unanimously adopted which required the signatories to start work on measures to prevent or reduce any "ambiguities, doubts or suspicions" concerning bacteriological activities and to improve international co-operation on the peaceful uses of microbiology. Among the measures proposed were the exchange of information concerning research facilities, biological products and the occurrence of rare diseases. A new arrangement allows any state to call for a meeting of

an advisory group of experts if a problem arises concerning the application of the Convention.

In recent years the ability of the Convention to control the threat posed by biological weapons has been questioned. The development of new technologies, such as the use of recombinant DNA, risks rendering the Convention useless because of the many ways in which these technologies can be employed. The Convention does not restrict research on biological or toxic agents in any way. Most such research is concerned with the properties of these substances and can be used for protective purposes. It is possible however that the same research could ultimately be used to produce new biological weapons. These concerns are a result of the ill-defined boundary between research and development in this field.

Doubts as to the effectiveness of the Convention have also arisen in connection with the allegations, first made in the seventies, that the superpowers (and their allies) have developed and used biological weapons. The most recent such accusation was made against the Soviet Union which was said to have used toxic weapons in South East Asia (yellow rain). The fact that a definite verdict on whether toxic weapons were used in that instance was never been reached emphasises the problems of verifying the Convention and the need to strengthen the Convention accordingly. The mechanisms required for verification have been the subject of considerable discussion and are at the heart of the disagreements which have arisen concerning the Convention.

Canada signed and ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Convention of 1972. After the Second World War it carried out research on the defensive aspects of biological and chemical weapons, often in collaboration with the United States and Great Britain. In the mid-sixties, at a time when the United States was being accused of using herbicides and defoliants in Southeast Asia, Canada increased its efforts in the UN to have such weapons banned. Canada is among the countries that have recommended that chemical

and biological weapons should be dealt with in separate negotiations. It is also interested in the verification measures required to enforce current measures concerning biological weapons.

Current Canadian Position

In recent years Canada has conducted research into the methods of enquiry needed for investigating apparent violations of the Convention. In 1985 Canada produced a document entitled, Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, which it presented to the United Nations. Following the 'yellow rain' accusations against the Soviet Union, Canada undertook three studies in Southeast Asia. These investigations, which were carried out by the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence, produced three reports the last of which was issued in 1986. All three were presented to the UN Secretary General.¹

On 9 September 1986, Arsène Deprés, the head of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Review Conference of the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention spoke of the major advances which had been made in biotechnology and the danger that they could be used for "illegitimate purposes of the kind prohibited by the Convention"². He added that the fact there had been several allegations of serious breaches of the Convention was a cause of major concern and stated:

¹ Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Ottawa, Department of External Affairs, Nov. 1985; Butler, G. C., Report on Use of Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia, Memo to External Affairs, 2 Dec. 1981; Shiefer, H. B., Study of the Possible Use of Chemical Warfare Agents in Southeast Asia: A Report to the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, 1982; Norman, J. J. and Purdon, J. J., Final Summary Report on the Investigation of 'Yellow Rain' Samples from Southeast Asia, Ottawa, Defence Research Establishment, Feb. 1986.

² DEA, Statements and Speeches, 9 Sept. 1986.

The Canadian Government considers that it should be the task of this Conference to seek to strengthen the application of the Convention in realistic and operationally practicable ways."³

At the UN General Assembly Canada co-sponsored Resolution 41/58 (A) which called upon all states that had not already done so to sign and ratify the Convention. The resolution was adopted without a vote.

Parliamentary Comment

The issue has not been raised in the House of Commons since the summer of 1986.

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³ Ibid.

4. CANADA AS A NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONE

Background

Nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ) were first discussed in the 1950s. They are seen as a way of limiting the deployment and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The first proposal for a NWFZ was put forward by Poland in 1957 at the United Nations General Assembly. Known as the Rapacki Plan (named after the Polish Foreign Minister) the proposal called for a nuclear-free zone covering Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and West Germany. No nuclear weapons would be manufactured or stockpiled in this zone and the use of nuclear weapons against the area would be forbidden. The Plan proposed a broad system of air and ground surveillance, run jointly by the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations, to ensure compliance. The Plan failed to gain support from the Western Powers.

The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 established the first nuclear weapon-free zone in the uninhabited Antarctic region. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established Latin America as the only populated NWFZ in the world, was signed in 1967. Twenty five Latin American nations are party to this Treaty, under which they agree not to test, produce or acquire nuclear weapons or to allow other nations to deploy them on their territory. Protocol II of the Treaty was signed by all five nuclear weapons states and requires them to respect the nuclear-free status of Latin America, and to agree not to threaten to use weapons against the Treaty's members.

On 6 August 1985, at Rarotonga, the thirteen members of the South Pacific Forum signed a treaty which declared the major part of the South Pacific to be a nuclear weapon-free zone and banned the deployment, production or testing of such weapons in the area; whether nuclear weapons would be permitted on foreign planes or vessels was left to the discretion of the signatories. The Soviet Union and China signed the two protocols to this treaty forbidding nuclear testing, or the use of or threat of using,

nuclear weapons in the area. Other areas have also been proposed as nuclear weapon-free zones. These include: the Nordic states, the Balkan states, Africa, the Middle East, and Southern Asia.

In the UN General Assembly Canada has supported resolutions calling for the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa and Southern Asia; but it has always been opposed to the establishment of such zones in Central or Northern Europe or the Balkans, saying that zones in those areas would cast doubts on the effectiveness of the NATO deterrent and expose certain areas to the risk of Soviet attack, without making a genuine contribution to nuclear disarmament.

Current Canadian Position

Canada supports the principle of nuclear weapon-free zones whenever this is feasible and likely to promote stability in the area. Although the creation of such a zone is not a satisfactory alternative to having the countries of the area ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty it can make a significant contribution to preventing the spread of nuclear arms.

The Canadian Government is prepared to study such proposals on a case-by-case basis but it believes that to be effective any proposals must meet certain requirements: the zone must apply to a defined geographical area; it must be based on proposals which emanate from and are agreed to by most countries in the area concerned, including the principal military powers; it must not give advantage to any state or group of states; it must contain adequate treaty assurances and means to verify that countries abide by their commitments, and it must not permit the development of an independent nuclear explosive capability in the area.¹

¹ DEA, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, "Canada Position on Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones", Disarmament Bulletin, Summer-Fall 1986, p. 12.

The Government does not support a declaration of nuclear weapon-free status for Canada. Although Canada does not possess nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons are not stationed on Canadian territory, Canada is a member of NATO which relies on a nuclear deterrent. The declaration of a nuclear weapon-free zone would be inconsistent with membership in that alliance.²

Despite this position the local authorities in sixty Canadian cities have declared their areas nuclear-free zones.

Parliamentary Comment

In recent years proposals to make Canada a nuclear weapon-free zone have been put forward in the House of Commons on several occasions. The New Democratic Party has sponsored these resolutions and is opposed to the presence of nuclear weapons on Canadian territory; it believes that they do not contribute to the security of Canada or of the West. According to the NDP Canadian activities such as testing the cruise missile only serve to weaken the Canadian position on disarmament and to encourage nuclear proliferation.

Bill C-214, to make Canada a nuclear weapon-free zone, received first reading on 8 October 1986. It was introduced by NDP member Jim Fulton. It would forbid the deployment, testing, manufacturing, transporting or stockpiling of any nuclear weapons or the components thereof on Canadian territory, including Canadian territorial waters and airspace.

At its convention in November 1986 the Liberal Party put forward a resolution on this issue. The party resolved that the Canadian Government should stop testing the cruise missile in Canada and "should move

² Ibid.

immediately to make Canada a nuclear-free zone, to support a comprehensive test ban treaty, and to oppose completely the Star Wars proposal".³

In a speech to the Commons on 17 February 1987, Conservative member Alan Redway commented on the resolutions adopted at the Liberal Convention:

If we decided to leave NATO or, for that matter, unilaterally declared Canada to be a nuclear free zone, we would be forfeiting the ability to influence in some way the negotiations for nuclear disarmament or for other kinds of conventional disarmament, perhaps the consultations on the first use of nuclear weapons in Europe, or the decision to use nuclear weapons first, before anyone else does. We would be forfeiting the right to consultation. It makes no sense for us to forfeit that right or to get out of NATO, nor does it make any sense for us unilaterally to declare Canada a nuclear free zone. Whatever happens in a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union, whether or not we are a nuclear free zone will not save our hides.⁴

Mr. Redway added that it was "surprising and disturbing" that the Liberals had adopted a resolution of this kind when they had been such strong supporters of NATO and of multilateral and verifiable nuclear disarmament for many years.

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³ Commons Debates, 1 Dec. 1986, p. 1635.

⁴ Commons Debates, 17 Feb. 1987, p. 3551.

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5. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Background

In recent years there have been various allegations about the use of chemical weapons in regional conflicts. This has raised awareness of the importance of their prohibition. The early conclusion of a chemical weapons ban has been designated a priority by the Canadian Government. Negotiations in this area take place primarily in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), at Geneva but there have also been bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Although a chemical weapons ban has been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament and its various antecedents since 1968, it is only in recent years that there has been any progress. In an attempt to facilitate action, the forty-nation CD established the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons in 1980 at which all CD participants were represented. Their first task was to define the issues that a ban on chemical weapons should cover. The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases, but does not ban their manufacture or stockpiling. Most of its signatories, including Canada, retain the right to retaliate to any attack by chemical weapons. The second task of the Working Group was to draft a comprehensive treaty which would constitute an effective and verifiable ban on the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. In 1983 it developed a consensus document which identified the elements of a comprehensive treaty, and outlined areas of agreement and disagreement.

In 1984 the United States put forward a proposal for a ban on chemical weapons which marked an important step in the CD negotiations on chemical weapons. The proposal was noteworthy in suggesting verification by challenge inspections - sudden mandatory inspections of plants suspected of cheating. It was agreed in 1984 that the destruction of existing

stockpiles should be subject to systematic international inspection, but there was disagreement over the particular inspection procedures to be used.

Since 1980 the UN Secretary General has conducted several enquiries into the alleged use of chemical weapons. Two of the reports which resulted from these enquiries, one in 1984 and the other in 1985, concluded that chemical weapons had been used in Iran. A report in 1986 confirmed that Iraq had been the country which had used these weapons. A further UN study, released on 13 May 1987, confirmed that the Iraqi forces were continuing to use chemical weapons and had even employed them against civilians. The UN Human Rights Commission also reported in November 1986 that certain types of chemical weapons had been used in Afghanistan by Soviet and Afghan troops.

In 1986 some progress was made in the Ad Hoc Committee of the CD on provisions concerning chemical weapons production facilities and effective ways of monitoring the chemical industry to ensure that production was not diverted for chemical weapons purposes. Agreement was reached in April on a preliminary list of chemicals used for industrial and military purposes. The United States provided detailed information concerning the nature and location of its stocks of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union declared itself in favour of intermediate measures to bring about an agreement and it accepted the principle of systematic on-site verification of the destruction or dismantling of production facilities. In the meantime, however, the United States and France both announced that they would resume production of chemical weapons in order to counter the Soviet Union's arsenal.

In the fall of 1986 the UN General Assembly adopted three resolutions calling on the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts to achieve a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the

development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. It was also decided to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee for 1987. Progress in the CD negotiations in 1987 has given rise to the hope that agreement might be reached early in 1988. Draft provisions under discussion involve the establishment of an organization to supervise the destruction and dismantling of production facilities over a period of ten years and methods to ensure that the agreement is respected.

In February 1987 the Soviet Union agreed to reveal the location of its stockpiles. While this represented an important change in the Soviet position it still failed to meet Western demands for obligatory challenge inspections on short notice. In April the Soviet Union announced that it had stopped producing chemical weapons.

Several questions concerning a ban on chemical weapons still remain. They include: a definition of chemical weapons; the identification of the main agents to be banned; the question of acceptable usage of chemicals; and the destruction of existing stockpiles and factories.

Current Canadian Position

In order to compensate for limitations in the Geneva Protocol and in the hope of providing a basis for further multilateral negotiations, Canada has submitted several working papers to the CD since 1980. These dealt with the definition and promotion of a treaty and the need for verification.¹

¹ Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Committee on Disarmament, Chemical Weapons - Working Papers, 1969-1982 Sessions, Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs, April 1983. In 1986 Canada published an indexed compendium of all chemical weapons documentation for the period 1983-85.

In December 1985 Canada presented the UN Secretary-General with a 174-page Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons which sets out detailed operational methods for the investigation of such allegations. In 1986 Canada tabled a further document at the CD concerning an international system for classifying chemical substances.

At the beginning of 1986 the Canadian ambassador to the CD, J. Alan Beesley told the Conference that Canada was ready in principle to accept and apply the verification proposals tabled in the US draft treaty of 1984. He added that it would be of

...limited utility if we get an effective, bilateral convention which is not a comprehensive convention in both senses in extending to all the main issues under negotiation and compromising a genuine non-proliferation convention.²

In July 1986 Mr. Beesley said that in the course of the lengthy negotiations it had become apparent that there was "unlikely to be agreement on the precise substances to be controlled until there is also agreement on exactly what type of controls would be applied".³

Canada co-sponsored two of the three resolutions on chemical and biological weapons which were proposed at the UN General Assembly. Resolution 41/58 C urged the CD to accelerate its negotiations and called upon all states to co-operate in efforts to ban chemical weapons. It was passed by a vote of 137-0-14. Resolution 41/58 D asked the CD to spend more time on chemical weapons negotiations and to re-establish the Ad Hoc committee in 1987. It was adopted without a vote. Canada abstained on an East German Resolution, 41/58 B, which called on all states to cease from producing chemical weapons and from using them against others.

² Disarmament Bulletin, Winter 85-Spring 86, p. 14.

³ DEA, Chemical Weapons - Final Records (PV), Conference on Disarmament, 1986 Session.

In a speech to the CD in April 1987, Ambassador Beesley referred to allegations that chemical weapons had been used in the Gulf War, and said that this underlined the importance of including in a treaty "a provision for an unqualified, verifiable ban on the use of chemical weapons going beyond use and including, of course, possession, destruction etc."⁴ He also announced that Canada was continuing the research begun for the handbook submitted to the Secretary General in December 1985, and was studying other practical and technical aspects of procedures for verification.⁵

On 9 July 1987 Canada and Norway submitted a document to the CD entitled General Procedures for Verification of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons.⁶ This study contained proposals to be included in an annex to article IX of a future Chemical Weapons Convention.

Parliamentary Comment

The subject has not been raised in the Commons since the summer of 1986 when there was considerable controversy over Canada's decision to support NATO in its endorsement of the US decision to produce new binary chemical weapons. (See 1985-86 issue of the Guide)

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⁴ CD/PV 410, 30 Apr. 1987.

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Cross-References

Biological Weapons

6. A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR FREEZE

Background

Comprehensive nuclear freeze proposals generally call for a halt to all nuclear weapons production, testing and deployment in order to arrest the nuclear arms race while significant reductions are being negotiated. The concept of a nuclear freeze was frequently raised at the United Nations and was the subject of lively debate early in the eighties. In March 1980 Randall Forsberg, of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies in Boston, drafted a resolution entitled "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race". The resolution stated that "...the United States and the Soviet Union should stop the nuclear arms race" and called for "a mutual freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and of missiles and of new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons."

The idea of a nuclear freeze appealed to many people who were increasingly concerned by the nuclear arms race. Their concern had been aggravated by the policies of the new Reagan Administration which appeared unenthusiastic about arms control and was slow to develop an arms control policy. Comments from senior administration officials suggesting the possibility of a limited nuclear war, and the impending deployment of US cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe did nothing to alleviate this anxiety. Support for the freeze movement grew quickly, therefore, in the first years of the Reagan Administration, generating a movement of substantial political strength. Early in 1982 a New York Times poll stated that 72 per cent of the American public were in favour of a freeze. And in June 1982 an estimated 750,000 people, including Canadians, staged an anti-nuclear rally in New York to mark the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament.

While this degree of support for and awareness of a freeze was a relatively new phenomenon in arms control issues, the concept itself had been

established earlier. In 1964 President Johnson proposed a limited freeze on strategic weapons but it was rejected by the Soviets who argued that it would guarantee the nuclear superiority of the United States. In 1978 Prime Minister Trudeau advocated "suffocating" the arms race by imposing a ban on testing and prohibiting the production of fissionable materials. The idea of a freeze was discussed in various international fora and also in bilateral negotiations between Washington and Moscow about the possibility of limiting strategic weapons.

The freeze movement generated political responses in both the US Congress and the United Nations. In 1982 Senators Kennedy and Hatfield introduced a resolution in the United States Senate, proposing a mutual, verifiable freeze on the testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems as an interim step to negotiating reductions on nuclear warheads and delivery systems. Senators Jackson and Warner presented a counter resolution which effectively outlined the Reagan position on arms control as finally enunciated. In it they proposed that US and Soviet nuclear forces be frozen at reduced but identical levels and that this be ensured by a long-term treaty. The Kennedy-Hatfield resolution lost in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a vote of 9 to 6, and in the House of Representatives, a resolution endorsing the President's arms control policy passed, after a long and hard debate, by a vote of 204 to 202. The following year the House voted for a modified version of the freeze proposal which outlined the objectives which the Administration should seek to achieve in the START negotiations.

At the United Nations, resolutions on a comprehensive freeze were sponsored in the First Committee in 1982 by Mexico, Sweden, and India and by the Soviet Union in 1983. All the resolutions passed but in each case most of the NATO countries registered a negative vote. While Congressional resolutions left the timing of the freeze up to the superpowers, and thus implied that the freeze itself was open to negotiation, the resolutions at

the United Nations suggested the freeze would be accomplished by declaration. At the Disarmament Conference in 1985 the socialist and non-aligned countries once again advocated a nuclear freeze as a necessary prerequisite for nuclear disarmament. The West for its part preferred to emphasise the need to strengthen international measures for enforcing non-proliferation, as well the need for improved techniques of verification. Debate about the freeze focussed on two main issues: verifiability and force imbalance.

It was the latter problem which most concerned the European NATO members. In particular they pointed to the force imbalance in Europe which had been created by the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles.

Current Canadian Position

At the 41st session of the United Nations two resolutions calling for a nuclear freeze were presented in the General Assembly.¹ Canada voted against both resolutions.

The Canadian Government recognizes the important symbolic value of the freeze concept, but also stresses the need for significant, balanced and verifiable reductions in the level of nuclear arms. The UN resolutions made no reference to verification and did not allow for the production of fissionable material for peaceful purposes. A freeze must be accompanied by agreements between the nuclear powers in order to achieve any real progress in disarmament or arms control. It was for this reason that Canada chose rather to encourage the bilateral negotiations on nuclear arms between the United States and the Soviet Union.

¹ Resolution 41/60 E which passed with a vote of 136-12-5. Resolution 41/60 I which passed by a vote of 139-12-4.

Parliamentary Comment

The issue was not raised in the House of Commons.

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7. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

Background

In the late 1950s The United States and Britain began negotiations with the Soviet Union on a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) on all forms of nuclear weapons testing. Although these efforts failed to produce a CTB, they did result in the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) which was signed by the three countries in 1963. The Partial Test Ban prohibits testing in the atmosphere, underwater or in outer space and has since been signed by 111 other countries, but not by France and China. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), limiting underground nuclear tests to 150 kilotons, was signed in 1974 by the Soviet Union and the United States, but has not been ratified by the United States Senate. Similarly the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) of 1976, which established special provisions for peaceful nuclear explosions, has not been ratified by the US Senate. Despite the failure to ratify, the signatory states have undertaken to comply with both treaties. Trilateral negotiations on a CTB were re-opened by the Carter Administration in 1977, and substantial progress was made in developing a draft treaty. However, in the wake of strong opposition in the United States, and the political turmoil involved in the negotiation and ratification debate on the SALT II Treaty, little more of substance was accomplished in the negotiations. The negotiations ceased under the Reagan Administration.

On 6 August 1985 the Soviet Union began a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, which it extended four times. Although the Soviet Union continually asked the United States to join in the moratorium and negotiate a CTB treaty the US refused. The moratorium ended with a US test in Nevada on 3 February 1987. The Soviet Union resumed testing on 28 February 1987. The United States has stated that while the CTB is a long-term goal for them testing must continue in order to ensure weapons reliability and national security. The US Administration also believes that a CTB cannot be

adequately verified.

On 8 August 1986 as part of the Defense Appropriations Bill, the US House of Representatives passed a resolution calling for a one-year moratorium on testing above 1 kiloton as long as the Soviet Union did the same and allowed on-site monitoring. The amendment was eventually dropped as part of a compromise with the Reagan Administration which agreed to submit the TTBT and PNET to the Senate for verification. A US Senate amendment which also banned tests above 1 kiloton was put forward in 1987. The amendment was dropped in May 1987.

The Soviet Union continued to put forward proposals on nuclear testing after it ended its unilateral moratorium. On 9 June 1987 it submitted a draft treaty to the Conference on Disarmament. The treaty called for a complete ban on nuclear tests but the Soviets said they were willing to negotiate a limit of 1 kiloton.

In 1983 the United Nations Conference on Disarmament established a working group to deal with a CTB. This group, now called the Ad Hoc Committee, has had little success in agreeing on a programme of work. The group has not met since 1983, and the 1987 spring session of the CD ended without agreement on an acceptable mandate. The Group of Scientific Experts, also under the CD, continues to work on developing a global system of seismic monitoring.

In 1986 and 1987 the CTB remained one of the Canadian Government's six major goals in arms control and disarmament, and in February 1986 the Government approved a \$3.2 million upgrade to the seismic array station in Yellowknife as a contribution towards seismic verification. In October 1985, the Government awarded a two-year research grant to the University of Toronto for further research on the use of regional seismic data for verification of a CTB.

Current Canadian Position

In October 1986 Canada hosted a technical workshop on seismic verification of a CTB. The Canadian Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) Mr. Alan Beesley, tabled the proceedings of this workshop at the CD on 30 April 1987.¹ Mr. Beesley stated:

...we are convinced that the Conference on Disarmament has a substantive role to play in the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. As we all know, there are important related talks going on bilaterally which we hope will produce results on which the CD can build in its summer session....I hope that the working paper I have tabled today will not only provide further evidence of the substantive role which the Conference on Disarmament can play in achieving a comprehensive test ban, but will also give encouragement to the CD to establish an ad hoc committee as soon as possible in order to get on with the job expected of us.²

In his address to the 41st Session of the UN General Assembly the Secretary of States for External Affairs, Joe Clark, stated:

Canada will again be supporting a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This is a fundamental goal and one towards which concrete steps can and should be taken now.³

Responding to questions in the House of Commons, Mr. Clark outlined the Canadian position on the Soviet testing moratorium. He stated:

Our view,...is that the real test in these agreements is to find something to which both sides can

¹ CD/753, 28 Apr. 1987.

² Conference on Disarmament, Final Record of the Four Hundred and Tenth Plenary Meeting, CD/PV. 410, 30 Apr. 1987, pp. 10-11.

³ DEA, Statements and Speeches, 24 Sep. 1986, p. 5.

comfortably agree. That is not likely to happen in the case of a moratorium so we believe the encouragement that Canada must give is to the United States to continue along the path that was signalled by the President...indicating a willingness to now ratify treaties that some months ago the United States was not prepared to ratify. We think that step-by-step movement toward an end to testing is more likely to be practically effective....⁴

At the 41st Session of the United Nations General Assembly, four resolutions regarding a comprehensive test ban were passed. Resolution 41/47, sponsored by Australia and other Western nations, was passed by a vote of 137-1-15, with France voting against.⁵ The resolution calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to begin work on a nuclear test ban treaty at the beginning of its 1987 session. Canada voted in favour of the resolution.

Resolution 41/59(N) called for advance notification of the date, time and location of all nuclear tests.⁶ The resolution was passed by a vote of 130-1-22 with France again voting against. Canada voted in favour of the resolution.

Resolution 41/46 (A), sponsored by Mexico called upon the CD to begin negotiations for a CTR.⁷ The resolution passed with a vote of 135-3-14 with Canada abstaining.

Resolution 41/46 (B), also sponsored by Mexico, called upon states party to the PTBT to meet to amend the PTBT to make it comprehensive.⁸ The resolution passed by a vote of 127-3-21. Canada abstained.

⁴ Comons Debates, 6 Oct. 1986, p. 108.

⁵ UNGA Resolution 41/47, 3 Dec. 1986.

⁶ UNGA Resolution 41/59 (N), 3 Dec. 1986.

⁷ UNGA Resolution 41/46 (A), 3 Dec. 1986.

⁸ UNGA Resolution 41/46 (B), 3 Dec. 1986.

In December 1986 in response to the report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations which had recommended that Canada continue to work towards a mutually verifiable CTB, the Government stated that:

...this remains a fundamental Canadian policy objective. In the meantime, Canada is presenting proposals in various bodies designed to lead to such a treaty and is developing the necessary techniques of verification.⁹

Parliamentary Comment

On 3 October 1986, Liberal member Warren Allmand called upon the Government to prepare a resolution for the House of Commons concerning a CTB. He said:

Considering the summit planned in Iceland for October 11, it is important that our Government make a public statement urging immediate negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty. To this end the Minister should prepare a resolution for this House, so that Parliament can declare itself on this important issue before the Icelandic Summit.¹⁰

A few days later, during the debate on the Throne Speech, NDP member Pauline Jewett stated:

Many of us are distressed indeed that Canada has not yet placed at the top of its agenda urging the United States to join the Soviet Union in a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing....We say from time to time that we cannot do much about nuclear testing since there is a problem of

⁹ DEA Canada's International Relations, Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, Dec. 1986, p. 47.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 3 Oct. 1986, p. 25.

verification. That is the Reagan argument. However, virtually every seismographic expert outside the US Administration believes that test ban verification can now be assured. We would like to see the Government move in that area.¹¹

On 7 October 1986 Liberal member Don Johnston called upon the Government to make a clear statement asking the United States to join the Soviet testing moratorium.

Given the meeting this coming weekend between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan, would the Secretary of State bring a resolution to the House for adoption by unanimous consent of all Parties exhorting the superpowers to take concrete steps at this meeting in Iceland leading to a comprehensive test ban treaty.¹²

Mr. Clark responded:

What is clear about the state of the world now is that the action the world needs is action which can be taken by those two superpowers meeting together. We should be doing everything we can to encourage a constructive result of that meeting. Lecturing from afar will not necessarily add to a constructive result.¹³

NDP member Derek Blackburn suggested that continued US nuclear tests and refusal to join the Soviet moratorium set back chances at achieving a CTB by at least five years.¹⁴

Liberal member Warren Allmand also condemned the continued United States testing in light of the last extension of the Soviet moratorium. He said:

¹¹ Commons Debates, 6 Oct. 1986, p. 84.

¹² Commons Debates, 7 Oct. 1986, p. 154.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Commons Debates, 4 Feb. 1987, p. 3096.

This test [on 3 February] occurred despite the knowledge that the Soviet Union would end its self-imposed unilateral moratorium....It is indeed unfortunate that mankind is being propelled further into the nuclear arms race due to the regressive notion that nuclear testing can help.¹⁵

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¹⁵ Commons Debates, 9 Feb. 1987, p. 3231.

8. THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

Background

The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 was the culmination of two years of negotiation in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Amongst other things, it dealt with the need for measures to reduce the risk of military confrontation between the East and West. The confidence-building measures in the Final Act, however, were voluntary, and there was general recognition of the need for more substantive methods.

After three years of discussion, on 9 September 1983, the 35 nations of the CSCE established the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). Its initial goal was to discuss possible confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), which would reduce the threat of military brinkmanship in Europe. Actual implementation of disarmament methods was to be considered after a CSCE review in November 1986.

The talks began in Stockholm on 17 January 1984. The 35 participating countries included representatives of NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and a group of neutral and non-aligned states. The NATO countries, including Canada, presented the following six proposals in January 1984: annual exchanges on military formations; annual announcements of upcoming military manoeuvres; notification of military activities outside of garrison; acceptance of observers at such activities; verification by challenge and on-site inspection; and the establishment of hotlines to ensure communications in time of crisis.

The Soviet Union tabled the Warsaw Treaty Organization's (WTO) suggestions in May, 1984, which stressed the value of political steps to increase confidence and reduce the risk of war. The WTO called for: an agreement on the non-use of force; a negotiated chemical weapon-free zone in Europe;

declarations of nuclear-free zones in the Balkans, Central Europe and the Nordic area; a freeze and reduction of military spending; and some general suggestions regarding limits on military exercises, advance warning of troop movements and mutual exchange of observers. The Soviet Union also tabled a draft treaty on the non-use of force.

The neutral and non-aligned group (NNA) presented confidence-building suggestions that included restrictions on offensive weapons based near borders, and vastly improved notification and observer provisions. The NNA's emphasis on geographical restrictions was seen by the West as an intermediate step between CSBMs and actual disarmament, and as such only to be considered after CSBMs had been agreed upon. The East favoured restrictions but was wary of concrete military changes that would impinge on their requirements for national security.

After much discussion, in December 1984 two working groups were formed. Working Group A examined all CSBMs not included in the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE. Working Group B studied the modest measures of observation and notification of military activities which are included in the Final Act. A third group discussed the links between the two working groups.

In January and February 1985, NATO member countries submitted six working documents which reiterated their suggestions from the year before, and, inter alia, recommended 45 days notification for any military manoeuvres involving 6,000 troops, the mobilization of 25,000 reservists and any amphibious activity with 3,000 combat troops. The 1975 Helsinki accords call for 21 days notification of events involving 25,000 men. The WTO states tabled their CSBMs at the same time. They suggested 30 days notification of movement of more than 20,000 men and an overall limit of any manoeuvres to 40,000 men.

On 15 November 1985, the NNA group submitted a revised proposal that many

hoped would be a bridge between the NATO and Warsaw Pact positions. It combined the Western emphasis on specific information exchange and on demanding verification measures with the WTO's desire for a declaration on the non-use or threat of force.

The NNA proposal also suggested that notice of a broader range of military activity would be helpful in avoiding any aggression, either by misinterpretation or accident. All CDE states should be invited to observe military activities and should be given 42 days advance notice of such activities. Details of standard conditions should be provided so as to enhance the knowledge of the observers. The NNA addressed the problem of verification in a manner meant to reconcile the divergent East and West positions on compulsory inspection. It suggested "observation upon request", which would require a 12-hour notice for investigation of any suspicious activities.

At the end of 1985, there were still large areas of disagreement between East and West, including whether to include independent air and naval activities as part of a treaty as the East wanted, or to focus on ground forces, as the West and NNA group wanted.

Although many disagreements remained, much of the last sessions in 1986 were spent in formulating a draft with a view to having a final treaty ready by 19 September 1986, the final deadline before the CSCE Preparatory Committee meeting in Vienna. The NATO initiative tabled on 30 June 1986 adopted a previous Austrian proposal to define the notification threshold by combining unit structures, manpower, and equipment. Raising the limit on troop numbers requiring notification from the previously suggested level of 6,000 was also agreed to in principle. Notification of mobilization activities was no longer required. Limits on the duration of observation missions during military exercises were accepted, and the number of

verification inspections to which every state was entitled was lowered from two to one per year.

As the end of the eleventh session of the Stockholm Conference approached in mid-July 1986, further progress was made on the definition of the numerical/structural notification threshold, and the issue of notification for independent air activities was resolved.

In August 1986, both the Soviet Union and the United States modified their negotiating positions. The Soviet Union accepted the principle of on-site inspections on 19 August. For its part, the United States agreed, on 26 August, to provide advance warning of any trans-Atlantic movement of forces from North America to Europe. The need for aerial inspection from the East German border to the Urals was agreed to by the Soviets ten days later, although Soviet negotiators argued that the host country should supply the aircraft and pilots to carry the other side's observers. The American negotiating team was reluctant to accept the Soviet position on aerial inspection. The United States believed that the aircraft of neutral nations, carrying both observers and host-nation officials, should be used for inspections. The Soviet offer would be considered, however, if technical details regarding navigation, monitoring, and camera equipment aboard host-nation aircraft could be resolved satisfactorily. Soviet negotiators were hesitant to accept this counter-offer since their government wished to install its own monitoring equipment on aircraft overflying Eastern bloc territory and to control the flight path of inspecting aircraft. Furthermore, they argued that the number of permitted aerial inspections per year should be limited to two as opposed to five as suggested by the United States.

As the Conference deadline approached in September, differences narrowed on the "split threshold agreement" for notification of ground force exercises. NATO held that compulsory advance notice was required for manoeuvres involving one or more divisions, 9,000 or more troops, and 250

or more tanks. In addition, each state had the right to dispatch observers to monitor exercises involving more than 14,000 troops. The Warsaw Pact argued for a higher threshold - advance warning for military activities involving more than 16,000 troops or 450 tanks, and monitoring of exercises exceeding 20,000 men.

Despite these differences the Conference participants felt that an agreement was within reach. Accordingly, the Conference clocks were stopped at 2256 local time on 19 September 1986 to allow negotiations to continue without breaching the final deadline. By 21 September 1986, the last issue to be resolved concerned the numerical threshold. Agreement was reached on notification of exercises with more than 13,000 troops or 300 tanks, with observers required for exercises exceeding 17,000 troops.

The final package was adopted at the 178th plenary session of the Stockholm Conference on 22 September 1986.¹ The terms, effective 1 January 1987, included the following: warning of military activities involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 tanks must be given 42 days in advance; foreign observers may attend manoeuvres exceeding 17,000 men; each state has the right to request a ground and/or aerial inspection of an exercise in question, although no state is required to submit to more than three such inspections per year; aircraft for aerial inspections will be chosen by mutual consent of the parties involved, and inspectors will furnish the monitoring equipment and control the flight path of the aircraft in the suspected area; calendars outlining the schedule for military exercises in Europe within the next calendar year must be exchanged by 15 November, of the previous year, and warning of manoeuvres involving over 40,000 or 75,000 troops must be given one and two years in advance, respectively, by the same date; finally, the signatories commit themselves to refrain from the threat or use of force

¹ Document of the Stockholm Conference: On confidence and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe convened in accordance with the relevant provisions of the concluding document of the Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1986, Department of External Affairs, pp. 1-20.

against the territory or political independence of other states in accordance with the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki accords and the Charter of the United Nations.

Current Canadian Position

The agreement on a confidence-building regime in September 1986, to which Canada is a signatory, drew unqualified Canadian support. The official position was outlined in the Canadian Government's response to a recommendation contained in the 1986 report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons:

Canada has been an active participant in the Stockholm Conference on confidence- and security-building measures and hailed its successful conclusion. In the government's view, Stockholm represents a significant accomplishment in the field of arms control which will impart an unprecedented openness to the conduct of military affairs in Europe. The Stockholm Conference measures and their early implementation will give a powerful impetus to the work of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the NATO High Level Task Force in pursuing conventional arms control in Europe.²

The Canadian Ambassador to the Stockholm negotiations noted:

...from a Canadian point of view, the positive outcome of the Stockholm negotiation was in very large part attributable to the effective coordination of effort between and among NATO allies....³

² DEA, Canada's International Relations: Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, 1986, p. 48.

³ Delworth, T., "Stockholm Conference", The Disarmament Bulletin, Winter 1986-Spring 1987, pp. 5-7.

Parliamentary Comment

The issue was not raised in the House of Commons which was not in session at the time of the Stockholm agreement.

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9. DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

Background

During the 1970s efforts were made, particularly at the United Nations, to advance international understanding of the relationship between disarmament and development. In 1978 the Final Document of the first UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) noted the contradiction between growing military expenditures and the persistent poverty of two-thirds of the world's peoples.¹ UNSSOD I also set out the frame of reference for the Secretary-General's Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, which began its work under the Chairmanship of Mrs. Inga Thorsson of Sweden in 1978. Canada was represented at this group by Bernard Wood of the North-South Institute.

The Experts' findings and recommendations were submitted to the Secretary-General in September 1981.² Their study, also known as the Thorsson Report, provided comprehensive documentation on the worldwide use of resources (labour, industrial capacity, raw materials, land, financial capital, research and development) for military purposes. It noted, for example, that over 50 million people were employed in military activities and that US\$ 500 billion (6 per cent of global output) was spent on military goods in 1980. The Group argued that this use of resources undermined development prospects in market, planned and developing economies alike. It also weakened global security by promoting the arms race and preventing the allocation of the resources needed to address the roots of instability in the developing world.

As a result of these findings, the Group suggested that national and

¹ UNGA, Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (UNSSOD I), 1978, para.16.

² Thorsson, I., "Relationships Between Disarmament and Development: How Development Would Promote Development and Security," Development: Seeds of Change, No. 3/4, 1983.

intergovernmental policies aimed at combining disarmament and development objectives could contribute to both the North-South dialogue and East-West detente. The report made nine specific recommendations including the following:

- governments should undertake studies to identify and publicize the benefits that would be derived from the reallocation of military resources;
- governments should create the necessary prerequisites... to facilitate the conversion of resources freed by disarmament measures to civilian purposes;
- consideration should be given to establishing an international disarmament fund for development.

Canada supported the report and commissioned a Canadian writer, Clyde Sanger, to write a popular version of it for wider distribution. On the question of the disarmament fund, the Government noted that

[although it] agrees that the disarmament dividend approach is the most feasible of the various options examined, it considers the likelihood of a separate disarmament fund for development...remote (and that) any excessive stress on the idea of a deceptively simple "transfer" of financial resources from military to development purposes could serve to obscure the more significant aspects of global efficiency and economic co-operation for development which the Group's report has begun to illuminate.³

The relationship between disarmament and development has continued to interest the United Nations since the release of the Thorsson report. The Second Special Session on Disarmament in 1982 considered the issue, as did the Secretary-General's Group of Consultant Experts, which produced a study on the economic and social consequences of the arms race that same year.

³ Canadian submission contained in UNGA, Relationship between Disarmament and Development, Report of the Secretary-General, 1982, A/S-12/13, pp.8-14.

Canada supported the 1983 General Assembly resolution which invited governments to communicate their views and proposals on the relationship between disarmament and development, and it supported resolutions calling for a conference on this topic. This conference was originally scheduled to be held in Paris in 1986, but was postponed until August 1987. There were three main issues on the agenda:

- the relationship between disarmament and development in all its aspects and dimensions;
- the implications of continued military spending for the world economic and the international economic and social situation; and
- ways and means of reallocating resources released from disarmament for socio-economic development, particularly of the developing countries.

Current Canadian Position

From the very beginning Canada welcomed the decision to hold a conference on this subject. Speaking to the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, in July 1985, the Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, stated that "the Canadian Government welcomes the holding of a well-prepared international conference on the disarmament/development question."⁴ Canada would like the conference to emphasize "a practical, in-depth examination of the question."

Ambassador Roche also stressed the importance of preserving the integrated approach to the question as presented by the Group of Governmental Experts. According to him, Canada had a special role to play in the process of advancing the relationship between disarmament and development:

⁴ Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, Statement, New York, 30 July 1985.

The world ratio of military spending to development assistance is 20:1, and the Canadian ratio is 4:1. I believe that this essential fact puts Canada in a good position to enter the discussions at the world community level.⁵

"As a developed country with a tradition of deep involvement with the developing world and as an active participant in all the multilateral arms control forums," Mr. Roche later noted, "Canada will bring special expertise and sensitivities to the discussions."⁶

On 25 March 1987, in a speech to the United Nations Regional Conference on the World Campaign for Disarmament, which was held in China, Mr. Roche made some further points. He reminded his audience that the quest for security was an important aspect of the relationship between disarmament and development. This was why the immediate goal of disarmament was not the release of resources for development but the establishment of a balance of security at the lowest possible level. He also listed Canada's major objectives for the forthcoming Conference; recognition of the fact that disarmament and development are distinct issues that are interrelated through security; acceptance that the approach to disarmament must be a global one; appropriate attention to the potential developmental benefits of disarmament measures; attention to the level of arms transfers within the Third World and their development implications; and, an objective appraisal of the overall effect of differing levels of military spending (in both large and small countries) not only in macroeconomic terms but also in terms of the alleviation of poverty and under-development.⁷

(Note: the conference was underway as this volume went to press)

⁵ Special Committee on Canada's International Relations, Canada's International Relations, 28 Jan. 1986, pp.7-8.

⁶ DEA, Statement, 86/17, 10 Mar. 1986.

⁷ DEA, "Disarmament, Development and Security", Address by Ambassador Roche, 25 Mar. 1987.

Parliamentary Comment

The issue was not raised in the House of Commons.

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10. MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS TALKS (MBFR)

Background

Canada has participated in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks since they began in Vienna in 1973. The talks, involving nineteen nations from the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, seek reductions in military manpower and armaments in a defined area in Central Europe that includes: the Benelux countries, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland and West Germany.

In the negotiations, NATO has focused on the following issues: parity in military manpower, in the first instance requiring accurate counts of the forces deployed in the region by each alliance; effective methods of verification to monitor compliance with treaty provisions; allowance for geographical asymmetries - American, British, and Canadian forces must travel overseas to reach the European theatre while Soviet forces can use existing land transportation networks through Eastern Europe; and collectivity in force reductions, thereby allowing one nation to compensate for troop shortfalls in another without breaching the collective force limit.

At the NATO Ministerial Meeting in December 1983, Canada called for a review of the Western negotiating position. This review led in 1984 to a new initiative adjusting the West's position on the exchange of force data. Agreement on troop numbers has been a major stumbling block in the negotiations as the two sides cannot agree on the numbers deployed in the region - the West counts 230,000 more troops for the Warsaw Pact than the number reported in the East Bloc's official data. Previously the West had required data on all ground and air personnel as a prerequisite for reductions but the revised 1984 proposal limited the data exchange to only a portion of the ground force manpower (combat and combat support units) of both sides.

On 5 December 1985, at the close of the 37th Round of negotiations, the Western delegation submitted a new proposal in response to the Warsaw Pact's "Basic Provisions" of 14 February 1985. Adopting the first-phase framework presented by the East, the proposal called for the immediate withdrawal of 5,000 American and 11,500 Soviet troops from Central Europe without prior agreement on force levels. A detailed exchange of data on remaining forces down to battalion level would follow. Additionally, force levels in the European theatre would be frozen for three years. The proposed verification regime included thirty on-site inspections (five aerial) and permanent entry/exit points for troops entering or leaving the zone.

Warsaw Pact negotiators countered by suggesting first-phase reductions of 6,500 American and 11,500 Soviet personnel, thereby leaving post-reduction force ratios unchanged (according to Eastern figures) and setting a precedent for future proportionate troop reductions. Requests for on-site inspections were to be allowed "if there is justified suspicion that the agreement is not being complied with" and data on withdrawn units rather than residual forces would be exchanged.

The political atmosphere for conventional disarmament changed dramatically in 1986. On 18 April, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, speaking in East Berlin, offered to expand the "zone of reductions" to the "entire territory of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals". A follow-on initiative presented in the communiqué issued at the Warsaw Pact summit in Budapest on 11 June included: proposals for troop cuts of 100,000 - 150,000 over the next two years and, ultimately, reductions of 500,000 personnel and associated equipment in each alliance by the early 1990s; negotiations to be held in a reconstituted CDE forum, a widened MBFR forum including the 35 members of the CSCE, or in a new disarmament forum; nuclear- and chemical weapon-free zones; consultative commissions; and on-site

inspection if necessary. The North Atlantic Council, meeting in Halifax on 30 May, created a high-level task force to study the Alliance's CDE and MBFR negotiating positions in the light of these initiatives and report on its findings by year's end.

The MBFR negotiations resumed in Vienna on 29 September 1986, two days after the signing of the agreement in Stockholm on security and confidence-building measures in Europe. It was hoped that the success of the CDE negotiations would create a positive atmosphere for the resumption of the MBFR talks.

In February 1987, the Warsaw Pact and NATO began discussions on an alternative negotiating forum on conventional disarmament to pick up where the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures left off. Within NATO France wanted the new forum to include all 35 members of the CSCE while the US wanted only Warsaw Pact and NATO members to be included as in the MBFR negotiations. A compromise between the two positions was reached at a NATO meeting in June, but as of July had not been made public. On 31 July the informal meetings between the two alliances on the nature of the new forum, recessed until September. Depending on the nature of the agreement reached, it is possible the MBFR talks could end if their function is covered in a new forum.

Current Canadian Position

The Government of Canada, along with its NATO Allies, supports the goal of conventional disarmament in Central Europe. A detailed explanation of the Canadian position was presented in a major statement to the MBFR conference by the head of the Canadian delegation, Michael Shenstone, on 15 May 1986. Mr. Shenstone expressed disappointment with the East Bloc's response to the Western proposal tabled on 5 December 1985, in particular its failure to

suggest adequate verification measures. Despite this, Mr. Shenstone reaffirmed that:

...the West still supports the common framework approach so earnestly advocated by the East over the past 15 months. We still consider it the most realistic and practical means of achieving an early first agreement for reductions and limitations on conventional armed forces in Central Europe.¹

The key to agreement, however, remains an effective verification system. While the West has fully explained its position in this regard, "the East has still to demonstrate how its meagre verification measures can satisfy the high standards required of a viable verification regime."² Finally, Mr. Shenstone noted General Secretary Gorbachev's April 1986 proposal, and, while not commenting on the proposal in detail, observed that:

the view that European security is a concept going beyond Central Europe is consistent with a long-held NATO position - often expressed at this table - that certain of the Associated Measures proposed by the West should apply beyond Central Europe.³

Speaking before the Standing Committee on National Defence, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, spoke of the situation in Europe:

...it is a daunting alternative to redress the conventional imbalance through negotiation. Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops and weapons are a threat to the West. However, one must understand the military and political situation in Eastern Europe. The capacity to use force, or to threaten the use of force within that area itself is a major reason for the current level of Soviet troops deployed there. It is also a

¹ "Major Canadian Statement at MBFR Negotiations", The Disarmament Bulletin, Summer-Autumn 1986, p. 15.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

major factor in explaining why the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks have not produced any agreement to reduce the level of conventional forces in Europe despite 14 years of trying.⁴

Parliamentary Comment

At hearings before the Standing Committee on National Defence, Conservative member Bud Jardine questioned Mr. Clark about the progress at the MBFR talks, particularly about the prospect of reducing the overall costs of maintaining force in Europe. Mr. Clark replied:

The MBFR talks have not shown a great deal of progress, either recently or historically....It is important that one bear in mind that reducing parts of the mutual arsenals does not guarantee economies....No one should assume that arms control talks are some magic way of reducing defence budgets. The MBFR is not making progress quickly.⁵

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⁴ SCND Proceedings, 28 Apr. 1987, p. 7.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 20-21.

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11. THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Background

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed on 1 July 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970. The Treaty has a twenty-five year duration and thus comes up for renewal in 1995. It also contains provisions for quinquennial reviews of the operation of the Treaty.

Some observers regard the NPT as an agreement between states that possess nuclear weapons and states that do not. However, to date only three nuclear weapon states (NWS) - the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain - have signed the Treaty. France and China, along with some near-nuclear states such as South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan and Spain have not become signatories. The reason most often stated for not signing the Treaty is that it is discriminatory; it allows nuclear weapon states to maintain their arsenals while refusing the right of acquisition to others. Furthermore, non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) are required to open all their facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) while NWS are not. As of 1985, 130 countries have signed the NPT. Only one non-signatory NNWS, India, is known to have exploded a nuclear device. That explosion occurred in 1974 and India stated that the detonation was for peaceful purposes only.

Article 1 of the Treaty declares that each nuclear weapon state

...undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosives directly or indirectly; and not to in any way assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

In return, in Article II, non-nuclear weapon states agree

...not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices or of control over such weapons...nor to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Nuclear weapon states also agree to provide information and assistance to non-nuclear states on the peaceful use of nuclear energy through the IAEA. The non-nuclear states in turn agree to accept international safeguard measures over material and equipment. Article VI of the NPT is seen by the non-nuclear states as critical to the entire agreement. It states that all signatories will undertake

...to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The first Review Conference was held in 1975. The non-aligned and neutral states, which make up a large portion of the signatories, stressed that the nuclear weapon states had failed to bring about a halt in the arms race. Specifically they called for an end to underground nuclear testing, a substantial reduction in nuclear arsenals and a pledge by the NWS not to use or threaten to use weapons against non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). A Final Document was issued in which the nuclear weapon states agreed to try harder to reach these goals.

The 1980 Review Conference was less successful. By this time the total number of the signatories had grown to 115 of which 75 were in attendance at the Review Conference. Since 1975 none of the non-aligned countries' demands had been met, and, although there was some agreement on safeguards for peaceful nuclear programmes, no consensus could be reached on bringing a halt to vertical proliferation. There was therefore no final declaration nor even a formal reaffirmation of support for the Treaty.

When the NPT states came together again in 1985, there had not been an arms control measure of any major kind in the previous five years. Once again the failure of the nuclear weapon states to achieve anything substantive with regard to Article VI (vertical proliferation) was the key issue.

In the Final Declaration, which was adopted by consensus, the participants declared that they were convinced that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was essential for international peace and security and reaffirmed their support for the treaty and its objectives: to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, to put an end to the nuclear arms race, and to promote co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The participants also agreed to include the following paragraph in the Final Declaration:

the Conference, except for certain states,... deeply regretted that a comprehensive multilateral Nuclear Test Ban Treaty banning all nuclear tests by all states in all environments for all time had not been concluded so far and therefore called on the nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985 and called on all the nuclear-weapon states to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of such a Treaty as a matter of the highest priority in the Conference on Disarmament (Article VI, Part B, 14).

The certain states alluded to were the United States and Britain, and in the next clause of the Declaration it is noted that those 'certain States' felt that deep and verifiable reductions in existing arsenals of nuclear weapons were the highest priority.

The Final Document also included the resolutions put forward by the non-aligned and neutral states calling for a ban on nuclear tests and a nuclear freeze.

In addition to Article VI two other issues gave rise to discussion. In the

event of a nuclear ban being imposed those states which did not have nuclear weapons wished to have reliable guarantees of their security and adequate technical assistance for research and development on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (as laid down in Article IV).

Canada was the first Western nation to adopt comprehensive safeguards on all nuclear exports. In other words Canada will only export nuclear materials to states that are party to the NPT or will accept full IAEA safeguards on their nuclear programme. Canada, along with the Netherlands and Australia attempted to have a clause in the Final Declaration calling on all states (including nuclear weapon states) to open themselves to IAEA safeguards and inspection. In the process of compromise that led to the final consensus, the eventual statement simply reaffirmed the commitment of both nuclear and non-nuclear states to the non-proliferation regime.

Current Canadian Position

Current Canadian policy on non-proliferation is the result of changes introduced by Ottawa in 1974, and 1976, which imposed tighter controls over nuclear exports.

Nuclear co-operation will be authorized only for those non-nuclear weapon states that have made a general commitment to non-proliferation by either having ratified the NPT or having taken an equivalent binding step and that have thereby accepted IAEA safeguards on the full scope of their nuclear activities. In addition, nuclear exports can go forward only to those states (both non-nuclear and nuclear weapon states) which have undertaken to accept, in a formal agreement, a number of additional requirements designed to minimize the proliferation risk associated with Canadian nuclear exports. These requirements are:

- an assurance that Canadian-supplied nuclear items (nuclear material, heavy water, nuclear equipment and technology) will not be used in connection with the production of nuclear explosive devices; and
- a provision for fallback safeguards in the event that a situation arises where the IAEA is unable to continue to perform its safeguard functions. They also include control over the retransfer of Canadian-supplied nuclear items; and over the reprocessing of Canadian-origin spent fuel.¹

Since 1976, agreements incorporating the new requirements of Canada's nuclear policy have been negotiated with Euratom, the United States, Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

In his opening speech to the Review Conference in 1985, the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, stated that:

any weakening of the NPT will lead to the very condition - nuclear anarchy - that we are pledged to prevent. The implications of nuclear proliferation are so dangerous for all that we must find a realistic way to constrain such an unacceptable threat to common security and stability.²

Speaking in New Delhi on 7 February 1987, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark said that nuclear proliferation presented the world with "unparalleled dangers" which "must be guarded against collectively". He said that it was essential that all nuclear weapons and weapons-capable states sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty.³

¹ DEA Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy, 1985, p. 13.

² Douglas Roche, "Canadian Address to Third Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference", The Disarmament Bulletin, Autumn 1985, pp. 4-5.

³ DEA, Statement, 87/08, 13 Feb. 1987.

In October 1985 Mr. Roche had told the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence:

....Canada has strong credentials to play a role in the NPT, because we were the first nation in the world having the capacity to participate in nuclear development....We were the first nation having the capacity to renounce the development of nuclear weapons....We think it is of great importance that Canada play a strong role in the protection of the NPT this year.⁴

Parliamentary Comment

The Defence White Paper tabled in the House of Commons in June 1987 called for the purchase of 10-12 nuclear submarines. NDP member Pauline Jewett asked the Government where it planned to acquire the enriched uranium needed to power nuclear-powered submarines and suggested that Canada would have to violate its obligations under the NPT to do so. (See entries on Defence- Major Acquisitions and the Defence White Paper).

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⁴ Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND) Proceedings, Oct. 1985, pp. 5-6.

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Comprehensive Test Ban
 Uranium and Tritium Exports
 Canada as a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone

12. NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS NEGOTIATIONS

Background

On 8 January 1985, US Secretary of State George Shultz and the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, signed a joint communiqué outlining the nature and objectives of new negotiations "concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship."

When these negotiations, known as the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST), began on 27 March 1985, the opening positions of both sides demonstrated little change from those taken in the arms control talks (START) that had been discontinued the year before. However, on 30 September 1985, the Soviet negotiator, V. Karpov, presented a new proposal. The new proposal called for a 50 per cent reduction in strategic launchers and a 6,000-warhead ceiling with no more than 60 per cent of the warheads allowed on any one leg of the triad. A month later, the United States submitted a counterproposal calling for a warhead ceiling of 4500, a limit of 1500 on air-launched cruise missiles, and a sub-ceiling of 3000 on ICBM warheads.

When General Secretary Gorbachev and US President Reagan met at a summit in Geneva, on 19-21 November 1985, they issued a joint communiqué reiterating the objectives of the Geneva negotiations and agreeing to hold two more summits in the following years.

On 15 January 1986, Gorbachev made a public statement outlining a Soviet proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Reductions would occur in three stages over a fifteen-year period, culminating in a universal accord to prevent such weapons from coming into existence again. An important change was the inclusion of an offer to eliminate all US and Soviet intermediate-range missiles (INF) in the European zone. Early in February 1986, Soviet officials expanded on this offer by stating that an

INF agreement was possible without prior agreement on limitations on the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Over the summer of 1986 progress was made in the INF arena. In September 1986, the Soviets proposed that each side reduce their INF warheads to 100 each in Europe. The United States responded by proposing a 'global' limit of 200 INF warheads each, with 100 each in Europe, 100 in Soviet Asia and 100 in the territorial United States.

On 11-12 October 1986, with only two weeks prior notice, Reagan and Gorbachev met for their second summit in Reykjavik, Iceland. It seemed that an INF agreement might have been possible at that point but in fact the Summit dealt with all the issues under discussion at Geneva.

With respect to INF, Reagan and Gorbachev agreed on the complete elimination of all INF missiles in Europe. Each side would retain 100 INF warheads outside of Europe; the Soviets in Soviet Asia, the US on its territory.

As in the NST negotiations, the issues of strategic arms reductions and maintenance of the ABM Treaty were linked. Gorbachev proposed there be agreement not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years. In that ten-year period all nuclear weapons would be eliminated. Reagan proposed that the elimination of all ballistic missiles occur in the ten-year period. There was agreement that in the first five years both sides would reduce to 6000 strategic warheads each and 1600 strategic launchers.

Statements by both Reagan and Gorbachev immediately after the Summit indicated the talks had broken down over the issue of strategic defence. The Soviet proposal included a stipulation that both sides strictly adhere to the ABM Treaty and that the testing of elements of anti-ballistic defense in space be prohibited, except research and testing in

laboratories. Reagan was unwilling to accept this provision. At the close of the Summit, Gorbachev "re-linked" agreement on the INF issue to agreement on the larger package.

On 28 February 1987 Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would again separate the INF issue from the larger package. Negotiations on an INF agreement, based on the Reykjavik formula of zero INF in Europe and 100 in the US and Soviet Asia resumed.

As it became clear that an agreement to eliminate INF missiles in Europe was possible, Western European members of NATO became increasingly concerned about Soviet shorter-range intermediate forces (SRINF) in Europe. NATO does not have missiles of comparable range in Europe and Western European countries became concerned that the elimination of INF from Europe would leave them vulnerable to Soviet SRINF.

In April, while meeting with US Secretary of State George Shultz, Gorbachev confirmed that the Soviet Union was willing to eliminate SRINF in Europe. This concession in turn led to Western European fears of becoming vulnerable to Soviet superiority in conventional arms in a Europe free of SRINF and INF missiles. However, after consideration of the proposal NATO agreed to make elimination of both SRINF and INF missiles from Europe part of its negotiating position.

Finally, on 23 July Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would agree to eliminate all INF missiles rather than maintaining 100 in Asia. This solved the more difficult verification questions and the question of Alaska-based US missiles that were slowing down negotiations. The most important outstanding issue remaining was the fate of the seventy-two West German Pershing I missiles whose nuclear warheads are under US control. The US and West Germany want the missiles to remain while the Soviet Union wants them to be eliminated. US Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze will meet in September 1987 to discuss arms control.

Current Canadian Position

After the Reykjavik Summit, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, made a statement in the House of Commons commenting on the results of the Summit. Mr. Clark stated:

At Reykjavik three lessons were reinforced. The first two are: both sides are serious; and arms control is possible. But the third lesson is that arms control will not come easily. It is a deliberate and difficult process. The more sobering element of reality as it has emerged from Reykjavik lies in the fact that the two sides remain far apart in their views on the future role of strategic defences. This is not a question of saying yes or no to SDI but of finding a way of managing the research on defensive weapons in which both sides are engaged....

We are encouraged by the public undertakings of both the President and the General Secretary to build on the progress which was achieved at Reykjavik. The resumption last Wednesday in Geneva of the nuclear and space negotiations can only be regarded as more good news. The superpowers have succeeded in bringing a major arms control agreement tantalizing close. We cannot stop here....Canada's role is not simply to give advice. Many of the persisting obstacles to negotiating progress arise directly from a lack of trust....Arms control agreements alone do not produce security; confidence in compliance produces security. Verification justifies that confidence. Such an approach enhances the credibility of Canada's counsel.¹

During testimony in front of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) Mr. Clark elaborated further on his earlier statement:

This government has supported the United States in its efforts to secure such reductions. The current

¹ Commons Debates, 21 Oct. 1986, pp. 553-554.

US proposal...should be vigorously pursued, along with an agreement on INF missiles. The longer-term goals of eliminating ballistic missiles or nuclear weapons entirely requires, however, more time...nuclear deterrence must not be discarded or eroded without a satisfactory and acceptable alternative régime to ensure and enhance international stability and security. There is not much benefit to a nuclear-free world if that will only make it safe for devastating conventional war....A world with fewer ballistic missiles could increase the relative importance of bombers and of cruise missiles. We are studying the implications of that for our air defences.²

Responding to the Soviet offer to conclude a separate agreement on INF, Mr. Clark welcomed the Soviet move as a "positive development." He further stated:

Canada has actively supported the idea that an INF agreement should not depend on agreement being reached in strategic arms or on defensive systems. This support flows from Canada's belief that allowing achievable progress to be consolidated in concrete agreements is the most effective means of moving forward the arms control process and improving East-West relations.³

Parliamentary Comment

Liberal members Donald Johnston and Lloyd Axworthy pointed out that US insistence on keeping the SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) programme intact had been an important stumbling block at the Reykjavik Summit. Prime Minister Mulroney responded:

² SCEAIT Proceedings, 21 Jan. 1987, pp. 8-9.

³ DEA, Communiqué, 40, 1 Mar. 1987.

I am inclined to recognize that a serious problem exists, but also that there is the potential for future progress. Meeting under ideal conditions, both parties discussed a very complex and delicate problem, leaving in place mechanisms for sustained and continuing negotiations in the future.⁴

Mr. Axworthy asked that the Prime Minister take action to put the question of SDI on the agenda in Geneva. He asked:

In Canada's strong support for the continuation of negotiations, will the Prime Minister be communicating directly with our allies in the United States and urging them to reconsider their position and put the Star Wars SDI Program back on the agenda for Geneva so we can eliminate that stumbling block and reach an historic agreement?⁵

Mr. Mulroney replied:

I think there is a reason to be modestly hopeful. I think the elements are in place for an ongoing civilized dialogue at Geneva and, hopefully, which will result in Mr. Gorbachev's coming to the United States as agreed upon.⁶

Mr. Axworthy then asked the Prime Minister to draft a joint parliamentary resolution to urge that the question of SDI be put on the table at Geneva and that an agreement to limit the testing of SDI in space be achieved.

Mr. Mulroney replied: "I do not know why we would pass a resolution putting the question on the agenda when it clearly is on the agenda and it was on the agenda all weekend".⁷

Responding to the Secretary of State's comments on the Summit, Liberal

⁴ Commons Debates, 14 Oct. 1986, p. 330.

⁵ Ibid., p. 331.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

member Donald Johnston stated:

His comments are optimistic in the aftermath of the Reykjavik summit meeting....To a degree I share that optimism. However, I must say it has been very much tempered by the outcome. In my view a historic opportunity was lost in Reykjavik....It was lost because of the insistence of the United States on continuing to develop its Star Wars Initiative,...beyond laboratory testing.⁸

Responding to the same speech, NDP leader Ed Broadbent said:

There were moves on both sides, but the major moves were taken by the Soviet Union....The stumbling block...was in fact President Reagan's insistence on the United States' right to go ahead with the development of testing of Star Wars during the next ten years and the right to deploy such a system at the end of the decade....I would have liked the Secretary of State for External Affairs to say that clearly in the House today....⁹

Conservative member Bob Hicks also asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs to state that the US position on SDI and the ABM Treaty prevented agreement at Reykjavik. Mr. Clark responded:

The NDP leader said today that the Americans were trying to scuttle the ABM treaty. Quite the opposite occurred. The United States agreed at Reykjavik to respect that treaty for another ten years. That is real progress.¹⁰

During the SCEAIT Committee hearings Mr. Clark was again asked about the role SDI played in negotiations during the Reykjavik Summit. He responded:

⁸ Commons Debates, 21 Oct. 1986, p. 555.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 556-557.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 584.

I think there was an immediate reaction, largely among critics of the American administration, that SDI had played a major role in the final failure to agree on all of the matters that had been put forward....my view would be that it is being referred to less now and that indeed the emphasis now is less upon what actually might have been discussed at Reykjavik and more upon what legacy of Reykjavik may be capable of being pursued at Geneva or elsewhere.¹¹

Mr. Clark was also asked for his assessment of the European response to events at Reykjavik. He replied:

I think on the one hand satisfaction and surprise that as much progress appeared to have been made as did appear to have been made. I think however, also a certain renewal of...the old fear in Europe that there might be some actions taken that would deprive western Europe of the full scale of protection it now enjoys. I think that has been registered fully and effectively with the American administration and those fears are less lively now than they were.¹²

In a statement to the House on 2 March 1987, Liberal member Warren Allmand praised the Soviet offer for a deal in the INF area. He said:

It not only reopens the door to a concrete plan for action towards disarmament, but also augurs well for the talks between the two superpowers which ultimately will decide the fate of a world wanting to rid itself of all nuclear weapons. I urge our Government to support the two sides negotiating in good faith...and encourage our US neighbour to take most seriously this latest breakthrough on a matter of such critical importance.¹³

¹¹ SCEAIT Proceedings, 21 Jan. 1987, p. 14.

¹² Ibid., p. 15.

¹³ Commons Debates, 2 Mar. 1987, p. 3710.

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Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

Arms Control Treaty Compliance

Canada-US - Cruise Missile Testing

Canada-US - Research on the Strategic Defense Initiative

13. NUCLEAR WINTER

Background

The nuclear winter theory holds that an exchange of nuclear weapons could produce enough smoke and dust to cut off sunlight to the earth for months, or even years, thus causing a severe drop in temperature to somewhere below the freezing mark. Plant life and agriculture would be destroyed and any surviving animals and humans would starve. These effects would have a global impact, with the collapse of ecosystems and food supplies leading to worldwide starvation. The thesis was first put forward in 1983 by a group of American scientists, including astronomer Carl Sagan, and has since been the subject of several scientific studies, and of debates concerning its potential effect on nuclear strategic thinking.

On 27 November 1984 the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution, sponsored by Mexico and the Neutral and Non-aligned Nations, citing nuclear winter as a certain outcome of a nuclear exchange. Canada also tabled a resolution maintaining that nuclear winter was a worst-case-scenario outcome but subsequently withdrew the resolution for lack of support. Canada then voted in favour of the Mexican resolution.

On 31 January 1985, the Royal Society of Canada, responding to a request by the Government of Canada, presented its report entitled "Nuclear Winter and Associated Effects." The report concluded that a prima facie case supporting the nuclear winter hypothesis had been made, but that further study, possibly involving Canadian participation in the larger US research programme, was needed.

In mid-July 1986 the Canadian Forestry Service invited a group of international scientists to observe the controlled burning of approximately 800 hectares of crushed fir trees in Northern Ontario. Scientists also

observed the burning of five acres of dead brush in Los Angeles National Forest's San Dimas Experimental Forest in December 1986. It was thought that data on the smoke effects of these controlled fires would shed some light on the nuclear winter theory.

Studies conducted in 1986 by the National Centre for Atmospheric Research, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the United States have cast doubt on the original predictions of the nuclear winter hypothesis. Using detailed computer simulation models of climatic processes, researchers determined that the cooling effects following a nuclear exchange might not be as severe as originally predicted by Sagan and his associates. In their view, the world may be faced with a "nuclear autumn", an effect which would be essentially irrelevant amid the general devastation of a nuclear exchange.

Current Canadian Position

In response to the 1985 report of the Royal Society of Canada, the Canadian Government agreed that the nuclear winter hypothesis was scientifically credible, and called for further study of the phenomenon in co-operation with other countries.

In 1986 Canada voted in favour of UN Resolution 41/86 which requested the Secretary-General to carry out a study of the possible climatic and physical effects of nuclear war and submit it to the next session of the General Assembly. The Resolution passed by a vote of 140-1-10 with the US voting against.

Parliamentary Comment

The issue was not raised in the House of Commons.

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14. PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

Background

Although the prevention of an arms race in outer space has been considered by the United Nations since the beginning of the space age in the late 1950's, it was only taken up by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in a serious and comprehensive manner in 1982.

In 1961, a consensus resolution was passed in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) which identified the principles by which states should be guided in their exploration and use of outer space. It was established that international law, including the UN Charter, applied to outer space, and that outer space and all celestial bodies were free for all states to explore. Two years later, one hundred and twenty five countries including the US and the Soviet Union signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) forbidding nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater.

In December 1966, the UN General Assembly unanimously approved the Treaty on Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies. Canada ratified this treaty in 1967. The Outer Space Treaty, as it is known, states that the exploration and use of outer space shall be for the benefit of all, and bans all weapons of mass destruction in space.

The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union limits the number of anti-ballistic missile sites, interceptor missiles and associated radar, and tests of defensive weapons. Under Article V of the treaty the parties undertake "not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based." The ABM Treaty, therefore, acts as a barrier to the extension of the arms race into outer space.

In June 1979, bilateral superpower talks on anti-satellite (ASAT) activities were suspended after a year of inconclusive discussions. There was disagreement concerning the capabilities of each side in this area, and the possible defensive or offensive nature of ASAT weapons.

The Final Document of the First UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) urged that further agreements be developed to keep outer space for solely peaceful purposes.

In 1982, at the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II), Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau outlined Canada's official stand on the increasing militarization of outer space. He pointed out the "highly destabilizing" loopholes in the Outer Space Treaty, particularly those regarding "anti-satellite weapons or anti-missile laser systems."

I believe that we cannot wait much longer if we are to be successful in foreclosing the prospect of space wars. I propose, therefore, that an early start be made on a treaty to prohibit the development, testing and deployment of all weapons for use in space.¹

In 1982, as a contribution to the necessary preparation for substantive negotiations, Canada tabled a working paper which outlined the factors of stable and unstable deterrence, desirable objectives for arms control, the increasing importance of space for military purposes and the present state of arms control in space. The paper also illustrated the relationship of anti-satellite systems to ballistic missile defence.² The following year, Canada initiated a national research programme on the problems for verification which were likely to arise from the possible dual nature of many space systems.

¹ DEA, The Prime Minister's Address to the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, New York, 18 June, 1982, p. 10.

² CD 320, 26 Aug. 1982.

For a long time the forty nations represented at the Conference on Disarmament were unable to reach a consensus on a mandate for the Ad Hoc working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It was only in 1985 that the matter was resolved. It was agreed that in addition to studying the issues involved in such a ban the committee should also study existing treaties and international law relating to outer space along with any proposals concerning the issue.

In 1985 the Canadian delegation tabled a working paper entitled "Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space at the CD."³ This review of existing relevant agreements was considered essential to ensure that the CD worked in conformity with existing treaties and international law. Over twenty international agreements, including the UN Charter, were examined, and a variety of issues were identified that were deemed fundamental to the successful development of a treaty preventing an arms race in outer space.

The multilateral negotiations at the CD on the prevention of an arms race in outer space take into consideration the bilateral talks between United States and Soviet Union on this topic. The most important difference between these two parties is that Moscow thinks priority should be given to obtaining a general agreement banning on arms race in outer space, while Washington insists that the coverage of earlier agreements (1962-1967) should be examined first.

Current Canadian Position

Since the beginning of the 1980s Canada has been conducting a research

³ Conference on Disarmament Document 618, CD/OS/WP.6, 23 Jul. 1985.

project on verification "PAXSAT A" studying the feasibility of developing a system of satellites capable of verifying an arms control agreement in outer space. It is concerned with studying the application of space-based remote sensing technology to the tasks of verification for a treaty controlling the use of arms in outer space. A second project, PAXSAT 'B', is a feasibility study of the possibility of using space-based remote sensing to verify agreements on conventional weapons.

In a speech to the CD in April 1987 Ambassador Beesley gave an account of the requirements of a verification system of the type envisaged by PAXSAT A.⁴

At the CD in July 1986 Canada tabled an official paper on the terminology relevant to arms control in outer space. This drew attention to the fact that experts in international law disagreed as to how certain terms should be interpreted.

At the 41st session of the UN General Assembly Canada voted for Resolution 41/53 which called on the CD to give priority to the question of preventing an arms race in outer space, and to re-establish at the beginning of the 1987 session, the Ad Hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It also called on the United States and the Soviet Union to intensify their negotiations on this subject. No country voted against this resolution, and the only abstention was by the United States. The Resolution passed by a vote of 154-0-1.

Speaking before a workshop on outer space and arms control sponsored by the Department of External Affairs, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs outlined Canada's efforts in the field. He also stated:

⁴ CD/PV 410, 30 Apr. 1987.

Given the complexity of the issues and the need to ensure that any actions taken on agreement concluded do indeed contribute to strengthening international security in the long term, Canada hopes the CD will pursue its task with energy and deliberation.⁵

The Canadian Ambassador to the CD, Alan Beesley echoed this view and said:

The Outer Space Treaty of 1967...has been and remains the keystone of a legal framework which currently governs activities in outer space, including certain military activities. Canada believes that the multilateral dimension of arms control in outer space is gaining increasing importance and will continue to do so.⁶

Parliamentary Comment

The subject was discussed in the Commons on 3 February 1987 when NDP member Pauline Jewett put forward a private members motion to the effect.

That, in the opinion of this House, the Government should consider the advisability of drafting and promoting a treaty for the peaceful and non-military uses of space and space based technologies.

Ms. Jewett spoke of Canada's increased involvement in space activities and said that she believed "Canada should take a lead in maintaining the frontier of space for peaceful purposes."⁷ The treaty should

...prohibit weapons in space; it would forestall the deployment of anti-satellite weapons; it would prevent other types of militarization such as military training, research, and experimentation;....I would hope that such a treaty would create a world space organization that would concentrate on using space technology for peaceful international activities.⁸

⁵ DEA, Statement, 87/29, 15 May 1987, p. 3.

⁶ Conference on Disarmament, Final Record of the Four Hundred and Tenth Plenary Meeting, CD/PV. 410, 30 Apr. 1987, p. 12.

⁷ Commons Debates, 3 Feb. 1987, pp. 3046.

⁸ Ibid., p. 3047.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Finance, Pierre Vincent, referred to Canada's activities in the First Committee and at the CD which "attests to the Government's firm commitment to promote the peaceful use of, and the prevention of the arms race in, outer space."⁹

The Liberal member Lloyd Axworthy supported Miss Jewett's resolution and said he was not satisfied with Mr. Vincent's response which did not address "the ongoing development of the Strategic Defence Initiative and the clear determination on the part of the Reagan Administration to deploy that system in space at the earliest possible opportunity."¹⁰ He also maintained that some military activities in space were desirable, such as surveillance and verification and should not be precluded.

Conservative member, Reginald Stockhouse, dwelt on the need to focus on the peaceful uses of outer space. He hoped the record of the debate would:

...show some fuller attention given to the technological, scientific, and productive development of space because peace is not simply a matter of excluding conflict but also...of developing the opportunities for the human race to lead a fuller life.¹¹

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Deputy Prime Minister, Pierre Blais, ended the debate by pointing out that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space at the UN was already working towards a treaty. He also stated that Canada had contributed a great deal to work in this area and said that "at this time we already have another agency...and we should follow the course already taken."¹²

⁹ Ibid., p. 3048.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 3050.

¹² Ibid., p. 3053.

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Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
Canada-U.S. - Space Station
Verification

15. URANIUM AND TRITIUM EXPORTS

Background

Canada is one of the world's largest suppliers of uranium. It was involved in the research and development of the atomic bomb during World War II, and supplied uranium for atomic weapons from Port Radium in the Northwest Territories. In 1945 Canada renounced any intention of developing atomic weapons of its own but it continued to supply Britain and the United States with uranium and plutonium for their weapons programmes for the next twenty years. In 1965 Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson changed this policy and announced that from that point on Canadian exports of uranium would be used for peaceful purposes only. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970, requiring non-nuclear weapon states to submit to the full safeguard measures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to agree not to develop nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapon states are required to co-operate fully with non-nuclear states in the development of peaceful nuclear energy uses and have agreed to work to end vertical proliferation. Canada signed the NPT but continued to sell uranium to countries that had not signed this Treaty.

In 1974 India, which had participated in a nuclear co-operation programme with Canada, exploded an atomic bomb, claiming that it was a peaceful nuclear explosion. It initially stated that no agreement with Canada had been breached but later admitted that the plutonium used in the bomb had been produced in the Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor. In response, Canada suspended all nuclear co-operation with India and later that year announced more stringent safeguards on Canadian exports of nuclear material and equipment.

Natural uranium is a blend of Uranium²³⁵ and Uranium²³⁸. Uranium²³⁵ which can be used directly as a nuclear explosive constitutes less than 1 per cent of natural Uranium and this is too low to generate a nuclear

explosion. Natural uranium, therefore, is not classified as a strategic material. Approximately 85 per cent of Canadian uranium exported goes to the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France for enrichment and then for use in light water nuclear reactors. These reactors require uranium with a 3 per cent concentration of Uranium²³⁵ and natural uranium must be enriched to this concentration. This is done by increasing the percentage of the Uranium²³⁵ isotope. The enrichment procedure is elaborate and expensive and until recently only countries with nuclear weapons programmes could afford the cost of such large operations. These plants have both military and civilian uses, and therefore the separation of materials for civilian and military application occurs only as a bookkeeping procedure. Essentially, this is the basis of the principle of fungibility. Imported uranium effectively goes into a large pot and is not kept separate according to country of origin or intended use.

In a letter to Ed Broadbent, leader of the NDP, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark, outlined the principle of fungibility:

It is impossible to trace precisely each and every molecule of Canadian uranium through these complex enrichment plants....However, for each ounce of Canadian uranium fed into the enrichment plant the same amount, in both enriched and depleted forms as appropriate, is subject to the Canada-USA nuclear co-operation agreement and to the non-explosive use and non-military use commitments contained therein. This is an example of the application of the internationally-accepted principle of fungibility.¹

When the uranium is enriched to the required 3 per cent concentration, the commensurate amount is taken off and the "depleted uranium" (which still contains small amounts of ²³⁵) is stored. Depleted Uranium²³⁸ can be used

¹ Secretary of State for External Affairs, Letter to the Hon. Edward Broadbent, 3 October 1985.

in military reactors to breed plutonium which can be used to produce nuclear weapons. Uranium²³⁸ is also an important element of hydrogen bombs, providing 50 per cent of their explosive power.

After the Indian explosion in 1974, Canada announced that no uranium of Canadian origin could be enriched or reprocessed without prior consent from Canada. After two years of negotiations concerning this requirement, the European Economic Community (EEC) and Japan continued to refuse to agree to the stipulation, and in January 1977 Canada halted uranium shipments to both. Japan soon afterwards agreed to abide by the clause but the Community continued to balk and eventually, in September 1980, Canada signed an agreement with the EEC allowing sales to occur with consultation on a case-by-case basis. When Canadian uranium is enriched by the Soviet Union for use by Spain, East Germany, Sweden and Finland in their reactors, Canada requires that the depleted uranium be shipped to those countries along with the enriched. This requirement does not apply to Canadian uranium enriched in Britain, France and the United States, since these countries have bilateral agreements with Canada.

In 1965 Canada signed an agreement with the United States entitled the Canada-United States Nuclear Co-operation Agreement. This agreement stipulates that uranium from Canada can not be used for military purposes, and was most recently renewed in 1980. It requires that the amount of Canadian uranium entering an American plant must at least equal the amount of uranium enriched by that plant for non-military use (primarily light-water reactors).

Another key component of nuclear weapons, is tritium which is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, generally found as tritiated water. Canadian CANDU reactors use heavy water to control the nuclear reaction and the heavy water, containing deuterium, captures neutrons from the main reaction

chamber converting the deuterium to tritium. This process is peculiar to CANDU reactors and therefore more tritium is produced as a by-product by CANDU reactors than by other types of reactors.

Approximately 0.5 kg of tritium per year is used for civilian purposes such as phosphorescent runway lights and fusion experiments. Approximately 11 kg per year is used for military purposes. All but very primitive nuclear weapons contain tritium and because tritium decays at a rate of about 5.5 per cent per year, older nuclear weapons need to have their tritium supply replaced after a certain length of time.

The tritium by-products produced by CANDU reactors need to be removed for health and safety reasons and Ontario Hydro is therefore constructing a Tritium Recovery Facility at Darlington Ontario which is scheduled to begin operations in 1987. Ontario Hydro plans to market the recovered tritium which sells for approximately \$15 million/kg on the international market. Tritium is not classified as a nuclear material by the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) and is therefore not subject to their safeguards.

Current Canadian Position

(For the Canadian Government position on Uranium exports see the Guide for 1985-86)

In June 1986, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, responded to an open letter from author Margaret Laurence in which she expressed concern over Ontario Hydro's plans to export tritium. He stated:

...officials have consistently advised that any such exports would take place only within the general framework of Canada's non-proliferation policy as regards nuclear exports....The Canadian

Government believes that, given the physical nature of tritium and its limited proliferation significance, the application of safeguards to tritium is not appropriate. It should be clear, however, that export licences and permits for tritium will not be issued unless the Government is satisfied that tritium will not be used for nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive purposes.²

At the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Canada was the lead sponsor of a resolution entitled "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes" (UNGA Resolution 41/59L). The resolution passed by a vote of 148-1-6.

Parliamentary Comment

NDP member Bill Blaikie made a statement in the House of Commons protesting Ontario Hydro's plans to market tritium.

Most tritium that is produced in the world today is used for the manufacture of hydrogen and neutron bombs. The Government may claim that it intends to sell tritium only for civilian use, but, apart from the fact that it is nearly impossible to verify what is eventually done with a nuclear product, Canadian exports would certainly free up huge supplies of tritium for use in weapons production. If the Government allows Ontario Hydro to proceed and to export tritium to countries which have the capability of producing nuclear weapons, then Canada will be responsible for increasing the world's ability to produce nuclear weapons twentyfold.³

² Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, Letter to Margaret Laurence, 19 June 1986, as quoted in The Disarmament Bulletin, Summer-Autumn 1986, pp. 18-19.

³ Commons Debates, 11 Feb. 1987, p. 3321.

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Nuclear Freeze

16. VERIFICATION

Background

Verification is an issue which spans all areas of disarmament and arms control. It is at the heart of the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, the prohibition of chemical weapons and the peaceful uses of outer space. The difficulties which arise concerning verification have often made it impossible to reach an agreement on one or the other of these matters.

In 1986 the Soviet Union agreed to the principle of on-site inspection of nuclear tests. During 1987 the Soviet Union agreed to reveal the location of its stockpiles of chemical weapons and to allow on-site inspections. The Soviet Union also agreed that arms control agreements should be the subject of obligatory on-the-spot inspections at short notice.

In the summer of 1986 a private US research organisation, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), signed an agreement with the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The agreement allowed US scientists to set up seismic monitoring stations near the Soviet test site in Semipalatinsk and Soviet scientists to do the same near the US Nevada test site.

In 1983 the Canadian Government announced that it was launching the Arms Control Verification Research Programme. The programme was set up by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and involves the Government, the academic community and the commercial sector. Its objective is to improve the verification process as part of the effort to reduce arms and eventually eliminate them. The programme includes such projects as research concerning problems in international negotiations and the creation of specialized technical training programmes.

The Government's arms control priorities are: the achievement of a

comprehensive convention to ban chemical weapons; the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty; the development of a treaty to ban weapons for use in outer space; and the pursuit of arms control and military confidence-building in Europe.

Among the activities which the Government has undertaken as part of the verification programme are a \$3.2 million upgrade of the seismic array station at Yellowknife, two studies given to the UN Secretary General on operational procedures for investigating alleged chemical weapons abuses, and working papers on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The major project undertaken by the verification programme has been the PAXSAT research project. PAXSAT is a feasibility study of two potential applications of space-based remote sensing to the verification of multilateral arms control agreements. PAXSAT 'A' studies the use of space-based remote sensing for arms control agreements concerning satellites in space while PAXSAT 'B' is concerned with verifying conventional arms control agreements.

During the 1985 Fall Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Canadian delegation to the UN initiated and sponsored Resolution 40/152 entitled "Verification in All Its Aspects" which was passed by consensus. This was the first resolution on verification ever to be adopted by the UN.

The Resolution called upon member states "to increase their efforts towards achieving agreements on balanced, mutually acceptable, verifiable and effective arms limitation and disarmament measures." It also invited all members of the UN "to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than 15 April 1986, their views and suggestions on verification principles, procedures and techniques...and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification." The Resolution was called "a historic breakthrough", since previous resolutions on this issue had failed to proceed beyond the negotiating stage.

Carrying out the requirements of Resolution 40/152 O, in April 1986, the Canadian Government submitted to the Secretary-General and subsequently published "A Comprehensive Study on Arms Control and Disarmament Verification Pursuant to UNGA Resolution 40/152 (O)". This publication, in addition to describing the relevant principles, procedures and techniques used in verification, also foresees an important role for the United Nations in the application and interpretation of arms control agreements, despite the fact that the bilateral negotiations between the superpowers may continue to be of paramount importance in the global arms control programme.

Current Canadian Position

In 1986, during the first session of the UN General Assembly Canada sponsored Resolution 41/86 Q on the role of verification in arms control agreements and this resolution was once again adopted by consensus. The Resolution called upon states that had not already done so to submit their views and suggestions to the Secretary-General by 31 March 1987. It also asked the Disarmament Commission to put verification on its agenda and to report its conclusions at the next session of the General Assembly. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, issued a statement after the resolution was passed. He stated:

...the resolution will give further impetus to the consideration of verification by the United Nations, by referring the subject to the United Nations Disarmament Commission...[which] is expected to draw up principles, provisions and techniques to encourage the inclusion of adequate verification provisions in arms control and disarmament agreements....[the resolution] reflects the strong support of the international community for Canada's continuing efforts in this critical area.¹

¹ DEA, Communiqué, 14 Nov. 1986.

In his speech at Kiev, in the Soviet Union, on 11 December 1986, the Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, outlined the reasons why Canada stresses the importance of verification.

At the outset we must recognize that it is unfortunately true that arms control agreements cannot be negotiated on the basis of trust alone. The highly sophisticated nature of today's weapons means that, in order to be meaningful and durable, arms control and disarmament agreements must have provisions that ensure compliance and build confidence in the validity and integrity of a treaty. Because arms control agreements are directly related to the security of signatory nations, effective verification measures are vital.²

On 30 April 1987 the Canadian Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Alan Beesley, made a statement on Canada's verification programme. He recalled the contribution which Canada had made to the study of seismic verification and tabled the findings of a workshop of scientific experts which had met in Ottawa in the fall of 1986 to discuss seismic monitoring. He also outlined progress on the PAXSAT study and discussed Canada's research on verifying a chemical weapons ban.³

On 5 May, in a speech to the United Nations Disarmament Commission Ambassador Roche expressed gratification that Resolution 41/86 Q had been adopted without a vote and pointed out that

...there were over 20 co-sponsors representing all groups. The broad co-sponsorship underlines the growing recognition within the world community that adequate measures of verification are essential for effective arms control and disarmament measures.⁴

² DEA, Statements and Speeches, 11 Dec. 1986.

³ CD/PV, 410, 30 April 1987.

⁴ DEA Statements, 87/27, 11 May 1987.

Concerning the proposal to create a general international verification organization with responsibility for monitoring compliance with multilateral agreements Mr. Roche added:

Canada favours moving steadily towards the eventual creation of a general IV0, once the international community agrees on the desirability of establishing such an institution.⁵

Parliamentary Comment

Questions about Canada's verification programme have not been raised in the Commons since the summer of 1986.

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⁵ Ibid.

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SECTION II - DEFENCE

17. ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY AND SURVEILLANCE

Background

In 1880, when the Arctic islands first became part of Canada, a colonial bureaucrat noted:

The object in annexing these unexplored territories to Canada is to prevent the United States from claiming them, and not from the likelihood of their proving of any value to Canada.

Notwithstanding this view, successive Canadian Governments have attributed great political and economic value to the Arctic and its resources. Active involvement in the High Arctic began in the 1890s in the form of exploration and patrol expeditions. During World War II, the Canadian Arctic took on a new strategic significance when Canada gave permission to the United States to build a chain of airfields and weather stations in the Arctic in order to deliver military aircraft to the Soviet Union.

In 1955 Canada and the United States signed an agreement to build the Distant Early Warning System, a line of early warning radar stations stretched across the Canadian North. The main purpose of the system was to provide warning of a Soviet bomber attack across the North Pole against the continental United States.

While this increased activity in the Arctic was primarily initiated by the United States, co-operative agreements satisfied Canadian Government concern about the protection of sovereignty. This situation changed in 1969 when a privately owned American oil tanker, the Manhattan, attempted to cross the Northwest Passage without seeking the permission of the Canadian Government. Concerned both with the threat to sovereignty and possible increases in commercial shipping, the Canadian Government passed the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 1970, which established

Canadian environmental jurisdiction for up to 100 miles off the Arctic coasts. Following further multilateral efforts to codify the law of the sea this claim to regulation was acknowledged in Section 234 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (The United States does not recognize the authority of this Convention).

During the 1970s the resource potential of the Arctic grew substantially as reserves of oil and natural gas were discovered. Foreign and Canadian oil companies estimate that there are 8.5 billion barrels of oil beneath the Beaufort Sea and 65 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the High Arctic.

At the Quebec Summit in March 1985, Canada and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on developing the North Warning System (NWS), a line of modern long- and short-range radars to replace the DEW line. The NWS will be completely manned and controlled by Canadians, a change from the DEW line which was largely manned and operated by Americans.

Although the first nuclear submarine operated under the Arctic ice cap for an extended period of time as early as 1958, it is only recently that both superpowers have developed the technology needed to operate ballistic missile submarines under the ice. This capability has increased the potential for the Arctic to become a region of strategic importance to the superpowers, and has created new dilemmas for the Canadian Government. The presence of nuclear submarines is particularly difficult to detect and monitor effectively, thus posing a new challenge to the assertion of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.

In August 1985 a more visual threat to Canadian sovereignty presented itself in the form of the voyage of an US coast guard vessel, the Polar Sea, through the North West Passage. The declared purpose of this voyage was to shorten the sailing time to Alaska, but the US Government did not

request permission from the Canadian Government to make the voyage. Although the US Government made it clear that it did not agree with Canada's position on the status of the Arctic waters, it did propose that the voyage be on a co-operative basis. It also stated that the voyage did not prejudice the legal position of either government with regard to the waters.

John Anderson, at that time Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy at the Department of National Defence, explained the American view more fully:

...the Law of the Sea convention provided that international straits that would be closed by the extension of coastal jurisdiction under the other provisions of the Law of the Sea convention would become subject to a right of transit. That right of transit is without restriction....It covers operation of ships on the surface, submarines under the surface and aircraft above the surface [and] applies to straits that are considered to connect high seas to high seas....The Americans...contend that the Northwest Passage is such an international strait, connecting high seas to high seas. Canada contends that it is internal waters of Canada. Under the American interpretation of the status of those straits, even though we have closed them and made them internal waters, even though parts of that strait were closed as territorial sea when we extended the territorial sea to the 12-mile limit, under the 1983 convention a pre-existing right of transit would continue to exist.¹

Current Canadian Position

The Speech from the Throne, read by the Governor-General on 1 October 1986 said:

¹ Standing Committee on National Defence Proceedings, 5 May 1986, p. 34.

The government asserts complete sovereignty over the Canadian Arctic and recognizes that sovereignty requires a vigorous national presence. My government has drawn straight baselines around the perimeter of the Arctic archipelago to preserve Canadian sovereignty over the land, sea, and ice of the Canadian Arctic. Canada will construct one of the most powerful icebreakers in the world to enhance our sovereign rights and to contribute to the development of the North.²

In its response to the Special Joint Committee Report on International Relations the Government stated:

The government recognizes the importance of developing a coherent set of policies for the Arctic, including foreign policy. The major, closely interlinked components of policy will be: a) buttressing sovereignty over Arctic waters; b) modernizing northern defences; c) preparing for commercial use of the Northwest Passage, and d) expanding circumpolar relations, including contacts among northerners.³

The Government also stated that: "it would explore ways of expanding...bilateral and multilateral relations with all northern states" but said that because of the Soviet presence in the Arctic and likely Soviet unwillingness to cooperate, a demilitarized zone in the Arctic "does not seem practicable".⁴

Responding to questioning in the House of Commons, Mr. Clark made the following statement regarding ongoing negotiations with the US on Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic:

In September 1985, when we announced the dramatic action to assert Canada's sovereignty over our North, I also indicated that we would be entering

² Commons Debates, 1 Oct. 1986, p. 13.

³ DEA, Canada's International Relations, Dec. 1986, p. 85.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 86-87.

into discussions with the United States to see if there was some way we could have an arrangement that would serve their legitimate security interests and respect our sovereignty....I want to make the point that if there is a failure in those discussions, or if we are not satisfied that Canadian sovereignty will be respected, we are prepared to defend our claims to our North before the International Court of Justice....⁵

During an interview with US journalists prior to the Canada-US Summit, Prime Minister Mulroney stated this position further:

We are...aware of certain international, geopolitical realities where Canada as a friend and ally will seek to reach a mutually beneficial accommodation. But on the fundamental issue of sovereignty we expect the United States in the course of ongoing negotiations to recognize that and to reach an agreement with Canada.⁶

In the Defence White Paper delivered to the House in June the Government outlined its view of the situation in the Arctic. The Paper stated that the development of nuclear power for submarines has meant that the Arctic has become a viable passageway between the Arctic and Atlantic oceans.

In a period of tension or war, Soviet submarines could seek to operate off the deep channels of the Canadian Archipelago to intercept Allied submarines entering the Arctic...the Soviets might use these channels in war to reach patrol areas in the North Atlantic,...the Canadian Navy must be able to determine what is happening under the ice in the Canadian Arctic, and to deter hostile or potentially hostile intrusions.⁷

The White Paper announced a Government decision to purchase 10-12

⁵ Commons Debates, 23 Mar. 1987, p. 4446.

⁶ Prime Minister Mulroney, Interview with Meet the Press, 5 Apr. 1987.

⁷ DND, Challenge and Commitment, p. 50.

nuclear-powered submarines. Nuclear-powered submarines are the only vessel capable of operating under the ice for sustained periods of time and this was part of the rationale for the decision to purchase such submarines.⁸

Parliamentary Comment

During Hearings before the Standing Committee on National Defence (SCND) NDP member Derek Blackburn asked the Associate Minister for Defence, Mr. Paul Dick, about military exercises in the Arctic. He said:

I refer in my final question to the Secretary of State for External Affairs announcement,...that there would be naval exercises for the eastern Arctic. Now, these exercises never happened as such. I would like to know why they did not happen....⁹

Mr. Dick responded:

I can say generally...that there was an increase in surveillance by aircraft this year, and it will be maintained or enhanced again next year. There was some activity in the eastern Arctic, in the waters, by naval vessels.¹⁰

At a later hearing Mr. Blackburn asked the Minister of Defence about Canada's surveillance capabilities in the Arctic and whether we were completely dependent on allies or considering developing a Canadian capability in this area particularly as a way of controlling the choke points. Mr. Beatty responded:

I guess we would have a couple of concerns, seeing as one likely would not be entering our Arctic through those choke points. Would it be possible for somebody...to get into the Canadian Arctic and

⁸ Ibid., p. 53.

⁹ SCND, Proceedings, 2 Dec. 1986, p. 51.

¹⁰ Ibid.

hide there; possibly in the case of submarine-launched cruise missiles, to position themselves in a place where the southern areas of Canada become vulnerable? I do not believe...that simply looking at choke points, particularly in the southeast area, would give us the adequate coverage to ensure that somebody was kept out of the north.¹¹

Liberal member Russell MacLellan asked the Secretary of State to confirm whether three US submarines passed through Canadian waters on their way to surfacing at the North Pole on 6 May 1986 and whether they had asked Canadian permission. Mr. Clark responded:

...we have a variety of ways of knowing of the presence in our waters of submarines from the United States or other countries. I do not think...it would be in the interest of anyone, and certainly not in the Canadian national interest, to reveal publicly the nature of the means by which we come to that information.¹²

Progressive Conservative member Dave Nickerson, made a statement to the House on the issue of the three US submarines surfacing at the North Pole.

He stated:

...the reluctance of the Government of Canada to give straight answers regarding the May voyage...is leading to a suspicion on the part of Canadians that their Government was unaware of these manoeuvres and is now trying to save face.¹³

Liberal leader John Turner pursued the question that same day asking "had

¹¹ SCND Proceedings, 11 Dec. 1986, p. 18.

¹² Commons Debates, 5 Dec. 1986, p. 1823.

¹³ Commons Debates, 8 Dec. 1986, p. 1869.

the Canadian Government authorized in advance the presence of these American submarines in our Arctic waters?"¹⁴ Mr. Clark responded:

There have been reports of submarines having come to the surface at the North Pole. He would know that there are at least four routes by which they could have reached the North Pole, one Canadian and three American. I do not propose to be drawn into a question which might lead us to indicate the presence of submarines of Canadian allies anywhere in the world where that indication might work to the benefit of countries hostile to Canada.¹⁵

Liberal member Lloyd Axworthy asked Mr. Clark about the Government's response to the Special Joint Committee's proposal for a northern demilitarized zone. Mr. Clark responded:

...demilitarization, like disarmament, in order to be effective requires at least two to play. You cannot have unilateral demilitarization just as you cannot have unilateral disarmament.¹⁶

Conservative member Allan Lawrence asked:

...if the Government actually knows the routes taken by both Soviet and American submarines in the Arctic? Second...could he tell the House if there have actually been transgressions of Canadian sovereignty by Soviet and American submarines?¹⁷

Mr. Clark responded:

...I cannot say with confidence that we know all of the routes which might be taken, particularly by Soviet submarines....We have arrangements in place by which we can be informed of activities in our

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 1873.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Common Debates, 9 Dec. 1986, p. 1926.

watersThey are not as strong as they need to be. We are on the way to resolving that problem with regard to the ice-breaker, and we are naturally considering other measures which will allow us to ensure and protect Canada's sovereignty....¹⁸

NDP member Nelson Riis asked for assurances about renewed US activities in the Beaufort Sea area:

...the last time this area was open to some dispute the Minister sent a comment to the United States authorities asking them to back off....they are now back again. Is that a clear indication that they have ignored the plea from Canada?¹⁹

Mr. Clark replied:

...what happened before was that a note of protest was sent. As a consequence of that note being sent, the second step...the issuing of leases, was not proceeded with. In that case, what we requested was acted upon. I trust the request we have made this time will be acted upon.²⁰

The issue of US activities east of the 141st meridian in the Beaufort Sea was also raised by Liberal member Lloyd Axworthy who asked about hearings going on in the US:

In his note of protest did the Minister specifically ask that the hearings now being conducted be stopped until this particular issue is resolved and the Canadian rights to those territories are clearly identified?²¹

Mr. Clark responded:

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., p. 1924.

...We are asking the United States not to take any actions which would assume that those territories were not in dispute. When we last took that action, the United States agreed to the request....²²

Referring to an article in the New York Times which spoke of more extensive activities by US submarines in the Arctic, Pauline Jewett asked whether the US had asked permission for these activities. Mr. Clark stated:

...let me take this occasion to indicate publicly that the Government of Canada expects the US Government to respect and enforce the understanding among all NATO allies about not revealing the presence of our routes used by ships of the US or NATO fleets.²³

Conservative member Dave Nickerson made a statement in the House:

...in the wake of the Polar Sea transit, [the Government] announced...the Canadian Laws Offshore Application Act which was introduced into Parliament as Bill C-104 in April 1986. This Act would have confirmed Canadian jurisdiction within the area defined by drawing straight base lines around the islands of the Arctic Archipelago. Bill C-104 died on the Order Paper last June and to date it has not been reintroduced. What has happened to this Bill?²⁴

NDP member Pauline Jewett asked:

...will the Secretary of State for External Affairs quite explicitly assure the House that in the negotiations he is having with the United States there are not any discussions or negotiations on the question of Canadian sovereignty,...and that the United States...will not in fact be given full and free access to Canadian Arctic waters?²⁵

²² Ibid.

²³ Commons Debates, 19 Dec. 1986, p. 2296.

²⁴ Commons Debates, 26 Jan. 1987, p. 2680.

²⁵ Commons Debates, 23 Mar. 1987, p. 4447.

Mr. Clark responded:

...I presume what [she] is asking is whether or not, as a result of the discussions,...other countries would not be able to pass through our sovereign waters without our permission or agreement. That is the purpose of the negotiations.²⁶

Liberal leader John Turner asked the Prime Minister about his Summit meeting with President Reagan:

Why did the Prime Minister not receive an unconditional commitment from the President...recognizing in clear terms Canada's sovereignty over our Arctic,...complete sovereignty, unequivocal and unchallenged?²⁷

The Prime Minister replied:

I indicated prior to the presidential visit that we were not looking for anything other than steady, serious progress in all these matters. I think we have made some progress.²⁸

Liberal member Don Johnston pursued the question and Mr. Clark replied:

We are trying to work out an arrangement which will,...involve a mutual respect for sovereignty but will also take account of other interests. If that fails, we will be prepared, if challenged, to go to the International Court of Justice.²⁹

NDP member Pauline Jewett also raised the question of a deal between Canada

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Commons Debates, 7 Apr. 1987, p. 4926.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 4927.

and the US on the Arctic and asked for a full public discussion on the issue. Mr. Clark replied:

I have had discussions with the Heads of Government of both Yukon and Northwest Territories. I would be pleased to meet with members of opposition Parties to bring them up to date on the discussions....³⁰

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³⁰ Ibid., p. 4929.

18. ARMS TRANSFERS

Background

The global trade in conventional arms has expanded considerably during the past decade, from a worldwide total of deliveries of US\$ 63.3 billion during 1974-77 to US\$ 150.5 billion during the 1982-85 period.¹ Although the share of the supplier market held by the superpowers has decreased since the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union still accounted for 56 per cent of total arms deliveries in the years 1982-85. Britain, France, Italy and West Germany together held 21 per cent of the market during that period. The total of world arms deliveries has declined since 1982 from a peak of US\$ 42 billion (1983 dollars) to US\$ 27 billion.²

Arms imports of developing countries have also declined. In 1985 developing countries imported US\$ 21.8 billion in arms as opposed to US\$ 33.2 billion in 1982.³ Overall, between 1982-85, 80 per cent of global exports of conventional arms were purchased by developing countries. Half of these (51 per cent) went to the Middle East, followed by 18 per cent to Africa, 13 per cent to East Asia, 9 per cent to Latin America and 7 per cent to South Asia.⁴

There have been important attempts to regulate both the supply and demand side of the global arms trade. In 1974 eight Latin American countries signed the Declaration of Ayacucho, in which they pledged to work towards arms acquisition limitation agreements in their region. No concrete agreements were reached, but the initiative was revived by the Peruvian Government in 1985. The Contadora draft treaty, debated in 1985, contains provisions for the comprehensive limitation of arms transfers to Central America.

¹ Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Washington, ACDA, 1986, p. 147.

² Ibid., p. 6.

³ Ibid., pp. 147.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 147-148.

In 1977 the Carter Administration committed the United States to unilateral arms exports limitations and to negotiating multilateral restraints with the other major exporters. This initiative led to the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) talks with the Soviet Union. Four sets of discussions were held on this issue without result, and the process was abandoned in 1979.⁵

There has since been a decline in the priority attached to this issue by the main exporters. The idea of increasing the international availability of arms trade statistics, as an interim step towards arms trade regulation, was put forward by the UN Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, in their 1981 report. The Canadian Government responded to this recommendation, in 1982, by stating that it "...whole-heartedly supports the spirit and letter of this recommendation...."⁶

Canada is not a major player in the global conventional arms trade: it ranks twenty-seventh in the world's suppliers, far behind the superpowers, the secondary exporters and the new tier of exporters. Indeed, Canada's arms exports account for less than 0.7 per cent of the global conventional arms trade.⁷

The volume of Canada's military exports has nevertheless grown over the years, from \$ 336.2 million in 1970 to \$ 721.7 million in 1980, and \$ 1,902.7 million in 1985.⁸ Over 70 per cent of these exports were sold to US purchasers, a pattern reflecting both the overall continental orientation of Canadian trade and the impact of the Defence Production

⁵ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1980, London, Taylor and Francis, 1980, pp. 121-126.

⁶ UNGA, Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, Report of the Secretary-General, A/S-12/13, 14 May 1982, p. 10.

⁷ Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Washington, United States ACDA, 1986, pp. 101, 111.

⁸ DEA, Statistics on Canada's Defence Exports, Apr. 1986, unpublished.

Sharing Agreement (DPSA) between Canada and the United States.

Questions have been raised in the past about Canada's arms exports practices. Alleged violations of the Canadian policy, particularly the granting of export permits for the sale of strategic goods to governments involved in conflicts or known to systematically violate human rights, have been the subject of public debate. The need to enforce end-use provisions in arms sales contracts, as exemplified by the existence of Canadian military supplies in Vietnam and the resale of Canadian F-86 fighters to Pakistan in 1965, have also attracted public attention.⁹

Current Canadian Position

On 10 September 1986 after a review of Canadian policy on military exports the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, announced revised guidelines for Canadian export controls.¹⁰

The new guidelines restrict military exports to:

- countries with a persistent record of serious violations of human rights "unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population";
- countries under UN Security Council sanctions;
- countries involved in or under imminent threat of hostilities.

⁹ Regehr, E., Making a Killing: Canada's Arms Industry, Toronto, McClelland Stewart, 1975, pp. 5-8, 51-52. Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility, Annual Report 1983-84, Toronto, 1984, pp. 16, 53-54.

¹⁰ For a full overview of the new policy see: "Export Controls Policy" DEA Communiqué, no. 155, 10 Sep. 1986.

Exports of civilian strategic equipment will continue to be restricted to the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and countries where there is a risk the goods will be rerouted to these destinations (COCOM proscribed destinations). Restrictions on exports of peaceful civilian goods to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact will be lifted.

Previously Canadian policy had treated military and civilian exports together. The new policy focuses on military goods. Military goods have been defined according to the International Munitions List (Group 7 of the current Export Control List). This definition includes arms and ammunition along with equipment "specially designed for military purposes".

In particular the most major change is in exports to countries that have poor human rights records. Previously exports had been limited to regimes "wholly repugnant" to Canadian values but, since no regime was ever declared as such, exports to countries with human rights problems were controlled on an ad hoc basis. The new policy puts the onus on the exporter to prove that there is "no reasonable risk" the military equipment will be used against the civilian population.

Exports to South Africa continue to be limited as stipulated under UN Security Resolution 418 (1977). Further restrictions on the export of strategic and military goods to South Africa have been implemented.

The background paper accompanying the Minister's announcement stated:

...the Government recognizes the importance of the Canadian defence industry. Canada's defence industry is necessary for reasons of national security and sovereignty and has over the years made an important contribution to Canada's economic well being....

Canadian defence sector companies produce for the most part defensive military equipment and strategic products....It is not possible for our defence industry to recover the large costs of development of their products through Canadian

sales alone. Therefore, these goods are primarily exported to the United States and to our NATO allies....In recognition of this fact, the Government will continue to maintain an open approach to the export of military goods...to our NATO allies and other friendly countries.¹¹

Parliamentary Comment

When the controversy concerning arms sales to Iran arose in the United States, questions about Canadian sales to Iran were raised in Parliament. Pratt & Whitney had exported helicopter parts to Iran and opposition members inquired as to why permission for this sale had been granted and at what level the decision had been made. Mr. Axworthy pointed out that the helicopter engine in question was listed by the Department of External Affairs as having military purposes. The Deputy Prime Minister, Don Mazankowski replied:

...we have been assured that this was a commercially oriented transaction. There have been cases where permit applications have been refused....Where there is a clear case of spare parts being used for military purposes, the export permit requests are turned down.¹²

NDP member Pauline Jewett pursued the issue. She indicated that a company in Texas had refused to sell helicopter parts to Iran because it was confident they were being used for military purposes.¹³ Liberal member Don Johnston asked the Deputy Prime Minister whether the US government had asked the Canadian Government to approve the sale. Mr. Mazankowski replied:

¹¹ DEA Communiqué, no. 155, 10 Sep. 1986, p. 2.

¹² Commons Debates, 17 Nov. 1986, p. 1221.

¹³ Ibid., p. 1223.

...we have been assured that it was a straight commercial, civilian oriented transaction....I think the issuance of the export permits was in compliance with the policies of the Government at that time.¹⁴

Mr. Johnston raised the issue of US involvement in the sale again the next day. He asked: "...were there representations made by the US Administration to the Canadian Government to relax or set aside our export control policy?"¹⁵

Mr. Mazankowski replied:

...the assemblies in question had a US component for which an export control permit was sought. Because the assemblies in this particular case were used for civilian commercial use, no permit was required.¹⁶

Responding to further questioning, Mr. Mazankowski announced that Pratt & Whitney had voluntarily suspended further shipments of the helicopter parts and that "there has been an acknowledgement of the dual capability of these machines."¹⁷

Pauline Jewett asked whether the Government was aware that Pratt & Whitney engines were being used in helicopters by a Swiss company and that those helicopters were being used by both sides in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. Mr. Mazankowski replied that he would look into the issue.¹⁸

The issue of possible US involvement in granting Pratt & Whitney the export permits was raised again by Mr. Johnston and Pauline Jewett on 19 and 20 November. In both cases the response from the Government was that there was no US encouragement or solicitation of the sale of the helicopter parts to Iran.¹⁹ Questions on this issue were raised again in December as CIA director William

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Commons Debates, 18 Nov. 1986, p. 1277.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 1278.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 1279.

¹⁹ Commons Debates, 19 Nov. 1986, p. 1321; 20 Nov. 1986, p. 1362.

Casey testified before Congress,²⁰ and later in February as questions of Canadian involvement in arms sales to the Nicaraguan Contra rebels surfaced. Specifically opposition members raised concerns after a report appeared in a Montreal newspaper stating that a Canadian company was involved in such sales.

Mr. Clark stated: "Any Canadian companies shipping arms to those destinations do so contrary to Canadian policy....There is now an active RCMP investigation."²¹

During hearings before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) Mr. Clark addressed the possibility of using "end-user" certificates to cut down on the possible misuse of dual-purpose exports. He said:

...one possible device can in fact be an end-user certificate. That...was what was invoked by Pratt & Whitney - on their own,...to bring an end to the abuse by the user of the engines that were being exported....I am concerned about the implications that legitimate Canadian exports might be diverted to other purposes. I want to tighten that up.²²

Opposition members objected to Canadian exports to countries with human rights problems despite the new Government provisions. NDP member Nelson Riis asked about exports to Chile. Mr. Clark responded that the exports consisted of electrical equipment not military equipment.²³ Questions of Canadian arms exports to Syria and Indonesia were also raised.²⁴

NDP member Pauline Jewett asked about a conference sponsored by the Department of External Affairs to promote military exports. She said:

²⁰ Commons Debates, 11 Dec. 1986, pp. 2015-2017; 12 Dec. 1986, pp. 2048-52.

²¹ Commons Debates, 12 Feb. 1987, p. 3373. See also: Commons Debates, 18 Mar. 1987, p. 4289; 4 June 1987, p. 6731.

²² SCEAIT Proceedings, 21 Jan. 1987, p. 30.

²³ Commons Debates, 27 Jan. 1987, p. 2741.

²⁴ Commons Debates, 27 Jan. 1987, p. 2741, 17 Feb. 1987, p. 3522.

Can the Minister explain why the Department would, at public expense, be promoting military and military-related exports to countries which have major human rights violations or are in the midst of conflict or are CIDA recipients? Why are we, at public expense, promoting military exports to those countries?²⁵

Mr. Clark replied:

One of the reasons that we are prepared to promote military exports is because there are a number of Canadian jobs involved in the production of military equipment....the term 'military equipment' covers much more than weapons.²⁶

Liberal member Lloyd Axworthy asked Mr. Clark about tightening restrictions on Canadian exports given the ease with which Canadian arms can be shipped to countries through intermediary countries. Mr. Clark responded that he was willing to further examine the problem and said that he would welcome suggestions on the matter.²⁷

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Project Ploughshares, Taskforce of the Churches on Corporate Responsibility, "A response to the guidelines: Canada's Military Exports Policy", Ploughshares Monitor, June 1987, pp. 9-10.

²⁵ Commons Debates, 4 Mar. 1987, p. 3807.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Commons Debates, 4 June 1987, p. 6731.

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Non-Proliferation Treaty
Uranium and Tritium Exports

19. CANADA-US - CRUISE MISSILE TESTING

Background

On 10 February 1983 Canada signed an agreement with the United States entitled the "Canada/US (CANUS) Test and Evaluation Program" which established a procedure for the testing of US defence systems in Canada. The agreement is valid for five years, and was renewed automatically for another five years on 28 February 1987. The agreement can be ended on twelve months' notice. The agreement is not reciprocal since it only covers the testing of US systems in Canada. Under the agreement the United States could ask to test the following systems: artillery equipment; helicopters; surveillance and identification systems; advanced non-nuclear munitions; aircraft navigation systems; and the guidance system for unarmed cruise missiles. Canada may refuse any project and no biological, chemical or nuclear weapons may be brought into the country.¹

On 15 July 1983, the Canadian Government announced that it had agreed to allow the testing of the AGM-86B Air-launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) in Canada. The Government stated that the testing of the cruise missile guidance system was "linked intimately to Canada's security as a member of NATO and NORAD and to Canada's policy on arms control and disarmament." The cruise missile is an unmanned vehicle propelled by a jet engine that can carry conventional or nuclear warheads and be sea-, ground- or air-launched. The use of Canadian territory was explained on the ground that it offers extensive stretches of uninhabited cold weather terrain similar to the attack routes into the Soviet Union. Four to six tests per year of the unarmed ALCM are allowed and take place in the first three months of every year to ensure the proper weather conditions. The Government stressed that "this in no way changed Canada's own renunciation of nuclear weapons for our national forces."

¹ DND, Cruise Missile Testing in Canada, Background Notes, 1983.

The agreement to test the cruise missile generated considerable public debate among Canadians who felt it compromised Canada's position on nuclear weapons and contributed to the arms race. There was also concern about the potential harm to Canadian citizens and the Canadian environment should anything go wrong during a test. In announcing individual tests the Government has assured Canadians that the flight of the cruise missile will never be closer than eight kilometres "to any built-up area."

The Government also stated that the Canadian approach:

...is grounded in several elements: our founding membership in NATO, our dedication to the global dimension of peace and stability, our active pursuit of verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements, and our longstanding decision not to develop our own national nuclear force.

Two groups were formed within the Department of National Defence (DND) to oversee the process. A steering group exercises authority over the programme itself and makes recommendations concerning projects which are acceptable to Canada. A co-ordinating group reviews the feasibility of the projects and administers the programme. Every year on 1 January the United States submits a 30-month forecast to DND outlining the projects they wish to implement in Canada. After review and ministerial approval the Government informs the US of its approval in principle. US sponsors then submit a project proposal to DND. This is again reviewed and the proper authority granted, at which point a project arrangement is jointly developed which, when signed, allows testing to begin. Cabinet approval may be required for specific projects.

Only one test of the cruise missile was carried out in 1984. In 1985, three tests occurred. On 15 January, there was a "captive carry" test of the electronic guidance system in which four ALCMs were carried on a B-52 bomber; this was followed by a free flight test on 19 February, and another one on 25 February. All three tests were successful.

In 1986, two tests occurred. On 22 January, there was a free flight test which included a practice interception by two Canadian CF-18 fighters. The missile crashed in a wooded area, near the end of its flight; on 25 February, there was another free flight test in which the engine failed to ignite and the missile fell into the Beaufort Sea.

Two tests were carried out in 1987. A free flight test took place on 24 February in which US F-4 and F-16 fighters joined CF-18 fighters in trying to intercept the missile. A second, similar test was carried out on 1 March.

At the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks the United States and the Soviet Union have tentatively agreed to count ALCMs as part of a ceiling of 6,000 on nuclear warheads. The question of limitations on strategic arms remains linked to that of strategic defences and there has therefore been no final agreement.

Current Canadian Position

A Department of National Defence publication of January 1985 stated that the ALCM is an important retaliatory element of the US strategic triad which provides the ultimate deterrent for NATO. Canada's willingness to test the cruise missile is rooted in its obligation to NATO and the strengthening of deterrence. This continues to be the Government's position. During testimony to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, Secretary of State Joe Clark reiterated this position. He said:

...[ending cruise missile tests] are steps Canada could take. They would be taken with some very real consequences. One of the consequences would be that we would be putting aside obligations we have assumed as part of the Alliance. I have made it clear that I do not intend to do that with regard to cruise testing, because I think if we intend to exercise some influence over both our own destiny and the policy of the Alliance of which we

are a part, we cannot do that without assuming some obligation.²

Responding to an NDP motion to end cruise missile testing, Mr. Clark stated:

One of the Government's priorities in our arms control and disarmament policy is the enhancement of strategic stability. The air-launched cruise missile with its long flight time and its relatively slow recallable carrier is currently among the most stabilizing elements of nuclear deterrent forces. However, we believe that it too should be subject to arms control restraints. We have supported the inclusion of air-launched cruise missiles in the limits on strategic nuclear arms being negotiated at the Geneva talks.... One does not help people get to the negotiating table and then, just when the hard negotiation is about to begin, weaken the side which one supports.³

The umbrella-testing agreement reaches the end of its first five-year term on 28 February 1988. Since the Government did not state any intention of withdrawing from the agreement by 28 February 1987 (twelve months' notice) the agreement was automatically renewed for a second five-year term. The Associate Minister for National Defence made this renewal clear to the House. He pointed out:

...the project arrangements for cruise missile testing is part of an over-all test and evaluation agreement with the United States....Those [news] reports have left an impression that the Government is committed to a further five years [of cruise missile testing]. This is, of course, not the case. ...The agreement has always been and still is, liable to termination at any time by either party giving 12 months' notice.... Either party can terminate a specific arrangement under

² Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade Proceedings, 21 January 1987, p. 23.

³ Commons Debates, 6 Mar. 1987, p. 3909.

the agreement—for example, cruise missile testing—at any time on one day's notice should imperative circumstances so warrant.... We have repeatedly stated our intention to carry on, and will do so, but this in no way precludes second thoughts should circumstances change.⁴

Parliamentary Comment

On 1 December 1986 Liberal members John Nunziata and Warren Allmand called attention to resolutions made at a Liberal Party convention including a resolution to end cruise missile testing.⁵

In early February an access to information request made by Project Ploughshares uncovered the title of an internal DND memorandum which read: "Project Proposal for Captive Carry Tests of the AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile." NDP member Pauline Jewett asked the Minister for National Defence, Perrin Beatty, whether Canadian had received a request from the United States to test the advanced cruise missile. She asked:

As the Minister knows, testing the Advanced Cruise Missile, which is the Cruise using what is called "stealth" technology, would give a major impetus to Canada's participation in the escalation of the nuclear arms race. Has the Pentagon asked Canada to test the Advanced Cruise missiles and, if so, when and what has been Canada's response?⁶

Mr. Beatty replied that "there is no request before Canada at the present time"⁷ Ms. Jewett pursued the question the next day:

As the Minister is aware "project proposal" is the term used to denote a formal, detailed US request

⁴ Ibid., p. 3918.

⁵ Commons Debates, 1 Dec. 1986, pp. 1635, 1638.

⁶ Commons Debates, 2 Feb. 1987, p. 2974.

⁷ Ibid.

for weapon testing under the Canada-US testing agreement. Now that the Minister knows of the existence of this request from the United States, of almost a year ago, will the Minister tell the House...what Canada's response was....?⁸

Mr. Beatty replied "...what I can do is repeat...what I said yesterday, namely, that there is no current request before Canada at the present time to test the Advanced Cruise."⁹

Ms. Jewett asked Secretary of State, Joe Clark whether the possibility of a US-Soviet agreement on intermediate-range weapons in Europe would change the Canadian position on cruise missile testing. She stated:

When the Liberal Government of the day agreed in 1983 to test the cruise missile in Canada, the then Secretary of State...said...that we would test cruise missiles until "concrete results were achieved in the INF negotiations";...Will the Government indicate now that it too will end cruise missile tests if the breakthrough on INF in Geneva is realized?¹⁰

Mr. Clark responded:

What is taking place in Geneva...is that a discussion which appeared to be closed has now been opened. We will determine Canadian Government policy on the basis of what is actually decided in Geneva.¹¹

On 6 March 1987, Ms. Jewett put forward an NDP motion to end cruise missile testing. The motion read:

That this House, alarmed by the role of air-launched cruise missile deployment in violation of SALT limits and alarmed by threats to the integrity of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,

⁸ Commons Debates, 3 Feb. 1987, p. 3032.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 2 Mar. 1987, p. 3719.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 3720.

aware also of the possibility of a negotiated elimination of all medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, calls for strong initiatives by the government to strengthen arms control and disarmament measures including the termination of cruise missile testing in Canada.¹²

Ms. Jewett spoke to the motion in its three parts. With respect to the SALT agreement she pointed out that:

This is particularly important for Canada, and for Canadians, because it is we who test the air-launched cruise missile. The breach of the limits on those bombers carrying air-launched missiles made us directly complicit in the breach. That is why we called then for giving notice of termination of our testing program.¹³

Ms. Jewett also stated that the possibility of a new interpretation of the ABM Treaty and early deployment of SDI would encourage the Soviet Union to build up its traditionally small bomber and cruise missile force as well as the rest of its offensive forces. Finally, an INF deal in Europe should lead the Government to re-evaluate its policy on testing cruise missiles:

...[an INF agreement] will be for nought if, through the violation of SALT II limits, and through the destroying of the ABM Treaty by the development and deployment of Star Wars, all we are doing is enhancing the threat that comes to both sides by the development of strategic offensive weapons.¹⁴

Ms. Jewett stated that as a result of all these factors, cruise missile testing should be ended.

It seems to me that the Conservative party has said all the right things on SALT II and on the ABM Treaty, but it has not made enough criticism of

¹² Commons Debates, 6 Mar. 1987, p. 3901.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

testing development and possible deployment of Star Wars. ...It has said that it has urged the United States not to breach treaties. It has urged it to go ahead with the Soviet Union on arms reductions. However, it has not given a clear message to the United States. It is not enough just to say that we adhere to arms control régimes. We must show that we adhere to them....

We must take the one element of all these matters which touches upon Canadians most directly,...- the testing of the air-launched cruise missile - and say that we will not any longer be complicitly involved in the dangers of the dismantling or potential dismantling of treaties.¹⁵

Liberal leader John Turner then proposed an amendment to the motion. He moved that: "...the motion be amended by changing the period at the end of the motion to a comma and adding the following: "in a manner consistent with Canada's NATO and bilateral obligations."¹⁶ Mr. Turner stated that otherwise the motion was unacceptable to the Liberal party:

...[the motion] is not acceptable to us because it does strike at the heart of NATO's collective defence. It would commit us, we believe explicitly but certainly implicitly, to unilateral disarmament and neutralism for Canada, the course to which my Party cannot subscribe....Mutual deterrence, however much we regret it, is the instrument by which both East and West are now currently maintaining peace....

We shall want to terminate cruise missile testing as a contribution to disarmament negotiations. Therefore, we clearly look forward to concrete results in the negotiations....The timing of any such termination should further and enhance the pursuit of those negotiations.¹⁷

Debate then centered on the question of divisions within the Liberal Party on the issue. Ms. Jewett responded to Mr. Turner's criticisms of the motion by pointing out that Canada's agreement to test the cruise missile

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 3902-3.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 3905.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 3904.

is a bilateral arrangement with the United States and that it is not unusual for NATO allies to have independent policies on these issues.

...is [he] aware that various member countries of NATO take independent initiatives all the time?

They are not accused of being isolationist and neutralist. Some refuse to have foreign troops on their soil. Some refuse deployment of nuclear weapons on their soil....Some refuse to test cruise missiles....Why does he say that Canada, like Norway, Belgium or other West European powers, if in its best judgement such a decision should be made, cannot make such a decision?¹⁸

The debate then moved to a discussion of the proposed Liberal amendment. Members of the NDP party suggested that the amendment was out of order because it was a contradiction of the motion itself. Other members responded by stating that the motion itself was not clear in stating how and when the tests should be terminated; at the end of the first five-year period or immediately?

Mr. Clark spoke against the resolution. He stated:

This resolution suggests that to support unarmed cruise missile testing in Canada is to oppose SALT II. That is false. This motion suggests that Canada could strengthen the West's negotiating position by breaking the western solidarity which helped bring the Soviet Union to the table....It would have the opposite effect.... The point to underline, however, is that arms control negotiations have begun again in earnest. It is important for us both to reflect upon how that happened, how it came to be and also to consider what it might mean....in the longer perspective it is undeniably the case that a major factor leading to these arms control negotiations has been the consistent unity displayed by the allies of the United States....¹⁹

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 3905.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 3908-9.

The vote on the motion was taken on 9 March 1987. The amendment proposed by Mr. Turner was defeated by a vote of 29 in favour and 118 against. The motion itself was defeated by a vote of 27 in favour and 122 against. Four Liberal members voted with the NDP Party in favour of the motion. This prompted questions in the House concerning the official position of the Liberal Party on the issue and the degree of support it received from party members.²⁰

Current References

For the full debate on the NDP motion in the House of Commons see: Commons Debates, 6 March 1987, pp. 3901-3926.

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Cross References

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
Arms Control Treaty Compliance
Nuclear and Space Arms Talks

²⁰ See: Commons Debates, 9 Mar. 1987, p. 3948, 10 Mar. 1987, p. 4001, 11 Mar. 1987, p. 4039.

20. CANADA-US - NORAD

Background

The North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) was formed on an interim basis by Canada and the United States on 7 August 1957, and was formally established on 12 May 1958. The initial NORAD Agreement was of ten years duration. It established an integrated command framework to control the active and passive defence systems required to protect North American airspace. These included a joint fighter-interceptor force and a number of radar sites across the continent. By 1957 the Soviet Union had developed both an atomic weapon capability and a large long range bomber force. NORAD was a response to both these developments and to the resulting concern among American and Canadian strategic planners who feared a surprise Soviet bomber attack against US military bases and population centres.

Canada had previously undertaken three joint efforts with the United States in radar surveillance. The Pinetree Line which stretched across 50° North latitude began as a United States project. In 1951 Canada and the United States agreed to share the costs of its extension to cover areas of Canada. The Distant Early Warning (DEW) line was completed in 1957. The DEW Line consists of a series of short-range radars extending across the Canadian north (the 70th parallel). This system will be phased out as the new North Warning System (NWS) begins operations. The Mid-Canada line, which began operations in 1954, consisted of a string of 98 detection sites across the 55th Parallel and was completely designed, built and financed by Canada. This system was completely deactivated by 1965.

The NORAD Agreement was renewed in 1968 for a period of five years. At that time, a clause stating that the NORAD Agreement would "not involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defence" was inserted as part of the Agreement. In 1973 the Agreement was

only renewed for a further two years to allow a re-evaluation of the strategic situation. The Soviet Union had by now developed an arsenal of intercontinental nuclear weapons of its own and the threat of a Soviet attack coming by way of the long-range bomber had faded. This change coincided with the commencement of negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The 1975 renewal reflected the changed strategic situation. Although defence against air attack remained a basic tenet of the Agreement, new emphasis was placed on the need to deal with the possibility of ballistic missile attack. NORAD functions now included:

- warning and assessment of ballistic missile attack and ensuring an effective response should deterrence fail;
- space surveillance;
- maintenance of peacetime surveillance to warn of bomber attack and limited defence against bombers.

This also involved the development and maintenance of new surveillance systems such as the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) and the Satellite Early Warning System (SEWS) which did not directly involve Canada. Although the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty had been signed by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1972, the clause precluding Canada from any involvement in a ballistic missile defence system remained.

In 1980 the Agreement was renewed for a one-year term because of an upcoming election in Canada. The 1981 renewal was for five years, and changed the name of NORAD to North American Aerospace Defence Command, (replacing 'air' with 'aerospace'). This recognition of the changing nature of the threat to North American airspace led to a further redefinition of NORAD's roles which now involved aerospace surveillance and warning and characterization of aerospace attack. The 1981 Agreement also removed the ABM clause.

On 18 March 1985, Canada signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States establishing a framework for the upgrading of NORAD's surveillance assets. Most importantly, the Memorandum set out the terms for the construction of the North Warning System (NWS) which is slated to replace the DEW line system.

The modernized system outlined in the Agreement consists of:

- a system of Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radars to be deployed in the United States to monitor the eastern, western and southern approaches to the continent;
- the North Warning System (NWS), which will replace the obsolescent Distant Early Warning System in Alaska and the Canadian North;
- USAF Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) to supplement the NWS at times of alert;
- forward operating locations and dispersed operating bases to be developed at existing Canadian airfields in order to accommodate AWACS and fighter aircraft;
- communications equipment to facilitate the command and control of interceptors.

Canada has agreed to meet all the communications needs of the system. In particular this involves designing and implementing a system of communication between the radar stations, and integrating the radars with the Regional Operational Control Centres (ROCCs) in North Bay. Any new facilities required by the NWS in Canada will be designed and built by Canadians. After 1989 Canada will become the programme manager and will oversee the final development and construction stages. Once the NWS has been completed (1992) Canada will assume complete operational control of that portion of the NWS that is within Canada. Canadians will also be involved in the manning of the OTH-B radars in the United States and (to an as yet undetermined extent) in the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).

The entire modernization programme will cost approximately \$7 billion. The estimated cost of the NWS is \$1.29 billion. Canada will assume 40 per cent of the cost (\$511 million) and the United States 60 per cent (\$777 million). This 60/40 cost sharing relationship will also apply to the operation and maintenance costs of the system.

On 19 March 1986 Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and US President Reagan renewed the NORAD agreement for a further five years. No changes were made in the agreement.

Current Canadian Position

As part of the Canadian support for NORAD and the air defence modernization agreement signed with the US, the Minister of National Defence, Perrin Beatty, announced that Canada would be building five new airfields in northern Canada. These airfields will be used by NORAD interceptor aircraft to respond to unidentified aircraft detected by the North Warning System (NWS). The airfields will be located at Inuvik, Yellowknife, Rankin Inlet, Iqaluit in the North West Territories and Kuujuaq in Quebec. The cost of the programme will be shared equally with the US. Mr. Beatty stated:

These northern airfields will be a joint NORAD project with both partners involved. This is an essential element of the air defence modernization project previously announced.¹

The Defence White Paper, tabled in the House of Commons on 5 June 1987 outlines the various projects undertaken in the North American Air Defence Modernization Program and announced that Canada would participate in the US Air Defense Initiative (ADI). The Paper also outlines research programmes

¹ DND, New Release, 21/87, 11 Mar. 1987.

in space-based systems that may eventually replace ground-based systems such as the North Warning System.

In developing space-based or space-related systems, Canada will continue to co-operate and share costs, experience, technology and responsibilities with the United States, as we have done for almost 30 years in NORAD. In air defence the nature and cost of technology have demonstrated the logic of a continental defence partnership. The same logic applies to space. We therefore anticipate continuing participation with the United States in all forms of early warning and surveillance relevant to North American air defence, whether the means be ground, air or space-based.²

Parliamentary Comment

During hearings before the Standing Committee on National Defence (SCND) Conservative member Alan McKinnon asked representatives of the Department of National Defence about the proposed location of the North Warning System. Mr. McKinnon inquired about shifting the location of the system farther north:

What is the difference in cost between putting it along the shore of the mainland and putting it along the northwest shore of the archipelago...³.

Mr. Robert Fowler, the Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy replied:

It is essentially a cost-benefit decision. I have heard figures in excess of \$500 million in addition in terms of cost. It could give certainly some additional warning, but it would not give an additional warning in all eventualities....We had envisaged that relatively soon, within 10 to 15

² DND, Challenge and Commitment, p. 59.

³ SCND Proceedings, 28 Jan. 1987, p. 30.

years, the name of the surveillance game will be in space. It therefore was a rather hard-nosed cost decision that for the amount of money we were prepared to spend, we could get the coverage we needed with the current system.⁴

Liberal member Len Hopkins inquired about the system that would follow the NWS:

Is a Canadian satellite system not going to be the next generation to succeed the present North Warning System or to supplement it? If so it should be Canadian owned. Are there any long-term projections or discussions on this subject going on? If it is not Canadian owned, then how can we use it for our own sovereignty in the north if we have to share it with somebody else?⁵

Mr. Fowler replied:

The current North Warning System is a joint venture with the United States in order to jointly protect our continent. I think it would be reasonable to consider the system replacing it which will likely be in space, will also be jointly operated and funded. I am not saying there is any firm decision there at all, but we are talking about joint continental defence.⁶

Liberal member George Baker asked the Associate Minister of National Defence about Canada's capability to intercept Soviet aircraft in Canadian airspace. He said:

Is the Associate Minister of National Defence aware that we, under his Government, have to rely on US interceptor jets scrambled from US Air Force bases to intercept Soviet bombers that test our defence

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., p. 40.

⁶ Ibid.

lines in the North Atlantic?⁷

The Associate Minister of Defence, Paul Dick, responded by describing an incident where Canadian CF-18s intercepted Soviet Bear bombers. Mr. Baker pursued the question again:

...there have been three incidents of interceptions of Soviet Bears in Canadian airspace this year. Two of the three interceptions were made by American interceptor jets. Since these Bear aircraft normally come down from Greenland and Iceland and are intercepted off the Labrador coast, and since the Government announced new [interceptor] bases...why did it not put those jets where the action takes place, in Newfoundland and Labrador....⁸

Mr. Dick replied:

They were placed in Bagotville because it is more central to the entire northern region rather than only Newfoundland. We usually scramble our aircraft from Bagotville to Gander, the take-off point....we happen to have an agreement which we believe is working extremely well. It is called NORAD. We and the United States work together.⁹

During hearings before the Standing Committee on National Defence (SCND) Liberal member Doug Frith asked about how often the US would be using the new northern airfields and under what conditions. Vice Admiral Brodeur responded:

It would largely depend on the threat situation at the time. Whether the interceptors that would be forward-located would be the Canadian CF-18 or the US F-15 would depend very much on the circumstances. But while they operate in the Canadian NORAD region, they would be under its

⁷ Commons Debates, 27 Mar. 1987, p. 4633.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., p. 4634.

operational command.¹⁰

Mr. Frith then inquired about the choice of location of the airfields. D. B. Dewar, the Deputy Minister for National Defence responded:

The locations reflect judgements made about the range of the aircraft, the likely areas where interception for identification would be wanted, given the location of the North Warning System and the capacity of the ground controllers to maintain direction over the aircraft.¹¹

During later SCND hearings NDP member Derek Blackburn pursued the question of possible Canadian involvement in the US Air Defence Initiative (ADI) with officials of the Department of National Defence. When Mr. Healey (ADM (Material)) responded that Canada was not "directly linked" with the ADI programme, Mr. Blackburn then inquired as to whether the US would need Canadian territory for ADI or would be able to proceed without Canadian co-operation. He said:

It seems to me,...that there will come a time very shortly when the Americans will not be able to proceed without us. Is that a fair assumption?... ..do you anticipate that the Americans can proceed with their active depenetration surveillance and interception capabilities in their ADI program without Canadian co-operation....¹²

Mr. Healey responded:

Obviously any consideration of the defence of North America will have to take into account the work both sides are doing in this area. It has obviously been our policy that co-operation is the route to a more secure North American Air Defence....I think it would be our considered

¹⁰ SCND Proceedings, 17 Mar. 1987, p. 32.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 33.

¹² SCND Proceedings, 26 Mar. 1987, p. 8.

judgement at this stage that co-operation continues to be the appropriate route. We would see a coming together of the work we are both doing to ensure the North American continent is well defended against the atmospheric and air-breathing threat we have joined together to defend against so far.¹³

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¹³ Ibid.

21. CANADA-US: RESEARCH ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

Background

In his speech of 23 March 1983, President Reagan asked: "What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant US retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could interrupt and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?" President Reagan then called upon the American scientific community "who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete."

This vision of a leak-proof defence that could shield the entire population from nuclear weapons called into question previous assumptions about strategic doctrine. Nuclear deterrence rests on the assumption of mutual vulnerability - both sides accept that an attack on the other is certain to result in an unacceptably punitive response. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972, reinforced the logic of mutual deterrence by prohibiting the development of a nationwide ballistic missile defence. While President Reagan insisted that this new research would remain within the limits set down by the ABM Treaty, critics have expressed concern that the SDI may mark the beginning of the end of the ABM Treaty (See the ABM Treaty).

President Reagan's request led to National Security Study Directive 6-83 which established two study groups to examine the issue and outline how such a research programme could be shaped.

Both panels rejected the idea of a leak-proof population defence but supported limited defences, which, they claimed, would enhance deterrence by increasing the uncertainties of attack for the Soviet Union. On 6

January 1984 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 119 established a research programme called the Strategic Defense Initiative. In March 1984 Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson was appointed to head the project and in April the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was formed. The cost of the programme was estimated to be \$26 billion over a five-year period.

In February of 1985, almost a year after the SDI began, Paul Nitze, special advisor to the President on arms control, stated that the United States would not go ahead with the SDI on the basis of technological feasibility alone. A decision to continue the programme would be subject to other stringent criteria. He stated that the technologies must be survivable and be cost-effective at the margin, "that is, it must be cheap enough to add additional defensive capability so that the other side has no incentive to add additional offensive capability to overcome the defence."

Within NATO, reaction to the SDI was mixed. European allies feared the SDI would lead to US withdrawal or a weakening US commitment to the defence of Europe. Allies also feared that the SDI would spark the Soviet Union into greatly increasing its offensive forces, and generate a new, more dangerous arms race.

On 26 March 1985 Canada with all other NATO allies, as well as Australia, Japan and Israel, received a letter from US Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger. Weinberger reassured US allies that they were to be included in the benefits of the SDI programme and the decision-making process, and invited them to become participants in the research stage of the programme, insofar as they were allowed under the limits of the ABM Treaty.

On 7 September 1985 Canada refused the offer of government to government participation in the research programme but left open the possibility that private companies could compete for SDI contracts.

Current Canadian Position

On 14 October 1986, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney reiterated the Canadian position on the US Strategic Defense Initiative that had been established in September 1985. He stated:

...although this Canadian Government will not agree to take part in the government-to-government development of this policy and in the research involved, I think...that in the circumstances and considering the activities being deployed by the other side, it was a prudent gesture on the part of the United States and the Alliance to undertake research in this field.¹

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Jean-Guy Hudon expanded on the support the Government gives to the SDI by stating the Government's support for a move to a more defence dominated world less dependent on deterrence. He stated:

...both superpowers should indeed consider the possibility of jointly and progressively abandoning a deterrent system based on guaranteed mutual destruction through offensive nuclear weapons and opt instead for defensive systems combined with reduced arsenals of offensive weapons. This was the position of the American negotiators at the Geneva discussions on nuclear and space armament and we supported it.²

In a statement following the visit of Mr. Paul Nitze, Special Advisor to the US President on arms control, Mr. Clark elaborated on this position:

We believe...that any transition to a greater dependence on strategic defences should be

¹ Commons Debates, 14 Oct. 1986, p. 330.

² Commons Debates, 15 Dec. 1986, p. 2133.

undertaken on a mutually agreed basis by both superpowers and should be combined with significant reductions in strategic offensive forces....We welcome the assurance by Secretary of State Shultz that the USA administration considers premature any decision on deployment of a ballistic missile defence at this point.³

In his speech before a meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly in Quebec City, Prime Minister Mulroney stated that strategic defences must meet the criteria outlined by Mr. Nitze - cost effectiveness, survivability, and affordability - along with two other criteria: "extreme care must be taken to ensure that defences are not integrated with existing forces in such a way as to create fears of a first strike" and "we cannot allow strategic defences to undermine the arms control process".⁴

Parliamentary Comment

NDP member David Orlikow asked the Minister of State for Science and Technology about National Research Council funds being used to finance Canadian participation in SDI research. Mr. Oberle replied: "...the Hon. Member's premise is wrong. The Government is not actively involved with any aspect of the SDI project in the United States."⁵

NDP member Derek Blackburn pursued the question of the limits of permissible SDI research under the ABM Treaty and said:

...is it not fair for us to ask the Government not to support that private research in case that private research does result in the abrogation of Clause 5 of the ABM Treaty?⁶

³ DEA Statement, 87/14, 5 Mar. 1987.

⁴ Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address Before the North Atlantic Assembly", 23 May 1987, p. 3.

⁵ Commons Debates, 14 Oct. 1986, p. 338.

⁶ Commons Debates, 21 Oct. 1986, p. 581.

Another member, Lorne Nystrom asked whether the Government was

...in agreement with the Quebec Minister, Pierre MacDonald who says that the federal Government policy permits provincial Crown corporations to participate in Reagan's Star Wars program of the United States?⁷

Michel Côté, the Minister of Regional Industrial Expansion replied: "We want to let the companies decide for themselves whether they want to take part in this program or not...." Mr. Nystrom then pursued the issue suggesting that allowing Crown corporations to participate in SDI research was a violation of the Government's policy.⁸

The Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Mazankowski replied: "While Government initiatives were not to be condoned, private companies and institutions interested in participating in the program would be free to pursue such opportunities."⁹

In responding to the tabling of the Government's Response to the Special Joint Committee Report on International Relations, Liberal member Don Johnston outlined the Liberal view of SDI:

We believe the SDI Initiative is in breach of [the ABM] Treaty. The Minister may argue that under the letter of the law,...it is not in breach....This is not a job for Philadelphia lawyers. This is a job for statesmen. The SDI Initiative is blocking progress on disarmament, a declared objective of the Government....¹⁰

Liberal member Lloyd Axworthy called upon the Government to join in a joint resolution of parliament which would communicate support for the arms

⁷ Commons Debates, 18 Nov. 1986, p. 1280.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 4 Dec. 1986, p. 1766.

control proposals discussed at Reykjavik. He emphasized that President Reagan's refusal to limit research and development on the SDI programme had been the major stumbling block in reaching agreement at Reykjavik.¹¹

Speaking during an adjournment debate, NDP member Derek Blackburn expressed a similar view and called upon the Government to withdraw all its support for the SDI programme. Mr. Blackburn stated:

In a nutshell, the Canadian Government says it will support Star Wars only if research conforms strictly with the ABM Treaty, and the Americans say they can and will ignore the Treaty. Therefore, the Government can no longer support Star Wars....the Government began by defending SDI as prudent research to keep up with the Soviet Union. However, prudent research is exactly what President Reagan turned down by refusing to keep research in the laboratory for 10 years....Some argued that Star Wars would bring the Soviets back to the bargaining table. However, when Mr. Gorbachev came and made the concessions in offensive arms which the West had been seeking for years, President Reagan would not bargain....It has come down to a choice between Star Wars and arms control....Canada must now say no to Star Wars.¹²

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Jean-Guy Hudon replied:

...there is no doubt that SDI has something to do with the USSR returning to the Geneva negotiation table and the more pragmatic approach taken by the Soviets in recent months. It is unfortunate that at Reykjavik Mr. Gorbachev unilaterally chose to make SDI interruption a prerequisite of progress in other sectors of nuclear armament control.¹³

¹¹ Commons Debates, 27 Oct. 1986, p. 792.

¹² Commons Debates, 15 Dec. 1986, p. 2133.

¹³ Ibid.

During testimony before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) Mr. Clark responded to further questions about SDI being the stumbling block to progress at the Reykjavik Summit. He said:

The fact that a disagreement between the two superpowers existed on the American SDI program did not stop them from meeting, and certainly did not stop very significant proposals from being made - indeed, is not stopping them from being considered now at Geneva.¹⁴

NDP member Pauline Jewett said that an Ottawa firm was selling material to the United States for the SDI programme and that equipment from the National Research Council was being used. She asked about the NRC involvement and asked that the Government give the House information on Government agencies involved in programmes for SDI research.¹⁵

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¹⁴ SCEAIT Hearings, 21 Jan. 1987, p. 14.

¹⁵ Commons Debates, 15 May 1987, p. 6143.

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22. CANADA-US SPACE STATION

Background

In his State of the Union address in January 1984, President Reagan announced the beginning of a United States project to build a space station, and invited the US allies to participate. In response, Canada commissioned studies on the potential costs and benefits of participation in the project and on 30 March 1985 it announced its commitment in principle.

The space station would be built, in space, over a two-year period and is expected to be operational by 1994.

The Canadian contribution to the project would consist of construction of a Mobile Servicing Centre (MSC) which will service the instruments and payloads of the station, aid in the deployment and retrieval of satellites and aid in the actual construction of the station. In return for this contribution Canada will receive preferred access to all of the station's facilities.

The initial estimated cost of the station is \$12 billion, of which the United States is expected to contribute \$8 billion, the European Space Agency (ESA) about \$2 billion, the Japanese \$1 billion and Canada approximately \$800 million. The ESA is developing an orbiting laboratory for the station and Japan plans to develop a research laboratory and an unpressurized facility for space experiments.

On 7 April 1987, in a letter to Secretary of State George Shultz, US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated that the United States should be prepared to go ahead alone with the space station project rather than

accept any limitations that would preclude unilateral US decisions to use the station for military activities. This brought the international negotiations to a temporary halt while the US Departments of Defense and of State tried to settle the dispute.

Current Canadian Position

Responding to questions during a hearing before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT), Mr. Clark outlined the Canadian position on possible military use of the space station.

We were in touch with the United States on Friday, January 16. We indicated that we would be seriously concerned about activities aboard the space station which might constitute a reorientation of the primarily civilian character of the program.¹

The Minister of State for Science and Technology, Frank Oberle, told the Standing Committee on Research, Science and Technology, that in order to give the space station a useful "strategic military position" the design of the station would have to be changed.

...the station is designed to be operating near an equatorial orbit, which makes it of absolutely no strategic use for any military purposes....I made a public announcement and said if it should be the intention [of the US] to integrate this Space Station into SDI we would not be partners....Nor would the Europeans be partners....That sent an important signal to NASA and the State Department and the Pentagon that if they have any intentions other than those contained in the President's invitation...they had better state them right away and know what the consequences would be.²

¹ SCEAIT Proceedings, 21 Jan. 1987, p. 12.

² Standing Committee on Research, Science and Technology Proceedings, 2 Mar. 1987, pp. 34-35.

Parliamentary Comment

During SCEAIT hearings Liberal member Don Johnston suggested that Canadian involvement in a space station associated with SDI would be a violation of the Government's policy on SDI.³ Mr. Johnston raised the question again in the House of Commons with respect to Canada-US talks that had occurred in Washington on the space station issue. Mr. Johnston asked whether the Government was now satisfied that the space station would not be used for military purposes. Mr. Clark replied:

...I am not satisfied with the answer we got from the US authorities....the Canadian Government will insist on the interpretation that was given by the United States Administration when the project was announced. Use for defence purposes was supposed to be very minimal.⁴

NDP member David Orlikow asked about the Government's reaction to statements by the US Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, which implied the space station would be used for SDI-related activities. Mr. Clark stated that this was still only the position of Secretary Weinberger and not yet the official policy of the US Administration. Canada believed that the original agreement should be respected.⁵

At hearings before the Standing Committee on Research, Science and Technology (SCRST) officials from the Department of External Affairs answered questions about the space station programme and its possible military use by the United States. Mr. R. J. L. Berlet, Director General for the Technology and Investment Bureau at the Department of External Affairs pointed out that there were some "military uses" of the space station that might interest Canada and would be consistent with

³ SCEAIT Proceedings, 21 Jan. 1987, p. 29.

⁴ Commons Debates, 13 Feb. 1987, p. 3409.

⁵ Commons Debates, 9 Apr. 1987, p. 5007.

Canadian foreign policy. These included things such as verification, communications and search and rescue.⁶

Responding to questions from Liberal member David Berger, Mr. Berlet outlined what had happened in the United States to raise the issue of military use. He said:

...in the discussions the US was having with all the international partners over the course of the summer and autumn, certain agencies in the United States started interpreting the way the discussions were going as foreclosing the possibility of the Department of Defense using it for any purposes....we have been told that there are no DOD plans for using the space station.⁷

Mr. Berlet went on to say that the Canadian Government was trying to negotiate the establishment of a mechanism within the space-station programme that would allow Canada, and other participants, to consider and evaluate proposals for military uses of the space station before the project is put into action.⁸

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⁶ SCRST Proceedings, 26 Mar. 1987, p. 15.

⁷ Ibid., p. 17.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 17, 28.

23. THE DEFENCE BUDGET AND THE WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE

Background

The 1987-88 Overall Expenditure Plan of the Federal Government projects total expenditures of \$110.07 billion of which \$10.34 billion or 10.8 per cent will go to the Department of National Defence (DND). \$200 million of this was deferred by the Department of Finance to be restored in 1988-89. In 1986-87 \$9.91 (9.5 per cent) of a total \$116.54 billion went to DND. Of the \$10.34 billion allocated to DND, \$2.74 billion or 26 per cent will be devoted to Capital Expenditures.

Ongoing projects that fall under Capital Expenditures include:

- Tribal Class Update and Modernization project
- construction of new Canadian patrol frigates
- the ongoing CF18 procurement programme
- the Destroyer Life Extension programme
- procurement of a Tactical Towed Array Sonar System
- procurement of six De Havilland Dash 8 aircraft
- acquisition of Challenger aircraft
- construction of the North Warning System

The remainder of the budget is spent on operating expenses, salaries, pensions and benefits.

Despite election promises of an increase of 6 per cent in the defence budget, the Conservative Government announced in November 1984 that the 1985 projection was being reduced. The 1985, 1986 and 1987 budgets are therefore not markedly different from the defence budgets of previous governments.

The Defence White Paper, Challenge and Commitment, was tabled in the House

of Commons by the Minister of Defence on 5 June 1987. The Defence White Paper provides a new defence strategy for Canadian Forces over the next fifteen years.

Current Canadian Position

On 18 February 1987, the Minister of Finance, Michael Wilson, announced that \$200 million of the defence budget for 1987-88 would be deferred until 1988-89.¹ The defence budget for 1987-88 is therefore \$10.14 billion.²

The White Paper stated that there have been significant changes in the international environment since the publication of the last white paper (1971). These include changes in the Pacific area - possible conflicts between Asian countries, the economic rise of Japan - and the new strategic importance of the Arctic especially in view of the threat of new Soviet cruise missiles.³ Although deterrence has endured, the international arena remains dominated by the rivalry between East and West. Canada's security rests first and foremost on the promotion of a stable international environment and therefore continuation of Canada's commitment to central Europe is essential.⁴

The White Paper stated that after a review of Canadian defence policy, a "significant commitment-capability gap" was found to exist. This has come about as a result of a long-term trend of spending less on defence. The gap has reached such significant proportions that if current trends were allowed to continue Canadian Forces would face a situation of "rust-out" by the mid-1990s.

Three options to rectify the situation were outlined: increase funding

¹ Commons Debates, 18 Feb. 1987, p. 3576.

² DND, National Defence 1987-88 Estimates, Part III.

³ DND, Challenge and Commitment, 5 June 1987, p. 6.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 3, 5.

commitments and consequently resources to allow the Canadian Forces to become capable of meeting their commitments; reduce commitments to the point where they could be met by existing forces; or a combination of the first two alternatives. The Department of National Defence chose to mix the alternatives.⁵

Canada's contribution to NORAD and the defence of North America will continue without significant change, but Canada's commitment to Europe will be altered by eliminating its commitment to send the CAST brigade to northern Norway in a time of crisis. Instead, the CAST brigade will be assigned to the central front in Germany. In this way the logistical difficulties that plagued the Norway commitment will be lessened and Canada will be able to contribute a "division-sized" force in Germany in a time of crisis.⁶ (For more details on this issue see NATO entry).

Speaking before the House of Commons, the Minister of National Defence, Perrin Beatty said:

Consolidation into land and air divisions and the addition of divisional elements will provide larger, more effective and more visible Canadian contributions to the conventional deterrent and defence needs of the Alliance in Europe.⁷

The most significant change announced in the White Paper is the development of a three-ocean navy. In his speech before the House, Mr. Beatty stated:

The first key element in our new defence strategy is the creation of a three-ocean navy to protect our three-ocean country. The deplorable state of the navy is well known....The problem is so serious that we must either engage in a major rebuilding of

⁵ Ibid., p. 47.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 61-62.

⁷ Commons Debates, 5 June 1987, p. 6777.

our navy or give up even the pretence of being able to protect our waters. We have decided to introduce ship, submarine and helicopter replacement programs....⁸

In particular the new three-ocean navy strategy put new emphasis on the need to have an active presence in the Arctic. To this end, a fixed sonar system will be deployed in the Arctic and 10-12 nuclear powered submarines will be purchased.

Submarines are essential to meet current and evolving long-range ocean surveillance and control requirements in the Atlantic and Pacific as well as in the Arctic. Nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) are uniquely capable anti-submarine platforms....The SSN can also shift more rapidly from one area to another to meet changing circumstances....Given the vast distances in the three-ocean areas in which Canada requires maritime forces and the SSN's unlimited endurance and flexibility, the Government has decided to acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines to enhance the overall effectiveness of the Canadian navy.⁹

Finally, the White Paper promised significant increases in the Reserves. Reserve strength is projected to increase to 90,000 over the 15-year period and the Reserves will be given specific tasks such as minesweeping. New resources will be devoted to the Reserves and conditions of service will be altered to make it easier to coordinate reserve work with employment.¹⁰

Parliamentary Comment

Prior to the publication of the White Paper, NDP member Derek Blackburn

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Challenge and Commitment, p. 52.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 66.

asked the Minister of Defence about comments he had made to the press concerning US involvement in the preparation of the Paper. Mr. Blackburn asked, "Why has the American Defence Secretary been kept 'fully involved and informed' about the White Paper when this Parliament has seen nothing concrete....?"¹¹ Mr. Beatty responded that as a partner in NATO and NORAD Canada had a responsibility to consult its allies.¹²

In response to the Minister's speech on the White Paper, Liberal member Doug Frith emphasized the need for Canadian defence policy to be coordinated with foreign policy. By eliminating the CAST commitment to Norway and imposing a military solution to a legal problem in the Arctic the White Paper has failed to complement foreign policy. Although Mr. Frith said that he was in favour of improving the navy, he took particular issue with the decision to purchase nuclear-powered submarines. He stated:

I reject the assertion that the only method of addressing the security issue in the Arctic is the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines....It is our view that a combination of detection devices with increased air patrols and surface ships,...can provide a visible security presence in Canada's Arctic. I believe that in the long run a combination of conventionally powered submarines, frigates and air patrols will be a much more cost-effective way of dealing with the security problem....¹³

Mr. Frith stated that the real threat in the Arctic was not Soviet submarines but US submarines. In hearings before the Standing Committee on National Defence he had learned that, "There is no proof yet that the Soviets have used their nuclear-powered submarines under the Canadian ice cap."¹⁴

¹¹ Commons Debates, 5 May 1987, p. 5761.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Commons Debates, 5 June 1987, p. 6780.

¹⁴ Ibid.

NDP member Derek Blackburn made similar statements. He also advocated a navy based on a mix of conventional submarines, air patrols and fixed sensors as a way of protecting Canada's three coasts.

Mr. Blackburn emphasized the need to focus on arms control as a way of working to lessen the threat of nuclear attack and called upon the Government to do more in this area. In particular he suggested the Government refuse to participate in SDI and refuse to test the cruise missile. Mr. Blackburn also advocated developing a "sovereign defence for Canada" by pulling back CF-18 fighters from Europe for deployment in the Arctic and purchasing and operating AWACS.¹⁵

Liberal member Doug Frith continued questioning in the House of Commons. He asked the Acting Minister of Defence what Canadian submarines would do when they met foreign subs in Canadian Arctic waters. Mr. Andre responded:

...the whole idea of deterrents and the whole reason for our expenditure on them is to make it obvious to potential adversaries that we have the capability of knowing if they are in our waters and of doing something about it....¹⁶

Mr. Frith pursued the question again the next day and Bud Bradley, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, responded that when Canadian submarines discovered foreign submarines, "...they would log the location, the time, and the character of the submarine, which information might be utilized in international courts in disputes over waters."¹⁷

Mr. Frith also asked the Government for assurances that Canada would not

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 6782.

¹⁶ Commons Debates, 8 June 1987, p. 6834.

¹⁷ Commons Debates, 9 June 1987, p. 6891.

become involved in the US forward Maritime Strategy. Mr. Andre responded that Canadian submarine activities would always be carried out "in the context of NATO policy".¹⁸

NDP member Pauline Jewett asked about the apparent contradiction between the purchase of nuclear submarines and Canada's nonproliferation policy. She asked:

...nuclear powered submarines would require highly enriched uranium fuel. Canada has no facilities to create such a fuel. Does the Government plan...to export Canadian uranium to...[a] major nuclear weapons state to have it enriched for [its] subs? And is this not a blatant violation of Canada's own policy of forbidding the export of uranium for military purposes, including the fueling of nuclear submarines?¹⁹

Mr. Beatty responded that, "All of our actions will be fully consistent with Canadian treaty obligations under the NPT."²⁰ Ms. Jewett continued to question how Canada was going to obtain the enriched uranium needed to power nuclear submarines and how this would affect Canada's non-proliferation policy. She asked:

Will the Prime Minister assure the House that Canada will not use, import, or produce weapons-grade enriched uranium for military purposes, including the fueling of military submarines?²¹

Mr. Clark replied that "...we intend to continue to be consistent with the non-proliferation treaty which Canada has signed."²²

¹⁸ Commons Debates, 8 June 1987, p. 6834.

¹⁹ Commons Debates, 11 June 1987, p. 6997.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 6998.

²¹ Commons Debates, 23 June 1987, p. 7527.

²² Ibid., p. 7528.

On 31 July 1987 the NDP presented a policy paper on defence. The paper stated that Canada's contribution to NATO is "no longer militarily significant" and that Canada could "now make a more effective contribution to peace and security outside of NATO." The NDP said Canada should end cruise missile testing as well as low-level flying runs by NATO allies. Canada should end the NORAD agreement but establish a new agreement with the United States under which Canada would have complete responsibility for surveillance and defence of Canada. Like the White Paper, the NDP paper suggests improving the navy, however, the NDP advocates purchasing conventional submarines rather than nuclear-powered submarines.²³

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²³ Blackburn, D., "Canadian Sovereignty, Security and Defence: A New Democratic Response to the Defence White Paper", 31 July 1987.

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Cross References

Defence - Major Equipment Acquisitions

NATO

Non-proliferation Treaty

24. DEFENCE - MAJOR EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS

Background

The Department of National Defence has a number of ongoing major equipment acquisition projects.

In May 1985 three finalists were chosen from among 7 groups of firms competing for the Low-level Air Defence(LLAD) contract. On 16 April 1986 the Department of National Defence, announced that the contract had been awarded to the Oerlikon-Buhrle Litton consortium, and on 13 June 1986 final Government approval was given.

The LLAD system will consist of 10 anti-aircraft guns, 30 low-level surface to air missiles and 10 radar systems. It will be used to protect Canadian land and air forces in Europe. Specifically the system will protect Canadian troops and the airfields at the Baden-Soellingen and Lahr bases in Germany. The total programme cost is estimated at \$1.025 billion (1986 dollars) of which \$650 million will be spent on the system itself and \$350 million on spare parts, training, ammunition and other costs. The LLAD system should be complete by 1991.

The Tribal Update and Modernization Program (TRUMP) was approved on 9 May 1986. This programme involves four DDH 280 Tribal class destroyers which entered service in 1972 and 1973. The destroyers will receive a new command, control and communications system, and a supportive air defence missile system. The new air defence system is perhaps the most important improvement since the destroyers currently have no way of fending off the increasing threat from the air which consists of attacking aircraft and anti-ship missiles. The total cost of the TRUMP project will be \$1.2 billion (in 1986 dollars). The first vessel will enter the Lauzon shipyards in November 1987, and work on all four destroyers should be completed by early 1992.

The Canadian Patrol Frigate construction programme is an ongoing project. Six new frigates will be built by the Saint John shipbuilding and Drydock Company Limited at a total cost of \$5.255 billion. The final frigate is expected to be delivered by early 1993.

Prior to the publication of the White Paper the construction of a new Polar 8 Icebreaker was the major acquisition project announced. On 2 March 1987 the Government announced that it had given Versatile Pacific Shipyards in Vancouver a draft letter of intent for construction of the Arctic Class 8 Icebreaker. The Government had announced its intention to build such an icebreaker on 10 September 1985 as part of its new policy on Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.

On 16 July 1986, the Government announced the beginning of the project definition phase of the Canadian Submarine Acquisition Project (CASAP). The CASAP project will replace Canada's three Oberon submarines which are reaching the end of their useful life cycle. Late in 1986 a study group was formed within the Department of Defence to determine the feasibility of purchasing nuclear-powered submarines.

The Defence White Paper, issued on 5 June 1987 called for several new acquisition projects. These included:

- the purchase of 10-12 nuclear-powered submarines;
- a second batch of six patrol frigates;
- six new long-range patrol aircraft;
- new tanks for the forces in Europe;
- minesweepers for the Atlantic and Pacific coasts;
- an underwater surveillance system for the Arctic;
- replacements for the shipborne-Sea King helicopters;
- replacements for the medium-range Tracker aircraft.

Current Canadian Position

In announcing the contract for the icebreaker Mr. Clark stated:

...we must take appropriate steps to strengthen our actual control over the waters of the Arctic archipelago. Building an Arctic Class 8 icebreaker is a major step towards attaining this goal....We will be able to provide both for safe navigation and compliance with our laws throughout our Arctic waters.¹

The Minister of National Defence, Perrin Beatty, outlined the rationale for the new procurement programmes during his statement before the House on the White Paper. Mr. Beatty pointed out that Canadian forces are unable to adequately meet their commitments and that this has created a "commitment-capability" gap. He stated:

This gap is widening as ships, aircraft, vehicles and equipment become obsolete before they can be replaced. If this trend were allowed to continue, the Canadian Forces would rust out.²

Mr. Beatty said that the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, new frigates, and new minesweepers was part of a strategy to develop a three-ocean navy. He stated:

The naval vessels we are planning to acquire will be delivered through the next decade and beyond and will last, and represent Canada's naval capability, well into the next century....The issue is not the cost of a particular type of vessel but rather the cost of replacing a navy on the verge of rust-out. The real question is whether Canada can afford to have a modern navy....³

¹ Commons Debates, 2 Mar. 1987, p. 3723.

² Commons Debates, 5 Jun. 1987, p. 6776.

³ Ibid., p. 6777.

The White Paper also outlined a new planning system based on a five-year planning cycle. Certain of the above acquisition projects will require funding above the 2 per cent guaranteed by the Paper and this funding will be decided by Cabinet as part of an annual review process.⁴

Parliamentary Comment

Conservative member Bob Hicks asked about further delays in the Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) programme. Mr. Beatty responded that "We are informed by the President of Saint John Shipbuilding Limited that they are on track in terms of timing."⁵ Liberal members asked the Government for reassurances that when the contract for the second batch of frigates was awarded that it would be given to the St. John shipyards already building the first batch.⁶

Liberal member Len Hopkins raised the question of the all-weather capability of the LLAD system chosen by DND. Mr. Beatty responded: "The critical question is: if something can fly and attack either our bases or our troops can it be shot down? The answer is yes."⁷ The issue was raised again the next day. Mr. Beatty responded: "It is an all-weather operational system. It meets every element of the standards set in the request for proposals...."⁸

Responding to the Government's announcement of the contract for the Class 8 icebreaker NDP member Pauline Jewett called upon the Government to do more for Canadian shipbuilding industry. She also stated:

⁴ DND, Challenge and Commitment, 5 Jun. 1987.

⁵ Commons Debates, 28 Oct. 1986, p. 816. See also Commons Debates, 4 Nov. 1986, p. 1057.

⁶ Commons Debates, 5 May 1987, p. 5755; 20 May 1987, p. 6243.

⁷ Commons Debates, 27 Jan. 1987, p. 2743.

⁸ Commons Debates, 28 Jan. 1987, p. 2780. For a full discussion of the LLAD see: SCND Proceedings, 29 Jan. 1987.

...the long awaited and much welcome news of the contract for the Polar 8 icebreaker will not address the larger and critical issue of foreign militarization of the Arctic....⁹

Liberal leader John Turner asked about the nature of the contract: "...the announcement was tentative at best. It was an announcement, as I read the document, of an intent to negotiate."¹⁰ The Minister of Transport, John Crosbie, replied:

Yesterday we gave [Versatile Shipyards] a firm proposal. So long as they are able to meet the financial and technical requirements, it is a firm proposal under which they will have a contract....¹¹

Considerable controversy and parliamentary debate occurred when the Government awarded the CF-18 maintenance contract to Canadair in Montreal. Questions centred on possible government interference with the contracting process and then on why the contract had been awarded to Canadair rather than Bristol Aerospace in Manitoba.¹² The Government stated that the issue of technology transfer was one of the most important criteria for the decision and that they felt technology transfer "could be better done through the existing facilities of Canadair."¹³ Opposition members questioned Canadair's ability to carry out the contract successfully and asked that the matter be referred to the Auditor General.¹⁴ The maintenance contract for the CF-5 was later awarded to Bristol Aerospace.¹⁵

⁹ Commons Debates, 2 Mar. 1987, p. 3725. Other statements: Commons Debates, 2 Mar. 1987, p. 3714; 3 Mar. 1987, pp. 3760-3761.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 3 Mar. 1987, p. 3762.

¹¹ Ibid. See also: Commons Debates, 4 Mar. 1987, p. 4025.

¹² Commons Debates, 22 Oct. 1986, p. 615; 23 Oct. 1986, pp. 659, 669; 30 Oct. 1986, p. 904; 31 Oct. p. 945.

¹³ Commons Debates, 31 Oct. 1986, p. 947.

¹⁴ Commons Debates, 4 Nov. 1986, p. 1056; 5 Nov. 1986, p. 1093; 6 Nov. 1986, p. 1141; 28 Jan. 1987, p. 2769; 9 Feb. 1987, p. 3264.

¹⁵ Commons Debates, 21 Jan. 1987, p. 2507; 23 Jan. 1987, p. 2623.

There was also considerable debate about the possibility of Canada buying nuclear submarines. Liberal member Doug Frith asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs to reassure the House that if a decision was made to purchase nuclear-powered submarines it would not adversely affect the Patrol Frigate programme.¹⁶

Considerable debate occurred during hearings before SCND. Questions were raised about the alternatives to nuclear submarines and how nuclear submarines would enhance Canadian sovereignty in the north. DND officials maintained that the advantage of nuclear submarines was their ability to operate under the Arctic ice cap. Robert Fowler, ADM (Policy) from DND stated:

...while nuclear submarines were uniquely capable of operating under the ice in the Arctic, this was by no means their only value. They have enormous value in both other oceans...[and it is] generally recognized as the best anti-submarine warfare platform that exists....The SSN gives you a flexible response. It is a movable platform, it is a highly effective platform and it allows you to exercise much greater discretion.¹⁷

DND officials stated that the underwater threat that needed to be guarded against in the Arctic primarily stemmed from Soviet attack submarines and cruise missiles carrying submarines.

...we do not envisage the Soviet ballistic missile submarines would wish to enter Canadian archipelago waters....we would presume one of the first things they would wish to do would be to prevent any allied submarine from entering the Arctic Basin and transiting toward their bastions....they would [also] wish to...patrol and station choke-off

¹⁶ Commons Debates, 27 Apr. 1987, p. 5233.

¹⁷ SCND Proceedings, 26 March 1987, p. 5.

points out of the Canadian Arctic to prevent allied submarines from transiting into the basin.¹⁸

The alternatives to nuclear submarines in terms of the role they would play in the Arctic are mining and increased passive surveillance.¹⁹

After the official announcement of the purchase of nuclear submarines in the Defence White Paper,²⁰ opposition members began questioning the Government on the estimated cost of the programme. NDP member Derek Blackburn asked for an estimate of the total cost of the programme including the development of a training infrastructure. The Acting Minister of National Defence Harvie Andre responded, "...nuclear submarines cost 1.6 time as much as conventional submarines. For that expenditure you get at least three times the capability in defence commitments...."²¹

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¹⁸ SCND Proceedings, 28 Jan. 1987, p. 24.

¹⁹ For full discussion of the issue see: SCND Proceedings, Issue no. 3, Issue no. 6, Issue no. 8, 28 Jan. 1987, 17 Mar. 1987, 26 Mar. 1987.

²⁰ DND, Challenge and Commitment, 5 June 1987, pp. 52-53.

²¹ Commons Debates, 8 June 1987, p. 6836.

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Cross References

The Defence Budget and the White Paper on Defence

25. NATO

Background

Canada is a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO's declared aim is the prevention of war:

It works to achieve this by striving to improve understanding between East and West and by possessing sufficient strength to deter an attack on any member of the Alliance. The Treaty provides that Alliance members will come to each others assistance in the event of an armed attack upon any one of them.¹

After the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the initial concerns of the signatories were primarily military. By the mid-fifties, however, there was a growing sense that NATO needed to address larger security concerns than could be dealt with in strictly military terms, and to generate a greater sense of cohesion in order to combat Soviet efforts to create disunity in the Alliance.

In 1956 a NATO report proposed guidelines for institutionalizing alliance consultative, and suggested a number of non-military areas in which the allies could work together. (For example, resource development, science and public information). The report set the parameters for a consultative process that remains an important part of alliance decision-making. It also outlined a code of conduct for consultations that requires allies to keep each other adequately informed of actions and activities of common interest, to take the opinions of other allies into consideration in the formation of national policy, and to ensure that any member which fails to adhere to alliance consensus decisions in its national policy provides an adequate explanation of this behaviour.

¹ NATO and Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons, NATO Information Service, Brussels, 1984, p.1.

In 1967, faced with a new strategic situation, NATO issued another report entitled "Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance" (the Harmel Report). This report outlined two objectives for the Alliance: continued maintenance of adequate military strength and political cohesion, and new efforts to achieve a more stable and durable relationship with the East. To ensure these goals, the report argued, the consultative process must be enhanced and continued. This commitment to close consultation and co-operation was renewed in the Ottawa Declaration in 1974.

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the central consultative body of NATO and was established by the Treaty in 1949. The Council is composed of permanent representatives who meet on a weekly basis. Ministerial consultation occurs in three forums: NATO Foreign ministers meet twice each year at the Council level; NATO Defence ministers meet twice each year in the Defence Planning Committee, and twice in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). Special Council meetings involving heads of government and ministers are sometimes convened, as was the case when President Reagan met with NATO ministers after the US-Soviet Summit in November 1985.

Canada's force commitments to NATO at present consist of:

- a Mechanized Brigade Group of about 6,000 men based in Lahr, West Germany;
- 3 squadrons of the Canadian Air Group, based in Baden-Soellingen, West Germany;
- the Canadian Air/Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group based in Canada and committed to reinforcing Northern Norway when required, consisting of a Brigade Group and 2 squadrons of fighters;
- a destroyer in the Standing Naval Force Atlantic.

The primary objective of operations and training for 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and 1 Canadian Air Group is to maintain their formations and their

respective units and squadrons at a high state of operational readiness to conduct high intensity operations in the Central Region in a conventional or nuclear biological or chemical environment."²

In addition to these force commitments, Canada provides training facilities for NATO troops on Canadian territory. There is a West German facility for tank training in Shilo, Manitoba and the British Army uses facilities at Suffield and Wainwright, Alberta. Both the German and British forces use the Goose Bay, Newfoundland facilities for training in low-level flying.

The Canadian Air Group in West Germany is being refitted with CF-18 aircraft to replace older CF-104 aircraft. The deployment of these CF-18s was completed in 1986. The increased manpower commitment of an additional 1,220 personnel, made in 1985 was met in 1986. A total of 7,160 Canadian Armed Forces personnel are now stationed in Europe.

Canada's air base at Goose Bay is under consideration as a possible site for NATO's new Tactical Fighting and Weapons Training Centre (NTFWTC). A site at Konya, Turkey is the other choice. In September 1986 NATO officials recommended the site in Turkey.

Current Canadian Position

In an address to the Empire Club in Toronto, the Minister for National Defence, Perrin Beatty, outlined the rationale for Canadian membership in NATO. He stated:

We are not in NATO and in Europe today simply out of a spirit of altruism. We are there because our interests as a nation require us to be there and because the loss of a free Europe would be a grave

² DND, 1987-88 Estimates, Part III, p. 46.

blow to our ability to maintain our democratic freedoms here in Canada. There can be no doubt that the defence of Western Europe continues to be critical to the defence of the Canada we wish to preserve.³

Canadian officials lobbied hard within NATO to have a final decision on a NTFWTC site postponed until further more detailed analysis was carried out. In a news release from the Department of National Defence, the Minister of National Defence announced that Canada was still under consideration as a possible site. Mr. Beatty said:

We have good reasons to believe the military committee will not select a site at this time,... costs have been calculated in such a way that a fair comparison has not yet been possible. Canada has therefore asked that, in the next phase, both locations be costed in detail....[I am] confident that it will be followed up and that Canada's bid will get full consideration during the next phase of this project.⁴

On 4 December 1986, the Government announced that the Royal Netherland Air Force would also be making use of the Canadian base at Goose Bay to carry out low-level flying exercises as the result of a ten-year bilateral agreement between the two countries.

In the Defence White Paper, issued on 5 June 1987, the Government announced it would be withdrawing its commitment to provide troops to Norway in the event of a crisis. The CAST brigade will be assigned to a role in West Germany instead. The White Paper pointed out that one of Canada's main defence dilemmas was that it has a number of commitments that it chooses to fulfill. In particular, maintaining a commitment to NATO Europe in two different areas meant that resources were too thinly spread. The Paper stated:

³ Perrin Beatty, "Address to the Empire Club", Disarmament Bulletin, Winter-Spring 1987, p. 28.

⁴ DND, News Release, 78/86, 4 Dec. 1986.

There are particularly severe problems associated with the deployment of the CAST brigade to northern Norway. The force requires some weeks to reach Norway, making timely deployment questionable, and it cannot make an opposed landing. Moreover, once deployed, it would be extremely difficult to reinforce and resupply, particularly after the start of hostilities....If these commitments in northern Norway were to be met fully and effectively, the deficiencies cited above would have to be rectified. This could only be done at great cost....The Government has concluded that consolidation in southern Germany is the best way to achieve a more credible, effective and sustainable contribution to the common defence in Europe.⁵

The withdrawal of the Canadian commitment will not become effective, however, until another NATO country agrees to fulfill the role. The Canadian commitment to provide two squadrons of Rapid Reinforcement fighters to northern Norway will also be switched to southern Germany. As a result of these changes, Canada will have a "division-sized force" in Central Europe in a crisis. Equipment for the brigade will be pre-positioned and new tanks will be purchased.

Parliamentary Comment

Several petitions were presented to the House protesting the NATO low level flying exercises at Goose Bay. The petitions state that the low-level flying exercises cause damage to the environment and disrupt the lives of native peoples in the area.⁶

⁵ DND, Challenge and Commitment, 5 June 1987, p. 61.

⁶ See: Commons Debates, 10 Oct. 1986, p. 287; 2 Dec., p. 1677; 3 Dec., p. 1755; 9 Dec., p. 1906; 12 Dec., pp. 2058-59; 17 Dec., p. 2208; 19 Dec., p. 2306; 19 Jan. 1987, p. 2343; 21 Jan., p. 2520; 22 Jan., p. 2542; 23 Jan., pp. 2648, 2650; 30 Jan., p. 2928; 3 Feb., p. 3010; 6 Feb., pp. 3191-92; 13 Feb., p. 3416; 18 Feb., p. 3568; 15 May, p. 6150; 27 May, p. 6450; 19 June 1987, p. 7400; 26 June, p. 7686.

In a statement to the House, NDP member Jim Fulton called attention to the fact that a report from the Standing Committee on Environment and Forestry had recommended the Government halt the flights and make an assessment of their environmental impact.⁷ NDP member Bill Blaikie echoed this request citing the interim recommendations of the Federal Environmental Assessment Review and called upon the Government to implement them.⁸ NDP member Dan Heap protested the Government decision to allow the Netherlands to carry out low-level flying exercises at Goose Bay. He said that this showed contempt for the environmental assessment process which recommended the number of flights not be increased until the review was complete. Mr. Heap called "upon the Government to stop using environmental hearings as mere public relations gestures, [and] to take seriously the needs of the Inuit people...."⁹

Conservative Party member John Oostrom called upon the Government to continue lobbying for the establishment of the NATO base at Goose Bay. He said: "...it will provide this area with badly needed economic stimulation. this base will provide for more than 500 permanent jobs, and it will inject enormous amounts of capital into the local economy."¹⁰

Many statements and comments were made about the Liberal Party's position on NATO after resolutions debated at a Liberal Party meeting called for Canadian withdrawal from NATO.¹¹

Responding to the Minister's statement on the White Paper, Liberal member Doug Frith stated:

⁷ Commons Debates, 15 May 1987, p. 6133.

⁸ Commons Debates, 12 Feb. 1987, p. 3365. The recommendations included: restrictions on minimum altitudes; maintaining the number of flights at the 1986 level.

⁹ Commons Debates, 15 May 1987, p. 6133.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 8 Dec. 1986, p. 1872.

¹¹ See: Commons Debates, 21 Nov. 1986, p. 1402; 1 Dec., p. 1647; 2 Dec. p. 1692; 3 Dec., p. 1730; 26 Jan. 1987, p. 2681.

The Liberal Party has a major disagreement with the White Paper with regard to the...decision to withdraw its CAST commitment...Defence policy must dovetail with foreign policy....the Norwegians will view this withdrawal as a determination by Canada to withdraw its interest from other Nordic countries....

I agree with the Minister's statement that at the present time our CAST commitment militarily is not viable. However, I do not accept that because it is not viable in today's methodology we should scrap our commitment to Norway....¹²

Mr. Frith also suggested that the special training of Canadian forces for winter-war conditions made them especially suited to defend Norway.

In his response to the Minister, NDP member Derek Blackburn questioned the whole Canadian commitment to NATO. He suggested that the situation had changed dramatically since 1945 and European countries such as France, Germany and Britain are now economically strong enough to take on more of their own defence. He stated:

The Government could not bring itself to adjust our commitments to meet our capabilities. Instead, it cut a commitment, which existed only on paper, to send a brigade to Norway....Canada is now making one hollow promise instead of two....I ask if it makes any sense to over-commit our forces and keep them symbolically present in Europe at a time when the whole strategic architecture...has changed from the central flank in Europe to the Kola Peninsula....¹³

Mr. Blackburn went on to suggest that Canadian forces should be devoted to defending the northern half of North America. This would require a light transportable army which could be reinforced by upgraded reserves.¹⁴

¹² Commons Debates, 5 June 1987, p. 6781.

¹³ Ibid., p. 6783.

¹⁴ Ibid.

On 31 July 1987 the NDP presented a policy paper on defence that called for Canadian withdrawal from NATO (see The Defence Budget and the White Paper on Defence, p. 156).

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26. PEACEKEEPING AND OBSERVATION

Background

In the late 1940s four international observer missions were established under UN Security Council auspices to monitor conflicts in the Balkans, Indonesia, the Middle East and Kashmir. The role of these missions was limited to observation, investigation and reporting by unarmed military officers.

Since the establishment of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1956, ten peacekeeping and observation missions have been fielded by the United Nations. The most prominent peacekeeping missions outside the UN have been those in Indochina, Chad, Lebanon and Egypt.

Canada has been active in the creation and operation of multilateral peacekeeping forces, playing a key role in the establishment of UNEF and participating in all UN operations since that time. Canada has also contributed to several non-UN operations: the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC), created in 1954 to supervise the ceasefire in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam; its successor, the International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS), created in 1973; the Observer Team to Nigeria (OTN), created in 1968 to supervise the election after the Nigerian civil war; and the Commonwealth Monitoring Force established in 1979 to monitor the elections in Zimbabwe.

Canada currently participates in three UN peacekeeping missions as well as one non-UN mission. Canadian troops in the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) are responsible for policing the ceasefire and resolving local inter-community disputes in Sector Four, corresponding roughly to the old city of Nicosia. These tasks are carried out by one infantry battalion and by a small unit at UNFICYP Headquarters, totalling 515 Canadians. The UN Security Council renews the operation's mandate every six months at which

time troop contributors, such as Canada, indicate whether their commitment to the operation will change. The troop contributing countries finance the mission although the UN is required to reimburse their expenses and currently pays a portion of the cost through voluntary contributions by its members.

In the Middle East Canada is part of the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) which monitors the disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria along the Golan Heights. Two hundred and twenty Canadians, along with Polish troops, provide logistics, communications and transportation for the troops observing the ceasefire. This mission is financed by an assessment of UN members, and its mandate is renewed by the UN Security Council every six months. Canada also contributes 20 officers to the UN Truce Supervision organization, a mission created in 1948 to oversee the truce between Israel and its neighbours in Palestine. Its mandate is to observe the ceasefire ordered by the Security Council and supervise the General Armistice Agreements between Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Israel. Other peacekeeping contributions include posting an attaché to the UN Command Military Armistice Commission in Korea, and supplying air transport to the UN Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) for moving the headquarters from one country to the other every six months.

In spring 1985 Canada agreed to participate in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai. The MFO was established by Israel, Egypt and the United States in 1981 when the UN Security Council failed to agree on the establishment of a UN mission to supervise the border. One hundred and forty Canadians, committed to this task since 31 March 1986, provide transportation for the troops and civilian observers. The current commitment expires on 31 March 1988, at which time Canada may renew or terminate its participation in the mission.

Canada has consistently supported multilateral peacekeeping, although the

priority accorded peacekeeping has varied with different governments. However, peacekeeping operations have not received unanimous support in the United Nations. Four issues in particular have caused concern: the effectiveness of peacekeeping, support for non-UN operations, the financing of UN missions, and the use of force by UN peacekeepers.

Doubts persist over whether peacekeeping helps resolve conflicts or actually prolongs them by removing incentives for belligerents to negotiate. There is also disagreement over the desirability of non-UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions.

The problem of financing relates to the authorization of peacekeeping forces by the General Assembly. The Soviet Union and France have traditionally opposed the General Assembly's claims on this issue, and have refused to pay for peacekeeping operations not established by the Security Council. Many countries which support UNGA-sponsored peacekeeping operations in principle have nevertheless failed to make payments on time. As a result, UN peacekeeping operations have incurred a large deficit since the 1964 mission in the Congo. According to one source, "68 per cent of the overall deficit of the Organization is due to peacekeeping operations."¹ Consequently, troop-contributing countries have generally borne most of the burden for financing UN peacekeeping operations.

Attacks on the United Nations Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) once again raised questions regarding the use of force in self-defence by peacekeeping troops. During August and September 1986, the radical Shiite Moslem group Hizbollah repeatedly attacked the French contingent in UNIFIL, killing four and wounding thirty-three (one Irish peacekeeper was also killed). These attacks prompted calls for a liberal interpretation of restrictions on the use of force in self-defence by UN troops. Others maintained that this

¹ United Nations Association, "Peacekeeping", Briefing Paper, Ottawa, UNA, October 1984, p. 5.

would compromise UNIFIL's neutrality and make it a party to the Lebanese conflict.

Current Canadian Position

While supportive of UN peacekeeping missions, the Government of Canada has called repeatedly for effective multilateral financing of operations to ease the burden on troop-contributing countries. The Government has also stressed that peacekeeping remains an interim conflict-management measure pending political solutions to regional conflict.

In its response to the 1986 report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons, the Government pledged to continue its support for peacekeeping training seminars, the annual International Peacekeeping Academy Seminar at York University, and the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. The Government also expressed its preference for UN-sponsored missions and agreed that Canadian participation in future peacekeeping operations would be considered on a case-by-case basis.²

The Defence White Paper outlined the criteria the Government uses to determine whether it should participate in peacekeeping operations:

The Government's decision will be based upon the following criteria: whether there is a clear and enforceable mandate; whether the principal antagonists agree to a ceasefire and to Canada's participation in the operation; whether the arrangements are, in fact, likely to serve the cause of peace and lead to a political settlement in the long term; whether the size and international composition of the force are

² Canada's International Relations: Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, 1986, Department of External Affairs, p. 51.

appropriate to the mandate and will not damage Canada's relations with other states; whether Canadian participation will jeopardize other commitments; whether there is a single identifiable authority competent to support the operation and influence the disputants; and whether participation is adequately and equitably funded and logistically supported. Moreover, each of our current commitments is routinely reviewed in light of these criteria.³

Parliamentary Comment

The issue was not raised in the House of Commons.

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Cross References

Cyprus

The Israeli-Arab Dispute

27. AFGHANISTAN

Background

Following the coup by General Mohammed Daud in 1973, Afghanistan underwent rapid changes. These involved the imposition of a secular civil-military régime, the implementation of an ambitious development strategy, and the broadening of relations with both East and West. In 1978 the Daud régime was overthrown by the Khalq faction of the pro-Moscow Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The newly formed Revolutionary Military Council attempted to implement a land redistribution programme and other reforms. These policies and the régime's tilt towards the Soviet Union gave rise to an anti-government insurgency, and the country's political, economic and military situation deteriorated rapidly.

In September 1979 the regime was toppled by the backers of Hafizolla Amin, who in turn was replaced in December by Babrak Karmal of the PDPA's Parcham wing. The Soviet Union, which had been assisting the Amin Government's counter-insurgency efforts through the provision of equipment and troops, became dissatisfied with Amin and engineered Karmal's takeover and supported it through direct intervention. By 1980 there were over 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

In the first year of the occupation, large-scale military operations were conducted to overcome the resistance. However, the Mujahideen guerillas retreated into their mountain strongholds and adopted hit-and-run tactics which led the Soviet Union to focus on defence of the cities and major transportation arteries while leaving rural operations to the remnants of the Afghan army (50,000 to 60,000 troops had deserted since the Soviet invasion). Major Soviet offensives in the Panjshir Valley (through which

runs the vital Salang Road connecting Kabul with the Soviet Central Asian republics) and the Paghman from 1981 to 1983 failed to wrest these areas from Mujahideen control.

In 1984 the Soviet Union began a depopulation campaign in the Afghan countryside, destroying villages, crops, and animals in resistance areas and forcing the inhabitants to flee to refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran. Moscow hoped in this way to deprive the Mujahideen of logistical support within Afghanistan and, through the massive outflow of refugees, to undermine support for the resistance in Pakistan and Iran. During this period, Soviet regular and special force units were used more frequently in military operations as the Afghan army had proved ineffective.

Soviet strikes against the Mujahideen drew closer to the Pakistani border during 1985 with offensives in Kunar and Paktia in June and September of that year. Frequent cross-border incursions - 198 in the first nine months of 1985 - by Soviet and Afghan forces were also reported. To disrupt resistance logistics, the supply routes from Pakistan were mined and military operations were mounted occasionally along the border.

During 1985 elite heli-borne commando units (Spetsnaaz) were frequently used for night ambushes of Mujahideen convoys as the Soviet Union tried to deprive the resistance in Afghanistan of support from the refugee camps in Pakistan. The "security belts" (depopulated no-man's land) surrounding Kabul were also widened to 30 miles.

Since the beginning of the occupation, the Soviet Union has supplemented its military campaigns with a long-term programme to "Sovietize" Afghan society. Under the tutelage of the KGB, the security apparatus - Khad - was expanded to over 20,000 operatives, some of whom succeeded in infiltrating resistance groups based in Pakistan. Local tribal leaders were recruited for the new militia to guard against guerilla operations in

the countryside, although their loyalty to the Afghan Government remained in question. Russian and East European instructors taught Soviet-approved courses in Afghan classrooms, and over 30,000 Afghan children were sent to the Soviet Union for schooling.

The stalemate on the battlefield continued throughout 1986. Resistance efforts were plagued by the lack of adequate defences against Soviet low-level air attack. To remedy this, the Reagan Administration decided in March to supply Stinger and British-built Blowpipe shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles to the Afghan guerillas. The Mujahideen leadership initially denied receiving these weapons amid reports that Pakistan, through which arms are channelled to the resistance, had withheld the missiles, fearing Soviet reprisals and doubting the United States' commitment to its security. However, by December 1986, the Stingers were reported to have shot down many Soviet jets and helicopter-gunships, forcing the Soviet air force to fly at higher altitudes, thereby reducing its effectiveness.

Fighting flared again throughout the country in the fall of 1986 after a summer of relative calm. Thirty-three thousand Soviet and Afghan troops launched offensives north of Kabul and to the west in Herat province to blunt the largest resistance offensive mounted by the Mujahideen in three years.

Despite continued fighting, the Soviet Union proceeded in October with an 8,000-man troop withdrawal which had been announced by Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev on 28 July. Western officials described the withdrawal as a token gesture, however, noting that four of the six regiments withdrawn were anti-aircraft and anti-tank units (the Mujahideen do not have aircraft or tanks) and that over 120,000 Soviet troops still remained in Afghanistan.

In November 1986, the United Nations released a report on human rights abuses in Afghanistan, which detailed atrocities committed by Soviet and Afghan forces including reprisals against civilians, the torture and killing of prisoners, the forced dislocation of the population, and the booby-trapping of children's toys. In a controversial move, UN officials deleted 13 pages describing these atrocities from the final report. The deletion was said to be due to financial reasons and the pages appeared as an accompanying annex printed in English only.

Facing a stalemate on the battlefield, the Soviet Union launched a concerted diplomatic effort to resolve its difficulties in Afghanistan. In December 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev summoned the Afghan leadership to Moscow for consultations, and on 1 January 1987, the General Secretary of the PDPA, Najib (Babrak Karmel having been replaced in May 1986), announced a ceasefire effective 15 January. He also outlined a programme of "national reconciliation" - a coalition government including the resistance leadership, but with the PDPA in firm control; amnesty for opponents of the régime; the return of Afghan refugees to their homes; official acceptance of Islam as the national religion; and agreement on Soviet troop withdrawal (although no timetable was specified). Moscow signalled its support for the initiative with the visit to Kabul in early January of the Kremlin's two senior foreign policy advisers, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and the former Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin. The Mujahideen, however, rejected the government's overtures and demanded the immediate and complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country and the replacement of the puppet régime in Kabul. On the day of the ceasefire, Afghan officials held a news conference announcing the return of government troops to their barracks (they also displayed components allegedly retrieved from two Stinger and one Blowpipe missile, citing them as evidence of American interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs). Despite this, fighting continued throughout the countryside.

The Afghan ceasefire initiative coincided with efforts to break the impasse at the United Nations-sponsored talks in Geneva. The ninth round of talks, with UN Under-Secretary-General Diego Cordovez mediating between the Afghan and Pakistani delegations, was scheduled to open on 11 February 1987. Previous negotiations had produced agreement in three areas - non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan; the voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their homeland; and superpower guarantees for the agreements. A timetable for Soviet troop withdrawal remained the final obstacle to a settlement. The Soviet Union offered to withdraw its forces within four years of an agreement, although in talks with Indian officials, Soviet representatives hinted that a two- or three-year period might be considered. Pakistan and the United States called for a complete withdrawal within 3-4 months of a settlement.

The scheduled talks were postponed to 25 February amid a flurry of diplomatic activity. Pakistani Foreign Minister Shahabzada Yaqub Khan travelled to the Soviet capital twice during February for discussions with Soviet officials. Afghan leader Najib and UN mediator Diego Cordovez also visited Moscow to discuss the upcoming negotiations. The Geneva talks finally opened on 25 February, but were overshadowed two days later by an Afghan air force raid against villages and refugee camps in north-east Pakistan in which 70 Pakistanis and Afghans were killed and 200 wounded. Nevertheless, after two weeks of discussions, the gap on the withdrawal timetable had narrowed, the Afghan government offering an 18-month withdrawal schedule and the Pakistani delegation countering with a proposed seven-month schedule. As of July 1987 little further progress has been made in the negotiations.

Current Canadian Position

The Canadian Government has repeatedly condemned Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the human rights abuses committed by Soviet and Afghan forces. In the United Nations and other international forums, the Government has called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and a political resolution of the conflict. The Government has also provided humanitarian aid to refugees living in camps along the Afghan-Pakistani frontier.

On 5 November 1986, the United Nations General Assembly considered a non-binding resolution condemning the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. Resolution 41/33 passed with a vote of 122-20-11. Canada voted in favour of the resolution.

Canada's Ambassador to the UN, Stephen Lewis, set out the Government's position in a strongly-worded speech on 5 November. Lewis condemned the Soviet Union for the human rights abuses described in the Ermacora report, calling the booby-trapping of children's toys and other items a practice suggesting "a sickness equivalent to depravity".¹ He expressed solidarity with Pakistan in the face of repeated border violations by Afghan and Soviet forces, and referred to the October Soviet troop withdrawal, saying:

It matters little whether this is an elaborate military sleight of hand, or an adroit reshuffling of tanks, or the actual removal of men and machines whose presence in Afghanistan may or may not have been useful. What matters is that over 110,000 men, and all of their collective apparatus of war, remain behind for the systematic purpose of pacification. The world needs more than tokens as evidence of good faith.²

¹ DEA, Statement and Speeches, 5 Nov. 1986, p. 3.

² Ibid., p. 4.

He reaffirmed the Government's support for the UN-sponsored negotiations headed by Under Secretary Diego Cordovez and criticized as unreasonable the withdrawal timetable proposed by the Soviets. According to Lewis, "it took them only 72 hours to get in. It need take no more than a week or two to get out. But if the political will is absent, then the military might remain".³

The Ambassador's comments were echoed that same day by Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark in his address to the opening session of the Vienna follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). In speaking of the CSCE process, Clark pointedly noted that

we cannot forget that one participating state [the Soviet Union] has, over the past seven years, violated virtually all the principles guiding relations between states by its continuing military intervention in Afghanistan."⁴

The Government announced on 12 November 1986 that it was lifting sanctions imposed against the Soviet Union in the wake of the December 1979 invasion. Responding to questions in the House, Joe Clark said:

The sanctions that were introduced...against the Soviet Union in 1979 were successful at the time because they helped galvanize world opinion against the Soviet actions in Afghanistan. Those actions in Afghanistan continue to be deplorable....It is clear that if we want to change other aspects of the practices of the Soviet Union...then we have to try some other instruments.⁵

In December 1986, five Soviet Army "deserters" were spirited out of Afghanistan to Canada. Efforts to rescue six Soviet soldiers held by the

³ Ibid., p. 5.

⁴ DEA, Statement 86/63, 5 Nov. 1986, p. 4.

⁵ Commons Debates, 21 Nov., 1986, p. 1404.

Afghan resistance began in June 1984 when Serge Jusyp, a lawyer representing the Holy Trinity Russian Orthodox Church in Toronto, met several deserters while in Afghanistan. In October 1984 a first attempt to bring the six to Canada failed for administrative reasons but renewed impetus to rescue the six came in April 1986 following interviews with the soldiers by reporters of the Kingston Whig-Standard. In November, the five were released into Canadian custody and flown from Pakistan to Canada where they were placed with Russian and Ukrainian families in Toronto. Soviet officials were permitted to meet with the defectors and ask them if they wished to return to the Soviet Union - all five declined.

Speaking in India during his February 1987 visit, Joe Clark said that for Canada the major threat to Asia-Pacific security is the Soviet military build-up in the area. He referred to new statements from Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev that may signal a positive change in Soviet attitudes in the region and called upon Mr. Gorbachev to put his words into action:

Nothing would more dramatically illustrate Mr. Gorbachev's determination to follow through on his Vladivostok speech than a withdrawal from Afghanistan. The brutal occupation of that country, should it continue, will give the lie to any Soviet protestations of good intent in South West Asia. It would be my wish that all nations which share our commitment to democracy and human rights could join us in urging a Soviet disengagement from Afghanistan and self-determination for the Afghan people.⁶

With respect to the refugee problem, the Government remains committed to providing humanitarian aid to the refugee population. Responding to the report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons, the Government promised that:

⁶ DEA, Statement, 87/08, 13 Feb. 1987, p. 7

Canada will continue to respond favourably to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and the International Red Cross' programs for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. During the current fiscal year, CIDA provided \$4 million to the UNHCR and \$475,000 to the ICRC. In addition, \$14 million worth of food aid was delivered to Afghan refugees.⁷

Parliamentary Comment

The House of Commons applauded the Government's efforts in rescuing the five Soviet deserters from Afghanistan. Rising in the House on 24 November, Conservative member Mr. John Oostrom said:

The Secretary of State for External Affairs deserves our hearty congratulations. Through his sheer determination in dealing with a volatile geographical area of the world, he was successful in obtaining the release of five Soviet Army defectors from Afghanistan....The Secretary of State for External Affairs has again shown the world that Canada will always assist those who seek freedom."⁸

Conservative member John Reimer praised Ambassador Stephen Lewis for his remarks before the United Nations General Assembly condemning the "gross misrepresentation of events in Afghanistan"⁹ presented by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevaradnadze in his speech before the Assembly. Reimer warned that "Canadians will not be appeased by pathetic rhetoric and Ambassador Lewis is to be commended for reminding the USSR of that fact."¹⁰

⁷ DEA, Canada's International Relations - Response of the Government of Canada of the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, Dec. 1986, p. 76.

⁸ Commons Debates, 24 Nov. 1986, p. 1445.

⁹ Commons Debates, 26 Nov. 1986, p. 1534.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Conservative member Andrew Witer questioned the Government's decision to lift sanctions against the Soviet Union while imposing them on South Africa. He wondered "why sanctions against South Africa work, while they apparently do not work against the Soviet Union?"¹¹ On 27 January 1987 he cited human rights abuses committed by Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and said that "the time for questioning the effectiveness of sanctions has passed. Canada has a duty and responsibility to uphold sanctions until such time as the Soviets cease their illegal occupation of Afghanistan."¹²

In response, Mr. J. M. Forrestall, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Regional Industrial Expansion, observed that many of these sanctions, while initially galvanizing world opinion against the Soviet intervention, "could only be temporary since high-level dialogue, wider contacts and greater cooperation are all necessary in order to develop more secure and broadly-based East-West relations."¹³ He also stated that by renewing academic, scientific, and cultural exchanges, Canada was finally adopting policies similar to its NATO allies, many of whom had not imposed such sanctions on the Soviet Union.¹⁴

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¹¹ Commons Debates, 21 Nov. 1986, p. 1404.

¹² Commons Debates, 27 Jan. 1986, p. 2765.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

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28. CENTRAL AMERICA

THE CONTADORA PROCESS

Background

On 9 January 1983 the foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela met on the island of Contadora, off Panama, to discuss the deteriorating situation in Central America. Local conflicts in El Salvador and Nicaragua had spilled over their borders, creating tensions between the countries of the region and attracting increasing superpower involvement. The Contadora countries, as the Latin American group came to be known, initially sought to encourage dialogue which would help to de-escalate conflicts in the region. This initiative soon became a formal vehicle for conflict resolution in Central America.

On 7 September 1984, the Contadora Group presented the five Central American governments (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) with the Contadora Act for Peace and Co-operation in Central America. This treaty would have committed the parties to halt the arms race in all its forms, to launch a process of negotiated arms reductions, to cease supporting irregular forces, to promote national reconciliation and to establish representative and pluralistic political systems. It provided for the elimination of all foreign military facilities and prohibited all international military manoeuvres in the region.

Although the Act was accepted without revision by Nicaragua, it was rejected by Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras. On 12 September 1985, a new treaty was presented by the Contadora Group, which included improved guidelines for national reconciliation as well as for control and verification. It did not, however, prohibit US military exercises in the region or explicitly commit the United States to cease supporting the forces fighting to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. For these and other reasons, the 1985 treaty was rejected by Nicaragua, and the Contadora negotiations were suspended until May 1986.

On 12 January 1986, the foreign ministers of the Contadora Group and the Lima Group (the support group formed by Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay on July 28, 1985) released the Caraballeda Message. This document advocated the suspension of all external support to irregular forces, the suspension of international military manoeuvres in the region and the resumption of talks between the United States and Nicaragua. Four days later the governments of Central America endorsed this message in the Guatemala Declaration. Representatives of the Contadora and Lima Groups met with US officials in February to underline how important it was for the peace process that there should be no further outside support for irregular forces and insurrectionist movements in Central America.

After the February meeting representatives from the five Central American countries met on several occasions alone, and with their Contadora and Lima Group counterparts, in an attempt to have the treaty signed by 6 June 1986. On 7 June the Contadora countries presented the five Central American governments with a third draft treaty. This draft strengthened provisions prohibiting international military manoeuvres in the region and offered new guidelines for arms reductions. On 21 June Nicaragua announced its support for the revised draft. Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras rejected the Act and the Salvadorean Government called for the restructuring or the dismantling of the Contadora Group.

On 25 June 1986 the House of Representatives of the US Congress voted in favour of extending \$100 million in aid (including \$70 million in military assistance) to the contra forces fighting against the Nicaraguan Government. The next day the International Court of Justice ruled that US military support for the contras breached international law and that Washington was under an obligation to cease these acts. In December 1986 questions were raised about the linkage between US arms sales to Iran and financial support for the contra forces. The House of Representatives voted to suspend the \$40 million remaining of the initial \$100 million aid

granted by Congress until the money previously sent was accounted for. This move was defeated by the US Senate on 18 March 1987. US Congressional hearings on the linkage between arms sales to Iran and covert support for the Nicaraguan contras began in the early summer of 1987.

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations noted in its report in June 1986 that it had "received more submissions on Central America than on any other single subject". The Committee concluded that although "Canadian influence over the security policies of other countries is limited, Canada has a special opportunity to offer direct, practical and desperately needed help to the hundreds of thousands of refugees in the region."

The Canadian Government has supported the Contadora initiative and Canada agrees with the Contadora countries that the conflicts in Central America stem mainly from local conditions.

After the 1984 Contadora treaty failed to obtain unanimous support in Central America, Canada presented the Contadora Group with its views on ways to improve the agreement. Canadian officials suggested that the framework for financing verification operations be clarified and that Central American states be included in the Control and Verification Commission which would oversee the implementation of the agreement. Officials also recommended that the Commission's freedom of movement and access to communications media be guaranteed, that a sponsoring political authority be designated and that a time limit be established for the Commission's mandate.

In February 1987 Nicaragua voted to extend its five-year old state of emergency for another year. The Contadora group met in April and endorsed the idea of the June summit of Central American leaders. The group offered its good offices to help refine the Costa Rican proposals.

Canada continued to support the process after the second draft treaty was rejected and the Contadora Group recessed in the fall of 1985. On 15 February 1987 the Presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras met in Costa Rica to discuss a new Costa Rican peace plan. The plan called for a cease-fire between the Nicaraguan government and contra rebels as well as cease-fires in the civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala. Other elements included: a dialogue between the Sandinista government and the internal political opposition in Nicaragua; a ban on all foreign aid to rebels in the region; a withdrawal of Soviet, Cuban and US military advisors; and a calendar of democratization for Nicaragua that would result in free elections to be overseen by teams of foreign observers.

Nicaragua initially reacted unfavourably towards the Costa Rican meeting because it had not been invited, but later its position changed and President Ortega expressed willingness to meet with the other nations to discuss the plan. A summit of the leaders from the Central American countries was planned for June 1987.

However, after a meeting with US Special Envoy Phillip Habib, the President of El Salvador, José Napoleon Duarte, announced that there was insufficient agreement among the five nations and asked that the proposed summit be postponed.

Current Canadian Position

In a speech to the Inter-American Press Association in Vancouver on 15 September 1986, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney outlined the Canadian position on the conflicts in Central America. More so than previous statements, the speech expressed the Government's disapproval of

third-party intervention in the area and reiterated Canadian support for the Contadora process. Mr. Mulroney said:

Nor are we in favor of exporting revolution, any more than we approve of third-party intervention anywhere in Central America, whoever the third party may be, and regardless of its legitimate interests in the area. We regret the extension of East-West disagreements into the area, and we do not approve of any country supplying arms to any faction in the area. This is why we support the Contadora initiative, thwarted though it may be, as the best instrument for reconciliation in Central America. We know that only with development and peace can democracy prosper.¹

On 3 November 1986 Canada voted in favour of a United Nations General Assembly resolution that called upon the United States to comply with the World Court decision.² The resolution passed by a vote of 94-3-47.

In January 1987, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, issued a statement of support to the Contadora nations and the Lima Support Groups:

...I wish to reiterate the Government of Canada's strong support for the Contadora process. The past year has been a difficult one for those who have sought to further the cause of peace in the region. Your refusal to be discouraged by these problems...[has] sustained the hope of the international community for a lasting solution to the crisis in Central America.³

At the end of May 1987 a group of US-sponsored contra rebels attacked an international farm project in Nicaragua where Canadians were working. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, strongly protested the

¹ DEA, Statements and Speeches, 15 Sept. 1986.

² UNGA Resolution 41/31, 3 Nov. 1986.

³ DEA, Communiqué, 20 Jan. 1987, See also: Commons Debates, 20 Jan. 1987, pp. 2501.

attack and stated that he would convey his "deep concern" to US Secretary of State George Shultz in a letter and during future meetings with Mr. Shultz.⁴

Parliamentary Comment

In the debate on the Speech from the Throne, NDP leader Ed Broadbent responded to the Prime Minister's speech in Vancouver, endorsing and supporting its views. Mr. Broadbent then urged the Prime Minister to go further: "Having given support to the Contadora process I now urge the Government to follow the lead of [other] Governments...and embrace in principle the Contadora Treaty...."⁵

NDP member Dan Heap applauded Canada's vote at the UN on the World Court issue and asked the Prime Minister to make a specific request to the US President to stop funding to the contras. He also asked if the Prime Minister would "...warn El Salvador and Honduras that if they continue to allow their territories to be used for these attacks...Canada will cut off bilateral aid to them?"⁶ During an adjournment debate in January Dan Heap pursued this question again. He stated:

The largest single recipient of Canadian aid in Central America should not be the primary base for US terrorism in that region, which Honduras is. Instead we should direct Canadian aid...to a country...where it would do the most good....the very first step we should take, which would use only 10 per cent of what we are now wasting in Honduras, is to open an embassy in the capital of Nicaragua, Managua.⁷

⁴ Commons Debates, 1 June 1987, p. 6592.

⁵ Commons Debates, 3 Oct. 1986, p. 57.

⁶ Commons Debates, 6 Nov. 1986, p. 1145. See also: Commons Debates, 31 Oct. 1986, p. 943; 21 Nov. 1986, p. 1402; 11 Dec. 1986, p. 2018.

⁷ Commons Debates, 20 Jan. 1987, p. 2501. See also Commons Debates, 16 Mar. 1987, p. 4165.

Jean-Guy Hudon, -Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs replied:

...the Hondurans have formally requested that the Contra forces leave their territory. We are concerned about the raids made in Honduras by the Sandinistan soldiers in pursuit of Contras because this can only exacerbate existing tensions....⁸

Mr. Heap also asked about the Prime Minister's alleged refusal to meet with the Vice-President of Nicaragua. Mr. Mulroney replied:

The Government of Canada, through the Secretary of State for External Affairs, has constantly been available to meet with leaders from all walks of political life. We, of course, remain available to do so with courtesy with anyone who is interested in visiting us.⁹

In December, Liberal member Sheila Copps inquired about the attendance of the Secretary of State at a conference which featured Mario Calero, chief US fundraiser for the contras. The Secretary of State, David Crombie replied that he did not attend the conference.¹⁰

In a statement during an Adjournment Debate, NDP member Dan Heap addressed the issue of peace in Central America and particularly Canadian involvement in El Salvador. He asked the Government to publicly tell the US that Canada does not support its actions in Central America and to end its aid programme to El Salvador. Michel Champagne, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Agriculture, replied:

...Canada does not favour a military solution to the internal conflict. We promote a dialogue

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Commons Debates, 6 Nov. 1986, p. 1145. See also: Commons Debates, 7 Nov. 1986, p. 1177.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 17 Dec. 1986, p. 2200; 18 Dec. 1986, p. 2259.

between the Salvadorian government and the insurgents and regret that the expected third series of discussions...did not take place last September.¹¹

At the end of May, Mr. Heap again pursued the question of Canadian aid. He described a recent case of human rights violations in El Salvador and asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs if he would

...indicate to the President [of El Salvador] that Canada's decision to extend that aid was based on an expectation that the President would be willing and able to control human rights violations of this sort and that the continuation of the aid is conditional on progress in that matter?¹²

Mr. Clark responded:

The question of Canada's development assistance... is a matter of some delicacy. I do not want to make any general comment that might make that delicate situation more difficult....I will certainly look into the information which the Member has provided and will take whatever action is appropriate.¹³

In a statement to the House after a visit by President Reagan, Liberal member Warren Allmand took issue with the President's view of the situation in Central America. He said:

The revolution in Nicaragua was not...the result of the East-West struggle,...but rather the result of 50 years of Somozan dictatorship....It is unfortunate that the US Government does not understand that.¹⁴

In response to the contra attack on the international farm project, NDP

¹¹ Commons Debates, 5 Feb. 1987, pp. 3173-3175.

¹² Commons Debates, 29 May 1987, p. 6537.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Commons Debates, 8 Apr. 1987, p. 4968.

member Pauline Jewett asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs to make Canadian opposition to US funding of the contra rebels more public.¹⁵ Liberal member Warren Allmand asked Mr. Clark whether he would be willing to consider an all-party resolution condemning such attacks. He said that "the support of this entire House for those Congressmen [who are also opposed to the rebels] would be very helpful in bringing to an end this type of interference in the affairs of Nicaragua...."¹⁶ Mr. Clark replied:

I think the consequences of an action of that kind may indeed be counter-productive. It may complicate rather than achieve the goal of the Hon. Member....I think it is intolerable that projects of this kind...are the subject of that kind of attack and I am going to see if there are practical steps we can take.¹⁷

Liberal member Roland de Corneille called upon Mr. Clark to put the action before the United Nations as an act of terrorism and called upon the Government to ask the US to cease such attacks.¹⁸ At the end of June, Mr. Allmand specifically asked Mr. Clark what he had said to the US Secretary of State on the matter and also asked if Mr. Clark was ready to facilitate a House resolution condemning attacks on civilian projects. Mr. Clark replied that he was awaiting further details from the US Secretary of State and stated:

...I was shocked by the attack upon a Canadian aid project that involved, among other things, the loss of life of children. There should be no doubt in the minds of the United States Government about the abhorrence on the part of Canadians of actions of that kind.¹⁹

Conservative member Benno Friesen told Mr. Clark that the Conservative Party had been banned in Nicaragua and that the International Red Cross was

¹⁵ Commons Debates, 1 June 1987, p. 6593.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Commons Debates, 4 June 1987, p. 6730; 25 June 1987, p. 7599.

¹⁹ Commons Debates, 29 June 1987, p. 7746.

still being banned from the El Chipote prison in Nicaragua. He asked Mr. Clark to look into these matters and make representations protesting the situation to Nicaragua. Mr. Clark replied that he would look into the matter and would ask Nicaragua to give the Red Cross access to the prison.²⁰

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²⁰ Commons Debates, 5 June 1987, pp. 6773-4.

29. CYPRUS

Background

Cyprus, a Crown Colony of the United Kingdom since 1925, became an independent country in 1960. Under the 1960 agreements power was to be shared between the Greek majority (78 per cent of the population) and the Turkish minority (18 per cent). Britain retained two military bases on the island.

Fighting between the two communities broke out in 1963 when the Greek-Cypriot president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios III, presented a memorandum to Turkish-Cypriot Vice President Kuchuk proposing constitutional changes to replace the existing power-sharing arrangements with a unitary state and majority rule. These proposals were rejected by Turkish-Cypriots, and fighting between the two communities erupted on 21 December. A United Nations force (UNFICYP) was created in 1964 to restore and maintain peace on the island. It remains in Cyprus today.

On 15 July 1974, units of the Greek-Cypriot National Guard, supported by the military régime in Athens and led by Greek officers, overthrew President Makarios in a bid to force enosis (union with Greece). Violence erupted between the National Guard and Makarios supporters in the Greek-Cypriot community, and opponents of the coup were imprisoned and/or executed. Fearing the annexation of the island by Greece, Turkish forces landed in Cyprus on 20 July and occupied the Nicosia-Kyrenia corridor, later extending their control over the northern forty per cent of the island after negotiations broke down in August 1974. The Turkish invasion and the intercommunal fighting that followed forced 150,000 - 200,000 Greek- and 60,000 Turkish-Cypriots to flee their homes and resettle in the de facto partitioned zones on the island. UNFICYP forces were subsequently redeployed to form a buffer zone between the two communities along the ceasefire line. The Turkish Federated States of Kibris was created shortly

thereafter on 11 February 1975.

Numerous UN-sponsored talks have taken place since 1975 in an attempt to resolve the Cyprus dispute. Although at times both comprehensive and specific accords have been within reach, major disagreements remain. Greek Cypriots favour a bi-communal federation with the size of each territorial component and the organization of the federal government reflecting the demographic character of Cyprus; a federal government possessing substantive rather than merely ceremonial powers; freedom of movement and economic activity throughout the island; and, responding to the security fears of the Turkish-Cypriot community, the demilitarization of the island and the creation of a United Nations police force created for internal security. Turkish Cypriots prefer a loose bi-zonal confederation with strong state governments under the exclusive control of the two ethnic communities; provisions to maintain the Turkish-Cypriot majority in the north; and guarantees, possibly including a symbolic Turkish presence, for the viability of the new state.

In November 1983 Turkish Cypriot authorities unilaterally declared independence for their sector and renamed it the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The UN Security Council rejected this declaration of independence, reaffirming resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975) calling for an independent and unified Cyprus, and restating its support for UNFICYP and the Secretary-General's good offices in mediating the dispute. Only Turkey, which is believed to maintain approximately 20,000 troops in the north, recognizes the TRNC.

'Proximity talks' between the two communities resumed in 1984 under the guidance of UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, but have failed to resolve the impasse. The latest UN plan, presented in April 1986, called for the creation of a bi-zonal federation on the island. The TRNC tentatively accepted the plan, but President Kyprianou, speaking for the

Greek community, rejected the draft, maintaining that it did not provide sufficient guarantees for freedom of movement, work and settlement, or a timetable for the withdrawal of Turkish troops.

Current Canadian Position

The Government of Canada has supported UN efforts to mediate the dispute and reconcile the two communities in Cyprus. To this end, Canada contributes approximately 500 armed forces personnel to UNIFICYP to guard against a renewal of hostilities. The Government reiterated its commitment to this peacekeeping mission in its response to the report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, maintaining that the "continuing Canadian contribution helps to create an atmosphere in which differences can be resolved peacefully...[thereby contributing] to stability in the Eastern Mediterranean."¹

Parliamentary Comment

The issue was not raised in the House of Commons.

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30. HUMAN RIGHTS

Background

Since the mid-1970s, four international instruments have addressed human rights issues: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, and for the countries of Europe and North America, the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).

The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights covers labour, social security, education, and cultural rights. The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocol covers the right to life, freedom from torture and arbitrary arrest, equality before the law, and freedom of movement and expression. Both Covenants entered into force in 1976. This was also the year that the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination came into force. The Helsinki Final Act, which contains provisions for the protection and promotion of human rights, (economic, social, cultural, civil and political) entered into force in 1975.

Adherence to the International Covenants and to the Convention is monitored by UN agencies, particularly by the General Assembly (Third Committee), the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), the Human Rights Committee and the International Labour Office. Adherence to the Helsinki Final Act is monitored through the periodic meetings of the CSCE.

Since the ratification of international legal instruments in the human rights field has both domestic and foreign policy implications, and since human rights come under provincial jurisdiction, the Federal Government has worked with the provinces to formulate Canadian policies in this field. Several features have characterized Canadian policy since the mid-1970s.

After ratifying the international instruments including the Optional Protocol, Canada has encouraged other governments to follow suit. Canada has made efforts to improve UN machinery for human rights work, and has been active on committees such as the Working Group for the Disappeared. The Government has also promoted the development of new instruments such as the International Convention against Torture, which came into force in August 1985. Finally, although it has emphasized themes rather than individual cases in its human rights advocacy, Canada has spoken out bilaterally against certain governments' violations of human rights.

From 7 May to 17 June 1985 Canada hosted the first Human Rights Experts Meeting of the CSCE. The sessions focussed on the implementation of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. While pursuing a thematic approach and avoiding confrontation, Canadian representatives nonetheless criticized those member governments which continued to deny their citizens such rights as the right to emigrate, to form free trade unions, to practice their religious faith, and to form human rights monitoring groups. Canada defended the principle that human rights were not solely a matter of domestic jurisdiction.

On 23 August 1985 Canada signed the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

On 5 March 1986 the Chairman of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, Gordon Fairweather, made a statement to the UNHRC on behalf of the Canadian Government. He reiterated Canada's support for the establishment of the position of High Commissioner for Human Rights. He registered Canada's "strong support for the ongoing efforts of the Secretary-General to develop administrative measures which may assist in averting...mass displacements of populations."¹

¹ DEA, Statement, 86/19, 20 Mar. 1986.

Several weeks later, in an address to the Canadian Human Rights Foundation, Mr. Clark suggested that the Government is striving to develop "a universal policy of support for human rights, with special attention focussed on those human rights situations where our standing is strongest and the impact of our involvement is likely to be the greatest." Mr. Clark sounded a note of caution, however, on the use of sanctions to project Canada's human rights policy.²

At the closing session of the Experts Meeting on Human Contacts of the CSCE in Berne on 26 May 1986, the Canadian delegation expressed its disappointment with adherence to certain human rights provisions in the Helsinki Final Act:

We do not really lack documents of standards of performance...what we lack is compliance by certain signatory States. Our more profound disappointment stems from the fact that our bilateral talks, our formal discussions in our meetings, and, finally, our negotiations, have failed to reveal any new willingness by some States to make real, substantial headway in facilitating freer movement and contacts and the resolution of humanitarian cases.³

Current Canadian Position

Speaking to the 41st Session of the UN General Assembly, on 24 September 1986, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, pointed out that several members of the United Nations were violating the most basic human rights. He cited Afghanistan and South Africa as examples of this.⁴ The strongest statement on Afghanistan was made, however, on 5 November by Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN Stephen Lewis, who gave various

² DEA, Statement, 86/20, 26 Mar. 1986.

³ DEA, Statement, 26 May 1986.

⁴ DEA, Statements and Speeches, 24 Sept. 1986.

examples of human rights violations which had taken place in that country and declared:

The Afghanistan tragedy is one of the most difficult and gloomy realities of contemporary international politics. When you look at it, year over year, it presents an unbroken facade of intractability.⁵

Speaking on the same day in Vienna, at the Conference on Security and Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, Mr. Clark emphasized once again that several of the countries attending the conference "had failed to respect a fair number of the undertakings which they had made at Helsinki and Madrid" and that in some cases the situation had deteriorated since 1975. Mr. Clark believed that countries must take practical steps to give a clear indication of their intention to honour these undertakings and that this was an essential condition if the Vienna meeting were to have any success in re-establishing an atmosphere of confidence.⁶

The Government's response to the report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations was made public in December 1986; the report, had been tabled in the Commons on 26 June 1986. The Government indicated its willingness to help developing countries establish their own democratic institutions and set up machinery to promote respect for human rights, and stated its support for the establishment of an International Institute of Human Rights and Democratic Development. Canada's development assistance policy would continue to take account of gross violations of human rights but the government did not wish to give undue weight to human rights violations where these did not fundamentally jeopardize the delivery of assistance to those most in need.⁷

⁵ DEA, Statement and Speeches, 5 Nov. 1986. p. 5.

⁶ DEA, Statement and Speeches, 5 Nov. 1986.

⁷ Canada's International Relations, Dec. 1986, p. 25.

As far as South Africa was concerned the Government was exploring additional avenues of assistance to support black social, economic and political institutions. It also believed in expanding the dialogue with high-level representatives of black political organizations, including the African National Congress. Prime Minister Mulroney's trip to Southern Africa in 1987, where he met the leaders of the Front Line States, was in accordance with this policy.

Finally on 24 June 1987, Joe Clark announced Canada's ratification of the UN Convention against Torture which it signed in August of the previous year. Amendments to the Canadian Criminal Code, making torture as defined by the Convention a crime under Canadian law, entered into force on 1 June 1987.⁸

Parliamentary Comment

Several members of parliament drew attention to violations of human rights in the hope of influencing the Government's foreign policy. Members of all three parties insisted on the importance of maintaining pressure on the Soviet Union to abide by the Helsinki agreement. Several members maintained that Canada should pay more attention to human rights in its relations with the Soviet Union, by denouncing the lack of freedom of religion, and the problems encountered by Jews who wished to emigrate.⁹ Satisfaction was expressed concerning the freeing of one hundred and fifty Soviet dissidents including, Andrei Sakharov, Yuri Orlov, and Jossif Begun.¹⁰

The persecution of the Bahai, a religious minority which is outlawed in

⁸ DEA, Communiqué, 24 June 1987.

⁹ Commons Debates, 14 Oct., p. 329; 21 Oct., p. 583; 28 Oct., p. 848; 5 Nov., p. 1089; 27 Nov., p. 1586, 12 Dec. 1986, p. 2047; 4 Mar., p. 3805; 9 Mar., p. 3948, and 1 May 1987, p. 5625

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 7 Oct. 1986, p. 144; 19 Dec. 1986, p. 2287; 17 Feb. 1987, p. 3518.

Iran by the constitution, also gave rise to questions in the Commons. Liberal members Bob Kaplan and Sheila Finestone urged the Government to speak out at the United Nations condemning the atrocities being committed against the Bahai.¹¹

Reference was also made to the increase in religious and ethnic violence in the Indian sub continent¹² and to the increase in human rights violations in El Salvador.¹³ New Democrat Dan Heap asked the Government to stop giving \$8 million in aid to El Salvador.

Finally Canada's aid to Indonesia was questioned because of reported massacres in East Timor. Liberal member Roland de Corneille asked: "How can the Government continue to ignore the fact that Indonesia has invaded East Timor with 40,000 troops and is conducting 'Operation Extinction' which is tantamount to genocide."¹⁴

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, replied:

...the Canadian ambassador in Indonesia was invited to visit East Timor to see conditions for himself. He believes the arguments which have been made by various groups are exaggerated."¹⁵

In reply to a question from NDP member Pauline Jewett concerning Canadian arms exports to Indonesia, Mr. Clark added:... "I am satisfied that there are not massive violations of human rights."¹⁶

¹¹ Commons Debates, 6 Nov. 1986, p. 1134; and 21 Nov., p. 1395; 9 Dec. 1986, pp. 1134, 1395, 1919.

¹² Commons Debates, 15 Dec. 1986, p. 2101.

¹³ Commons Debates, 3 Dec. 1986, p. 1731.

¹⁴ Commons Debates, 17 Feb. 1987, pp. 352-3. See also: 4 Mar., p. 3806; 7 Apr. 1987, p. 4958.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

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31. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Background

Since 1985 international terrorism has become a major policy concern for Western governments, partly because of a general increase in terrorist attacks and also as a result of the US-Libyan confrontation in the spring of 1986.

Throughout 1985 there were a great many violent incidents, bombings, hijackings of both planes and a cruise ship (the Achille Lauro), and attacks on airports. The most frequent targets were the United States, particularly US servicemen, and Israel. The incident, however, which involved the greatest loss of life was that of the Air India flight originating in Canada which exploded in mid-air on 22 June 1985. Several groups claimed responsibility for these various incidents, among them, the Shi-ite Amal militia of Lebanon, the Palestinian Abu Nadal group, and Communist activist groups in Belgium, Germany and Portugal (For further details see last year's Guide).

In response to this wave of attacks, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a landmark resolution on terrorism on 9 December 1985. The resolution "unequivocally condemns, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed".¹ After repeated US entreaties for concerted action on terrorism, the European Economic Community agreed, on 28 January 1986, to ban all arms sales to states clearly implicated in supporting terrorism.

In early 1986 Libya became the focus of Western and particularly of US concern over terrorism. US-Libyan hostilities peaked with the bombing of a discotheque in West Berlin on 5 April 1986 and the US retaliatory attacks on two Libyan cities on 14 April.

¹ UNGA, Fortieth Session Resolutions, Resolution 40/61, pp.607-609.

At the conclusion of the Tokyo Economic Summit on 5 May 1986 the heads of government of the seven leading Western economies (Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, West Germany and the United States) released a joint statement strongly condemning international terrorism, urging determined national and international action to combat terrorism and pledging to take strong measures against states supporting these practices. These commitments supplemented those entered into by Western governments in the Bonn Summit Declaration of 1978.

At meetings of the North Atlantic Council, the foreign ministers have repeatedly condemned terrorism and expressed their resolve to combat it jointly. At the May 1986 meeting of the Defence Planning Committee the ministers "resolved to work together to eradicate this scourge and urge[d] closer international co-operation in this effort."²

The main international incident in late 1986 was an attack on the synagogue in Istanbul. During 1987 there were fewer violent incidents although hostage taking continued in Lebanon, the victims being American, French or British nationals.

Canada has not been immune to terrorist attacks. On 12 March 1985 a guard was killed during the siege of the Turkish Embassy by members of the Armenian Revolutionary Army. A bomb which exploded at Narita airport, Japan and the bomb which may have destroyed the Air India jetliner on 22 June are believed to have been planted in Canada. Finally, on 25 May 1986 an attempt was made to assassinate Punjabi Minister Malkiad Singh Sidhu on Vancouver Island, allegedly by four members of the Sikh community.

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations recommended, in its final report, that airport security and border control

² NATO Press Service, "Final Communique", No.M-DPC-1(86)15, 22 May 1986.

be improved to deal with terrorism in Canada. (Steps to improve airport security had already been taken in January 1986) It also recommended that the Government "work through the United Nations" by, for example, striving "to engage the support for a UN Security Council resolution to deny countries harbouring terrorists the right to invoke their sovereignty to prevent international action."³

Current Canadian Position

Canada has strongly condemned international terrorism on several occasions and terrorist attacks whether inside or outside Canada have given rise to debate. The Air India tragedy gave rise to particular concern in Ottawa. In his address to the UN General Assembly on 25 September 1985, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark suggested that "terrorism must be dealt with in more detail by the UN" and noted that Canada would "actively seek, through new international instruments if necessary, to deal effectively with this scourge."⁴ On 4 December 1985, Canada ratified the UN Convention against taking hostages.⁵

Finally, on 31 January 1987, in the course of a visit to London, Mr. Clark joined with the British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe in declaring that the West must not simply respond to terrorist attacks but must develop a long-term strategy for preventing them.⁶ On 6 June 1987, at the conclusion of the Venice Economic Summit the seven participating states (Britain, Canada, France, Italy Japan, West Germany and the United States) released a statement strongly condemning international terrorism and calling for increased co-operation in accordance with international law

³ SJCCIR, Independence and Internationalism, 1986, pp.63-64.

⁴ DEA, Statements and Speeches, 25 Sept. 1985.

⁵ DEA, Communiqué, 85/184, 4 Dec. 1985.

⁶ Globe and Mail, 31 Jan. 1987.

against those states which sponsored or supported terrorism. They reaffirmed their determination to combat terrorism both through national measures and through international co-operation. The statement supplemented the commitments contained in the Tokyo Declaration of 1986.

Parliamentary Comment

The Commons has not discussed the question of terrorism at any length since the summer of 1986. However, on 10 October 1986 Conservative member Bob Pennock did intervene to welcome a Canadian resolution which the International Civil Aviation Organisation had passed, unanimously labelling terrorist attacks on airports an "international crime".

This resolution requires countries to arrest and prosecute terrorists suspected of attacking airports anywhere in the world regardless of where they are arrested. Suspected terrorists would be sent to other signatory countries, even if no extradition treaty exists. This is another positive step forward in the fight against international terrorism.⁷

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⁷ Commons Debates, 10 Oct. 1986, p. 275.

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32. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Background

The offensive which Iraq launched against Iran on 23 September 1980, appears to have been motivated by a desire to forestall the spread of Islamic fundamentalism to the Iraq Shi-ites (who form 60 per cent of the population) and to regain territory ceded to Iran in the 1975 Algiers Agreement. In addition to frontier disputes tension had arisen between the two countries because of ethnic problems, rival nationalisms (Persian versus Arab), religious antagonisms (Shia versus Sunni) and the struggle for political supremacy in the region.

Until 1982 Iraq occupied a large section of adjoining Iranian territory. Nonetheless from 1981 on, at a time when Baghdad was beginning to lose its strategic advantage, the Iraqi head of state, Saddam Hussein, declared himself in favour of a conditional cease-fire. Iran then demanded, and continues to demand, unacceptable conditions for ceasing hostilities, involving Saddam Hussein's withdrawal from politics and several billions of dollars in reparations. The following year saw an important change in tactics when Iran launched its first mass offensive, which succeeded in breaching the frontier. This led to the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from virtually all the Iranian territory which they had previously occupied. Iraq responded by attacking economic targets inside Iran.

In 1983 the conflict showed no sign of solution and merchant shipping and oil tankers passing through the Persian gulf began to suffer from aerial bombardment. By May 1987 it was estimated that 314 oil tankers had been attacked.

The following year Iran launched a series of offensives on the southern front as a result of which it succeeded in acquiring almost all the oil fields in the Majnoun Islands. In the meantime both governments had been

accused of violating the Geneva Convention in their treatment of prisoners of war and their frequent bombing of civilians - a practice in which both sides indulged. Furthermore, the United Nations conducted an enquiry and issued a report confirming that chemical weapons had been used both in 1984 and 1985; a year later Iraq was identified as the country which had done this. It did not, however, respond to the Secretary-General's attempts to have this practice stopped.

In 1986 Iran launched the "Kerbala 5" offensive. The Iranian crossing of the river Chat Al-Arab, its natural frontier with Iraq, was followed by the occupation of the town of Fao which made possible an offensive against Basra, Iraq's second largest city. Baghdad once again attacked the oil complex on the island of Khary as well as that on the island of Sirri, thus reducing Iran's exports. In May 1987 Iraq attacked, apparently accidentally, the American frigate STARK in the Persian Gulf with an Exocet missile. Thirty seven members of the crew were killed. The United States lodged a strong protest and soon after announced that Kuwaiti oil tankers travelling through the Gulf would be under US protection.

Several organisations and several countries have made successive attempts to bring about an end to the conflict, but efforts by United Nations, the Non Aligned Movement and the Islamic Conference Organisation, have met with failure. The UN Secretary General's efforts at mediation did, however, lead to the suspension of attacks against civilians for nine months in 1984, and to an agreement on the treatment of prisoners of war. In the course of a speech on 4 August, 1986, the Secretary-General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, expressed his concern that the conflict might spread.¹

The Iran-Iraq conflict which to date has caused more than a million deaths seems no nearer a solution. If Iraq has an advantage in terms of military equipment, Iran on the other hand has the benefit of vast human resources.

¹ UN Chronicle, Nov. 1986, vol. XXIII, no. 5, p. 77.

In July 1987 the UN Security Council unanimously voted to ask the two belligerents to observe a cease-fire immediately and to withdraw behind their internationally recognised frontiers. The Security Council threatened to take further measures if they refused.

At the beginning of the war several Arab countries supported Iraq, including Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania, Yemen, Egypt and the Gulf States. Their help generally took the form of financial assistance or loans. Only two Arab countries have supported Iran - namely Syria and Libya. In May 1981 the Gulf States formed the Gulf Council for Co-operation, in the hope of enforcing collective security.

From the beginning of the conflict both the United States and the Soviet Union have declared themselves neutral. Moscow, however, is Iraq's principal arms supplier (deliveries were interrupted in 1980 and 1981), followed by France and Brazil. Iran relies on the international arms market, its main suppliers being Israel, North and South Korea and China, as well as Syria and Lybia. According to SIPRI at least twenty six countries have by now sold arms to both sides at once, either through their governments or private companies.²

In November 1986 press reports, subsequently confirmed in US congressional hearings and elsewhere, indicated that the United States had supplied Iran with military equipment with the help of Israel. The alleged aim of this operation, which the Reagan Administration had been carrying out for more than a year and a half, was to obtain the freedom of the American hostages in Lebanon and to improve US relations with Iran.

² SIPRI, Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook 1986, London, Oxford University Press, 1987.

Current Canadian Position

The Canadian Government has stressed the importance of achieving a negotiated settlement to the conflict and has expressed the hope that Iran will accept the Iraqi proposal. It has condemned the attacks on civilian population centres and the use of chemical weapons and has urged the two belligerents to accept the recommendations of the UN Experts Report on the treatment of prisoners of war.

In November 1986 it was reported that Pratt and Whitney had delivered helicopter parts to Iran which could be used for military purposes. This was made possible by the new Export Policy, announced in September, which modified the regulations concerning the export of strategic material to certain countries, including Iran.

Parliamentary Comment

Questions were asked in the Commons during November and December 1986 about Pratt and Whitney's export of helicopter parts to Iran. The opposition questioned the claim that these were only for commercial use. On 18 November, the deputy Prime Minister, Don Mazankowski, gave a reply which summed up Conservative policy on this matter:

...we were assured by Pratt & Whitney that the parts in question were for civilian commercial use. That undertaking was reaffirmed in a letter to the Canadian Government. Furthermore, on September 10 the Secretary of State for External Affairs announced a new export control policy and drew attention to the fact that the area of helicopters is one that provides some difficulty because of the interchangeability of the use of helicopters from commercial to military service. As a result, the Minister drew that question to our

attention. It is a matter which is being considered currently by Cabinet.³

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³ Commons Debates, 18 Nov. 1986, p. 1277.

33. THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT

Background

The 1985 Accord between Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) raised some hopes that progress towards resolving the conflict between Israel and its neighbours might be possible. But by February 1986 the initiative, like the Reagan Plan in 1982 and the Fez Charter in 1983, had failed to produce constructive dialogue between Israel, the PLO and the surrounding Arab states.

The Accord reached between King Hussein of Jordan and PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat, on 11 February 1985, called for the establishment of an international framework for negotiations, including a joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation, leading to Palestinian self-determination in the context of a confederation with Jordan. The Accord did not, however, mention UN Security Council Resolution 242 which, inter alia, recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Israel. One week later the PLO Executive Committee issued a communiqué rejecting Resolution 242, reiterating its demand for an independent Palestinian state and its claim to be the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people".

When US Secretary of State Shultz visited the Middle East in May 1985, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres indicated that his government was willing to meet with a joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation that did not include members of the PLO. For its part the United States welcomed the Accord and announced its readiness to meet with a joint delegation if this led to direct negotiations with Israel.

When King Hussein visited Washington later in May 1985 to discuss the sale of US arms to Jordan, he announced a five-stage plan which included a meeting between the United States and a Jordanian/Palestinian delegation,

US endorsement of Palestinian self-determination, PLO acceptance of Resolution 242 and US dialogue with the PLO followed by multilateral negotiations. Two weeks later Israel announced its own peace plan, which called for negotiations between Israel, the US, Egypt, Jordan and non-PLO Palestinians. Lists of potential Palestinian representatives were exchanged in July, but agreement could not be reached on the presence of PLO members in the delegation.

The Middle East was discussed at the US-Soviet Geneva summit in October 1985, but no fresh proposals were advanced. In November King Hussein travelled to Damascus where he met with Syrian President Hafez Assad. Syria's consistent opposition to Jordanian-Israeli discussions which might leave the problem of the Golan Heights unresolved was reflected in the communiqué issued after the Damascus meeting, which rejected direct negotiations and partial solutions to the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Attempts to bring Israel and the Palestinians to the negotiating table were pursued nevertheless. In January 1986, the US Government agreed to invite the PLO to an international forum if the PLO would renounce terror and accept Resolution 242. When King Hussein brought this offer to Yassir Arafat, the PLO Chairman indicated that he could only accept Resolution 242 if Washington stated its support for Palestinian self-determination. Discussions continued until 19 February 1986 when King Hussein publicly blamed the PLO for the breakdown of the peace process and announced the suspension of Jordanian mediation efforts.

The meeting between Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres in Alexandria, on 11-12 September 1986, raised hopes for renewed efforts toward a Middle East peace settlement. The summit, the first between Egyptian and Israeli leaders in five years, temporarily resolved one outstanding dispute dividing the two countries - the ownership of Taba, a strip of beach along the Red Sea - by referring the matter to

arbitration. Both leaders pledged to revive the comprehensive peace process, and declared 1987 as a year of negotiations for peace. The return of an Egyptian ambassador to Israel, Dr. Mohammed Bassiouny, was also announced (Egypt had withdrawn its ambassador after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982).

The following month witnessed a change of leadership in Israel. On 20 October, Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir was sworn in as Prime Minister replacing Shimon Peres (who became Foreign Minister) in keeping with the September 1984 coalition agreement. Shamir's return to this office - he held the post from October 1983 to September 1984 - signalled a hardening of the Israeli position toward peace.

Tensions in the region were heightened following a grenade attack on 15 October 1986, after a swearing-in ceremony for recruits of the élite Givati Brigade. Three grenades were tossed into the crowd, killing one man and wounding 65 others. Three groups claimed responsibility for the attack - the Democratic Front for the liberation of Palestine, Abu Nidal's Al-Fatah-Revolutionary Council, and the PLO. The PLO claim was issued from Cairo, prompting the Israeli Foreign Ministry to summons the Egyptian Ambassador the following day to lodge a protest.

On 16 October Israel retaliated for the Jerusalem attack with air and naval strikes against suspected PLO bases in the Palestinian district of Mieh Mieh on the eastern outskirts of Sidon.

Palestinian leaders in the territories maintained that the demonstrations were a reaction to provocations by Israeli military authorities - for example, the manning of checkpoints at Arab universities. Some Western observers believed the protesters were inspired by PLO successes in its fight against the Shiite militia Amal in south Lebanon, infusing Palestinian youth with a renewed sense of defiance.

Discussion of an international peace conference threatened to split the fragile Israeli coalition government in February-March 1987. During a visit to the United States, Prime Minister Shamir maintained that an international conference could not substitute for direct talks between Egypt, Israel, Jordan and representatives of the Palestinians living in the territories. His position conflicted with that expressed by US Secretary of State Shultz who stated that any approach, including an international conference, leading to direct negotiations between Arabs and Israelis should be explored. While Shamir was in the United States, Foreign Minister Peres travelled to Egypt for meetings with Egyptian President Mubarak. He expressed his continued support for an international conference that would serve as a brief prelude to direct negotiations, and tried to narrow differences with Egyptian officials regarding Soviet participation, the duration of the conference, and Palestinian representation. Peres returned to Israel with a joint pledge to push for an international conference in 1987 leading to direct negotiations among the parties.

Current Canadian Position

The Government of Canada has consistently supported the independence and integrity of Israel within secure and recognized boundaries. However, it does not accept the extension of Israeli jurisdiction over the Holy City of Jerusalem. The legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to a homeland in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, currently occupied by Israel, are recognized and the Government maintains diplomatic contact with the PLO at a less-than-ambassadorial level - formal recognition of the PLO is conditional on the latter's acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 with its implicit recognition of Israel's right to exist, and its renunciation of terrorism. Pending a settlement of the Palestinian question, the Government contributes to refugee support through the United

Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East.

Two resolutions on the Israeli-Arab situation were presented at the United Nations General Assembly on 2 December 1986. Resolution 41/43 on the Question of Palestine had four subsections. Section A endorsed the work of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and called upon them to continue their work and report to the Secretary-General as appropriate. The resolution passed by a vote of 121-2-21. Canada abstained.

Section B of 41/43 also dealt with the Palestinian Committee and invited all governments to co-operate with the Committee. It passed by a vote of 125-3-18 with Canada joining Israel and the United States in voting against. Section C requested the Department of Public Information to continue its special information programme on Palestine. It passed by a vote of 124-3-191 with Canada again voting against.

Section D called for a preparatory committee to be set up within the framework of the Security Council to work towards convening an international peace conference on the Middle East. In previous years Canada had voted against this resolution but this year the government changed its vote and abstained. The resolution passed by a vote of 123-3-19.

Resolution 41/162 entitled "The Situation in the Middle East" was divided into three sub-sections. Part A condemned Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Arab territories, as well as Israeli administration of the Golan Heights, and called upon all states to stop the flow of military, economic, financial and technological aid to Israel. The vote passed by a vote of 104-19-32. Canada voted against the resolution. Part B was similar in nature to Part A and called upon all states to cease all

dealings with Israel. Canada voted against. The resolution passed by a vote of 90-29-34. Part C of the resolution determined that Israel's imposition of its laws and administration on Jerusalem was illegal and not valid and deplored the transfer of diplomatic missions to Jerusalem by some states. The resolution passed by a vote of 141-3-11 with Canada voting in favour.

In explaining the vote on Resolution 41/43D in the House of Commons, the Secretary of State of External Affairs, Joe Clark stated:

...the proponents of the resolution have moderated their language to the point where Canada no longer opposes the resolution. Canada continues to encourage direct negotiation between the parties to the dispute and believes that there are circumstances in which an international conference could facilitate such direct talks.¹

During a visit by the Crown Prince of Jordan to Canada, Mr. Clark reiterated the Government's support for an international peace conference and praised Jordan's leaders for their work in this area. He stated:

Canada strongly supports these efforts. Such a conference...must provide...a settlement which not only recognizes the right of Jordan, Israel and all other states in the region to live at peace within secure and recognized boundaries, but also the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to a homeland in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.²

Parliamentary Comment

On 4 December 1986, Liberal member Lloyd Axworthy questioned the change in the Government's vote on United Nations General Assembly Resolution 41/43 D (see above). Axworthy questioned whether this abstention represented a

¹ Commons Debates, 4 Dec. 1986, p. 1789.

² DEA Statement, 87/32, 2 June 1987.

major shift in Canadian policy away from support for bilateral talks between the Arabs and Israel. Mr. Clark responded that the wording of the resolution had been changed and that as a result Canada was no longer opposed.³ (See above)

Reacting to the violence in the occupied territories during December 1986, Conservative member Alex Kindy called upon the Government to "support the call for an immediate international conference on Palestine so as to correct the long-standing injustices to the Palestinian people."⁴

NDP member Svend Robinson praised the Secretary of State for External Affairs for his denial of diplomatic accreditation to general Amos Yaron as Israel's military attaché to Canada. Mr. Robinson recalled that "an Israeli inquiry found that Yaron was well aware that more than 700 Palestinian civilians were brutally murdered by Christian militiamen in the Sabra and Shatila camps in Lebanon, and commended the Minister "for his courage in taking this step" which he acknowledged is not done very often.⁵

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³ Ibid.

⁴ Commons Debates, 12 Dec. 1986, p. 2046.

⁵ Commons Debates, 5 Mar. 1986, p. 3851.

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34. LEBANON

Background

In February 1984, Lebanese President Gemayel abrogated the May 1983 agreement with Israel which had sanctioned an Israeli security presence in Southern Lebanon. Later that spring, all US, British and Italian contingents of the Multinational Force withdrew from Beirut. The unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in early 1985 clearly established a shift in power towards Syria and the Shia community within Lebanon. By mid-1987, however, this had failed to produce agreement on the reforms necessary to end the twelve-year war.

Although the last phase of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon was completed in July 1985, Israeli forces continued to operate in a security zone in support of the South Lebanese army. Israel thus retained the right to intervene in Lebanon; a right which it has exercised on several occasions by bombarding Palestinian camps in both South and North Lebanon, particularly after July 1986.

At the end of September the UN Security Council passed a resolution requiring the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon.

In Tyr hundreds of demonstrators expressed their support for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL, and denounced the attacks against it. This force had been set up in 1978 to supervise the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, restore peace and security and help the Lebanese government to re-establish its authority in South Lebanon.

In October 1986 there was particularly bitter fighting in Beirut, Tyr and Sidon between the Palestinians and the Shi-ite Amal militia. In early December efforts by Iran and the leader of the Amal, Nabih Berri, to reach a cease-fire intensified but the Palestinian guerillas refused to give up

their positions and fighting continued. In February 1987 Syrian troops entered West Beirut in response to an appeal from Muslim leaders and put an end to Amal's siege of the Palestinian camps. Syria thus ended, at least temporarily, the war of the camps between the Lebanese Shi-ite, the Palestinians and the Druze (Progressive Socialist Party).

On 1 June 1987 the Lebanese Prime Minister, Rachid Karamé was killed when the helicopter which was taking him to the North of Lebanon was attacked. Two separate groups claimed responsibility for the incident.

In Canada, the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, released in June 1985, contained some observations on Canadian-Lebanese relations. It noted that the previous Government had opposed the 1982 Israeli invasion of the country and had called for a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon. The Committee suggested that "a continued Syrian presence might, in fact, assist temporarily in maintaining internal security in Lebanon. In some respects Syria may be the only power left in Lebanon capable of restoring some order and unity to the country." Finally, the Committee expressed its support for "any efforts the Canadian Government is able to make to promote Lebanon's territorial integrity."¹

Current Canadian Position

On 14 June 1985 the Government decided to withdraw all Canadian staff from the Embassy in Beirut, citing the risks to which they were exposed. Mr. Clark emphasized that "this measure in no way affects Canada's continuing strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon" or for international efforts to bring to a conclusion the recurrent

¹ The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on Canada's Relations with the Countries of the Middle East and North Africa, 1985, pp. 71-73.

violence in Lebanon."²

On 28 November 1986, in a speech to the UN General Assembly on the situation in the Middle East, Ambassador Stephen Lewis reminded the Assembly that:

Undoubtedly some of Lebanon's problems are indigenous....But...it is a victim of the generalized malaise which has afflicted the Middle East....It is a victim of tensions in the region and the interference in Lebanon's internal affairs which these have engendered.

Lewis added:

...Canada calls upon all members of this Assembly to give their strongest support to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon. We must give every encouragement to a political solution which will result in true national reconciliation in that war-torn country.³

Parliamentary Comment

On 11 February 1987 Liberal member Roland de Corneille referred to a United Nations account of the alarming living conditions in the Palestinian refugee camps which were under seige. He asked the Government to request that

...Stephen Lewis, our Ambassador to the United Nations, request an immediate investigation of this situation and ensure that the appropriate international agencies be provided access to determine whether civilians are starving, and to provide food if that is the case.⁴

² DEA, Communiqué, 85/81, 14 June 1985.

³ DEA, Statements, 86/76, 3 Dec. 1986.

⁴ Commons Debates, 11 Feb. 1987, p. 3319.

The following day Liberal member Warren Allmand and Conservative member Bob Corbett raised the subject again and urged the Government to do all it could to ensure that the victims received relief assistance.⁵ On 13 February, in reply to a question by Conservative member Reginald Stackhouse as to what Canada might do to help the refugees, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, replied that there were limits to what Canada could do about the situation but that they were encouraging Syria to do all that it could to get medicine and food to the refugee camps.⁶

Responding to questions about the re-opening of the Canadian Embassy in Beirut, Mr. Clark stated:

We took the decision to close our embassy there because we thought it was not safe to maintain it open. Circumstances in Lebanon have not changed since that decision was taken.⁷

He added that the Government would consider setting up an immigration operation with the British embassy or another embassy in Beirut, to enable Lebanese to come to Canada.⁸

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⁵ Commons Debates, 12 Feb. 1987, p. 3362.

⁶ Commons Debates, 13 Feb. 1987, p. 3412.

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⁸ Ibid.

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35. LIBYA

Background

Although the extent to which the Government of Libya is responsible for Middle Eastern terrorism is unclear, there is little doubt that since 1969 Libya has given material support and sanctuary to certain groups using terrorist tactics in Europe, in the Middle East and in North Africa. Such support for terrorism, in addition to Libya's military occupation of northern Chad, has increased tensions between Tripoli and governments in the West.

Tensions with the United States have been particularly acute since the Reagan Administration took office. The United States challenged Libya's unilateral claim to the Gulf of Sidra as territorial waters, its forces downing two Libyan planes after Libyan fighters fired on US interceptors over the Gulf on 19 August 1981. When Libyan troops moved into Chad in 1983, the United States and France jointly provided military support to Chad government forces. The shooting of a policewoman by a Libyan diplomat outside the Libyan Mission in London, on 8 May 1984, led Britain to break off diplomatic relations with Tripoli. The wave of terrorist activities following the formation of the Pan-Arab Command in March 1985 (consisting of Libya, Iran and Syria), particularly the 23 November 1985 highjacking of an Egyptair jetliner and the attacks on El Al counters at the Rome and Vienna airports on 27 December 1985, further heightened tensions between Libya and the West.

On 24 March 1986, the United States reported that Libyan forces had fired six surface-to-air missiles on US forces carrying out exercises in the Gulf of Sidra. US forces responded by disabling two Libyan naval vessels and by attacking ground missile facilities on the coast.

A bomb exploded in a West Berlin discotheque frequented by US servicemen

on 5 April. American officials claimed to have conclusive evidence showing Libyan sponsorship of the attack. That day France expelled two Libyan diplomats allegedly planning attacks on US targets in the country and two days later West Germany also expelled two Libyan diplomats.

On 12 April US naval ships in the Mediterranean were put on alert and, on the following day, the United States Ambassador to the UN, Vernon Walters, travelled to Europe to organize concerted action against Libya. After a special meeting in The Hague on 13 April, European Community foreign ministers announced new measures against Libya and urged all parties to the confrontation to exercise restraint. Several hours later, US fighter-bombers flying from bases in Britain attacked targets in Tripoli and Benghazi. Britain, Canada, Israel and South Africa expressed varying degrees of support for the US action.

The following week the European Community agreed to impose further sanctions on Libya, again urged all belligerents to exercise restraint, and called for international action to combat terrorism. At the Tokyo Summit on 5 May, the leaders of Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United States and the West Germany announced a package of measures against terrorism, noting that these applied "in respect of any state which is clearly involved in sponsoring or supporting international terrorism, and in particular of Libya...."¹

The US Government sought to maintain pressure on Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi throughout the summer of 1986. An article published in the Washington Post on 2 October revealed that the Administration had conducted a disinformation campaign intended to destabilize the Qaddafi regime. A Presidential directive signed by Ronald Reagan in August had authorized selective leaks to the foreign press emphasizing Qaddafi's continuing

¹ Original statement printed in the New York Times, 6 May 1986.

terrorist activities, his vulnerability to internal opposition, and the imminence of new US military action. Lacking specific guidelines for the execution of this campaign, Administration officials had passed the disinformation to the US press, and a story based on this first appeared in the Wall Street Journal on 25 August. The disclosure of this attempted deception put a strain on the Administration's credibility in its dealings with the domestic press.

Libyan fortunes in Chad worsened in the late fall of 1986 when the rebel forces of Goukhouni Oueddei defected to the Government of Chad following the wounding and detention of their leader in the Libyan capital on 30 October. The newly united forces of Chad then launched an offensive to dislodge the 7000 Libyan troops occupying the northern part of the country; they received logistic and material support from France and the United States including a US\$15 million shipment of weapons and ammunition announced by the Administration on 18 December. By early January 1987, Government forces had recaptured several important towns in the north, inflicting heavy losses on Libyan forces. Libya responded to these setbacks on 4 January by bombing two towns south of the 16th parallel - the line set by France in 1983 effectively partitioning Chad into Libyan- and Government-controlled zones - and by doubling its forces in Chad to 14,000. The following day, Qaddafi acknowledged for the first time the presence of Libyan forces in Chad, explaining that "several hundred" troops had entered that country to free Libyan technicians allegedly held prisoner. The Chadian victories continued and in late March and early April the Libyans suffered severe defeats and fled from their strongholds in northern Chad leaving behind large quantities of equipment most of which originated in the Soviet Union. Since then there has been little fighting. The Libyans are believed to be consolidating their position in the Aozou strip, an area of border territory which Libya claims, but which is generally recognised as belonging to Chad.

Current Canadian Position

The Government of Canada has had very limited relations with Libya since the 1970s. The Government has not opened an embassy in Tripoli, has not accepted Libyan ambassadorial representation in Ottawa, and restricts the entry of Libyan students into Canada. In January 1986, further restrictions were applied to commercial relations with Libya.

The Government gave guarded approval to the 13 April 1986 US military strike against terrorist facilities in Libya prompting considerable debate in the House of Commons. Although Canadians living in Libya appeared to be in no immediate danger of retaliation, the Government advised them to leave the country and maintained contingency plans for their evacuation.

Parliamentary Comment

The question of Libyan activities was not raised in the House of Commons.

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36. SOUTH AFRICA

Background

In November 1983 the white community in South Africa voted in favour of a new constitution which extended limited political representation to those classified under apartheid as Indians and coloureds. The new constitution established a tricameral parliament with one chamber each for the Indian and coloured peoples, but gave the white chamber the power to override its counterparts and denied any political representation to blacks, who constitute almost three quarters of South Africa's population. Elections were held under the new system in 1984, but the voter turnout was exceptionally low. Protests against the new constitution, school boycotts, and protests against local Government structures and economic hardships spread throughout non-white residential areas.

Unrest continued through 1985. On 21 July the Government imposed a state of emergency throughout most of the country. A week later it banned outdoor funerals. In August the Congress of South African Students was banned and President Botha announced that he was opposed to the implementation of a one-man one-vote political system. In November the Government prohibited foreign news agencies from reporting on township violence.

Protest inside South Africa was accompanied by an increase in South African pressure against the Front Line States (Neighbouring States). In March 1984 Mozambique and South Africa signed the Nkomati Accord, whereby Pretoria agreed to stop supporting the Mozambiquan National Resistance while Maputo pledged to close African National Congress (ANC) facilities on his territory. In September 1985, however, Pretoria admitted to technical violations of the Accord. Similarly, the non-aggression agreement reached with Angola in January 1984 was violated by Pretoria in May, June and September 1985.

Other Front Line States also felt the weight of South African pressure. Those developments provoked a reaction in the West and in the summer of 1985 all EEC members recalled their ambassadors from Pretoria, and France and the United States imposed limited economic sanctions. At the October 1985 Meeting in Nassau, the Commonwealth Heads of Government agreed to sanctions against South Africa (notably a ban on new investment and agricultural imports) and they decided to form an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to promote dialogue and seek a peaceful solution to the increasingly volatile situation in Africa. There were seven members in the Group: Archbishop Ted Scott of the Anglican Church of Canada; the former Australian prime minister, Malcolm Fraser; General Olusegun Abansanjo of Nigeria; Lord Barber, a former British Chancellor of the Exchequer; Nita Barrow, Barbados permanent representative at the United Nations; John Molecela a former Tanzanian member of Parliament and Sanhar Swasan Singh, an Indian minister.

Initially it was hoped that this Commonwealth initiative might lead to constructive dialogue between the Government and black opposition organizations. The Eminent Persons Group presented the South African Government with proposals for the release of Nelson Mandela and the legalization of the ANC, the suspension of ANC paramilitary activities and the initiation of dialogue leading to the establishment of a non-racial democratic government. In February 1986, in response to internal and external pressure South Africa announced some limited reforms including the abolition of pass-books for the blacks. But, on 19 May 1986, as the Group was finishing its discussions in the country, South African commandos carried out attacks on alleged ANC centres in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The Group left South Africa immediately. In its report to the Commonwealth Heads of State on 12 June, the Group concluded that:

while the Government claims to be ready to negotiate, it is in truth not yet prepared to negotiate fundamental change, nor to countenance the creation of genuine democratic structures, nor to face the prospect of the end of white domination....Its programme of reform does not end apartheid, but seeks to give it a less inhuman face.

Efforts to increase pressure on South Africa received a new lease of life when the Commonwealth Heads of Government, who had sponsored the EPG, met in London from 3-5 August, 1986. Six of the seven (the exception being Britain) agreed to impose additional sanctions such as a ban on bank loans and on imports of uranium, iron, coal and steel. They also decided to withdraw various consular services. In the autumn of 1986 the United States, Japan and the European Community also agreed to impose restrictions which would limit trade or investment with South Africa as well as to sever other links. Nonetheless these measures were far less stringent than those which the six Commonwealth countries had wished to see imposed on an international basis. As the US Congress was voting in favour of these economic sanctions, several US firms withdrew from South Africa, in accordance with the policy announced in 1985. By November 1986 more than seventy firms had abandoned their South African interests in the course of two years. At that point there were still fifteen Canadian companies which maintained substantial operations in South Africa.

In the meantime Pretoria had taken steps to impede the operations of two important anti-apartheid organisations within South Africa. The United Democratic Front was forbidden to accept assistance of any kind coming from abroad and 100,000 black workers from Mozambique, a country which Pretoria believed to be sympathetic to the African National Congress, were forced to leave South Africa when their contracts expired.

On 11 December South Africa announced new restrictions on the freedom of the press and a system of censorship was set up in several areas which prohibited the release of information about political agitation whether by local journalists or foreign correspondents. During the same period the

South African Government rejected a proposal to hold multi-racial elections for a local parliament in Natal.

On 20 February 1987 the United States and Great Britain vetoed a resolution in the Security Council of the United Nations which would have imposed sanctions on South Africa similar to those approved by the US Congress. Ten countries voted in favour of the resolution, while France and Japan abstained. Parliamentary elections in May for the white chamber returned Botha's National Party to power and gave the pro-apartheid Conservatives twenty extra seats which were lost by the Progressive Liberals.

Canada has opposed apartheid since Prime Minister Diefenbaker participated in the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth in 1961. Government support for bilateral trade was curtailed in 1977 and 1978, and an active aid programme to the Front Line States has been developed through the Canadian International Development Agency. A voluntary Code of Conduct for Canadian companies operating in South Africa was established in 1978.

Finally, in 1985, the government undertook a complete review of Canadian policy towards South Africa. As a result, a series of measures were brought into force, in addition to those agreed to at Nassau. These included stronger enforcement of the voluntary Code of Conduct, the suspension of recent government projects encouraging trade and investment in South Africa, and pressure on financial institutions to refuse loans to South African government agencies.

Canada has also been critical of South Africa for its behaviour in Namibia. At the end of World War I South Africa was given a mandate to administer South West Africa, a former German Colony. In 1966, however, the United Nations General Assembly declared that this territory should be administered by the UN with a view to gaining its independence. A year later it declared that the territory should henceforward be known as

Namibia. South Africa refused to comply with the UN decision and it tried to suppress the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) which the General Assembly had recognized as Namibia's authentic representative. Both the UN and the International Court of Justice have condemned South Africa on several occasions and in 1977 a Namibia Contact Group was set up in an endeavour to reach a solution. The Group consisted of the five Western members of the Security Council, including Canada. After some initial progress, however, its efforts came to nothing and South Africa continues to maintain its presence in Namibia and has made its withdrawal conditional on Cuban troops being withdrawn from Angola. On this point it is supported by the United States. Canada has joined the other members of the UN in condemning South Africa's behaviour and supporting the Security Council Resolutions on Namibia. In 1985 the Canadian Government made several statements on Namibia but there have been no significant developments since. (For a fuller account of this matter see the 1985-86 Guide).

Current Canadian Position

In 1986 Canada introduced further economic measures against South Africa, some of which it undertook along with fellow members of the Commonwealth. The Government announced the end of Canadian Government procurement of South African goods, a ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa, and the allocation of an additional \$2 million to existing programmes for the education and training of blacks in South Africa. It also tried to persuade Britain to join other members of the Commonwealth in imposing economic sanctions.

On 6 November 1986 Conservative member, Walter McLean, made a speech on apartheid to the 41st General Assembly of the United Nations. In dealing with various aspects of the South African situation he recalled the words of the Secretary-General who had said in his annual report:

Apartheid is in reality far more than a problem of human rights abuse. It is a problem with tenacious racial, political and economic roots - one that jeopardises the stability and security of an entire region.

Speaking of the measures which Canada had taken concerning South Africa Mr. McLean continued:

Our vision of the sanctions we have thus far put in place centres upon psychology and change, not punishment or destruction. Such measures are not an end in themselves. Before it is too late, they are intended to induce Pretoria to see the light and to dismantle apartheid and negotiate the establishment of a truly representative government.¹

In December 1986, in its response to the report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations, the Government said that in the meantime it preferred "a step by step approach to the imposition of limited sanctions" which would "strike at apartheid without destroying the South African economy on which the blacks depend". As far as its development programme was concerned the Government "was exploring other avenues of assistance to support black, economic and political institutions".² The Government believed that expanding dialogue with high-level representatives of black political organisations in South Africa should be part of a Canadian strategy to encourage the dismantling of apartheid.

In January 1986 Prime Minister Brian Mulroney visited Zimbabwe and Senegal. During his stay in Zimbabwe he paid a brief visit to Zambia. he also held a meeting with three leaders of the front-line states, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, and Quett Masire of

¹ DEA, Statements and Speeches, 6 Nov. 1986.

² DEA, Canada's International Relations, Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Special Joint Committee, Dec. 1986, p. 77.

Botswana. Pressed by his hosts to accept the need for violent action against South Africa Mr. Mulroney reaffirmed the need for a peaceful, negotiated resolution of racial conflict but said that he nonetheless recognised the validity of the reasons which led his hosts to support violence. While in Africa he undertook to impose further sanctions on South Africa, to try to persuade President Reagan, Prime Minister Thatcher and other Western leaders to take drastic economic measures against South Africa, and to meet the president of the African National Congress, Oliver Tambo.

A month later, while on a visit to Asia, Joe Clark, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, said that the Government might break off diplomatic relations with South Africa if the latter persisted in the policy of apartheid.³ Mr. Clark did not discount that further sanctions would be imposed on South Africa in October, when the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting took place in Vancouver.

On 28 February 1987, in a speech to the Canadian Council for International Co-operation in Montreal, Mr. Clark expressed satisfaction that world opinion was hardening on apartheid. Referring to sanctions he said:

If there has been some movement recently it is partly because sanctions have been introduced. The question now becomes what further sanctions will be effective, at what pace in the company of what other measures.

A little later he added:

As has been noted, the world's purpose is to bring South Africa to its senses, not to its knees. We are seeking to change an evil social system, not cripple a strong economy. Canada would welcome more trade with a South Africa free of apartheid.⁴

³ Citizen, 5 Feb. 1987

⁴ DEA, Statement 87/11, 28 Feb. 1987.

In the fall of 1986 several resolutions concerning South Africa were put before the General Assembly of the United Nations. Canada voted for two of these, one dealing with the work of the Special Committee on apartheid (Resolution 41/35 D) and the other calling for united international action to end apartheid (Resolution 41/35 H). It either abstained on the other resolutions or voted against them. Some of the resolutions to which Canada objected contained references to armed struggle and to assisting the liberation movements (Resolution 41/35A); others involved accusations against particular Western states, as in Resolution 41/35 C, or called for mandatory sanctions as in Resolution 41/35 F on the Imposition of an Oil Embargo and Resolution 41/35 B.⁵

Parliamentary Comment

In the debate on the speech from the throne, on 3 October 1986, the leader of the New Democratic Party, Ed Broadbent praised the Prime Minister's attitude towards South Africa:

I have not the slightest doubt about the depth and sincerity of his conviction expressed once again here today and about how much he loathes the institution and practice of apartheid.⁶

This did not prevent several NDP members, however, from raising a number of difficult questions.

On 6 October Pauline Jewett (NDP) asked:

What further assistance Canada might give the front line states which of course will be very damaged by the absence of grain imports from the United States if South Africa refuses to accept grain imports, since most of those imports went to the front line states.⁷

⁵ DEA, Explanation of votes, Item 33, reply to query by R. Stackhouse, M.P., 10 Nov. 1986.

⁶ Commons Debates, 3 Oct. 1986, p. 57.

⁷ Commons Debates, 6 Oct. 1986, p. 108.

Mr. Clark replied by referring to Canada's position at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in London where

...the Prime Minister of Canada volunteered that Canada would be prepared to be active in providing direct financial support to those front line states, although he said that he would prefer it if we were able to act in concert with other countries of the Commonwealth.⁸

In reply to a question by NDP member Les Benjamin about whether Canada would help to upgrade ports and railway lines to the Indian Ocean coast of West Africa in order to help the trade of the front line states. Mr. Clark replied that the Government was certainly prepared to consider such measures.⁹ South Africa's firing of tens of thousands of Mozambique workers gave rise to a question by NDP member Dan Heap, who ended by saying:

I now call upon the Government to raise Mozambique immediately from the lowest CIDA category for bilateral aid to the highest category, to reinstate CIDA humanitarian and technical aid to the African National Congress, and to rally other like-minded Governments and multilateral organizations to co-ordinate a response to South African aggression.¹⁰

On 22 October, Liberal member Sheila Copps and NDP member Howard McCurdy criticised Air Canada for flouting both Canadian and US sanctions by providing transportation for a tour to South Africa.¹¹ Mr. McCurdy asked the Government to issue clear directives to crown corporations not to trade with South Africa. He later argued that sanctions which were at present voluntary should be made mandatory and should be backed up by suitable penalties to ensure that they were enforced.¹²

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., p. 109.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 16 Oct. 1986, p. 417.

¹¹ Commons Debate, 22 Oct. 1986, pp. 612-16.

¹² Commons Debates, 24 Oct. 1986, p. 705.

Mr. Clark replied: "It is my view that for a variety of reasons it is preferable for us to proceed with voluntary measures which, by and large, have proved effective". He added that Air Canada officials were studying international regulations to see how these affected their position.¹³

On 18 and 20 November, NDP member John Rodriguez, asked about the Falconbridge Nickel Mines decision to reinvest \$31.6 million in a South African firm, Western Platinum, and questioned the effectiveness of voluntary guidelines for investment in South Africa.

Mr. Clark replied:

I very much regret that action of Falconbridge which I think defied Canadian Government policy. I have expressed my regret at that action. When the Deputy Minister met with the president of Falconbridge yesterday he re-expressed that and the president of Falconbridge indicated that Falconbridge intends to divest of its holdings in South Africa as quickly as it can.

He added that:

I think there is abundant evidence that voluntarism has been working. The Falconbridge example is a bad one and we trust that it will be changed.¹⁴

On 3 December, in reply to a question, the Secretary of State for External Affairs reaffirmed that Canada had no intention of providing military aid to the region although it intended to continue and increase its aid to Zambia, Zimbabwe and other front line states and to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).¹⁵

¹³ Commons Debates, 24 Oct. 1986, p. 705.

¹⁴ Commons Debates, 20 Nov. 1986, p. 1363.

¹⁵ Commons Debates, 3 Dec. 1986, p. 1740.

On 14 April 1987 Conservative member, Bill Attewell spoke of the complexity of the situation in South Africa and said that the Canadian Government rejected the concept "that total isolation of South Africa would somehow promote fundamental reform in that country. Racist mentalities feed on isolation. We, therefore, must maintain diplomatic relations with that country!"

He added later:

There is no doubt sanctions can and do serve an important symbolic purpose....this does not mean that such a course should be taken to its extreme, aside from the fact that we may be harassing economically the very people we are trying to help.¹⁶

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¹⁶ Commons Debates, 14 Apr. 1987, pp. 5171-72.

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Appendix 1

Canadian Treaty Obligations*

The Geneva Protocol of 1925

(The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare)

Signed by Canada: 17 June 1925 (Geneva).

Ratified: 1930?

For Canada the following provision applies:

The Protocol is binding on this state only as regards states which have signed and ratified or acceded to it. The Protocol will cease to be binding on this state in regard to any enemy state whose armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

United Nations Charter

Signed: 26 June 1945.

Ratified: 9 November 1945.

Entered into force for Canada: 9 November 1945.

North Atlantic Treaty

Signed: 4 April 1949, Washington, D.C.

Ratified: 3 May 1949.

Entered into force: 24 August 1949.

Partial Test Ban Treaty

(The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. Also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty or the Limited Test Ban Treaty.) Signed by the United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom on 5 August 1963 in Moscow.

Signed: 8 August 1963.

Ratified: 28 January 1964.

Entered into force: 10 October 1963.

* in the defence arms control and disarmament field

Outer Space Treaty

(Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies).

Signed: 27 January 1967.

Ratified: 10 October 1967.

Entered into force: 10 October 1967.

Non-Proliferation Treaty

Prohibits non-nuclear weapon signatories from acquiring nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon signatories from giving nuclear weapons or their technology to non-nuclear weapon states. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 12 June 1968. Signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968. Canada also has a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency as required by the NPT.

Signed: 23 July 1968.

Ratified: 8 January 1969.

Entered into force for Canada: 5 March 1970.

Sea-bed Treaty

(Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof). Approved by the United Nations General Assembly 7 December 1970.

Signed: 11 February 1971.

Ratified: 18 May 1972.

Entered into force: 18 May 1972.

Biological Weapons Convention

(The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction). Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 19 April 1972.

Signed: 10 April 1972, London, Moscow, Washington.

Ratified: 18 March 1972.

Entered into force for Canada: 26 March 1975.

Enmod Convention

(Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques).

Signed: 18 May 1977, Geneva.

Ratified: 11 June 1981.

Entered into force: 5 October 1978.

Inhumane Weapons Convention

(Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects).

Signed: 10 April 1981.

Ratified: not ratified by Canada.

Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

Signed: 26 September 1986, Vienna.

Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

Assistance for Nuclear Accidents

(Convention on assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency).

Signed: 26 September 1986, Vienna.

Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

Appendix 2

The Canadian Armed Forces

1. Personnel (end 1985)

Regular Forces	83,910
Primary Reserve	25,548
Supplementary Reserve and Cadet Instructors List	29,305
	<u>138,763</u>

<u>Command</u> ¹	<u>Regulars</u>	<u>Reserves</u>	<u>Civilians</u>	<u>Total</u>
Maritime	9,625	3,850	6,725	20,200
Mobile	17,883	17,445	5,959	41,287
Air	22,575	949	7,866	31,390

¹ Major commands only; totals do not correspond to personnel strength listed above.

2. Functional and Regional Commands

<u>Command</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>
Maritime	Halifax, Nova Scotia
Mobile	St.-Hubert, Quebec
Air	Winnipeg, Manitoba
Canadian Forces Europe	Lahr, F. R. Germany
Canadian Forces Communication Command	Ottawa, Ontario
Canadian Forces Training System	Trenton, Ontario
Northern Region	Yellowknife, NW Territories

3. Naval Forces - Maritime Command, Fleet Strength

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
Patrol Submarines	3
Destroyers	4
Frigates	16 (3 reserve)
Replenishment Ships	3
Tanker, Small	1
Research Vessels	3
Patrol Vessels/Training Ships	7
Gate Vessels	5
Reserve Tenders	14
Tugs	14
Auxiliaries	25
	<hr/> 95

4. Land Forces - Mobile Command and Canadian Forces Europe, Major Equipment

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
Tanks	114 Leopard C-1
Armoured Fighting Vehicles-Reconnaissance	174 Lynx 195 Cougar
Armoured Personnel Carriers	961 M-113 269 Grizzly
Artillery (Howitzer)	12 Model 44 (L-5) pack 105 mm 190 towed 105 mm 50 M-109 Self-Propelled 155 mm
Anti-tank Weapons	
Recoilless Rifles	787 Carl Gustav 84 mm
Anti-tank Guided Weapons	149 TOW
Air Defence	
Guns	57 L-40/60 40 mm
Surface-to-air Missiles	111 Blowpipe

5. Air Forces - Air Command and Canadian Forces Europe, Major Equipment

Type	Number
Fighter	24 CF-116-A (Northrop F-5A) 25 CF-116-D (Northrop F-5D)
Electronic Countermeasures	56 CF-18D (F/A-18A/B Hornet)
Maritime Reconnaissance	2 CF-101 Voodoo
	18 CP-140 Aurora
	22 CP-121 Tracker
Transport	28 CC-130E/H Hercules
	5 CC-137 (Boeing 707)
	7 CC-109 Cosmopolitan
	8 CC-144 Challenger
	1 CC-132 (DHC-7R Ranger)
	8 CC-138 Twin Otter
	11 CC-115 Buffalo
Training	4 CC-117 (Mystere-Falcon 20)
	17 CT-133 Silver Star
	111 CT-114 Tutor
	20 CT-134 Musketeer
	2 CC-129 (DC-3)

Type (Helicopters)

Anti-Submarine Warfare	35 CH-124 Sea King
	38 CH-135 Twin Huey
	36 CH-136 Kiowa
	7 CH-147 Chinook
Transport	13 CH-113/A Labrador/Voyageur
	9 CH-118 Iroquois
Training	14 CH-139 (Bell 206)

6. Canadian Forces Europe

a. Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBC) - Headquarters: CFB Lahr, F. R. Germany

Unit Formation	Unit Name	Base
Armoured Regiment	The Royal Canadian Dragoons	CFB Lahr
Mechanized Infantry Battalions	2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry 1 ^{er} Battalion du Royal 22 nd Regiment	CFB Baden-Soellingen CFB Lahr
Artillery Regiment	1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery	CFB Lahr
Engineer Regiment	4 Combat Engineer Regiment	CFB Lahr
Helicopter Squadron	444 Tactical Helicopter Squadron	CFB Lahr
Air Defence Units	128 Airfield Air Defence Battery 129 Airfield Air Defence Battery	CFB Baden-Soellingen CFB Lahr
Headquarters & Signal Units	4 Mechanized Brigade Group Headquarters and Signal Squadron	CFB Lahr
Support Units	4 Service Battalion 4 Field Ambulance 4 Military Police Platoon	CFB Lahr CFB Lahr CFB Lahr
Communications Units	CFE Communication Group Headquarters Communication Squadron Communication Squadron	CFB Lahr CFB Lahr CFB Baden-Soellingen

b. Canadian Air Group Headquarters: Lahr, F. R. Germany

Fighter	409 Tactical Fighter Squadron	CF-18	CFB Baden-Soellingen
	439 Tactical Fighter Squadron	CF-18	CFB Baden-Soellingen
Headquarters Unit	Headquarters 1 CAG		CFB Lahr
Support	1 Air Maintenance Squadron		CFB Baden-Soellingen

Appendix 3

Participation of Canadian Forces in Peacekeeping Operations (1972-86)*

	UNTSO	UNMOGIP	UNFICYP	UNCMAC	ICSC	ICCS	UNEF II	UNDOF	UNIFIL	MFO
1972	20	17	580	2	6					
1973	20	17	530	2	1	240 a	1000+			
1974	20	17	480-July 2 790-Dec.	2	b		900+	130 c		
1975	20	9	515	2			850	150		
1976	20	9	515	2			1050 (UNEF II + UNDOF) 1042 (UNEF II + UNDOF)			
1977	20	9	510	2						
1978	20	1	515	1			880	172	120 d	
1979	20	e	515	1			865 f	220		
1980	20		515	1				220		
1981	20		515	1				220		
1982	20		515	1				220		
1983	20		515 g	1				221		
1984	20		515	1				224		
1985	20		515	1				224		140
1986	22		515	1				235		137

* Average number of Canadian soldiers during the year

Source: Annual Defence Publications, Department of National Defence

a June-July 1973

b withdrawn 15 June

c 6 UNTSO not included

d March-October 1978

e 1 aircraft transport twice yearly

f withdrawn by year's end

g augmented by 35 engineers April-July

UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation, Palestine
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group, India-Pakistan
UNFICYP	United Nations Force in Cyprus
UNCMAC	United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission, Korea
ICSC	International Commission for Supervision and Control, Vietnam
ICCS	International Commission of Control and Supervision, Vietnam
UNEF 11	United Nations Emergency Force, Middle East
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, Middle East
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers, Sinai Peninsula

Appendix 4

Public Opinion

A large number of public opinion polls concerning international affairs and Canadian defence and foreign policy issues were conducted in Canada between July 1986 and July 1987. The following is a summary of how Canadians responded to questions involving issues of national and international interest.

Canadian Defence Policy

The release of the Canadian Government's White Paper on national defence in June generated considerable interest in the public's views on defence policy. A key issue was public support for the purchase of nuclear-powered submarines for the Canadian Armed Forces. In a poll commissioned by the Department of National Defence and conducted by Decima Research Ltd in March 1987, 1,000 Canadians were asked to respond to the following statement:

If Canada is to build submarines to defend Canadian sovereignty in the Atlantic and the Pacific and particularly in the Arctic, most experts feel that these submarines would have to be nuclear-powered--although they would not be armed with nuclear weapons--to do the job effectively.

Some people say that if the submarines need to be nuclear-powered in order to do the best job then we should go ahead and build that type of a submarine.

Others say that we should under no circumstances build submarines which are nuclear-powered.

Which one of these two points of view best reflects your own?

Of those polled 59 per cent responded that Canada should build nuclear-powered submarines, while 40 percent felt Canada should not build nuclear-powered submarines under any circumstances.

In a related question, as to "...how Canada should react to the possibility that both Russian and American submarines are currently patrolling under the ice in Canadian Arctic waters without Canadian consent..." the results were as follows:

	<u>Response</u>
- Canada should rely on the US submarine forces to provide security under the ice in Canadian Arctic waters.	12%
- Canada should build its own submarine force to patrol our Arctic waters.	45%
- We should both build our own submarines and rely on the Americans for further support in this area.	32%
- We should not take any new action to respond to this situation.	9%

Questions dealing with the submarine issue were also asked in a Toronto Star poll in June 1987 and a Globe-Enviro-nics poll conducted between May 25 and June 10, 1987.

In the Toronto Star poll, 42 per cent of 1,000 Canadians said yes, while 55 per cent answered no, to the question:

Should Canada buy nuclear-powered submarines to defend Canada's claim to the Arctic?

In the Globe-Enviro-nics poll, 2,033 Canadians were asked:

The Government is thinking about buying 10 nuclear-powered submarines to protect our sovereignty in the North. Do you approve or disapprove of this idea?

The survey found that 50 per cent of the respondents approved of the plan, 39 per cent disapproved, and 11 per cent had no opinion.

Another issue addressed in the polls was Canadian membership in NATO and NORAD. The DND-Decima poll asked respondents to grade Canadian involvement in the NATO alliance in terms of it being a good idea for Canada.

Responses were as follows:

Very poor:	3%
Poor	: 7%
Fair	: 19%
Good	: 51%
Very good:	19%

Opinions as to whether Canada's agreement with the United States to defend North America was a good idea broke down as follows:

Very poor:	3%
Poor	: 7%
Fair	: 19%
Good	: 48%
Very good:	22%

Asked by a Toronto Star poll whether Canada should stay in NATO, 81 per cent believed Canada should stay and 15 per cent believed Canada should get out.

A wide range of other questions concerning Canadian defence issues were asked. From the Toronto Star poll, 33 per cent answered yes and 66 per cent no to a question, as to whether Canada's military should be armed with nuclear weapons.

The DND released the results of two other questions from their poll concerning the role and the financing of the Canadian Armed Forces.

Asked to rate six possible roles or functions of the armed forces in order of priority respondents replied as follows:

	<u>Should be very high/high priority</u> %	<u>Should be top priority</u> %
Peacekeeping & emergency aid	82	32
Guarding sovereignty	77	14
Defence Preparedness	75	21
Economic and Technological Development	75	9
Training Young Canadians	70	10
Preventing Soviet Aggression Around the World	67	13

To a question as to whether outdated equipment should be replaced so that Canada could live up to its international commitments, or this should not be done because of economic difficulties even at the risk of weakening Canadian defences, the reply was as follows:

- | | |
|------------------------------|----|
| - should spend more money | 70 |
| - shouldn't spend more money | 30 |

Canadian Foreign Policy

Opinion on issues related to Canadian independence and Canada-United States relations was revealed in a number of polls throughout the year. In November 1986, Gallup interviewed 1,036 people asking:

In your opinion are the views expressed by Canada
its own independent views, or do you think they are
unduly affected by the views of other countries?
If unduly affected, what country are you thinking of?

Over two-thirds of the respondents, 68 per cent, felt Canada's views were unduly affected while 24 per cent believed Canada expressed independent views; 8 per cent expressed no opinion. The United States was seen as the country affecting Canadian views by 59 per cent of those polled, Britain by 1 per cent, other countries by 5 per cent, and 2 per cent didn't know.

A Decima poll of 2,000 people conducted in April and sponsored by the Canadian Government found that 50 per cent of those polled say:

...the Canadian Government does not push its own
point of view strongly enough with the United
States.

In May 1987 another Gallup poll of 1,040 people showed that 34 per cent thought Canada and the United States were getting closer together; 36 per cent believed they were drifting apart; 15 per cent felt things were about the same and 15 per cent had no opinion. The same question as to whether the two countries were drawing closer together was asked of Americans in the United States and resulted in the following breakdown: 31 per cent believed the two nations were getting closer; 28 per cent believed they were drifting apart; 9 per cent saw no change; and 32 per cent had no opinion.

An Angus Reid and Associates poll conducted in November 1986 and published in the Reid Report found 59 per cent of Canadians polled believed Canadian foreign policy was "too pro-Reagan", while 27 per cent felt it was sufficiently independent; 14 per cent of respondents were unsure. The Reid Report also queried Canadians over their support for cruise missile testing in Canada and found that 60 per cent of Canadians opposed the policy allowing tests, and 34 per cent supported it.

In a question with implications for the issue of purchasing nuclear-powered submarines, Gallup asked 1,026 Canadians if they were aware of the Northwest Passage and if so, whether they knew what it was or thought it should be part of Canada. Of the respondents who knew of the Passage 85 per cent thought it was or should be part of Canada's territorial waters. 37 per cent of those asked were not aware of the Passage.

In an April, 1987 poll of 1,011 people sponsored by the Department of External Affairs (DEA) 46 per cent mentioned issues broadly related to war and peace as being of greatest personal concern; poverty and hunger was of greatest concern to 21 per cent. Asked to attach priority to specific issues, respondents listed international peace, Canadian independence, acid rain, arms control, and Canada-US relations in that order. They believed that in practice Canada attached highest priority to Canada-US relations, acid rain, Canadian independence, international peace, and Third World hunger and poverty. They perceived Canada to be most effective in dealing with Canada-US relations, Third World poverty and hunger, Canadian independence, international peace and international co-operation in the UN and other multilateral organizations.

In regard to Canada-US relations the DEA poll found that 72 per cent of respondents viewed relations between the two as good or better; 54 per cent had seen no change in relations over the past year while 25 per cent saw a worsening and 19 per cent an improvement. Sixty-seven per cent believed

Canada should pursue independent policies even if this led to problems in relations with the US, and 74 percent did not think Canada pushed its own point of view strongly enough.

In regard to "Canadian sovereignty" 56 per cent of those polled were aware of the phrase and nearly all could define it in terms of independence and control. Of these respondents, 60 per cent perceived threats to Canadian sovereignty (about 33 per cent of the total number polled) and 56 per cent perceived the threat as emanating from the US. The US was perceived by 58 per cent of respondents as threatening Canada's "legal right" to the Canadian Arctic while 37 per cent perceived the USSR as doing so.

International Affairs

Canadian opinion on a number of global concerns was recorded by pollsters during the year. In a Macleans-Decima poll, Canadians were asked:

What if the choice came down to being governed by
the Soviet Union or risking a nuclear war?

In response, 42 per cent chose nuclear war, 50 per cent chose Soviet rule, and 7 per cent had no opinion. To a similar question asked in 1962 by Gallup, 65 per cent of respondents chose nuclear war, 11 per cent Soviet rule, and 24 per cent were undecided.

In a question related to the Reagan-Gorbachev October Summit in Reykjavik the Maclean's poll asked respondents to gauge the outlook for an arms control agreement. Forty-nine per cent felt an agreement was more likely following the Summit while 48 per cent believed it was less likely. Asked whether the President should have given up the Star Wars project in order to get an arms-control pact, 40 per cent replied yes and 55 per cent said no.

The Reid Report also investigated Canadian perceptions of the threat of nuclear war and superpower relations. Thirty-seven per cent of respondents believed the risk of nuclear war had increased in recent years; 14 per cent believed they lived in a safer world and 46 per cent felt there had been no change in the risk of a nuclear war.

Asked as to whether they perceived an accidental/error or a deliberately caused nuclear war as the more likely scenario, 53 per cent chose accidental/error and 36 per cent chose deliberate intent. Respondents were then asked to choose which superpower they perceived as being more likely to start a nuclear war with the following results:

<u>Respondents Choosing Accidental</u>		<u>Respondents Choosing Deliberate</u>
Soviet Union	25%	30%
United States	23%	25%
Both	18%	11%
Neither	10%	9%
Other	8%	13%
Unsure	16%	12%

In a follow-up question to the Reykjavik summit, Reid asked:

Last month, US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met in Iceland to discuss peace and disarmament. Which of these two leaders do you personally think has done the most towards ensuring lasting peace between the two countries?

Thirty-four per cent of respondents believed Reagan had done the most, 25 per cent Gorbachev, 9 per cent chose both, 17 per cent neither, and 15 per cent did not know.

On the subject of East-West relations the DEA poll found that almost half of the respondents felt there had been no change in the last year while 48 per

cent perceived an improvement. Fifty-four per cent saw the USSR under Gorbachev as a freer society. About 50 per cent chose "lack of trust between East and West" as the cause of tensions and 75 per cent said the main concern of both the US and the USSR is "increasing its power and influence in the world".

Canadians believed arms control and human rights were the most important issues in Canada-USSR relations. Just over 50 per cent of respondents felt the existence of nuclear weapons made war more likely and 59 per cent said current practices and new developments in nuclear weaponry increased this risk. Seventy-one per cent believed progress toward arms control agreements would be made in the future.

In regard to South Africa the poll found 44 per cent of respondents to be aware of "measures" taken by Canada to persuade South Africa to dismantle apartheid. Thirty-seven per cent of those polled felt Canada should "do more" to oppose apartheid, 45 per cent believed Canada was doing "enough", and 15 per cent said Canada should "do nothing". Fifty-eight per cent preferred limited sanctions of the type Canada has imposed while 26 per cent preferred total sanctions.

The DEA poll found 60 per cent of respondents to be unconcerned about the situation in Nicaragua and 66 per cent felt uninformed about the Central American region generally. Of those who were concerned about Nicaragua, 39 per cent selected human rights abuses as a specific concern, followed by refugee flows to Canada - 34 per cent; the possibility of US military intervention - 28 per cent; and expansion of Soviet and Cuban interference - 26 percent. Sixty-three per cent viewed poverty and injustice as the cause of tensions in Central America, while 22 per cent blamed the USSR and Cuba, and 13 per cent the United States. In answering how Canada could deal with the problems in Central America, more than half believed it should have some "arms-length" involvement, for example, by actively supporting the efforts of Central American nations to find a peaceful solution themselves (86 per cent) or increasing economic assistance (60 per cent).

Appendix 5

Strategic Nuclear Balance

United States

launchers	warheads	yield (Mt)	total warheads
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ICBMs

Minuteman II	450	1	1.20	450
Minuteman III	240	3	0.17	720
Minuteman III 12A	300	3	0.33	900
MX	10	10	0.30	100

SLBMs

Poseidon C3	256	10	0.04	2560
Trident C4	384	8	0.10	3072

Bombers

B-52 G	167
B-52 H	96
B-1B	15

Strategic Nuclear Balance

Soviet Union

launchers	warheads	yield (Mt)	total warheads
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ICBMs

SS-11	448	1	1.00	448
SS-13	60	1	0.60	60
SS-17	150	4	0.75	600
SS-18	308	10	0.50	3080
SS-19	360	6	0.55	2160
SS-25	72	1	0.55	72

SLBMs

SS-N-6	304	1	1.00	304
SS-N-8	292	1	0.80	292
SS-N-17	12	1	1.00	12
SS-N-18	224	7	0.20	1568
SS-N-20	80	9	0.50	720
SS-N-23	32	7	0.25	224

Bombers

Bear B/C/G	100
Bear H	40
Bison	20

